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ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the role performed by mothers in affecting their childrens' performance at school. The article develops firstly a theoretical model in which household (parent - child pair) is treated as an individual, whose utility depends both on the performance at school of the student and on consumption. The model focuses on the different possibilities through which help of mothers may affect pupil's performance both in terms of time devoted to supervision and spillover effects. Empirical evidence then, using PISA 2006 and focusing on Italian case, shows that education of mothers is an issue when interacted with her occupational status. Highly educated mothers have a positive impact on students' score only when they are highly qualified in the job market.

JEL Codes: J12, J24, I21

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1 Introduction

Achievement is a multidimensional concept. An individual may remain poor but reach a respected position in the community he lives in, or he may earn a high income in an ill-famed profession, have a good school or army record, or again he simply may succeed in living up to his/her standards, whatever they are. In this paper we discuss a particularly important type of achievement, namely school achievement, and the relationship between children's achievement and their parents' education level. As Haveman and Wolfe (1995) put it:

"(...) perhaps the most fundamental factor [among those influencing child's educational attainment] is the human capital of parents, typically measured by the number of school years attained. This variable (...) is included in virtually every study described [in their paper] (...); it is statistically significant and quantitatively important, no matter how it is defined."

In this paper we do not challenge this conclusion, but try to look in more depth into it. The question is, as the title of the paper says, *why* is parents' education so important in children performance. We begin by concisely reviewing two issues related to the influence of the family on children performance, while the third one lies at the core of the paper.

The first issue is the well known "nature or nurture?" question. Parents pass on to their children their genetic endowment. To the extent that school achievement depends on genetic factors, there might be no genuine causal relationship running from parents' to children's school achievements, both being explained by the common genetic endowment. The idea that "genetics explains all", has far-reaching implications for the very conception of equality among human beings and for public policies pursuing such equality. This explains why this issue has been the subject of recurring harsh public debates (see for instance Jensen (1969), Kamin (1974), Herrnstein-Murray (1994)). The typical methods of behavioural genetics (i.e. studies on twins and adoptees) have been used not only by genetists but also by scholars with a social and economic orientation (see Bound-Solon (1999), Holmlund, et al. (2008) and Pronzato (2008) for comparison among methods). As a whole, it seems that although genetic factors are non-negligible, they account for a partial share of the individual's performance (see for instance Thompson et al. (1991) and DeFries et al. (2001)).

Once the relative weights of nature and nurture are established, much remains to be said about what "nurture" is and how it works. The next important question regards the relative weights of family- versus non-family influences. Even in disciplines usually very keen on within-family effects, like developmental psychology, the issue of non-family effects emerges (see for instance the heated debate stimulated in the psychologists' field by Harris (1998)). On the

other hand, even if one is willing to stress the influences coming from the social environment at large, nevertheless one would agree that such influences are possibly mediated by the family environment (see also Patacchini-Zenou (2004) for a choice-based approach to the issue). Almost all recent studies based on the OECD -PISA database (see in particular Fertig-Schmidt (2002) , Fertig (2003), Bratti et. al. (2007), Sprietsma (2006), Fuchs and Woessman (2004) , Ammermullaer (2004)) include and emphasize background variables like territorial factors or the immigrant condition as explanatory variables. In this paper too a wide array of these background variables is taken into account.

The third important question is the nature of within-family influences. As economists, we are particularly interested in distinguishing between influences which require a specific allocation of resources and those which do not (see Becker and Tomes (1986) for an early contribution). Day-by-day interaction within the family influences *per se* the performance of children : just think of how transmission of ethical values, through moral suasion or personal example may induce or not children to put effort into studying; of how critical events such as death or divorce or long-term factors like the number of siblings can affect the school performance of children (Woessman (2003)). Notice also that, in these examples, the influence is in principle independent of the parents' human capital and, always in general, it may not require any specific allocation of time or other resources to the task. In other cases it is still true that no time/resource allocation is needed for the influence to take place, but human capital may instead be required. This happens with within-family knowledge spillovers: the simplest example is how children may learn a correct and sophisticated use of language by everyday exchanges with correctly speaking parents.

There are, finally, forms of influence of parents on the school achievement of children which require time . These include on the one hand supervision activities, which *per se* are independent of parents' human capital (like for instance controlling that children do their homework or regularly meeting teachers); on the other hand there are assistance activities which require both time and human capital (for instance, helping children when studying) .

