A COGNITIVE REVISION OF THE FG TREATMENT OF ILLOCUTION[1]

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ABSTRACT. *In the present paper, we carry out a revision of Dik's Functional Grammar illocutionary component from the point of view of Cognitive Linguistics (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987). We argue for a cognitive continuum between grammatical and pragmatic illocutions and we look into those mental constructs (i.e. image-schemas, cognitive models) which underlie the production and understanding of illocutionary acts.*

KEYWORDS. *Functional Grammar, Cognitivism, Illocutionary Acts.*

RESUMEN. *En este artículo pretendemos llevar a cabo una revisión del componente ilocutivo de la Gramática Funcional de S. Dik desde la perspectiva de la Lingüística Cognitiva (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987). Proponemos la existencia de un continuo conceptual entre las ilocuciones gramaticales y las pragmáticas y analizamos la base esquemático-imagística y los modelos proposicionales que subyacen a la producción e interpretación de los actos ilocutivos.*

PALABRAS CLAVE. Gramática Funcional, Cognitivismo, Actos Ilocutivos.

1. INTRODUCTION

Austin's (1962) insights into the nature of language as action, as well as representation, laid the foundation for a research field which has attracted a remarkable amount of scholarly attention. Among the most recent contributions to the study of the illocutionary layer of language, the Functional Grammar (henceforth FG) proposal stands out as an attempt to formalize the grammatically and lexically-based illocutionary force of utterances in a way which is sensitive to pragmatic, psychological, and typological considerations[2]. It is the second of these methodological requirements that will be the major focus of the present paper. The FG treatment of illocutions will be assessed in

relation to some key cognitive issues (i.e. the nature of human categorization, the role of cognitive models and image-schemas in the performance of speech acts, the concept of motivation, etc.) as defined within the school of Cognitive Linguistics (Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987). On the one hand, it will be argued that the strict division posited in FG between grammatical and pragmatic illocutions is not consistent with the findings of contemporary theories of categorization (i.e. Prototype Theory) and that a more cognitively-adequate view of the aforementioned illocutionary categories as gradual, rather than discrete options, would result in a greater explanatory power of the FG illocutionary component. On the other hand, I shall look into those mental constructs (i.e. image-schemas, cognitive models) which underlie the production and understanding of illocutionary acts and whose specification should, therefore, be central to an account of illocutions with aspirations to psychological adequacy, like FG.

2. THE FG ACCOUNT OF ILLOCUTIONS

In contrast to previous accounts of speech acts as carried out within the Austin-Searle tradition, one of the distinctive features of the FG approach to illocutions is its explicit commitment to take into consideration the way in which speech acts are grammatically coded in the language. Those sentence types (i.e. Declarative, Imperative, Interrogative, and, to a lesser extent, Exclamative), which are universally found in natural languages, are regarded as the carriers of the basic homonymous illocutions[3]. It is also assumed that these basic illocutionary values can be *converted* into other *derived* illocutions. Leaving aside the issue of lexical illocutions (i.e. those conveyed by a performative verb), FG distinguishes two types of illocutionary conversion. On the one hand, there are those cases of *grammatical conversion* in which the derived illocution is reached "through means which are in some way or other coded in the linguistic expression itself" (Dik 1997: 241). The linguistic elements used to bring about a grammatical conversion have been labelled 'illocutionary converters' (Dik 1997: 245). By way of illustration, consider the following example in which a basic imperative illocution has been turned into the derived illocutionary value of *request* by means of the illocutionary converter *please*:

(1) Switch on the TV, please. [*please* [Imp] > REQ]

On the other hand, *pragmatic conversions* take place when the derived illocution is wholly inferred from the context of the utterance in the absence of any explicit illocutionary converter in the linguistic expression. Example (2) shows a declarative illocution which, in an appropriate setting, could be interpreted as a request for the addressee to switch on the TV, even though none of the linguistic elements that make up the sentence can be said to codify such a request reading.

