

critic, the *chiste* furnishes a royal road into the remarkable association between the Falangist imaginary and the figure of the hand (see di Febo). A political historian turns to it for an example of the migration of the term *Movimiento* during the Spanish post-war, from its more or less proper historical use in the expression *Movimiento Falangista*, to the *Movimiento Nacional* after the nationalist victory in 1939, then to the entirely abstract *movimiento* found in the Dictator's speeches after the Matesa scandal, in 1969²: the semantic movements of *movimiento* marked Franco's effort to distance himself from the Falange, and in the early 1970s from its heirs, Fraga, Solís and Castiella (Preston 270, 694-95; Tusell and García Queipo de Llano 344-64). Those keen to understand the shapes taken by Spanish cultural anxieties today, on the country's joining the European Union and renegotiating matters long cherished as the prerogative of national sovereignty, must puzzle out the emergence of popular-cultural treatments of the years of transition alongside institutional efforts to rescue the material traces of events long repressed: the opening of mass graves, consolidation and democratization of access to Civil War archives, the surprising success of television serials like "Cuéntame cómo pasó," etc. And of course the resuscitation of old jokes, which now circulate with a nostalgic surplus-value hard at times to square with their sharply satiric beginnings. Finally, the notional cultural anthropologist might note that the moving hand speaks to the way in which political change is imagined at a moment when the *concept* of political movement and the signifier *movimiento* remain tied to the corporatist model of association—indeed to the

very body—that this notional movement might seek to abandon.

Or one might put the matter like this. For Spanish society since 1989, economic and social integration in the EU is shaped by a troubled recollection of the "transition," the movement from forty years of authoritarian rule to a constitutional democracy federating weakly-autonomous regions under a nominal monarchy. The shapes that this recollection takes are tricky to describe, because for the Spain that lived that transition, thinking "beyond" the "movement" so as to "change movements" decisively—thinking through a transition still to be recollected—meant assuming the figure and gestures of the *Caudillo* so as to work the violence of a gesture upon his body, or, less allegorically, assuming the burden of political terror so as to escape or profit from it, so as to work it through reflexively, introject it, consume it. To attach to the hand of the *Caudillo* the *form* that our retrospective thought about political change can take is to stress the ghostly influence that Franco's body has after its own passing, furnishing a recent history preserved under the entailing shadow of the *Movimiento's mort-main*, or *ley de manos muertas*, as the legislation is called in Spain.³

The task for radical democratic, transitional thought today may well be to find whether defining representations of political change ever become *detached* from such sublime bodies, or whether these bodies can suffer dematerializations or resemanticizations that effectively change their "movements" (direction, value—a whole micro-physics is entailed here), and if so how. Let us, as a preliminary to this task, first agree on this: "brokering" the

emergence of a socio-politico-economic formation means not just describing the transition from one *movimiento* to another, but also reflecting on the shapes and functions that these descriptions assume today: on the historical and cultural materials that determine those shapes, and on their social and conceptual uses, fantasmatic and practical, for *us* here and now no less than for those societies whose movements we address. And let's say that the accepted story of the establishment of European nationalisms and of their apparent, imminent subsumption in meta-national organisms shadows closely the story of the desacralization, politicization and depoliticization of the notion of "terror."

One might gloss this story in this way. In accounts of the phenomenology of national or proto-national consciousness, the experience of terror, an affect traditionally restricted to private, aesthetic or physiological domains, moves suddenly, and to some extent on account of the Enlightenment's normativization of those domains, into the public sphere. The aesthetic vehicle for this movement is the language of the sublime, tied as early as Burke to a reflection on the circumstance of political revolution (33); its cultural-journalistic vehicle can be found in the eponymous characterization of the Robespierrian revolution as "the Terror," an over-concretization that apotropaically restricts to a particular moment and to a particularly egregious set of behaviors what is in fact a general condition of representative government (compare Laqueur 26). The early-national *crainte des masses*, as Balibar calls it, is experienced in both the subjective and the objective forms, both as the fear that the masses experience towards the forms of identification

newly available to them, and as the fear that the emergent political establishments would experience toward the masses they would nominally represent (293). On one side we might range the social anxieties classically said to follow on the development of modern forms of identification: anxiety over the first definitions and almost correlative subsumption of a notional private sphere in a public one or vice-versa; more generally, anxiety over the subsumption (facilitated by changes in communications and technology, the increased ease of movement of persons and of capital, etc.) of local modalities of identification—ethnic, geographical, economic, religious—in larger or differently organized national ones: in brief, social anxiety expressed as terror of the political, and incidentally, apotropaically, as terror of and resistance to the political classes. Consider on the other side how, called to administer these larger or differently organized forms of identification, required to represent a *volonté générale* in the face of a *volonté particulière* forever both subsumed in the public sphere and irreducible to it, the modern political classes encountered in the masses and in the "citizen subject" an *extimate* knot of familiar and unfamiliar interests, interests reducible to (political or other) representation and interests exceeding these reductions. The terror of the intimately alien mass and of the citizen-subject (in this case the genitives are subjective) comes to be expressed practically as greater or lesser degrees of repression practiced by the political classes—as political terror, in brief—and in the language of political economics in the commodification of terms intended to negotiate between particular and collective interests, or between representable and

unrepresentable interests: the “spirit” of laws or of nations, the voluntary surrender of the will, the inevitable globalization of capital.

A successful republicanism, it turns out, does not minimize, but seeks instead to understand, guard and administer these intimate, asymmetrical terrors, and their practical and politico-philosophical expressions: resistance and repression, Schumacherite reterritorialization and economic globalization. We might put it polemically: radical-democratic republicanism nurtures and depends upon the experience of social terror. This is not a claim that anyone living and writing after the events of September 11, 2001 can make lightly. Social terrors, which appear as the critical-epistemological devices on which republican ethics are to be founded, must in the first instance be distinguished from the phenomenon of “terrorism.” This turns out to be a particularly delicate task; it is not on that account any less pressing. Consider Saint-Just’s famous proposition, “A republican government has virtue as its principle; otherwise, it has terror” (cited in Kintzler 17). Here the relation between governance and principle is not *political* but foundational, the sort of mythic posit that Kintzler calls a metaphysical “moving force located beyond the political, understood as a machine” (17). In Saint-Just, the principles of republican government reveal themselves as mythic posits, that is, as precisely not republican, when the mechanicity of political institutions is laid bare: when the formal devices of republican representation fail to map the field of political interests, when an impasse or a differend arises between the claims of right and the formality of law, when virtue is not a perspicuous, *given* term but itself the opaque occasion of administra-

tive disagreement, or indeed the contested ground of semantic battles as terrible as the literal ones that they support. In this instance the experience of “terror,” because it evokes what Kintzler calls “the scenario of an abolition or suspension of the [political] machine, a scenario equivalent to that of its foundation,” becomes not the exceptional but the normative cause for critical reflection on the principles of republican government, and in particular on the sublime asymmetry between the principles and means of government.⁴ Deplorable as it may seem, the breaks in the fabric of social experience revealed by the experience of terror become defining attributes of genuinely open, radically democratic states whose institutions seek to negotiate the constitutive antagonism between interest-governed doctrines of right and law (compare Laclau and Mouffe 93-105, and Piñuel 13).

