Introduction: Wittgenstein's role in the development of informal logic and argumentation theory

Introducción: El rol de Wittgenstein en el desarrollo de la lógica informal y la teoría de la argumentación

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This special issue of Cogency is devoted to Wittgenstein's role in the development of informal logic and argumentation theory. The papers here illustrate how Wittgenstein's ideas have been applied and have aided research in these inquiries.

Ralph H. Johnson's paper – Wittgenstein's Influence on the Development of Informal Logic – focuses on the perception that W played an important role in the development of informal logic. In this paper, Johnson discusses Wittgenstein's influence on Toulmin, Hamblin, and Scriven–all of whose views about logic and argument have been important in the development of informal logic. He also discusses direct application of idea in On Certainty, stemming from Fogelin's 1985 paper "The Logic of Deep Disagreements." The conclusion that he comes to is that Wittgenstein's influence on the development of informal logic has been indirect rather than direct, more a matter of "the spirit" behind informal logic than direct influence on any of its seminal thinkers.

In "You Can't Step Into the Same Argument Twice: Wittgenstein on Philosophical Arguments," Daniel H. Cohen and George H. Miller focus on the role of argument in Wittgensteins's own work. They begin by identifying the nature and role of argumentation in philosophy *according to* the *Tractatus*, followed by a case study of an argument *from* the *Tractatus*. Then they turn to Wittgenstein's transitional and later works, paying par-

ticular attention to the interpretive challenge posed by his provocative *and deliberate* evolution away from definite assertions in philosophical matters and towards creating interpretive tensions in his readers in order to achieve greater clarity in the long run – albeit with less dogmatic confidence. They argue that this challenge can be met only after achieving the perspective that comes from having worked through the *Tractatus*. While their conclusions are largely negative concerning the place for arguments in Wittgenstein's philosophy, conceptual space is created for a more positive account of argument both in philosophy and in general.

In " 'A Picture Held us Captive': The Later Wittgenstein on Visual Arguments" Steven Patterson shows how the views of the later Wittgenstein, particularly his views on images and the notion of "picturing," can be brought to bear on the question of whether there are such things as "purely visual" arguments. He draws on Wittgenstein's remarks in the *Blue* and *Brown Books* and in *Philosophical Investigations* in order to argue that although visual images may occur as elements of argumentation, broadly conceived, it is a mistake to think that there are purely visual arguments, in the sense of illative moves from premises to conclusions that are conveyed by images alone, without the support or framing of words.

One issue that evolved from *On Certainty* is the question of deep disagreements. In "The Logic of Deep Disagreements" (*Informal Logic*, 1985), Fogelin claimed that there was a kind of disagreement – deep disagreement – which is, by its very nature, impervious to rational resolution. He further claimed that these two views are attributable to Wittgenstein. In their paper, David Godden and William Brenner focus on this issue. Following an exposition and discussion of that claim, we review and draw some lessons from existing responses in the literature to Fogelin's claims. In the final two sections (6 and 7) they explore the role reason can, and sometimes does, play in the resolution of deep disagreements. In doing this they discuss a series of cases, mainly drawn from Wittgenstein, which they take to illustrate the resolution of deep disagreements through the use of what we call "rational persuasion." They conclude that, while the role of argumentation in "normal" versus "deep" disagreements is characteristically different, it plays a crucial role in the resolution of both.

Although in this introduction I have commented on the papers in a thematic order, in this special issue the papers have been arranged in alphabetic order.