(2) There is an interesting programme on TV now.

The issue of the borderline between grammatical and pragmatic conversions is dealt with in the 1997 version of *The Theory of Functional Grammar* (henceforth TFG2). Although it is admitted that, in practice, it is not always easy to draw a line between those two types of conversion, the conclusion remains unaltered: unless the expression under scrutiny contains an overt linguistic element whose presence realizes the conversion from a basic to a derived illocution, the interpretation of that utterance as a speech act different from the one associated with its sentence type will be a case of sheer pragmatic conversion. The example offered by Dik is the following:

(3) Could you open that door?

Constructions of this type are more often used for conveying requests than as questions about the addressee's capacity to perform the predicated action. Nevertheless, such a convention of use is not coded in the linguistic expression as evidenced by the fact that it can still be used as a regular question as in :

(4) You claim that you are very strong. Well, could you open that door, for instance?

Therefore, Dik argues that the request interpretation of sentence (3) is a matter of pragmatic conversion which lies completely beyond the realm of grammar. Consistent though Dik account may seem, it does not do justice to the explicit nature of certain constructions, like (3) above, as conventional means to express certain illocutionary values. That is to say, Dik's account is not sensitive to the psychologically real fact that upon hearing a sentence like (3) the addressee's preferred interpretation will be that of a request[4]. Only in those cases in which such a request reading proves senseless in a given context will the addressee need to attempt a different interpretation of the utterance as a genuine question. In sum, constructions of this kind, without being fully codified in the grammar of a language, yet express a certain illocutionary value in such a straightforward way that they can be said to have a preferred or unmarked reading. The realization of the special status of these constructions has motivated several attempts to account for them among linguists working within the FG framework.

In his revision of the FG treatment of illocutions, Moutaouakil (1986) suggests that both grammatical and pragmatic illocutionary values should be captured by means of operators. According to this analysis, the underlying representation of example (3) above would include two illocutionary operators. One of them would capture the literal illocutionary act of the utterance as conveyed by its sentence type (i.e. Q= question), while the other would indicate its contextually inferred illocutionary force (i.e. Req= request), as illustrated in (5):

(5) [Q + Req] [you open that door]

It is clear that Moutaouakil's proposal is not consistent with the canonical FG treatment of illocutions, since it represents an attempt to load grammar with issues (i.e. contextually inferred illocutions) which are clearly the object of pragmatics.

In a similar vein, Risselada (1990: 16) puts forward a reanalysis of conventional speech acts as direct expressions of the illocutionary intention of a speaker rather than as pragmatically converted illocutions. Risselada's account of sentence (3) above, which is repeated here as (6) for convenience, would be the following:

(6) Could you open that door?

First of all, Risselada (1990: 14) points out that requests are subject to certain restrictions as regards their propositional content, which must refer to specific actions or behaviour. This would explain that a sentence like *Could you open a door?*, whose second argument can have a generic reading, would be interpreted as a genuine question while sentence (6), whose second argument is specific, is directly understood as a request. Second, Risselada (1990: 14-15) further notices that, in the case of requests, the auxiliary verb *can* does not refer to ability but to posssibility, which would explain why *can you*, but not *are you able to*, is an appropriate expression for a request. Finally, this author offers an argument of a more formal nature to the effect that the use of the past modal should be understood as a device to mitigate the force of the request illocution, but not that of the basic question illocution expressed by the interrogative sentence type.