On this description, social terror becomes the privileged *cause* of the reflection on the status of political principles, and the disruptive and disrupted phenomenology of terror becomes the privileged trope for post-national principles of association. But can social terror also serve as a *model* for this reflection? Not, seemingly, without assuming the form of a terrorist *act*. Consider now these pseudo-syllogistic lines from a *communiqué* that ETA-V published in *Hautsi* in 1973:

What tactics can the Vietnamese, the Irish, the Basques, etc. rely upon in their fight, when they have been denied every legal and democratic avenue of combating for legitimate rights, under a legal system that is foreign to them? [...] Our objectives are to favor [...] the organization of the working class and of the people, so that the latter, directed by the former, can carry

out the revolutionary fight for the national and social liberation of our people. At the same time, revolutionary activities will be directed at dividing and isolating the oppressors, in an effort to radicalize the contradictions that exist in the breast of the exploiting classes [...]. This is not terrorism. We are not attacking indiscriminately, but rather attacking selected people, well-defined inasmuch as they are leading members of an oppressor class, or of the repressive apparatus. (cited in Bruni 154-55)

ETA's effort to distinguish between the "indiscriminate" attack—terrorism—and the representative act of violence—a justifiable military tactic undertaken in the context of a foreign legal system that sacrifices rights to law—rests on an unstable principle closely related to Saint-Just's wobbly distinction between "terror" and "virtue." The impasse here is both strategic and analytic. To the extent that the "oppressor class" or the "repressive apparatus" are taken to be given, perspicuous terms, then the "terrorist" organization relinquishes the vanguardist function of "laying bare" the mechanicity of a repressive State or conceptual apparatus—purchasing thereby a rationale for every act at the cost of the epistemologically and politically critical function of revealing the mythic foundations of the contradictions in the "oppressors' breasts." But say, on the other hand, that an organization like ETA seeks to lay bare and exacerbate these contradictions by taking as its target civilians selected precisely *because* their "representativeness" is *not* self-evident, but must be *made* manifest. In this case, the organization purchases a critical function at the expense of any immediate political representativeness of its own. The less evident

the target's membership in the "repressive apparatus," the more the act's didactic function, which is to make manifest retrospectively the rationale for choosing the target, itself appears as an arbitrary re-semanticization, a form of "terrorism" conducted at the level of the sign.

This impasse at the heart of ETA's *communiqué* allows me to return to my question: can the experience of social "terror" serve non-instrumentally as a *model* for reflecting on political principles obscured by the mechanics of government? If the post-national models of radical democracy that emerge in the shadow of state and/or revolutionary terror nurture and guard an explicit and historical relation to the experience and cultural affect-value of terror (as a *cause of* reflection, as a trope for an unsutured and open social field, perhaps as a *model for* reflection upon the political more broadly), then "brokering" post-national forms of association means opening to scrutiny the double bind of terror disclosed by its instrumentalized form, that is, by what we call terrorism. A double bind: for the "terrorist," the opacity of the relation between individuals and the class-interests they represent or can be made to represent must be both maintained (the didactic function of the act of terror being to construct it *après coup*, to generate after a first, inexplicable blow a second one in the form of what could be called a political "Aha!"—phenomenon, the (re)construction of the "representativeness" or collusion of the target of the first blow in a repressive apparatus) and undermined (in the form of the assertion of the self-evident transparency of the relation between the individual and the class or conceptual interests s/he represents). The logic of "terrorism" oscillates between the poles of this antinomy,

as its tactics move between what Marighella called the precision of the guerrilla's "shot" and the "irreparable damage" caused by the terrorist's less discriminating bomb (Marighella 49, 84; see also Crenshaw 18). Radical-democratic "terror"—the affirmative "terror" of (again, both forms of the genitive govern) post-national, non-conceptual, unevenly de-territorialized and unevenly re-territorializing forms of association—takes shape when this oscillation no longer obtains between the poles of a conceptual antinomy describing "the political" but constitutes the substance of "the political" itself.

What might it mean, then, to submit the logic of terrorism—as "terrorism" of State, or acts of "terrorism" against the state, or, as in Al-Qaeda's case, attacks against civilians weakly representative of broad cultural and economic formations—to a critique rooted in the thought of "terror"? And vice-versa: what might it mean to submit republican "terror" to the strong solvent of "terrorism"? To turn to the legacies of terrorism so as to make evident the conceptual instability which, nurtured at the heart of the philosophy of terror, remains necessary to a radical-democratic post-nationalism? Say that one associates the cultural experience of political terror with the somaticization of the corporate nation-State (an embodied concept is heir to all the outrages that afflict the flesh: hence the two bodies Kantorowicz famously imagined for the King, or the bodies that Franco sports in my opening *chiste*). Here again the case of Spain proves instructive. In the Catholic-mystical form it took for the Falange, the organicism of the State is best summarized in the words of José Antonio Primo de Rivera:

The Fatherland is a total unity, in which individuals and classes are integrated; the Fatherland cannot be in the hands of the strongest class, nor of the best-organized Party. The Fatherland is a transcendent synthesis, an indivisible synthesis, with its own ends to accomplish. And what we would like is for the movement of today, and the State that it creates, to be the effective, authoritative and authoritarian instrument, in the service of an indisputable unity, of that permanent unity, that irrevocable unity, called Fatherland. (66-67)

Note two things. In the first place, the paradox that haunts populist authoritarianism: the Fatherland is not in the hands of the strongest, or of the best organized—not because it is in everyone's hands, as it is putatively in a democratic society; but because being *in hands*, being concretely used as a form of concrete power, cannot be an attribute of the transcendent. "Movement" and "state" relate to this transcendent synthesis entirely contingently (concrete institutions cannot be said to act for the Fatherland, in the sense of having it in their hands), but also as parts of its irrevocable unity. But on the other hand, the "movement of today" imagines the State as the "end" of the Fatherland, and seeks to fashion the State in that model: the movement, in other words, is conflated with the transcendent, as what accomplishes *fines propios*. The movement serves the fatherland by making its "own ends" available to it, by making certain that the state is the end of the fatherland. The bind is a difficult one: either the movement is unnecessary, because the transcendent synthesis of the fatherland exists already, and will produce from itself a material match to its ideality; or else the party is

the instrument by means of which the fatherland builds the state in its image, in which case the preexistence of the fatherland is not an *a priori* but an accidental aspect of the fatherland, one requiring technique, handling, an instrument, a Slave. Note in the second place that the distinction between State and Fatherland [*Estado, Patria*] is a temporal as well as an ontological one (the Falangist state remains to come, but the fatherland is permanent, irrevocable, a concept rather than a materialization; the “movement” is an instrument both for the creation of the State, for the reconciliation of the matter to the concept, State to Fatherland; and, with the resulting State, for the service of the Fatherland). In other words, the transcendental synthesis attributed to the party (with its own goals) both exists independently of the concretization of the party, and requires the party as its instrument.