Which of the influences described is more or less relevant to child's school performance is an issue of some policy import. Were supervision time the sole factor influencing school performance, increasing the level of education of parents would be not beneficial (on this particular respect) , since it would increase the opportunity cost of time for parents and reduce their propensity to spend time in supervising children. If instead knowledge spillovers were the key factor, the conclusion would be the reverse one. Then understanding why is parents' education important may help in designing long-term education policies. There is a rather sensitive point to be made here. In this paragraph and in the model of the next one, we speak of "parent" and "parents" without any specification of gender; all we say applies in principle to mothers and fathers alike. The economics of education literature is however rather keen on this kind of distinction . (some recent contributions are Holmlund et al. (2008), Pronzato (2008), Behrman et al. (1997), Andrabi et al. (2009)). There are good reasons for this

interest. The main one is that any notion of development meaning more than GDP growth, includes improving women education levels as a critical goal; then the effects of women education vis-a-vis male education become crucial. The other one is that that women and men play different roles within family. The nature and the strength of social and cultural background determines what such roles are and how strict or interchangeable they are; to the extent that different roles are systematically played, the same education level in mother and father might have differential impact on the children performance. As we shall see later, our data seem to confirm that the impact of mother's education is more complex than that of father's. However we do not offer explanations of this difference. We simply take it as given and discuss at some length the evidence concerning mother's education.

In this paper we model the parents' choice about the allocation of time between labour and children "guidance", which includes both supervision (guidance time whose effectiveness is independent of parents' education) and assistance (guidance time whose effectiveness might in principle be sensitive to parents' education). Parents are characterized by a level of education and by an occupational status, which are observable, and by an underlying unobserved characteristic (parents' quality) which is related to education and to the occupational status in a non-deterministic way. (Section 2). The model provides an interpretative framework for some of the results we obtain in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper.

2 A model of parental support

Let us consider the household (the parent-child pair) as an individual agent whose utility depends on s (the school achievement of the child, as measured by the test score), and on consumption c . Suppose that the household then maximizes the following utility function

$$\max u(c, s) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + s^\alpha c^\gamma \quad (1)$$

This functional form allows for a decreasing marginal utility of consumption and for some complementarity between consumption and child's performance. Parents are characterized by two parameters: one, discrete and observable e , the education attainment, which takes values $e_0 < e_1 < e_2$. The other, continuous and unobservable, q corresponds to the "quality" of the individual. This is related to education, in the sense that for $e = e_i$ ($i = 0, 1, 2$), the quality q of an individual with e_i is $q = e_i + \epsilon$, where ϵ is a random variable with mean 0. Then, if $e_i > e_j$:

$$prob \{q \geq \hat{q}; e_i\} = 1 - F(\hat{q} - e_i) > 1 - F(\hat{q} - e_j) = prob \{q \geq \hat{q}; e_j\}$$

where $F(\cdot)$ is the distribution function of ϵ . The parent owns a time endowment T which he/she can employ in the labour market, earning a wage $w(q)$, or in supervising the child in studying. $w(q)$ is a Mincer function with $w'(q) > 0$. If we denote as h the time devoted to supervision, the budget constraint is

$$c = w(q)(T - h)$$

School achievement s depends on h through the following education production function (Hanushek (2008))

$$s = kh + b(q) \quad (2)$$

$b(q)$ is a continuous increasing function of q , while k depends on q in the following way

$$k(q) = \begin{cases} k_H & \text{if } q > q_0 \\ k_L & \text{if } q \leq q_0 \end{cases}$$

for some threshold q_0 , with $k_H > k_L$. We therefore assume that the ability of a parent in assisting the children changes with the parent's quality level, but in a discrete way and only at relatively low levels of education. Then the parent's quality affects children performance both directly ($b(q)$) and through a higher efficiency in the use of time devoted to children assistance.

Now let us consider an individual with a given quality level $q > q_0$. After suitable substitutions, the objective function becomes:

$$\varphi(h, q) = \frac{[w(q)(T - h)]^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + (kh + b(q))^\alpha [w(q)(T - h)]^\gamma \quad (3)$$

where $k = k_H$. The necessary condition for an internal solution is

$$\varphi_h(h, q) = -w(q)^{1-\sigma} (T - h)^{-\sigma} + (kh + b(q))^\alpha w(q)^\gamma (T - h)^\gamma \left\{ \alpha k (kh + b(q))^{-1} - \gamma (T - h)^{-1} \right\} = 0 \quad (4)$$

Hence:

$$(kh + b(q))^\alpha = \frac{w(q)^{1-\sigma-\gamma} (T-h)^{-\sigma-\gamma}}{\alpha k (kh + b(q))^{-1} - \gamma (T-h)^{-1}} \quad (5)$$

For sufficiently small changes in q , the full impact on the test score s is given by:

$$\frac{ds}{dq} = k(q) \frac{dh}{dq} + b_q \quad (6)$$

The full expression for $\frac{dh}{dq}$ is $\frac{dh}{dq} = -\frac{\varphi_{hq}}{\varphi_{hh}}$, where $\varphi_{hh} < 0$; therefore, as q increases (by sufficiently small amounts), h changes according to the sign of the following expression