Both Moutaouakil's and Risselada's proposals seem to respond to a similar concern to account for the intuition, already suggested by previous pragmatists[5], that certain instances of non-coded illocutions (i.e. conventional speech acts) are still straightforwardly understood as having a primary force different from that of their sentence types, without any or very little inferential effort mediating. In this sense, Moutaouakil's and Risselada's proposals can be said to be correct while Dik's account ignores the psychological reality of conventional speech acts[6]. However, both Moutaouakil's and Risselada's attempts to account for conventional speech acts can be criticized for *overgrammaticalizing* phenomena which, as Dik (1997:249) has rightly noted, do not clearly belong to the domain of grammar. In sum, regarding the issue of conventional speech acts, Dik, on the one hand, and Moutaouakil and Risselada, on the other hand, adopt radically opposed solutions. Following Martin's (1984) useful distinction between *exporting* and *importing* models of language, it could be said that Dik's account of illocutions belongs to the first group, since it *exports* the issue of conventional speech acts to a wider theory of interaction (i.e. pragmatics). On the contrary, both Moutaouakil's and Risselada's proposals qualify as *importing* accounts given that they try to build the description of conventional illocutions within the domain of grammar (i.e. capturing contextual illocutions by means of operators, in the case of the former; regarding conventional speech acts as direct expressions of illocutionary acts, in the case of the latter).

3. THE GRAMMAR-PRAGMATICS CONTINUUM

In the following I would like to suggest that an approach to the study of the illocutionary layer of language from a cognitive perspective would permit a more

psycologically realistic account than those presented within the FG framework up to date, at the same time that it would allow us to settle the problematic issue of how to deal with conventional speech acts. Furthermore, as shall be shown below, such a cognitively-adequate account of illocutions would not invalidate the canonical (Dik 1989, 1997) FG proposals on illocutions, which cannot on the whole be argued against, but would rather complement them in such a way that the FG model would be able to materialise its own programmatic aspirations to psychological adequacy.

One essential aspect in which the FG account of illocutions fails to conform to the findings of cognitive linguists and psycholinguists about the nature of human cognition has to do with the matter of *categorization*. Works by linguist-anthropologists like Berlin and Kay (1969), and especially by experimental psycholinguists like Rosch (1977, 1978) have provided ample evidence against the classical model of categorization in terms of binary features, which results in clear-cut discrete categories, and in favour of a new theory of categorization known as Prototype Theory. According to Rosch (1978), members of a given category, far from having equal status, show different degrees of membership. Such asymmetries are known as *prototype effects* and the best example of a given category is called its *prototype*. One direct consequence of a theory of categorization in terms of prototypes is that categories no longer display clear boundaries. The existence of extremely peripheral, non-prototypical members blurs the line between categories and permits the occurrence of mixed instances which display attributes of both and can hardly be ascribed to one of them exclusively. In sum, fuzzy boundaries suggest the existence of continuums between concepts, along which an infinite number of intermediate mixed instances can be found.

With this in mind, let us consider the following instances of the speech act of *promising*:[7]

(7) I'll *surely/certainly* buy you a computer

(8) I'll buy you a computer, *honest/believe me/you can count on it/God's honour*

(9) *No problem/certainly/sure*, I'll buy you a computer

(10) *I can and I will* buy you a computer

(11) I'll buy you a computer

(12) I'll buy her a computer

(13) I'll buy a computer

(14) I'll see to it that you get a computer

(15) I am going to make sure that you get a computer

(16) I understand/know/have been told that you want a computer

(17) So you want a computer, don't you?

(18) You'll get a computer

If Dik's proposals are applied, only sentences (7)-(10) would qualify as grammatically converted promises. In each case, there is an illocutionary converter (in italics) which turns the basic declarative illocution into the derived illocutionary value of a promise. By way of illustration, within the canonical FG proposal, sentence (7)

would display the following simplified underlying structure, where the adverb *surely* functions as an illocutionary converter which turns the declarative illocution (Decl) into a promise (PRO):

[*surely* [Decl] > PRO] [I buy you a computer]

A similar description could be provided for sentences (8)-(10). Nevertheless, according to Dik's account, the rest of the examples, (11)-(18), would represent instances of sheer pragmatic conversion and hence, would be *exported* from the domain of grammar to that of pragmatics. In other words, the constructs of grammatical and pragmatic conversions are thought to yield discrete, clear-cut instances of either fully coded (examples 7-10) or fully inferred (examples 11-18) illocutions. On the one hand, the conceptualization of grammar and pragmatics as discrete categories contradicts the findings of Prototype Theory which would predict a continuum between those domains instead[8]. On the other hand, a clear-cut division between grammatical and pragmatic illocutions does not seem realistic from an intuitive point of view, since at least one of the above utterances which would be *exported* to pragmatics by applying the FG model is more straightforwardly understood as a promise than the others, even in the absence of a context of utterance. This is the case with example (11), repeated below under (18):