Imagine, then, that this unstable relation between party and State becomes a strategic element in an ideology that both identifies *movimiento* with *Patria*, and makes the first the means to achieving the true spirit of the latter. Imagine, too, that the fantasy of a rupture in the organicist nation-State model locates that rupture precisely at the point of the greatest mystification of that strategic element: where the “transcendent synthesis” of the Party’s political apparatus with the State’s conceptual extension takes concrete form, i.e., in the homology between the concrete shape of the Party leadership and the conceptual extension of the Fatherland. In Franco’s hand, in short—executive, hortatory, indexical, monitory, and above all, uncannily, *both* a concrete and an entirely allegorical organ.

Here is an example of an act of “terrorism” that attaches to that homology. I’m turning to it in some measure for its spectacular shape, in part because it furnishes an example of an act of violence the target of which seems so “well selected,” so “distinct,” as to obscure rather than facilitate reflection on the State’s contradictions, and in part because of the privileged place granted this event in the histories of Spain’s transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. But what principally governs my choice of examples is this: as Spain seeks to devise for itself a post-national, “European” identity, the interests at war in the death of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco still define the relation between local nationalism and State interest. That event, and the specific conflict it represents, mark in ways as yet unacknowledged the limit of the capacious, liberal-democratic, “European” social imaginary.⁵

In 1973, in the waning days of Franco’s regime, Carrero, the president of the Spanish government and the anointed successor to the Generalísimo, stepped out of the church of San Francisco de Borja in Madrid, where he regularly attended Mass, and into his official car. Minutes later there was a huge explosion. The first news reports that day stated that a gas main had exploded, causing no injuries but digging up a huge trench on the street, Claudio Coello. And in fact the President’s car had not been found immediately. Blown over the façade of the church by a bomb that commandos had planted, the limousine was discovered some moments later by a priest who was reading, and made his way to the balcony of an inner courtyard where he discovered the car, deformed into a V-shape, resting so that

he was able to see only the hands of the occupants. To these hands he administered the last rites. “And with this event,” writes Josep Carles Clemente, “the transition to democracy begins” (qtd. in Vilarós 125.)

Both the timing and the target of the attempt were in a way entirely foreseeable. The bombing took place on the day in which the elaborately prepared *proceso 1001*, the trial of ten imprisoned leaders of the underground Communist union Comisiones Obreras, was to begin. Carrero, Franco’s longest-standing deputy, was known to be in charge of the political *relevo* envisioned for the time of Franco’s death, and had recently—in June of 1973—been appointed President by Franco and charged with forming a Cabinet. ETA made the argument in this way:

From 1951 on Carrero was for all practical purposes the Chief of Government of the regime. Carrero more than any one else symbolized the figure of ‘pure Franquismo.’ His police force managed to insert itself in all the apparatus of Franco’s government. He thus became the key element of the system, and the most basic piece in the political game of the oligarchy [...]. Everybody knows that the Spanish oligarchy was counting on Carrero to insure a smooth transition to a ‘franquismo’ without Franco. (Forest 46)

The assassination provoked an immediate—or almost immediate—crisis, both political and social. A number of theories explaining who really killed Carrero surfaced, and remain the subject of some (at times absurdly heated) discussion; a subclass of jokes about the assassination and a cotillion of rather morbid parlor games made the rounds. The political result of the attack was the return to power of the

hard-line Falangist faction that had been replaced after the Matesa scandal; the event’s epistemological and one might say psycho-social consequences were in their way quite a bit more important. Here are two moments in Vilarós’s description of the assassination’s outcome:

The complicated inweaving and unraveling that [...] the political and the affective responses [to Carrero’s assassination] underwent in the palace of El Pardo partially reflect what the Spanish social body also suffered at the time, equally and conflictedly entangled between affect and politics, feeling in part a surge of hope at what the magnicide might imply, and in part horrified at the violence that political change demands [...]. But in addition to marking the end and the beginning of an era, the assassination also marks the beginning of the process of historical encryption with which the fabric of Spanish society reacts to the magnicide. (120, 125)

Remark, in the spirit of decryption to which the event invites us, the mediations (temporal, institutional, symbolic) between the bombing and its social (re)construction. In the hours and days immediately after the assassination, the re-semantization of Carrero’s body proceeded frantically and unevenly, following official and unofficial channels, according to voluntary and involuntary mechanisms. The “news-bomb delivered in small doses,” as Campo Vidal calls it (28), was doled out to and by the media in an atmosphere that *El País’s* investigation some years later would call “hermetismo informativo” (Fuente, García and Prieto 167-79); a smattering of alternative accounts filtered into Spain from France. *Operación Ogro*,

Eva Forest's 1974 interviews with the ETA commando responsible for the attack, gave the event a narrative shape it has not yet shed, and a heroic cast confirmed in Pontecorvo's version of Forest's account, the film *Ogro*. And even today it seems difficult to tell the story without importing oddly discrepant elements. In a recent history of the period, a merely evocative animism employed to naturalize Carrero's vehicle oddly flows into terminology drawn from the field of competitive diving:

The street pavement disintegrated under the wheels of the official vehicle, which suddenly interrupted its slow horizontal movement [...] to rocket up over thirty-five meters [...]. It was a clean jump. On its descent—which was too vertical—the car scratched the border of the overhanging roof. (Herrero 13-14)

What socio-cultural work do these accounts carry out? Here is Forest's transcription of a conversation in which two members of the group recall how they dug the tunnel in which the explosives were placed:

We could just manage to get one arm through the hole and start digging dirt out with the other hand [...]. The stink was atrocious! As soon as we hit earth, it began to reek of escaping gas—[...] the earth was impregnated with gas. It was soft, greasy, humid earth [...]. And every time we pulled the toilet chain in the water-closet—hombre!—there was a stench that just about knocked us out. When we dug through the sewage, we must have opened one of the conduits to the toilet disposal. It was impossible to withstand that stink. (89; I have slightly modified the translation)