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi_{hq}(h, q) &= (\sigma - 1 + \gamma) w(q)^{1-\sigma} (T-h)^{-\sigma} \frac{w_q}{w(q)} + \\ &+ \left[\frac{(\alpha-1)k(kh+b(q))^{-1-\gamma}(T-h)^{-1}}{\alpha k(kh+b(q))^{-1}-\gamma(T-h)^{-1}} \right] \alpha w(q)^{1-\sigma} (T-h)^{-\sigma} (kh+b(q))^{-1} b_q \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

Equation (7) summarizes the two components of the impact of q on h . In the absence of a direct effect ($b_q = 0$), the sign of φ_{hq} depends on $(\sigma - 1 + \gamma)$. If there is no complementarity between consumption and school achievement ($\gamma = 0$) it is still possible that an increase in e increases the amount of family support (a rapidly declining marginal utility of consumption is required, i.e. $\sigma > 1$). The sign of the second term is also ambiguous. If $\alpha < 1$, it is certainly negative: a higher value of q increases the direct spillovers, so that the parent can reduce the time devoted to children assistance. By means of some tedious calculations, however, it can be shown that the term

$$\frac{1}{\varphi_{hh}} \left\{ \varphi_{hh} - \left[\frac{(\alpha-1)k(kh+b(q))^{-1-\gamma}(T-h)^{-1}}{\alpha k(kh+b(q))^{-1}-\gamma(T-h)^{-1}} \right] \alpha w(q)^{1-\sigma} (T-h)^{-\sigma} (kh+b(q))^{-1} \right\}$$

which represents the overall contribution of the term b_q to the variation of s , is always positive.

Suppose on the other hand that q changes from some initial level $\underline{q} < q_0$ to $\underline{q} + \Delta q > q_0$, where Δq is finite. Then we have the following change in the test score

$$\frac{\Delta s}{\Delta q} = k_L \frac{h(\underline{q} + \Delta q) - h(\underline{q})}{\Delta q} + \frac{b(\underline{q} + \Delta q) - b(\underline{q})}{\Delta q} + (k_H - k_L) \frac{h(\underline{q} + \Delta q)}{\Delta q} \quad (8)$$

While the first and the second term in (8) are the discrete counterparts of the two terms of (6), the term $(k_H - k_L) \frac{h(q+\Delta q)}{\Delta q}$, unambiguously positive, appears only in this discrete case. Now, if we compare two parents, A and B with education levels respectively e_0 and e_2 , the probability that $q_A < q_0$ and $q_B > q_0$ is: $F(q_0 - e_0) [1 - F(q_0 - e_2)]$, while if we compare parents C and B , where the education level of C is e_1 , the probability that $q_C < q_0$ and $q_B > q_0$ is $F(q_0 - e_1) [1 - F(q_0 - e_2)]$. This means that we are more likely to observe the effect described by the term $(k_H - k_L) \frac{h(q+\Delta q)}{\Delta q}$ when we compare a low level of education with higher levels, rather than when comparing levels both relatively high.

Unfortunately, we do not observe h nor q , but only e and y , the occupational status of the parent. The occupational status (y_{bl} =blue collar-low qualified, y_{bh} =blue collar-high qualified, y_{wl} =white collar-low qualified, y_{wh} =white collar-high qualified, u = unemployed) is assumed to signal, however imperfectly, both the quality of the parent and the use of time he/she makes. More precisely we assume:

$$\frac{\text{prob}\{y_{wh}; e, q \geq \hat{q}\}}{\text{prob}\{e; y_{wh}\} \text{prob}\{y_{wh}\}} = \frac{\text{prob}\{e, q \geq \hat{q}; y_{wh}\} \text{prob}\{y_{wh}\}}{\text{prob}\{e, q \geq \hat{q}\}} > \text{prob}\{y_{wh}; e\} = \frac{\text{prob}\{e; y_{wh}\} \text{prob}\{y_{wh}\}}{\text{prob}\{e\}}, \text{ i.e.}$$

$$\frac{\text{prob}\{e, q \geq \hat{q}; y_{wh}\}}{\text{prob}\{e, q \geq \hat{q}\}} > \frac{\text{prob}\{e; y_{wh}\}}{\text{prob}\{e\}} \quad (9)$$