(18) I'll buy you a computer

Let us compare sentence (18) to examples (12) and (13), repeated below as (19) and (20):

(19) I'll buy her a computer
(20) I'll buy a computer

These three examples are declarative sentences in the future simple tense. None of them contains an illocutionary converter, like *surely*, *certainly*, etc., which would effect a grammatical conversion from the basic declarative illocution to a derived *promise* illocutionary value. Therefore, the FG model would regard all these three utterances as declarative illocutions which could be interpreted as promises via a pragmatic conversion. However, it is obvious on pure intuitive grounds that example (18), in which the beneficiary of the predicated action is the addressee and it is overtly expressed by means of the pronoun *you*, is more easily and straightforwardly understood as a promise than (19) and (20), where that is not the case. That is to say, in spite of the fact that example (18) is not fully coded (i.e. there are contexts in which it can still function as a mere declarative act), it contains a formal element (i.e. pronoun *you*) which motivates a preferred interpretation of the utterance as a promise, rather than as a declarative illocution. Since, to use Morgan's (1978) terminology, the use of the second person singular pronoun *shortcircuits* the implicature that would lead to an interpretation of sentence (18) as a promise, it can be said that the amount of processing effort is smaller in the case of (18) than in the cases of (19) and (20). Taking this into account, it does not seem adequate, from a psychological point of view, to simply include examples like (18)

in the group of pragmatically converted illocutions, which is the solution adopted within FG. Promises like (18) clearly constitute borderline cases between the domains of grammatical and pragmatic illocutions and a psychologically adequate theory of language should deal with them in precisely these terms. It should be noted here that borderline illocutions of this kind only represent a problem for a model of language which follows the classical model of categorization. If the tenets of Prototype Theory are applied and grammar and pragmatics are seen as prototypical categories with fuzzy boundaries, conventional illocutions stop being problematic to become predictable phenomena. Furthermore, since those instances of borderline (i.e. conventional) speech acts are neither fully coded nor fully inferred, likewise their analysis should not be carried out neither by grammar (as suggested by Moutaouakil and Risselada), nor by pragmatics (as put forward by Dik) exclusively. Grammatical conversions and pragmatic conversions should be complemented with a third construct which may describe and explain those instances of conventional illocutions. Such a construct would account for those formal elements of sentences which motivate, without fully codifying, a certain illocutionary interpretation. In his revision of the FG illocutionary component, though from a pragmatic rather than from a cognitive perspective, Ruiz de Mendoza (1993, 1994) advanced the above conclusion about the necessity of approaching the study of illocutions at three different levels: coded illocutions, inferred illocutions, and those intermediate instances between them, which he labelled *conventionalized* illocutions (a term that I shall adopt to refer to *conventional* illocutions since it seems more capable of capturing the fact that conventionalization is itself a matter of degree). According to Ruiz de Mendoza (1993, 1994), conventionalized illocutions should not be dealt with neither by means of grammatical conversions, nor by pragmatic conversions, but rather by means of *rules of convention*, which would account for their *preferred* interpretations as certain illocutionary acts different from the basic illocutions associated with their sentence types. Like the phenomenon that they describe, such rules of convention are half-way between grammar and pragmatics, and therefore, they include formal, semantic and pragmatic information. Another major difference between rules of convention and grammatical conversions is that the former allow for degrees of achievement. That is to say, depending on how well a given instance of illocution fulfils the conditions stated in the rule of convention, it will be said to have a higher or lower degree of conventionalization. I shall apply the notion of rule of convention to account for cases of borderline promises like (18). In order to do so, let us consider the following examples of promises:

(21) I'll buy you a computer
(22) I'll dance for you
(23) I'll buy her a computer
(24) I'll eat more

Promises can be defined as commitments on the part of the speaker to do something that is desirable to the addressee. It should be also taken into account that the beneficiary of the predicated action and the beneficiary of the promise need not be the

same person (i.e. I can promise to someone that I will do something for a third person). Examples (21) to (24) illustrate this fact. In sentences (21) and (22) the beneficiaries of the predicated action and the act of promising are the same person (i.e. the addressee). On the contrary, in sentence (23) the beneficiary of the action is a third person (i.e. *her*) different from the beneficiary of the promise (i.e. the addressee). Similarly, in (24) the beneficiary of the act of eating is the speaker, while the beneficiary of the promise is the addressee. As shown above, those cases in which the beneficiary of the action is the addressee, are more straightforwardly understood as promises than those in which the beneficiary is a different person. This should be captured by the corresponding rule of convention:

Rule of Convention for Promises

A declarative sentence would be preferably read as a promise if the following conditions hold:

(1) the declarative sentence has the form "I'll + inf..." (optionally "I will + inf...").

(2) the beneficiary of the action predicated in the declarative sentence is the addressee and it is overtly expressed (e.g. by means of the pronoun 'you' or a prepositional phrase like 'for you').

Now, consider the following attested examples from colloquial Spanish:

(25) Te le compraré un ordenador
For you to her I'll buy a computer
?"I'll buy her a computer for you" (for you=because I know you want/desire that)

(26) Te comeré más
For you I'll eat more
?"I'll eat more for you" (I'll eat more because I know that it pleases you)

In both sentences, the beneficiary of the predication is not the addressee, but a third person, in example (25), and the speaker himself, in example (26). However, the use of the second person dative pronoun *te* suggests that the addressee also benefits somehow from the performance of the action expressed in the predication[9]. Though the addressee is not the actual beneficiary of the predication, he is presented as interested in the carrying out of such an action. In other words, the fact that the speaker or a third person may benefit from the action expressed by the predication is relevant to the addressee. Because of this, the use of the pronoun *te* in the above sentences motivates their interpretation as promises. This should also be captured by our convention rule as optional condition (3):

(3) the beneficiary of the action expressed in the predication is somebody different from the addressee, but in spite of this, the bringing about of the aforementioned action is presented as relevant to the addressee by overt linguistic means (e.g. use of the second person singular dative pronoun te in Spanish).

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Notice that the use of the pronoun *te* in Spanish is not possible in a sentence in which the beneficiary of the predicated action is the addressee himself, as in:

> (27) * Te te compraré un ordenador
> For you to you I'll buy a computer
> "I'll buy you a computer (because I know it pleases you)"

This is only logical given that if a person is the beneficiary of an action, it is clear that the carrying out of such an action is relevant to him.

3. IMAGE-SCHEMAS AND PROPOSITIONAL ICMS IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF PROMISES

The recognition of a cognitive continuum between grammatical and pragmatic illocutions, and the description of those rules of convention which account for the cognitive economy that characterizes the performance of conventionalized as opposed to purely inferred illocutions should be pursued in order to endow the FG treatment of illocutions with the desirable level of psychological adequacy. Another aspect in which the FG illocutionary layer should be elaborated in order to achieve the aforesaid goal has to do with the discovery and description of those idealized cognitive models (henceforth ICMs) which underlie the performance of illocutions and which motivate the form of both coded and conventionalized illocutionary acts. As pointed out by Lakoff (1987), a cognitive grammar (i.e. a grammar which is psychologically adequate) is the one in which form is not independent of meaning or, to put it in Lakoff's (1987: 463) own words, "many aspects of syntactic structure are motivated by, or are consequences of, the structure of cognitive models". In the remainder of this paper I shall attempt to show how some formal aspects of coded and coventionalized promises described in the previous section are motivated by the propositional ICM and the force image-schema which underlie our understanding of the concept of *promising*.