The stress in these lines falls largely in the multiplying analogy between the terrorist's (bowel, or at any rate excretory) movements, the pulling of the chain, the stench; and the expulsion, from the analyzed body of the street of Claudio Coello, of the president's car.⁷ The mechanism of the analogy is again all too evident: nothing could seem more repugnant than the stench from a toilet; nothing more routine, more natural than the various digestive and muscular processes that lead to "pulling the toilet chain in the water-closet" (the Spanish makes the analogy even bolder: "cada vez que daban *la bomba del piso de arriba salía por allí un tufo que no se podía aguantar*," [Forest 170-71]). Once established, the cloacal analogy forms the basis of the pseudo-syllogism for the "natural" necessity of eliminating or expelling Carrero, *la bomba del piso de arriba* and the toilet chain operating much as the *bomba* planted below the *piso de abajo* would do, the President a stand-in for the fecal material that forms the panorama of Madrid's *cloacas*, and *vice-versa*. The argument's rhetorical bridge-work carries an additional conceptual value: the expulsion of Carrero reverses the anti-federalism of the Falange, which refused to acknowledge the "foreignness" of the Basque country to the Spanish state, by showing explosively that the Castilianizing ideology of the Franco regime can itself be symbolically and quite literally detached from the body of the city, of the State, of Spain.

What Forest's analogy deliberately loses is precisely what Herrero's description provides, in the shape of his droll characterization of a car "interrupting its movement," "jumping or diving" [*salto*] and finally "scratching" the roof: the element of the will that the body or mind

exercises in pulling the chain, *deciding* to interrupt its movement (its *movimiento* or its *desplazamiento*), to dive, to scratch—an act of will animistically supplied when it comes to the President's car. Displaced, of course, as if to compensate for the violence with which Carrero's own will, whatever it might have been, was shown to be beside the point. And it is the loss of this element that these lines from *Operation Ogro* envision most powerfully: the bomb blocks the passage from *decisión* to *movimiento*. By means of ETA's "operation" or "execution" the corporate body of the state loses the immediacy of its limbs to its will, or, to put it differently, the "terrorist" shows that the exercise of a corporate will is never direct but always mediate and interruptible, that an element of the in-voluntary or of the merely reflexive inhabits the "transcendent union" between the "symbol" and the concept of *franquismo*, as between the "movement" and the State, or indeed between "Spain" and the intimately alien province of the Basque country. One set of explanations for the overdetermination of the Ogro story now becomes patent: the issue is not only the fecalization of Carrero, the analization of the city, the eroticizing of the "terrorist's" strategy of introjection and expulsion. Forrest's interviews show explicitly what popular historiography also suggests: that the construction of Carrero's assassination represents the denial of a form of closure to the conceptual body that the state ascribes to itself, and locates that resistance to closure in the body's lack of control, in its absence of will, in the recourse to reflexive action cut from reflection that the State suffers in managing the economy of the body's surfaces and borders, internal (the surface of Madrid suddenly reveal-

ing a thick, unsuspected and threatening material panorama) as well as external (the border between the Basque country and France being at this time hardly subject to Spanish control).

This, at any rate, is how Franco himself would construe ETA's attack on Carrero. In the complex, much-debated "Mensaje de fin de año" that Franco delivered some two weeks after the assassination the inside-outside logic that would be appropriated in ETA's account in *Operation Ogro* is significantly recast. Characterizing the attack, opaquely but fascinatingly, with the words "there is no evil that does not result from good," Franco proposed that:

The violence of a minority, supported and encouraged from outside the country, a minority that represents no-one and nothing, drowns itself in the maturity of the Spanish people [...]. The institutions have worked from within our people [...]. We have not even had to turn to the exceptional measures that the law provides for, since the confidence and hopes of the Spanish people insured that order and peace would prevail. Peoples cannot be judged by the external appearances of consumer society, or by the frivolity of a part of their social classes. There exists in them [*ellas*] what cannot be seen, what the ideals of our Movement have engraved [or "infused" or "mined": *calar*] in the good Spanish people, that which makes itself manifest on all great occasions. (Franco, qtd. in Vizcaíno Casas 298)

The relation that Franco's words establish between the open frontier and the effect of the bomb is double. On the one hand the attack on Carrero reveals the existence

of a porous border, a way in which the external can influence the state from outside. But on the other hand, and correspondingly, the effect of the bomb is to close the state in upon itself, to reassert the fundamental laws and to provoke the closed defense of those ideals. On one hand the attack, and social reaction to the attack, reveal the external frivolity of the commercial classes, the classes of consumer society; on the other they suggest the existence of what is not seen, the soul or the ideals or the character of the people. The argument is complex, and in one sense at least quite troubling. “Revealing” what the *Movimiento* has inscribed within the “buen pueblo español” (as *madurez, serenidad, confianza* and respect for “los órganos del estado”) is clearly desirable here—on the more or less Hegelian grounds that recognizing that aspect of “el buen pueblo” that on occasion “makes itself manifest” for “el buen pueblo” to see is the condition for *el pueblo*’s twin awareness, of itself *as pueblo* and of itself as the object of the *Movimiento*’s work of inscription and formation: its *cala*. But if this is so then the assassination of Carrero, precisely one such “gran ocasión,” cannot be entirely condemned. Instead, the bombing and its sequel must be as it were introjected or consumed (to use Franco’s word), turned to advantage, must reveal themselves a case, to reverse the “movement” of Franco’s aphorism, of “no hay bien que por mal no venga,” the emergence of a “good”—the externalization of the *Movimiento*’s mark upon the people, the concretization of a border that had become all too porous, the reassertion of a Falangist hard line endangered by the technocratic government that Carrero had sought to install—out of an “evil.” ETA, in brief, reveals it-

self the witting or unwitting agent of the Falangist State’s self-recognition, the agent of the dialectical reassertion of a mediate but decisive—read: willed—relation between the people and the party, as the party reveals itself deeply marked—*calado*—within the substance of the people.

Or say this: in Franco’s words the concepts of “terrorism” and of “the foreign” arise before the act that they characterize, as the place to which the act is destined in the field of the social and as the outside of that field. This pre-destination of the act of resistance to the State’s outside means, naturally, that the State generates the names and the categories of “terrorism” and “the foreign” for the purposes of imposing its will, of holding and making use of the chain that will expel what the social body cannot consume. A familiar, coercive pattern ensues, the immediate effect of which is to preempt genuine dissent by associating it with an arbitrary “foreignness,” but whose more interesting and far-reaching consequence is to generate (nominally as well as practically) excessive acts of “terror” to which a strong State, and a nation unified internally by a patterned “outside,” can respond as one. Because this patterned outside then stands also as a product of the strong State and of the national character, as the concretization of what most intimately defines the State’s interior, the topology of Franco’s *mensaje* and of ETA’s account assume in relation to each other the ghostly, mirroring shape that Aretxaga sketched, in discussing “narrative excess” in accounts of state terror in the Basque country:

[T]he [...] *feeling* body of the state becomes real, not so much through the

confluence of reason and violence that is the hallmark of the modern state, as through the performance of mimetic violence against a fantasized enemy [...]. The state is constituted through the narrative proliferation of excess, [and] as nothing but excess. Nationalist activists are constituted as political subjects in an imaginary relation to the state, just as the state is constituted in an imaginary relation to the phantom Basque terrorist. (Aretxaga, "Playing" 53)

In Franco's argument the State's "feeling body" becomes real in his key verb *calar*, in its own slim way the bearer of deeply excessive narratives. Meaning to saturate some matter completely, to mark or enter deeply into something, *calar* here describes the work of ideology in the formation of the people's self-recognition. In its substantive form, the verb *calar* becomes a *cala*, the hole, cut, or incision made in a surface—a wall or the pavement of a street, say—to determine its thickness, its composition, and to find what lies beneath. But *calar* also means "to embroider" or "to stitch together according to a pattern"—in its antithetical condensation a wonderfully compact description of the de-suturing and re-suturing movement by means of which, in Franco's account, the movement of *mal* and *bien*, of externalization and internalization, of "terrorism" and reason of state in the social fabric are reducible to a closed and regulated economy. Franco's phrase carefully designs and follows a syntactical and conceptual border defined by these three senses, and by the distinct topologies they envision: "What the ideals of our Movement have engraved [or 'infused' or 'mined': *calar*]

in the good Spanish people" suggests the bore, the core-sample that the *Movimiento* draws from the depths of the Spanish people and then introjects, a *movimiento* whose ideology thus comes to reflect these core values of the people it governs; it suggests the infusing of the *Movimiento's* ideology within the matter of the Spanish people, the insertion into or "impregnation" of that interiority by volatile ideals from without (inherited, for instance, from Italian fascism, or from the vanguardist cadre of the Falange itself); and it suggests the superficial patterning that guides the needle's incision, a map upon the skin of the "buen pueblo español." Poised within, without, and upon the very skin of this "good people," Franco's words define the counter-erotic economy of a corporate State body at whose well-policed borders allopaths of every description—immigrants, subversive ideas, commercial products that threaten the competitiveness of local merchandise, etc.—can be turned back.

Or let in at will, of course. Aretxaga's careful analysis of the narratives of state terror closes on a note of qualification that turns out to be particularly apt here. In the mirroring constitution of facing subjectivities "as fetishes of each other" "neither the state nor radical nationalists constitute a homogenous or coherent subject" ("Playing terrorist" 53). And if this is so, then we can expect to find in cultural narratives that link social terror and state or separatist terrorism in a correspondingly mimetic relation what we could call an *excess of excess* in the project of mutual fetishization—an enigmatic double to the part that narrative excess plays in constituting "terror" as the "inside" of the terrorist act and vice-versa, or in constitut-

ing “terrorism” as the intimate “outside” of the strong state (and vice-versa).

Strong as it turns out to be, Franco’s account leaves untouched an aspect of ETA’s version of the assassination that cannot be traded in the counter-erotic economy that his remarks set in place. With the occlusion of the corporate will, the immediate exhaustion of “Carrero” in his symbolic function and the critical rematerialization of Carrero’s symbolic body, the story of Carrero Blanco’s assassination reveals itself to do too much and too little work for the process of inscription and reinscription, undertaken by both ETA, by Franco and by Campo Vidal’s government-informed *circuitos informativos*, to succeed: the grim story “*tiene chiste*.” This unstable an-economy of semiotic and conceptual lack and excess opens the logic of terrorism to a different construction of lived terror. It lodges “en el seno” of the vocabularies of “transition” and “movement” since Carrero’s assassination, and is the proper object for our reflection today.

Think about what might be doubly excessive or doubly lacking in accounts of the assassination of Carrero Blanco. By this I don’t mean to ask whether the act itself is to be condemned or not, or on what grounds—those are crucial questions, but of a different order from the ones I have in mind. Nor do I mean, exactly, the strangely unclosed aspect of the assassination itself—the complex repetitions of which it became susceptible, under one sign or another.⁸ I mean instead to draw attention to those aspects of the *story* of the assassination that exceed its fashionings by Franco, by ETA and by others, or that fall short of the story’s ideological reconstruction *and of* the Oedipalized

“process of historical encryption” that Vilarós has described. If Franco’s *cala* and ETA’s *bomba* (either one) prove inadequate to the event of Carrero’s assassination, it may be because the moment of social terror cannot itself be *fashioned*—though its immediate consequences can to some extent be *managed* (to this or that end). The resistance that the social experience of terror opposes to the borders that one or another organization may draw for it (whether as a form of de-suturing or as a means of re-suturing the social field) itself becomes the source of a sort of tertiary terror, the affect-form in which the critical unveiling of the mechanical principles of State and party fascism—their *chiste*, if you will—is at length undertaken.

What to make, for instance, of the extraordinary *literality* of the assassination itself? Everything about Carrero’s assassination seems to take place between instances of reading and of writing, or between tropically substituted symbols—parts (the parts of bodies) taken for wholes, bodies (those of Carrero and his entourage; those of the ETA commando) emblematically or mistakenly taken for others (for the body of Franco, the conceptual body of the central State; and of course the terrorists were taken for sculptors), events substituted counterphobically for others (the explosion of a gas main for the assassination). Recall that the ETA brigade that planted the bomb marked the spot with a red spot of paint; that the priest who turned from reading on hearing the blast said he saw a car deformed by the explosion into the shape of a letter—the letter “U” or “V”—flying outside the window; that the tunnel in which the explosives were hidden below the street was described as having the shape of the

letter “T.” Note the perverse multiplication of body parts throughout descriptions of the event: remember how it was the victims’ hands alone that father Jiménez Berzal saw when he first ran to the crushed car, and to which he administered the last rites; that the name of the street on which the assassination occurred bears a cryptic, entirely accidental relation to this *sparagmos*—the pronunciation of the word “Coello” in “Claudio Coello” opens from the closed “O” towards the sound of the “U”—the shape of the blasted car—and towards *cuello*, the neck. Recall the odd animism still at work in descriptions of the event: the car’s “jump,” its animalization (still clearer in the Spanish: *arañar*, or “to scratch,” refers us to another figure of aesthetic metamorphosis, Arachne, *arañada* in an even more primitive sense), its personification. Carrero’s assassination was not only foreseeable; neither was it destined to be the mere *object* of intense written and visual polemic. The attack was always already “written,” and took place as it were within the space of a certain *aesthetic* construction (of the state, of the city, of the relation between concrete bodies and what they represent). Or say rather: the radical re-materialization of the State that ETA’s bomb provoked and revealed opened contiguous figures, names, spaces, and geographies to this process of rematerialization. The bomb that killed Carrero scattered and animated the city-scape with a flurry of broken names, bodies, and senses, partial ghosts whose hauntings no *cala* or *corte* could hope to describe or contain.