This assumption simply means that the probability of an individual getting a high qualified, white collar job is higher if he/she has a given level of education *and* he/she is of high quality, than in the case he/she simply has that level of education. Notice that since by definition:

$$\text{prob}\{e, q \geq \hat{q}; y_{wh}\} = \frac{\text{prob}\{e, q \geq \hat{q}, y_{wh}\}}{\text{prob}\{y_{wh}\}} \quad \text{and} \quad \text{prob}\{e, y_{wh}; q \geq \hat{q}\} = \frac{\text{prob}\{e, q \geq \hat{q}, y_{wh}\}}{\text{prob}\{q \geq \hat{q}\}}$$

we have

$$\text{prob}\{e, q \geq \hat{q}; y_{wh}\} \frac{\text{prob}\{y_{wh}\}}{\text{prob}\{q \geq \hat{q}\}} = \text{prob}\{e, y_{wh}; q \geq \hat{q}\} \quad (10)$$

We can easily prove the following lemma

Lemma 1 *Under assumption (9) : $\text{prob}\{q \geq \hat{q}; e, y_{wh}\} > \text{prob}\{q \geq \hat{q}; e\}$*

$$\frac{\text{prob}\{q \geq \hat{q}; e, y_{wh}\}}{\text{prob}\{e; q \geq \hat{q}\} \text{prob}\{q \geq \hat{q}\}} = \frac{\text{prob}\{e, y_{wh}; q \geq \hat{q}\} \text{prob}\{q \geq \hat{q}\}}{\text{prob}\{e, y_{wh}\}} > \text{prob}\{q \geq \hat{q}; e\} = \frac{\text{prob}\{e; q \geq \hat{q}\} \text{prob}\{q \geq \hat{q}\}}{\text{prob}\{e\}} \quad \text{that is:} \quad \frac{\text{prob}\{e, y_{wh}; q \geq \hat{q}\}}{\text{prob}\{e, y_{wh}\}} > \frac{\text{prob}\{e; q \geq \hat{q}\}}{\text{prob}\{e\}}$$

Proof. By assumption: $\frac{\text{prob}\{e, q \geq \hat{q}; y_{wh}\}}{\text{prob}\{e, q \geq \hat{q}\}} > \frac{\text{prob}\{e; y_{wh}\}}{\text{prob}\{e\}}$. Substituting (10) we get:

$$\frac{\text{prob}\{e, y_{wh}; q \geq \hat{q}\}}{\text{prob}\{e, q \geq \hat{q}\}} \frac{\text{prob}\{q \geq \hat{q}\}}{\text{prob}\{y_{wh}\}} > \frac{\text{prob}\{e; y_{wh}\}}{\text{prob}\{e\}}$$

that is:

$$\text{prob}\{e, y_{wh}; q \geq \hat{q}\} > \frac{\text{prob}\{e, y_{wh}\}}{\text{prob}\{e\}} \text{prob}\{e; q \geq \hat{q}\}$$

$$\text{or: } \frac{\text{prob}\{e, y_{wh}; q \geq \hat{q}\}}{\text{prob}\{e, y_{wh}\}} > \frac{\text{prob}\{e; q \geq \hat{q}\}}{\text{prob}\{e\}}$$

According to our assumption, we should then expect that a high level of education associated with a high qualified, white collar job is also associated to a high quality level of the parent. Assuming that being unemployed signals quality, i.e. that the probability of being unemployed is larger for low-quality individuals, is certainly too rash; on the contrary, it seems reasonable to assume that being unemployed signals that the opportunity cost of parent's time is rather low, and therefore it should, *ceteris paribus*, lead to more assistance to children. ■

3 Data and method

The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an OECD survey for educational attainment which tests 15 year-old students in the subjects of mathematics, science and reading proficiency. We use the 2006 cross-section, which includes data about the 24 OECD countries plus other 33 countries.

Along with test scores in reading, math and science, information is collected about many characteristics in a students' and in a school questionnaire¹.

The students' questionnaire contains information about family background, socio-economic status in terms of ownership of durable goods, a specific focus on science² issues.

The school's questionnaire contains information about number of students enrolled, number of teachers part-time and full-time employed, quality of infrastructure, type of funds which the school receives (public or private).

For a detailed description of PISA dataset, see OECD (2006).

Looking at data used for this analysis, the Italian sample consists of 21773 students and 799 schools.

Italy is one of the worst achievers among industrialised countries in terms of PISA scores. OECD 2006 is no exception. In this paragraph, the distributions

¹A parents' questionnaire is available for some of the countries containing information about parents' perception of students' achievement, but we do not use this data

²It's the reference theme for 2006

of test scores for Italy is presented. Non-parametric kernel density estimates describe the score distribution of the country.

Figure 1 displays the test score distributions for reading and math tests in the case of Italy (ITA). In the next few sections we proceed to econometric analysis. The average reading score is 486 points, while for math the average score is 482 points.




Figure 1

In order to perform our econometric analysis, we divide the scores into 3 quantiles, defined at 0.15, 0.50 and 0.85. The assumption behind this choice is that we can discriminate three levels of students: low performing, average students and high performing students.