The propositional ICM of *promising* will be described in relation to the seven gradual variables (as opposed to binary features)[10] of *cost-benefit* (i.e. the degree to which the speaker's goal represents a cost or a benefit for the speaker and/or the addressee), *optionality* (i.e. the degree to which the speaker and/or the addressee have freedom to decide upon their following course of action), *indirectness* (i.e. the length of the path between the illocutionary act and its illocutionary goal), *explicitness* (i.e. the degree of explicitness or implicitness in the expression of the speech act); *social power* (i.e. the relative position of the speaker and the addressee in a hierarchy of power), *social distance* (i.e. the relative position of speaker and addressee in a continuum of intimacy), and *directivity* (ie. the degree to which the speaker and/or the addressee wish their goal to be achieved). Following Dik's (1989: 255) suggestion, all the variables used in the description of our ICM of promising take into account both the point of view of the speaker and the addressee[11].

Propositional ICM of Promising.
- Promises represent a *cost* to the speaker and a *benefit* to the addressee.
- Promises restrict the optionality of the speaker who commits himself to the realization of the action that is expressed in the predication.
- Promises are usually direct, since they represent a *benefit* to the addressee. Indirect promises, however, are also possible and respond to an attempt on the part of the speaker to minimize the cost that the carrying out of the promised action would bring about for him.
- Promises are usually explicit, since they represent a *benefit* to the addressee. As was the case with the *indirectness* variable, promises can also be implicit if the speaker attempts to minimize the cost that the carrying out of the promised action would bring about for him.
- Asymmetries of power between the speakers affect the degree of indirectness and explicitness of the speech act of promising. The more powerful the addressee is, the more direct and explicit the promise will tend to be (e.g. (to a boss) *Certainly, I'll get this done* vs. *You'll get this done*). Moreover, the more powerful the addressee, the smallest the degree of optionality of the speaker.
- Social distance also affects the degree of indirectness of a promise. The smaller the social distance between the speakers, the more indirect a promise can be, provided that it is taken for granted that the speaker wants the benefit of the addressee (e.g. the sentence *I've been told that you want a computer,* addressed by a father to his son, may perfectly well count as a promise. The same sentence addressed to a stranger would be more likely interpreted as a simple declarative sentence).
- The degree of directivity of both speaker and hearer is high. Both have a great desire that the predicated action is carried out.

Together with this propositional ICM, our understanding of the act of promising is also dependent of the force image-schema, as shall be spelled out below:


Figure 1. *Force image-schema of the act of promising*

Applying Talmy's (1988) force dynamics to the analysis of promises, it is observed that both the *agonist* (i.e. focal force entity) and the *antagonist* (i.e. the force element which opposes the agonist) affect the same entity, namely, the speaker. The speaker is the agonist (i.e. entity which has an initial intrinsic force tendency towards rest) and also the antagonist (i.e. the entity whose intrinsic force tendency is towards action). Moreover, in the case of prototypical promises, the antagonist is stronger than the agonist and, consequently, the resultant of the force interaction is towards action. In other words, in uttering a promise the speaker *forces* himself to perform the predicated action[12]. Such workings of the force image-schema in the understanding of promises surface in everyday expressions like *My* promise *pushes/forces/impels me to do x; I made a promise, so now I am* forced *to do x,* etc. The balance of strengths between agonist and antagonist will be determined by the interplay of the variables included in the propositional ICM of promising. To give just an example, a promise which represents a great cost to the speaker, which is uttered in a context in which there are no power asymmetries negative to the speaker (i.e. speaker and addressee are equals or the speaker is more powerful), and which rates low in the directivity variable (i.e. the participants' desire that the action is carried out is not high), will tend to be indirect and, as a result, the strength of the antagonist will not be as high as that characterizing prototypical promises. That is to say, a promise which displays the aforementioned characteristics does not place the speaker under a strong obligation: an indirect promise does not exert such a strong force onto the speaker as a direct promise does (e.g. *I'll get you a computer* vs. *You'll get a computer* or *I've been told that you want a computer,* etc.).