Take now one of these ghosts: Carrero’s *car*. Campo Vidal excerpts, with signs of shock (“chocante, inconcebible incluso [...] rayana en la irreverencia”), the publicity campaign that Chrysler España

launched after the assassination. “The vehicle has certainly demonstrated [...] its solidity and strength,” ran the advertisement, “since it bore rather well the tremendous explosion that took place right under it, which launched the car to the height of some twenty-five meters.”

The president’s car not only did not disintegrate (as we are sure would have happened to many other cars of different national or international origins, including some more expensive than the Dodge 3700): its doors did not open in its jump to the terrace, thus avoiding that the occupants’ bodies should have flown out, which would have increased the drama of the events [...]. What is more, we have heard that *when the car had landed on the terrace, one of its turning lights was still blinking.* (64, qtd. in *El Economista*)

The grim device of this advertisement is the link it forges between the integrity of the car’s body, the solidity of the *fabricación española* (the Dodge, although a foreign car, is made in Spain—*fabricado en Villaverde*), and the inviolability of the state and the market: the strength of the President’s car embodies and libidinizizes the solid value of the State he heads, and to buy (or acquiesce to the political legitimacy of) the one is to acquiesce to the political legitimacy of (or to consume) the other. The underscored, climactic detail—that the car’s turning signal is still on after the explosion—becomes thus a peculiarly uncanny sign, no longer indicating a (spatial or political) *cambio de movimiento*, but instead signaling the opposite: the signal’s little light makes manifest insistently the internal solidity of the car, its internal and the external spaces at one

under its driver's still hand, still safe from the drama that might have opened another car to lurid interest or critical scrutiny. Marked by this turning sign and by the gesturing hand of the *Caudillo*, inside and outside, *movimiento* and *cambio de movimiento* are sutured together and held apart even and especially when an incision—*corte* or *cala*—has been made in the body politic.

The economization of the Dodge's fragile but persistent turning signal, however, not only confirms Franco's subtle regulation of inside-outside tropes in his *mensaje de fin de año*, it also dramatically unbalances it. How, after all, does one regulate this excess value added to the narrative detail? To the letter? Note again the terms that Campo Vidal uses to express his shock: the advertisement is "inconceivable," its tone "rayana en la irreverencia." The mechanisms that Franco deploys in his *mensaje de fin de año* are indeed these triplets of Enlightenment political economy, the doctrine of *reverence* for a *concept* (the State, say, or "el buen pueblo español") depending for its definition on established and well-policed *borders*—*rayas*, in the topology of this example, or the inviolable interior of the President's car. The libidization of this triplet itself, however, announces the emergence of the field in which Carrero's assassination will be most thoroughly and unpredictably absorbed, the field of a desire-driven commodity-culture no less shocking, inconceivable, and irreverent with respect to the conceptual topology of national identity than the field of terrorist acts it so avidly consumes. The advertising copy for Chrysler España *tiene chiste*: it sings out the unforeseeable and unregulated, excess affect-investment that

undefines the corporate State body whose outline it draws and capitalizes upon.

Here in conclusion is another ghost—this time, the re-awakened ghost for which Carrero substituted, Franco's gesturing body itself. I have suggested that the attack on the President emblemized in the cultural and political imaginary of the early 1970s the threat and pleasures of a lack of (ideological, economic, cultural, physical) closure, and produced in the languages of the political establishment, and in particular in Franco's determining reconstruction of the event, a compensatory counter-eroticization of the reflexive borders that keep the inner and outer spaces of the (State's, people's, Party's) body under the sway of a corporate will. This ghostly emblemizing proves increasingly ungovernable: the content of the assassination is rendered too literal to be exhausted by the mechanics of ETA's substitutive logic, but not literal enough to attach only to a single, given and unrepresentative body; too easily consumed to be restricted to a regulated economy, but never entirely consumed in its circulations in emergent commodity culture. Ungovernable, too, in any conventional *historiographical* sense, for by now the chronological "borders" of the assassination have themselves also become strangely porous. We are not surprised to find, for example, that ETA's blow against Franco's deputy in 1973 repeated, in the form of tragedy, a more or less farcical "blow" that Franco himself had suffered in a hunting accident in 1961. Spaniards were made aware of the accident by means of a bulletin announcing that

[w]hile hunting this afternoon in El Pardo, His Excellency the Head of State

suffered slight wounds in his left hand through an accident of his hunting rifle.

Some days later the daily ABC printed an interview with the attending physician; here again the strange logic of the *Caudillo's mensaje de fin de año* of a decade later is anticipated, in quite a different key—almost, one suspects, *de chiste*:

- Did the Caudillo say anything?
- [Dr. Gil]: When I said to him, “This is exciting,” he answered simply that “People are good.”
- Do you know the specifications of the rifle that failed?
- Not exactly; but it certainly isn't a Spanish rifle. (ABC 27/12/1961)

Gil's “not exactly”—“it *certainly* isn't a Spanish rifle”—captures marvelously the tautologous arrangement of foreign and national, outer and inner identities played out in Franco's words and policies in the nearly two decades that followed. And yet the incident's connection to Carrero's assassination is not as tenuous as it might seem. This early and accidental threat to the *Caudillo's* control of the state was among the principal reasons given for passing the legislation that eventually stipulated the form that the transition would take on Franco's death—legislation that Carrero was instrumental in crafting and in consolidating, legislation from which he had stood to profit so signally. That afternoon in El Pardo, the threat itself concerned the *Caudillo's* wounded hand, but also (and much more importantly) quite a different set of organs. Ramón Soriano recalls Franco's doctors commenting to the Marquis of Villaverde that “It's only a hand. We recently did a check-up on the *Generalísimo*, and everything was

normal. The only exception,” they continued,

‘is that he tends to digest food slowly.’ This observation, which to the lay person might seem a trivial enough detail, was worth keeping in mind for the team of doctors. When under anaesthetic, a body's reflexes disappear, and particularly those that block the entrance of foreign bodies in the lungs and windpipe. In these circumstances, if the patient regurgitates, the contents of the stomach can invade the lungs and choke the patient [...]. The fact that the *Generalísimo* had suffered the accident some two hours after lunch made it probable that the stomach contained something. (16)

