NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS METAPHOR[1]

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RESUMEN. Con este artículo tratamos de profundizar en el estudio de la metáfora PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS, primeramente postulada por G. LAKOFF and M. JOHNSON en 1980. Más concretamente, exploramos cómo esta metáfora puede aparecer en operaciones de interacción con la metonimia y, también, cómo puede explicar el hecho de que verbos de sonidos de animales representen una fuente muy productiva de órdenes indirectas figuradas. Para ello, nos basamos en algunas de las ideas expuestas en F.J. RUIZ DE MENDOZA and O.I. DÍEZ (2002), donde se defiende que la interacción conceptual está totalmente regulada y constreñida por un número limitado de patrones de interacción, y en el análisis de los actos de habla de PÉREZ (2001) tratados desde el punto de vista de la teoría de la metáfora conceptual.

PALABRAS CLAVE. PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS, metaphor, metonymy, interaction, figurative indirect orders, speech act.

ABSTRACT. The aim of this study is to provide further insights into the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor, which was first put forward by G. LAKOFF and M. JOHNSON in 1980. More specifically, we explore the way in which this metaphor may appear in interaction operations with metonymy and; we also explain how animal sound verbs represent a productive source of figurative indirect orders. In order to do so, we elaborate both on some of the ideas in F.J. RUIZ DE MENDOZA and O.I. DÍEZ (2002), where it is argued that conceptual interaction is fully regulated and constrained by a limited set of interactional patterns, and on PÉREZ'S (2001) analysis of directive speech acts that are liable to be analysed on the basis of conceptual metaphor theory.

KEY WORDS. PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS, metaphor, metonymy, interaction, figurative indirect orders, speech act.

1. INTRODUCTION

In this paper, we attempt to provide further insights into the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor, which was first put forward by G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON in 1980. First, we explore the way in which this metaphor may appear in interaction operations with metonymy

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and, second, we account for how animal sound verbs represent a productive source of figurative indirect orders. In order to do so, we elaborate both on some of the ideas in F.J. RUIZ DE MENDOZA & O.I. DÍEZ (2002), where it is argued that conceptual interaction is fully regulated and constrained by a limited set of interactional patterns, and on L. PÉREZ's (2001) analysis of directive speech acts that are liable to be analysed on the basis of conceptual metaphor theory. The expressions under study have been obtained from Google searches, English textbooks, and dictionaries.

2. SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS

In order to carry out this study, we should begin by analysing the GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR, which allows us to understand nonhuman attributes in terms of human character traits. Under the name of the Great Chain of Being, G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON (1980) manage to treat ontological metaphors as an exploitation of a folk model in which different kinds of entities are arranged in a hierarchy where human beings represent the higher order and natural physical things are located in the lower position. The items in the hierarchy are organised as follows:

Human beings > animals > plants > complex objects > natural physical things

From this basis, the Great Chain determines the relationships holding between the different orders of the hierarchy. Hence, each level is characterised by having the properties that define the lower ones but also incorporates an additional distinctive trait. In fact, by means of this metaphor, we are able to understand human attributes in terms of corresponding animal attributes, as in *He is a fox, Mary is a snake,* or *Peter is a whale*. All these sentences are in fact realisations of the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS METAPHOR; in them, a culturally attributed behavioural feature of foxes (i.e. guile), snakes (i.e. malice), and whales (i.e. weight) is used to describe people. In this respect, F.J. RUIZ DE MENDOZA (1997) claimed that metaphors based on the Great Chain are invariably cases of one-correspondence metaphor. Therefore, in this sort of metaphor a singular aspect of the source domain is singled out and mapped onto the target domain. For instance, in *Mary is a snake*, the malice and spite typically associated to snakes (adders especially) is used to describe Mary's behaviour.

3. THE PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS METAPHOR IN INTERACTION OPERATIONS

Conceptual metaphor and metonymy may interact in a number of ways that have been described in F.J. RUIZ DE MENDOZA & O.I. DÍEZ (2002) and in J. HERRERO (2004, forthcoming), namely:

Metonymic expansion of a metaphoric source.

Metonymic expansion of a metaphoric target.

Metonymic reduction of one of the correspondences of the target domain of a   metaphor.

Metonymic expansion of one of the correspondences of the target domain of a metaphor.

Metonymic expansion of one of the correspondences of the source domain of a metaphor.

Metonymic reduction of the metaphoric source.

Metonymic reduction of a metaphoric target.

In this respect, there are many expressions based upon the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor that follow any of these interaction patterns, as can be shown in the following examples.