With the above in mind, let us now consider some examples of grammatically converted and conventionalized promises in order to see how some aspects of their parameters of form are largely motivated by their parameters of meaning as captured by the corresponding propositional ICM and force image-schema of promising. Some previous examples are repeated below for convenience:

(28) I'll surely/certainly buy you a computer
(29) Sure/certainly, I'll buy you a computer
(30) I'll buy you a computer

In the case of examples (28) and (29), the expressions *sure, surely,* and *certainly* function as illocutionary converters which turn the basic declarative illocution into a promise. Why do this kind of adverb, which express the speaker's believe that something will definitely happen, can effect such a conversion? The answer to this question can be found by considering the special traits of the force image-schema which underlies the performance of promises. As shown above, this type of speech act is characterized by a speaker who is both the agonist and the antagonist in a given force interaction. Given that the antagonist is the speaker himself, he is capable of knowing in advance whether the predicated action will take place or not. Because he is the antagonist, he knows to what an extent he is committed to the performance of the expressed action. This explains that the use of the aforementioned adverbs would not be possible in a sentence intended

as a pure declarative sentence (e.g. statement of future acts), since in this case the antagonist would not be the speaker himself but other external elements which may prevent him from carrying out the action expressed in the predication. The force image-schema of a simple declarative sentence, like *I'll buy a computer tomorrow*, would be the following:

Speaker   External element

Figure 2. *Force image-schema of a declarative sentence*

Figure 2 represents an agonist (i.e. the speaker) with an intrinsic force towards action and an antagonist (i.e. external element) with an opposing force (i.e. towards rest). Depending on whether the strength of the antagonist is greater or smaller than that of the agonist, the resultant force interaction will be that of rest or action respectively.

In the case of promises, there can also exist external elements which may hinder the performance of the promised action. One can promise something and then not be able to fulfil his promise due to facts which are beyond his control (e.g. one may have an accident and lose his physical capacity to carry out the promised action). However, it should be pointed out that no external element can hinder the actual performance of the speech act of promising, since the only antagonist is the speaker himself[13].

Now, let us consider example (30):

(30) I'll buy you a computer

This is a case of conventionalized promise. As captured in our rule of convention, what favours a promise reading of an average declarative sentence like (30) is the overt expression of the beneficiary of the predicated action (i.e. *you*). The motivation for this formal aspect of conventionalized promises can be explained by considering the variable of cost-benefit of the propositional ICM of promising. According to this variable, promises constitute a benefit for the addressee. Hence, a sentence where it is explicitly expressed that the beneficiary of the speaker's action is the addressee will be understood as a promise more easily than a sentence in which it is not overtly manifest that the beneficiary will be the addressee (cf. I'll buy a computer).

5. CONCLUSION

In the present paper, I have presented an analysis which reveals the need to complement the FG treatment of illocutions in several ways in order to endow it with the

psychological adequacy postulated in its own methodological requirements. I have shown that the FG view of grammatical and pragmatic conversions and their output (i.e. coded vs. inferred illocutions) as classical, rather than prototypical, categories is one of the factors which hinders the FG illocutionary component from being able to account for psychologically real phenomena, like those borderline cases of conventionalized promises dealt with in this paper. Furthermore, the FG description of illocutions should also be complemented by means of the description of those ICMs (propositional, image-schematic, metaphorical, metonymic) which underlie the performance and understanding of illocutionary acts. Only by accomplishing this task will the FG model be able to spell out the motivation of the syntactic forms of both grammatically coded and conventionalized speech acts. The specification of such ICMs would also serve to bridge the gap between the domains of grammar and pragmatics. On the one hand, they motivate the parameters of form of grammatically converted and conventionalized illocutions. On the other hand, they guide and make possible the inference of a given speech act in a certain context.