We then run quantile regressions to catch the effects of a specified set of regressors on the performance of students in different parts of the distribution, testing different dependent variables: score in math; overall average score³ ; the overall average score relative to school of attendance.

The set of controls does include: age and gender of student; his/her migration status⁴ ; a variable saying if pupils speak a different language from that of the school's country; school's type⁵, school's region⁶, education of both mother and

³ Arithmetic mean of math, reading and science tests.

⁴ We consider as migrants the students who were born in a different country from that of the school they attend

⁵ Lyceum or technical institute

⁶ The variables says if the school is in the North or in the South of Italy

father⁷ ; occupational status of both mother and father⁸, a composite index for socio-economic status at family level ; the number of books owned at home⁹, the lack of qualified math teachers; city size¹⁰; the presence of other school of the same type in the neighbourhood; availability of computers at school; a variable saying if the students studies at home; a variable saying if the students takes out of school lectures.

Education is treated as a set of dummy variables saying if the parent has low education, a high school diploma or a degree.

The database contains some information about employment status of parents, although not as detailed as we perhaps would like. Since we know if working parents are white or blue collars, high or low qualified, we assume that individuals who are not classified neither as blue- nor white collars but that are registered in the dataset are not working.

Finally, we introduce an interaction term containing the educational level variable and the indicator of the occupational status.

4 Estimation Results

If we look at variables other than parent related ones, we find a number of standard result, along with some less conventional suggestions. A general feature is that many coefficients become smaller in absolute value as we consider higher quantiles. The likely meaning of this feature is that adverse factors are compensated for by increasing student's talent, while favorable influences become less and less crucial to the final performance. Unsurprising results are obtained as regards the school's type, the region and the non-native condition: attending a technical school¹¹, living in the southern regions and being a non-native entail lower scores. More precisely, students of lyceums get on average 45 points more than student of technical schools. Students in the north of Italy get on average 30 points more than students in the south. Being a non native student determines a 20-25 lower scores than that of native students.

Two less conventional results are:

a) the coefficient for spoken language at home is positive, which means that *per se* speaking a foreign language constitutes an asset (while, as we have seen, being an immigrant is not).

b) Males perform on average better than females in math (which is a commonly found result): however, the coefficient is increasing with the quantile considered, a phenomenon for which an explanation is needed.

⁷Edum and Eduf in the results

⁸Msecateg and Fsecateg in the results

⁹The variable is a dummy with different categories, going from 0 to more than 500 books

¹⁰village with less than 3000 people; small town (between 3000 and 15000 people); town (15000 up to 100000 people); city (100000 up to 1milion people); large city (more than 1 milion people)

¹¹Italian high school system is basically split into pre-university institutes, like classical and scientific lyceums, and more technical and professional schools

As regards parents' education, the coefficients referred to father's contribution are significant and positive on average. The weight of the coefficient is rather small in comparison to that of the mother, with the expected sign.

As regards mothers, three main results are obtained

1. While holding a high school degree has a positive and significant impact on child's performance, the coefficient associated to graduated mothers is negative and significant. In terms of the model, if we assume that there exists a threshold q_0 at which the mother's skill in assisting children when studying increases to a high level (k_L to k_H), we might interpret this result by saying that the threshold is likely to be reached when the parent earns a high school degree. This explains the strong observed effect. When the parent earns a university degree, k_H does not increase anymore.
2. The fact that the mother works has a positive impact on the performance of their child. If anything, this outcome signals that allocation of time to children assistance or supervision is not the key factor for a good child's performance.
3. When we control for the occupational status of mothers, the interaction between being graduated and holding a high qualified job has a positive impact on the performance of pupils, with higher impact for students with a lower score. This is all the more significant if we remind that holding a university degree per se has a negative impact of children's behaviour. The effect of being a high qualified white collar mother translates, on average, into a 20 points higher score of the student.

We check the robustness of results by trying different dependent variables, e.g. the math score and the relative score computed with respect to the school average score. We also ran regressions clustered for school. These estimates confirm the previously exposed results.

We also estimated the same models for different countries in PISA dataset: namely, Sweden and Portugal. We followed here the work by Ammermueller (2004) and Canova and Vaglio (2010). Sweden is a Scandinavian country which we choose according to traditional development of welfare state of countries within this area, while Portugal, besides very similar to Italy as regards the distribution of the PISA scores, may also be considered similar to Italy with respect of the general structure of the cultural context belonging to the Mediterranean model of welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1996).

Portugal yields a set of results very close to those concerning Italy, which comforts us on the robustness of estimates. Swedish data instead produces remarkably different outcomes. Since the Swedish socio-economic and cultural context is commonly held to be completely different from the "Mediterranean" model common to Italy and Portugal, it is reasonable to conjecture that these social and economic context variables could be of some help in explaining the peculiar features of mother's education.