In the expression *to leave with his tails between its legs* the source of the metonymy is a subdomain of the target, which provides us with the main elements in order to build the metaphoric mapping (i.e. the output of the metonymic mapping is the input to the metaphor) while focusing on only one of the correspondences, the central explicature of the metaphor (i.e. a person is defeated and humiliated and hence stops his attempts to achieve his goal). This is not possible with metonymies where the source is not a subdomain of the target, as in F.J. RUIZ DE MENDOZA & O.I. DÍEZ here noticed (2002). This example can be labelled a «metonymic expansion of a metaphoric source», always following this pattern:

SOURCE	TARGET
A dog leaves with its tail between its legs	after being defeated and humiliated a dog leaves with its tail between its legs

metonymy

metaphor

TARGET

after being defeated and humiliated a person stops his attempts to achieve his goal

Figure 1. *To leave with his tails between its legs.*

In *to stand/get up on one's hind legs* one of the correspondences within the metaphoric source is developed metonymically («rear up» for the action of energetically standing up in order to argue in public). The metonymy has the function of highlighting the possibility of «rear up» to become the action of «standing up in order to argue». So, the source of the metonymy becomes the one with the highest degree of prominence since the metonymy itself puts into focus one of the correspondences in the activation of the metaphoric source.

This pattern is labelled «metonymic expansion of one of the correspondences of the source domain of a metaphor».

SOURCE   metaphor   TARGET

Horse rears up   persons energically
(source)   stands up in order tu argue

Metonymy
(target) horse
energetically rears
up as if to attack

(conscientiously)

horse   person
legs   legs

Figure 2. *To stand/get up on one's hind legs.*

A different pattern can be found in instances such as to have hawk's eyes, in which the metonymy is of the target-in-source type (i.e. «hawk's eyes» standing for «excellent eyesight» since hawks are characterised for having extraordinary eyesight, which maps onto the subdomain of a person's eyesight). This leads to patterns labelled «Metonymic reduction of one of the correspondences of the metaphoric source».

SOURCE   metaphor   TARGET

Hawk   Person
Hawk's eyes   a person's eyes

                  metonymy

Good sight   Good sight

Figure 3. *To have hawk's eyes.*

These patterns of interaction belong to the interaction phenomenon labelled by J. HERRERO (2002) as «Sequenced interaction metaphor-metonymy» and, in them all, metonymy is subsidiary to metaphor although it performs different functions, as we have already shown.

Nonetheless, the issue of sequencing does not end here. We believe that in order to understand all its intricacies it is necessary to take into account both the ontological status of the domains involved in the interaction and the level of genericity of the mappings. This takes us to our second proposed question about the definitional relationship between metaphor and metonymy. Consider first the sentence *Peter foxed me*, which can be roughly paraphrased as «Peter was able to deceive me by acting in a cunning way». This paraphrase reveals two stages of interpretation. One, where _through the metaphor PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS_ attributed animal behaviour is mapped onto human behaviour: Peter is as clever and deceitful as foxes are thought to be. Another, in which Peter is seen as acting according to the behavioural traits ascribed to him. This second stage is the result of the application of the high-level metonymy[2] AGENT FOR ACTION which has the effect of converting an ontological[3] metaphor into the equivalent of a situational metaphor[4].

First stage: PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor.

Second stage: High-level metonymy: AGENT FOR ACTION.

Figure 4. Sequential interaction metaphor > metonymy: *Peter foxed me.*

As can be observed, the interaction process in *Peter foxed me* is carried out along the lines of pattern (2) above, although with one crucial difference. Here the metonymic development of the target has consequences in terms of the ontological status of the resulting

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[2] By *high-level metonymy,* we understand a metonymy in which both the source and target domains are generic cognitive models.

[3] In which abstract entities are dealt with as if they were physical objects or substances, as in TIME IS SOMETHING MOVING.

[4] Which works on the basis of deriving generalisations from a conventional situation, and which usually appear in combination with a metonymic mapping; this metonymic connection has the function of projecting a concrete picture onto a wider situation; e.g. *To get up on one's hind legs.*

metaphor where we have more than one correspondence at issue: we think of Peter acting in such a way that his actions result in the speaker being tricked. This goes beyond saying that Peter is astute, as in Peter is a fox, where there is only one correspondence.

Metonymies are by definition one-correspondence mappings. However, when a metonymic model is further developed into a high-level action scenario, as exemplified in the figure above, the result is very similar to pattern (2) of metaphor-metonymy interaction. We postulate that this is possible because this pattern is initially created on the basis of a one-correspondence metaphor. Indirectly, this shared property of both interaction patterns is evidence in favour of F.J. RUIZ DE MENDOZA's distinction between one-correspondence and many-correspondence metaphors and the existence of a metaphor-metonymy continuum where the former are closer to metonymy than the latter both in terms of their structure and their functionality. In this connection, Ruiz de Mendoza has observed that one-correspondence metaphors may be used referentially, like metonymies (e.g. *There's the nasty rat who betrayed me*). We additionally note that this kind of metaphor enters into the same interactional patterns as metonymy.