NOTES

1. Finacial support for this research has been given by the DGES, grant no. PB96-0520, Ministry of Education and Culture, Spain, and by the University of La Rioja, Research Department, grant no. API-97/B18
2. Unless otherwise specified, the present paper deals with the canonical version of the FG treatment of illocutions as described in Dik (1989, 1997), Dik et al. (1990), and Hengeveld (1988, 1989).
3. The idea that universal sentence types should be regarded as syntactic markers of illocutionary force is shared by Sadock and Zwicky (1985), who have put forward typological evidence in favour of the pervasiveness of declarative, imperative and interrogative sentences. In contrast to Dik, these authors argue for the existence of other minor sentence types (e.g. suggestions, optatives, etc.) which are rather treated as derived illocutions within the FG framework (see Dik 1997: 249).
4. For psychological research on this topic, see Ervin-Tripp (1976), Ervin et al. (1987), and Gibbs (1983, 1984, 1994).
5. See Gordon and Lakoff (1975) on *conversational postulates*, Searle (1975) on *conventional indirect speech acts*, Morgan (1978) on those *conventions of usage* which *shortcircuit* the implicature which produces a certain illocutionary reading, etc.
6. There is a whole tradition of pragmatists, starting with Bach and Harnish (1979) and including, among others, Leech (1983), Levinson (1983), and Recanati (1987), who reject the existence of both codification and convention in the understanding of speech acts. On the contrary, they suggest that the illocutionary force of every utterance needs to be inferred. From a cognitive point of view, the validity of theories of this kind can be questioned on economic terms. It does not seem plausible that we need to infer every single speech act that is addressed to us, since this would result in higher processing efforts and lack of cognitive economy.
7. In spite of their frequency of appearance, I shall not deal here with instances of promises produced by means of performative verbs (e.g. *I promise I'll go with you*). The following discussion focuses exclusively on the issues of grammatically and pragmatically converted illocutions, as defined by Dik (1997).
8. Postulating a gradation between components of a linguistic theory is not anything new. Cognitive grammars, like Langacker's (1987) and functional grammars, like Givon's (1984, 1990, 1995) have already explicitly recognize the existence of a continuum between the domains of cognition and language, and between the different subdomains of language (i.e. lexicon, syntax, pragmatics).

9. The use of the pronoun *te* in these sentences in Spanish is an instance of the *ethic dative* inherited from Latin. According to Valentí Fiol (1984), this kind of dative indicates a person who has a special interest in what is expressed in the predication. It is an optional element often used to add overtones of affection.

10. The gradual nature of the variables involved in the description of the ICM of promising allows us to account for the existence of members with different degrees of prototypicality within the category of promises. Prototypical promises will display all these variables optimally, while less prototypical promises will display them to a lesser extent and/or will even lack some of them. I do not present these six variables as the only variables conforming the promising ICM. Previous research on speech acts, however, has provided evidence that these are some of the most relevant features in the characterization of speech acts. See Leech (1983) on the variables of *cost-benefit, optionality, indirectness, social power*, and *social distance*; and Verschueren (1985) on the *directivity* variable.

11. Descriptions of directive speech act ICMs along the line suggested in this paper can be found in Pérez (1997, 1998).

12. In the case of requests, for instance, it is the addressee who is the agonist (i.e. focal force entity with an intrinsic force tendency towards rest) and the speaker represents the antagonist (i.e. opposing force). Factors like cost-benefit, indirection, optionality, directivity, social power, and social distance will determine the balance of strengths between agonist and antagonist and this will yield a resultant force interaction towads either rest or action. For an analysis of indirect request in terms of the force image-schema, see Pérez (1996).

13. Conditional promises (e.g. *If I get paid, I'll surely buy you a computer, If you are a good boy, I'll surely buy you a computer*) can be seen as cases in which the speaker warns the addressee about the existence of possible external antagonists, which may be beyond his control and prevent him from fulfilling his promise.

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