Results of these regressions are presented in Appendix A.

Table 1 -Quantile regressions: results for 0.15, 0.50, 0.85 quantiles: overall scores

VARIABLES	(1) q15	(2) q50	(3) q85
sex	2.341 (1.904)	10.52*** (1.346)	14.23*** (2.315)
lyceum	59.83*** (1.172)	53.06*** (0.792)	42.80*** (0.820)
employed	89.02* (48.24)	70.18*** (15.10)	18.05 (15.37)
_leduf_2	11.03*** (1.712)	8.567*** (1.914)	12.37*** (1.930)
_leduf_3	-8.103*** (2.778)	-3.238 (2.470)	3.967** (1.727)
_ledum_2	8.843*** (1.594)	13.23*** (1.002)	9.953*** (2.447)
_ledum_3	-25.01*** (6.593)	-17.99*** (3.281)	-12.48* (6.950)
_lmsecateg_1	2.911 (5.144)	5.358** (2.163)	4.719 (3.476)
_leduXmse_2_1	-3.782 (7.201)	-5.562 (3.446)	-2.724 (3.034)
_leduXmse_3_1	26.21*** (10.63)	22.90*** (5.606)	19.20*** (4.747)
fsecateg	5.742*** (1.404)	2.817 (1.880)	1.304 (3.186)
migrant_student	-37.67*** (4.172)	-33.10*** (3.897)	-20.45*** (5.989)
_lforeign_1_1	20.81*** (1.666)	16.05*** (1.978)	12.21*** (1.175)
escs	5.330*** (0.660)	3.954** (1.548)	0.517 (1.677)
_lnr_books_2	15.45*** (1.845)	12.98*** (3.244)	19.92*** (5.128)
_lnr_books_3	30.71*** (2.975)	30.18*** (1.858)	38.48*** (3.995)
_lnr_books_4	41.18*** (4.277)	42.46*** (3.009)	51.58*** (4.231)
_lnr_books_5	53.08*** (2.393)	49.30*** (2.815)	60.40*** (3.343)
_lnr_books_6	60.01*** (6.718)	61.18*** (4.173)	70.01*** (1.731)
no_sch_available	-4.639* (2.558)	-6.022** (2.971)	0.118 (2.645)
_lcity_size_2	15.92*** (5.160)	21.02*** (6.962)	18.13*** (8.401)
_lcity_size_3	29.80*** (4.677)	34.42*** (6.144)	25.38*** (7.698)
_lcity_size_4	35.01*** (4.785)	40.29*** (6.330)	33.66*** (5.127)
_lcity_size_5	27.82*** (9.669)	36.05*** (6.826)	21.63*** (7.209)
school_north	39.45*** (1.190)	37.46*** (1.783)	31.86*** (1.800)
study_out	-45.58*** (2.988)	-47.23*** (1.267)	-50.61*** (3.075)
selfstudy	10.44*** (2.376)	4.098* (2.094)	-0.593 (1.225)
Observations	15192	15192	15192

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

* denote level of significance: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%

5 Conclusions

Why is parents' education so important? The general finding of this paper is that parents' education influences children achievement through indirect channels rather than through relatively time-intensive channels. Motivation, knowledge spillover, provision of a material and emotional environment enhancing school performance seem therefore to be the driving factor. This is particularly important if we think that these results refer to mother's education and use of time (e.g. women access to the job market), which are two key issues in the discussion over women role in the society: our results mean that an educated and high qualified mother benefits the school achievement of her children independently, at least to some extent, of the time she devotes to direct supervision and help. Were our conclusions confirmed by further research, then those institutional arrangements which enhance women education and participation to the job market (and to the most qualified segments thereof), would receive further support.

The policy relevance of such a conclusion is important in terms of design of social policies aiming at helping mothers through childcare allowances or other public transfer, which, at the same time, do not preclude job perspectives of beneficiaries. The relevance of the issue is striking for a country like Italy which is traditionally considered an example of the familistic welfare state model (Esping Andersen, 1990) and that experiences an overheated debate about the possibility of reforming radically education system.