In fact, this pattern of interaction, where an ontological metaphor acquires properties typically ascribed to situational metaphors, is very productive, as evidenced by the following examples:

(1) *Bad luck seems to have dogged me throughout my whole life*.
(2) *I called out to him but he hared off in the opposite direction, at top speed*.
(3) *She was beetled about doing the housework when I arrived*.
(4) *Stop monkeying about, be serious for a minute!!! There's no time for playing the fool*.
(5) *You've been hogging that book all morning. I'd like to read it too*.
(6) *Jack's beavering away at his homework and he has almost finished*.
(7) *Since he joined the company he has wormed his way into the boss's favour*.
(8) *I'd like to have the time and money to swan off to France for a weekend*.
(9) *He must have been starving. He wolfed a huge plate of stew and then asked for a second helping*.
(10) *He parroted the exact words I had been saying in the previous meeting*.
(11) *He is being hounded by the press*.
(12) *He pigged himself on apple pies. He's now in hospital with indigestion*.
(13) *She's been ferreting around among my things*.
(14) *He's larking about all day long. He's such a fool*.

4. THE SPEECH ACT OF ORDERING AND THE PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS METAPHOR

The PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor can also be analysed in relation to pragmatics and speech acts. More specifically, it should be noted that animal sound verbs in English represent a rich source of indirect orders.

In order to provide a better explanation of this phenomenon it is important to take into consideration J. GRADY's (1999) notion of *resemblance metaphors*. Grady has distinguished two types of metaphorical operation according to the nature of the correspondences between source and target domains, i.e. *correlation* and *resemblance*. As opposed to *correlation metaphors*, *resemblance metaphors* are not motivated by experience, they occur when source and target are perceived to have similar attributes. For example:

(15) *John is a lion*.

This example illustrates the metaphor BRAVE PEOPLE ARE LIONS, which is a subcase of the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor. The use of this metaphor allows us to conceive the behaviour of brave people in terms of the behaviour of lions. As a result, and taking into consideration that animal sound verbs can be approached from the perspective of the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor, we believe that resemblance metaphorical mappings help us to process the figurative expressions that we use to understand human behaviour in terms of animal behaviour. In other words, the speech acts of ordering that we will analyse arise from a resemblance operation between a source domain (animal's utterance of a specific sound) and a target domain (figurative comparison of the human being acting in ways comparable to those of an animal).

SOURCE   TARGET

Animal uttering a specific sound → Human being acting in ways comparable to those of an animal

Figure 5. Resemblance metaphorical mapping.

Basically, our goal is to analyse the illocutionary element of the indirect speech acts drawn from the metaphorical mapping between animal sound verbs and human being utterances. In fact, the illocutionary model that we possess in our minds allows us to better process the illocutionary force of the speech act performed.

SOURCE   TARGET

Animal sound verbs → Human being utterance

Figure 6. Speech acts based on a resemblance operation.

Another crucial theoretical framework for our analysis is provided by the work of L. PÉREZ (2001) in which she provides a thorough analysis of directive and commissive speech acts. Although figurative cases of ordering were not considered at all in her study this extension of her analysis will show that Pérez's model is sensitive to the requirements of metaphor theory. Let us consider the following examples to illustrate both accounts:

(16) *The sergeant ordered*
(17) *The sergeant barked*

Example (16) contains the verb *to order* that is used in direct orders. However, example (17) represents the use of a metaphorical verb to produce a speech act of ordering. As a result, the illocutionary force of the metaphorical instance proves to be more productive and provides the hearer with a greater number of cognitive effects because of the meaningful comparison of a person performing the speech act of ordering, with an angry dog that is barking fiercely. Moreover, the animal scenario instantiates better the power variable than the verb *to order*.

In order to better understand the thesis we propose, we should first take into consideration both the literal and the figurative interpretations of each of these verbs. That is, the creation of a metaphorical mapping from the source to the target domain will permit us to fully comprehend the illocutionary force of the indirect speech act generated.

SOURCE   TARGET

Dog barking   *Sergeant barking*

(Animal   LITERAL   (FIGURATIVE
interpretation)   interpretation of human
                                                                  behaviour in terms of
   animal behaviour)

Figure 7. Metaphorical indirect speech act of 'ordering'.