The incidental similarities between the accident and the assassination are less significant than the political continuities between the two crises, of course—and yet it is hard to settle precisely on the criteria to be used for distinguishing between “accidental” and “deliberate” or “necessary” similarities or entailments, between the political *content* of the event and the merely *aesthetic* matter in which it is couched, and which may threaten to invade, perhaps even to choke it when the anaesthetic is applied. Consider that matter for a moment—for instance the overdetermined wound to the *Caudillo's* hand, tropically wounded again in 1973, and reemerging in the truncated (and doubled) form of the chauffeur's dead hands, posed upon the steering wheel of the President's car; consider how the “foreign” gun's back-firing finds its aesthetic complement in the failure of “foreign” elements—ETA—to disrupt the characteristics that “el buen pueblo español” carry treasured within their breast, like the grim body of Carrero

within the inviolate Dodge 3700; consider that the President's car was indeed made in the very town—Villaverde—we learn to associate with the Marquis to whom the *Caudillo's* doctors report Franco's rather slow digestion. These are surely "trivial enough details" to the lay person—but they reveal alternative, perhaps even "foreign" "contents" within the political "content" that ostensibly joins the hunting accident to the political assassination. For instance, the cryptic collusion between the Spanish aristocracy (the Marquis of Villaverde), the incipient globalization of labor-markets signaled by the location of Chrysler's assembly plant in Spain (*fabricado en Villaverde*), and the trial of leaders of independent trade unions, scheduled to begin on the day of Carrero's assassination; and for example, that the assassination of Carrero Blanco might well bear examining *as a reflexive act*: the Falange turning upon itself, wounding itself as foreign to itself, a self-mutilation rather than an attack from "outside."

Here then would be a way of speaking to the event from the vantage of the detail, and of sketching out thereby the shape we might ascribe to a transitional thought that arises conditioned by the "movement" it rejects, and yet remains radically external to that movement: anaesthetic thought. Where ETA eroticized the sphincter, anal-ized the street of Claudio Coello, re-embodied Madrid as a body parasitized by a foreign State, and made this body's reflexive, expulsive function the natural figure for the assassination of Carrero, the medical reconstruction of Franco's operation a decade earlier had sought to control and de-eroticize the invasion and expulsion of what the Head

of State had consumed, and of the "foreign" gun that had backfired. When Franco's doctors sought to suture *physically* the wound to his hand, and *aesthetically* the second wound caused to the "transcendent synthesis" of party, State, nation and ruler by the threat to Franco's life, they anticipated unknowingly but with an exemplary clarity the cultural functions of Franco's year-end message—principally, the regulation of exchanges between the inner and outer surfaces of "el buen pueblo español," and the policing of the borders or *rayas* of a concept irreverently breached by ETA. The danger then posed by the anaesthetic lies just where ETA's treatment of the assassination also dwells, just where the reflex movement that keeps an event's political content from being contaminated by its aesthetic expression or vitiated by "trivial enough details" also begins, and also falters: in the failure of corporate mechanisms for regulating the passage from external to internal organs, from the outside of the body to its interior.

I am not making an intentionalist argument. ETA's rationale in the 1973 bombing does not follow in deed or word the description of Franco's operation; the organization does not envision the attack on Carrero in relation to the market processes that Chrysler-España would exploit; the linguistic dissemination of partial ghosts across the geography of the city and across Spain's recent cultural history was not ETA's goal. The assassination of Carrero Blanco works culturally as an unbounded event rather than as a bounded sign or act: it produces languages that designate it and histories that explain it—the anatomies, ideologies, temporality and economies of its sense; it exposes an

underdetermination of social intent and an excess of social affect radically irreducible to any definition of political interest. To put it more compactly: in the domains of Spain's political imaginary, of its economic symbology, and of the narratives forming its national history, the unbounding of terror is a form of thought as well as a model of ethico-political intervention. This an-aesthetic unbounding subjects "terrorism" to the rigors of terror, and subjects the mystification and paralysis to which such "terror" becomes bound (as the sublimity of one or another corporate form) to the ethico-political demands posed in the terrorist act.

I'd like to conclude by mentioning briefly ETA's assassination of Miguel Ángel Blanco in Ermua, in July of 1997. It was possible in the months that followed to believe that the moving images of silently marching crowds, white hands outreached in a gesture that condensed the claim of innocence—hands unspotted by the blood of the killing—and the name of the victim—*manos blancas*, Miguel Ángel Blanco—marked the exhaustion of the instrumental logic of nationalist terrorism, a logic for which the materialization of a corporate body-form itself serves to idealize concepts exempt from critique. It made sense at that time to track two braided strands of Spanish fascism—ETA and the Falange—at the end of the transition along the lines of a hand—*las rayas de la mano*—that reached across sixty years, from the first *falanges* to the *Caudillo's* accident, the death of his *mano derecha*, and the murder of Miguel Ángel Blanco. It seemed useful to offer, as an example of the critical, an-aesthetic thought preliminary to any future post-national republicanisms, the intellectual labor that this tracking still implies—a

work of suturing and de-suturing socio-cultural wounds, of tracking the unbounding movement of cultural resemanticizations within and across historical moments, of making space in political thought for the habitation of social terror. But to believe that such logics "exhaust themselves," or that the "movement" beyond the material and ideological formations that give rise to them can be understood on the model of a spatial displacement—say, the trace of a hand's movement, the movement of a car, the reflex-closure or opening of a frontier or a body—is to set back in place Primo de Rivera's dialectical fantasy of the "*síntesis trascendente [...] indivisible, con fines propios que cumplir*" (66). In that way, too, the twinned assassinations of Carrero and of Miguel Ángel Blanco also radicalize the dangers to which an-aesthetic thought exposes itself—the belief that the cultural critic can act immediately outside the corporativization of university culture, beyond the material determinations that bind and bound his or her speech; the fantasy, in short, that transitional thought acts as explosively as a bomb. In its pathological form—as a fantasy—this belief threatens to rebuild the closure of the act's immediate exhaustion in a sense given it, dialectically or immediately, by the institutional forms that produce it (in the case of Carrero's assassination, as their content: ETA; or as the notional form of an outside that defines the closure of a national identity: Franco's *mensaje de fin de año*). Radical-democratic thought assumes its most precise form—as an ethic of terror, in the sense we have come to understand—when it takes these necessary fantasies as its condition of possibility and as the irreducible object of its critique.

Notes

¹ Earlier versions of this essay were read at conferences at Yale University and at the Center for Literary and Cultural Studies at Harvard. I want to thank the organizers of the Duke colloquium on “Brokering Postnationalist Culture” for their kind invitation. All the translations, except where marked, are my own.

² Matesa, a textiles company directed by an associate of Franco’s Minister of Development, Laureano López Rodó, was discovered in August of 1969 to have been involved in a massive diversion of state funds, obtained through the Banco de Crédito Industrial. These funds had later been used to bankroll projects carried out by the Opus Dei outside of Spain; not surprisingly, it turned out that the principal agents in this intrigue, all high-ranking members of Franco’s government, were themselves members of Opus Dei. A confrontation within the government ensued, between the faction associated with the traditional Falange (Manuel Fraga most prominently), and the *renovadores*, religious technocrats allied with Opus Dei. The appointment of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco as Franco’s successor followed the destitution of a number of cabinet ministers associated with Matesa and with Opus Dei, but as Carrero was himself a close ally of the Opus faction, the *renovador* group within the government paradoxically found its position much more secure *after* the scandal than before it.