The main evidence seems to be that quantity of time devoted to education of children is not a driving factor in having an impact on the performance of students. Parents who have invested in human capital have a strong positive impact on students' scores and the quality of their job is relevant. Spill-over effects or personal example provided by parents is probably playing a role here and must be taken into consideration as an evidence that pupils' educational attainment is the multidimensional result of many factors, requiring therefore targeted public interventions for each of them,

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Appendix A

Quantile regressions: results for 0.15, 0.50, 0.85 quantiles: overall relative scores

VARIABLES	(1) q15	(2) q50	(3) q85
sex	0.0236 (0.0354)	0.0670*** (0.0224)	0.0926*** (0.00668)
lyceum	0.0759*** (0.0201)	-0.0681*** (0.0158)	-0.191*** (0.0412)
employed	0.785*** (0.279)	0.338 (0.912)	0.554 (0.458)
_Ieduf_2	0.0662*** (0.00760)	0.0435* (0.0230)	0.0572* (0.0298)
_Ieduf_3	-0.0664 (0.0575)	-0.0552 (0.0424)	-0.0381 (0.0667)
_Iedum_2	0.0358 (0.0366)	0.0755*** (0.0161)	0.0707* (0.0401)
_Iedum_3	-0.296*** (0.0873)	-0.240*** (0.0486)	-0.184*** (0.0429)
_Imsecateg_1	0.00970 (0.0772)	0.0156 (0.0262)	-0.0149 (0.0463)
_IeduXmse_2_1	0.00708 (0.0960)	-0.0172 (0.0345)	-0.00900 (0.0310)
_IeduXmse_3_1	0.308** (0.131)	0.335*** (0.0438)	0.312*** (0.0621)
fsecateg	-0.00126 (0.0224)	0.0405 (0.0281)	0.0582*** (0.0160)
migrant_student	-0.553*** (0.0352)	-0.402*** (0.0454)	-0.284*** (0.0288)
_Iforeign_1_1	0.129*** (0.0207)	0.0195 (0.0259)	-0.0348 (0.0356)
escs	0.0449 (0.0337)	-0.0281 (0.0216)	-0.0710*** (0.0142)
_Inr_books_2	0.162*** (0.0463)	0.155*** (0.0284)	0.0853*** (0.00937)
_Inr_books_3	0.311*** (0.0535)	0.275*** (0.0394)	0.247*** (0.0155)
_Inr_books_4	0.444*** (0.0677)	0.384*** (0.0348)	0.338*** (0.0215)
_Inr_books_5	0.523*** (0.0820)	0.437*** (0.0389)	0.445*** (0.0410)
_Inr_books_6	0.610*** (0.0746)	0.598*** (0.0834)	0.608*** (0.0872)
no_sch_available	-0.0183 (0.0210)	0.00295 (0.0172)	0.0354 (0.0312)
_Icity_size_2	0.0376 (0.137)	-0.0998 (0.0696)	-0.173* (0.100)
_Icity_size_3	0.116 (0.145)	-0.0869 (0.0878)	-0.192* (0.110)

Quantile regressions: results for 0.15, 0.50, 0.85 quantiles: math scores

VARIABLES	(1) q15	(2) q50	(3) q85
sex	25.60*** (1.911)	33.93*** (1.926)	37.27*** (1.369)
lyceum	52.73*** (1.488)	46.54*** (1.119)	40.28*** (1.473)
employed	106.5*** (32.79)	67.69* (39.78)	17.75*** (4.851)
_Ieduf_2	8.881*** (2.217)	8.397*** (2.870)	13.53*** (1.996)
_Ieduf_3	-5.819* (3.001)	0.816 (1.912)	9.119*** (1.799)
_Iedum_2	10.06** (4.163)	10.02*** (1.858)	8.787*** (1.655)
_Iedum_3	-28.55*** (2.927)	-21.14*** (3.165)	-17.25*** (6.031)
_Imsecateg_1	6.022 (5.913)	7.199 (4.543)	6.086 (6.242)
_IeduXmse_2_1	-4.767 (8.057)	-3.939 (4.840)	0.559 (6.857)
_IeduXmse_3_1	23.49*** (3.111)	17.08** (6.713)	20.11*** (3.010)
fsecateg	3.610** (1.583)	4.135*** (1.408)	2.921 (2.358)
migrant_student	-34.11*** (5.652)	-25.61*** (2.796)	-23.71*** (6.746)
_Iforeign_1_1	20.68*** (2.387)	22.23*** (1.799)	21.12*** (2.051)
escs	6.426** (2.752)	3.426*** (0.481)	-1.354 (2.709)
_Inr_books_2	7.143 (5.287)	9.068*** (3.140)	12.94** (6.572)
_Inr_books_3	26.45*** (3.157)	29.44*** (4.587)	33.68*** (4.302)
_Inr_books_4	31.60*** (1.689)	39.52*** (4.361)	49.35*** (5.457)
_Inr_books_5	49.10*** (1.222)	50.62*** (1.448)	61.50*** (6.461)
_Inr_books_6	51.20*** (2.825)	58.20*** (5.744)	69.43*** (3.884)
no_sch_available	-4.386** (2.004)	-2.557 (1.703)	-0.0499 (3.078)
_Icity_size_2	14.46*** (3.758)	22.39*** (3.680)	10.50* (5.636)
_Icity_size_3	25.48*** (3.521)	31.84*** (3.750)	19.62*** (5.544)