For instance, a *bark* is the short, sharp, explosive, sudden, loud, rough cry of a dog, fox, or seal (e.g. *Our dog always barks at strangers*). When a human being is said to *bark*, he shouts in a loud, rough voice, or speaks in a curt, loud and usually angry tone (e.g. *He would bark an order and everyone would run to obey*, *The sergeant barked (out) an order*). In the case of the military field, a sergeant is compared by means of a resemblance metaphor to a dog that is emitting a loud rough cry, i.e. the relevant attributes of a dog barking (loud noise emitted) are correlated to those attributes of an angry sergeant who is shouting at his soldiers, who rather produces as much noise uttering the order as a dog does when barking.

SOURCE   TARGET

Dog   Sergeant
barking   barking

Figure 8. *The sergeant barked (out) an order*.

Bellow, if considered literally, refers to a bull or a large animal that emits a deep loud noise implying warning or threat (e.g. *The bull bellowed angrily*). Applying it to the behaviour of a person, it can be said that it figuratively refers to someone shouting in a loud, deep voice (e.g. *The sergeant bellowed orders at the platoon*). In fact, human beings

normally bellow when they are angry. The sergeant's power variable is activated thanks to the physical force and the powerful cry of the bull. This resemblance criterion is reinforced by the angry tone of both the animal and the sergeant.

SOURCE   TARGET

Bull bellowing   →   Sergeant bellowing

Figure 9. *The sergeant bellowed orders at the platoon*.

Animals that *howl* make a long loud sustained doleful cry, especially wolves and dogs (e.g. *The dog howled over his master's body*). In its figurative interpretation this verb involves saying something in a very loud voice (e.g. *'Be silent!', the judge howled*). The mapping operation focuses on the way the wolf produces the cry, i.e. in a doleful manner. In the same way, the judge is trying to order people to be quiet. In fact, the judge expresses his power in a specific way, he does not threaten the audience nor does he speak loudly; he simply possesses an institutional power that is inherent in him. He therefore expresses his desire that people be in silence.

SOURCE   TARGET

Wolf howling   →   Judge howling

Figure 10. *'Be silent!', the judge howled*.

When lions *roar*, they utter a mighty loud, full, deep prolonged noise (e.g. *The animals roared and fought*). The figurative expression refers to someone who shouts something in a very loud and deep voice, i.e. that shouts with full force, as in «*Forward with the Revolution», the crowd roared back*. As in the previous cases, the power that we attribute to the speaker is triggered by the physical force of the lion (which is indeed considered the King of Beasts). As a consequence, we fear this animal because of its physical power. In addition, the mighty sound that it emits is also frightening. This aggressive sound can be regarded as a threatening element. In the same way, we can establish certain correlations between a lion roaring and a crowd that is producing a similar noise. The lion's power feature resembles the power of the crowds, which we might think that any governor may fear. The noise produced by the crowd resembles the lion's pre-attack and it thus causes fear.

SOURCE   TARGET

Figure 11. '*Forward with the Revolution', the crowd roared back.*

Finally, dogs *snarl* when they produce a fierce, angry, rough and surly sound in their throat while showing their teeth (e.g. *The dog snarled at the milkman*, *The lion would bare his teeth in a furious snarl*). As a consequence of this literal definition, people who snarl figuratively say something in a fierce and angry way, i.e. they speak in an angry bad-tempered voice (e.g. *'Let me alone!', I snarled*; *'Get out of here!', he snarled at us*). The metaphorical resemblance of a person with a dog showing its teeth originates a speech act that could be placed in a borderline with a threat. The dog clearly causes fear when it shows its teeth, because we can feel its desire to attack us. Consequently, we are able to select the dog's desire to attack and its power (represented by the teeth as a weapon) and apply it to our processing of the scene where a person is uttering an order in an extremely aggressive manner.

SOURCE   TARGET

Figure 12. *'Let me alone!', I snarled*; *'Get out of here!', he snarled at us.*

5. CONCLUSION

In this paper we have not only confirmed that conceptual interaction is fully regulated and constrained by a limited set of interactional patterns, but we have also provided additional evidence in support of this thesis in the domain of metaphor-metonymy interaction. Furthermore, we have been able to examine the question of the sequential arrangement (or *sequencing*) of interaction operations in relationship with the issue that occupies us within this article. Besides, we have proven that English animal sound verbs represent a rich source of indirect speech acts, as we have demonstrated with the examples corresponding to the act of ordering. Apart from this, we have furthered L. PÉREZ's (2001) analysis of directive speech acts by means of the adaptation of her theory to the examination of metaphorical animal sound verbs. Consequently, we have enriched her approach to illocution by applying the most relevant aspects of metaphor theory to the comprehension of indirect orders. Finally, J. GRADY's (1999) notion of *resemblance metaphors* has helped us

to better understand the nature of the whole scenario of indirect metaphorical orders under analysis; i.e. the resemblance element between both entities guides our selection of the animal attributes that trigger the use of the metaphorical expression regarding the human utterance of indirect orders.

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