³ In late-medieval jurisprudence, *mortmain* refers to a restricted modality of ownership, particularly of tenancies or land, such that these properties held in *mortmain* cannot be sold or expropriated (they are in this sense *entailed* properties). Spanish law preserved the principle of *mort-main* or “ley de manos muertas” until the notorious *desamortizaciones*, or seizures in particular of entailed Church property, carried out by Juan Álvarez Mendizábal between 1834 and 1855.

⁴ Widdowson makes a cogent argument for recovering the notion of “terrorism” as critique:

Terrorism may be, in itself, a ‘charade’; but it is the sign and symptom of a reaction to the terroristic behaviour of the Western liberal democracies, in which there is also a political vacuum

in terms of collective opposition to them. (20)

Consider also Negri’s early argument:

Violence always presents itself to us as synthesis of form and content. In the first place, as an expression of proletarian counterforce, as a manifestation of the process of self-valorization. In the second place, as a destructuring and destabilizing force—which is to say as a *productive force* and as an *anti-institutional force*. It is therefore evident that proletarian violence need not show itself in an exemplary way, nor to choose for itself exemplary objectives or targets [...]. [T]he centrality of violence presents itself all the more as synthesis of content and form; of a form of exclusion, by excluding the enemy; and of rationality, measure, definition of the refusal of labor. Violence is the *rational cord* [*filo razionale*] that binds [*legga*] proletarian valorization to the destructuring of the system, and this destructuring to the destabilization of the regime. Violence is a revolutionary project become effective because the desirability of the content has become the form of the programme, and because this program has been becoming a dictatorship. (67–68)

⁵ See Reinares:

[T]he crisis derives in this way from an evident conflict between two wills: basically, the will to be Basque, and the will to be Spanish. The dialectic between being Basque and being Spanish crystallizes this antagonism in a polarization, while hostility catalyzes the conflict. At the root of the confrontation there is an aspiration, which is understood as a right: the recovery [*la recuperación*] of self-government, of Basque *sovereignty*. (9)

This arrangement of “will,” “aspiration” and “right” bears closer scrutiny than I can give it here, but it is worth noting that Reinares’s last

claim—that the “aspiration” toward self-government has the shape of the “recovery” of an historical formation since lost to a central administration—is still directly contested by Basque *españolistas* like del Burgo.

⁶ The most complete account of the incident is in Bardavío (1974).

⁷ For the function of excretive images as forms of symbolic resistance, see Aretxaga, “Dirty Protest” 125.

⁸ Compare Baeza:

Los grupos antiterroristas, en lucha principalmente contra ETA, FRAP y GRAPO, nacen exactamente el día siguiente del 20 de diciembre de 1973, cuando es asesinado en un atentado terrorista realizado por la ETA el Presidente del Gobierno español, el almirante Luis Carrero Blanco, (68) and Campo Vidal 28-31.

Works Cited

- Aretxaga, Begoña. “Dirty Protest: Symbolic Overdetermination and Gender in Northern Ireland Ethnic Violence.” *Ethos* 23.2 (1995): 123-48.
- . “Playing Terrorist: Ghastly Plots and the Ghostly State.” *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies* 1.1 (2000): 43-58.
- Baeza, Alvaro. *GAL: Crimen de estado*. Madrid: ABL, 1995.
- Balibar, Etienne. “Spinoza: la crainte des masses.” *Spinoza nel 350 Anniversario della Nascita: Atti del Congresso, Urbino, 4-8 ottobre 1982*. Ed. Emilia Giancotti. Naples: Bibliopolis, 1985. 293-320.
- Bardavío, Joaquín. *La crisis: historia de quince días*. Madrid: Sedmay, 1974.
- Bruni, Luigi. *E. T. A.: Historia política de una lucha armada*. Bilbao: Txalaparta Argitaldaria, 1988.
- Burke, Edmund. *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. Oxford: Oxford World’s Classics, 1999.
- Campo Vidal, Manuel. *Información y servicios secretos en el atentado a Carrero Blanco*. Barcelona: Argos Vergara, 1983.
- Clemente, Josep Carles. *Historias de la transición (1973-1981)*. Madrid: Fundamentos, 1994.
- Crenshaw, Martha. “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice.” *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Ed. Walter Reich. Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Cambridge UP, 1990. 7-20.
- Del Burgo, Jaime Ignacio. *Soñando con la Paz: Violencia terrorista y nacionalismo vasco*. Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1994.
- Di Febo, Giuliana. *Teresa d’Avila: Un culto Barocco nella Spagna franchista*. Naples: Liguori Editore, 1988.
- Forest, Eva (writing as Julen Agirre). *Operation Ogro: The Execution of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco*. Trans. Barbara Probst Solomon. New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., 1975.
- Fuente, Ismael, Javier García, and Joaquín Prieto. *Golpe mortal: Asesinato de Carrero y agonía del franquismo*. Madrid: El País/PRISA, 1983.
- Herrero, Luis. *El ocaso del régimen: Del asesinato de Carrero a la muerte de Franco*. Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy, 1995.
- Kintzler, Catherine. “Terreur et vertu: Métaphysique, morale et esthétique au comble du politique.” *La République et la terreur*. Ed. Catherine Kintzler and Hadi Rizk. Paris: Kimé, 1995. 3-20.
- Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. London: Verso, 1985.
- Laqueur, Walter. *The Age of Terrorism*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1987.
- Marighella, Carlos. *The Terrorist Classic: Manual of the Urban Guerrilla*. Ed. and trans. Gene Hanrahan. Chapel Hill: Documentary Publications, 1985.
- Negri, Antonio. *Il dominio e il sabotaggio*. Milan: Feltrinelli, 1978.
- Piñuel, José Luis. *El terrorismo en la transición española*. Madrid: Editorial Fundamentos, 1986.
- Preston, Paul. *Franco: A Biography*. New York: Basic Books, 1994.

- Reinares, Fernando. *Violencia y política en Euskadi*. Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer, 1984.
- Soriano, Ramón. *La mano izquierda de Franco*. Madrid: Planeta, 1981.
- Tusell, Javier, and Genoveva García Queipo de Llano. *Carrero: la eminencia gris del régimen de Franco*. Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy, 1993.
- Vilarós, Teresa. *El mono del desencanto: Una crítica cultural de la transición española (1973-1993)*. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1998.
- Vizcaíno Casas, Fernando. *1973/El año en que volaron a Carrero Blanco*. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1993.
- Widdowson, Peter. "Terrorism and Literary Studies." *Textual Practice* 2.1 (1988): 1-21.