Quantile regressions: results for 0.15, 0.50, 0.85 quantiles: math score for Portugal

VARIABLES	(1) q15	(2) q50	(3) q85
sex	22.83*** (4.647)	24.45*** (2.754)	25.49*** (1.839)
employed	-86.26** (41.40)	-23.09* (12.71)	41.47* (21.84)
lyceum	-73.01*** (4.619)	-79.11*** (1.001)	-77.54*** (1.759)
_Ieduf_2	-6.534 (8.012)	-6.575 (4.704)	-1.862 (3.431)
_Ieduf_3	-20.57* (11.74)	-12.19*** (3.829)	-2.972 (10.45)
_Iedum_2	9.328* (4.989)	4.413* (2.516)	-1.980 (6.005)
_Iedum_3	-19.86 (20.39)	-15.34 (10.05)	-13.11*** (4.189)
_Imsecateg_1	8.248 (9.389)	22.14*** (7.412)	8.850 (8.417)
_IeduXmse_2_1	-5.330 (21.25)	-16.18 (12.97)	-9.488 (8.303)
_IeduXmse_3_1	30.07** (14.47)	6.825 (9.285)	19.79 (12.42)
fsecateg	13.47** (6.395)	18.00*** (4.036)	13.03*** (3.428)
migrant_student	-13.25** (6.550)	-9.175 (5.848)	5.551 (10.95)
_Iforeign_1_1	16.08 (20.52)	20.64 (15.81)	21.66* (11.55)
escs	11.06*** (2.798)	6.509*** (1.099)	1.830 (3.782)
_Inr_books_2	3.031 (5.600)	-0.842 (5.329)	3.538 (6.181)
_Inr_books_3	31.70*** (6.094)	19.39*** (4.055)	24.73*** (4.979)
_Inr_books_4	29.97*** (8.970)	20.49*** (4.388)	35.63*** (3.588)
_Inr_books_5	33.69*** (10.16)	32.27*** (10.23)	53.31*** (11.42)
_Inr_books_6	41.62*** (12.63)	34.66*** (6.060)	48.80*** (10.46)
no_sch_available	-14.92*** (5.065)	-13.71*** (2.432)	-16.98*** (0.856)
study_out	-27.60*** (8.190)	-27.02*** (4.394)	-27.77*** (4.118)
selfstudy	-5.855*** (1.739)	-5.258** (2.547)	-10.67*** (2.962)

Quantile regressions: results for 0.15, 0.50, 0.85 quantiles: math score for Sweden

VARIABLES	(1) q15	(2) q50	(3) q85
sex	4.492 (4.453)	8.391** (3.815)	17.14*** (5.027)
employed	47.05*** (9.164)	44.44*** (6.797)	40.61 (40.37)
lyceum	-72.35*** (10.83)	-61.71*** (7.189)	-39.73*** (9.643)
_Ieduf_2	6.989 (5.957)	10.51* (6.377)	18.27*** (4.095)
_Ieduf_3	-2.848 (2.747)	-1.182 (4.632)	14.54*** (5.256)
_Iedum_2	12.21 (11.36)	11.87 (9.375)	12.81 (10.02)
_Iedum_3	5.733 (9.161)	7.278 (5.723)	8.283 (11.21)
_Imsecateg_1	0.795 (18.22)	-8.733 (12.17)	-8.088 (18.16)
_IeduXmse_2_1	13.40 (24.76)	24.39 (15.05)	6.802 (16.48)
_IeduXmse_3_1	13.69 (12.33)	33.68*** (9.872)	30.37* (17.25)
fsecateg	20.42*** (3.684)	22.66*** (2.628)	21.50*** (5.071)
migrant_student	-24.83*** (8.866)	-13.27*** (4.935)	-8.562 (14.77)
_Iforeign_1_1	-11.28 (14.33)	-20.74*** (7.388)	-7.811 (7.637)
escs	13.63*** (3.966)	9.055*** (1.106)	-2.372 (3.710)
_Inr_books_2	20.37* (12.20)	28.83*** (7.650)	16.70* (8.943)
_Inr_books_3	36.12*** (11.04)	46.20*** (10.61)	49.75*** (13.16)
_Inr_books_4	52.16*** (9.489)	65.33*** (15.04)	72.88*** (14.32)
_Inr_books_5	61.61*** (9.731)	81.92*** (10.12)	88.42*** (12.82)
_Inr_books_6	80.62*** (13.80)	97.12*** (14.90)	112.7*** (10.03)
no_sch_available	-7.340** (3.225)	-3.323 (2.493)	-7.141* (4.013)
study_out	-38.38*** (11.41)	-37.23*** (4.363)	-34.06*** (5.112)
selfstudy	-6.001 (5.713)	-8.278 (6.907)	-18.77*** (4.199)

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