

In the last fifteen years a series of important studies of regions in Peru charting the period between 1780 and 1830 have been produced.⁴ In contrast, the armed forces have tended to be looked at either before or after the wars of independence without crossing over, even though those involved were the same actors. Therefore, much attention has been paid to the Bourbon reformed militias on the one hand, and to *caudillos* (strong men that could reputedly govern with or without institutions) on the other.⁵ The participation of subalterns on both sides during the wars transformed the armed forces. But change was not as dramatic as it might initially seem. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, although colonial militias were often organized in units segregated by caste, the majority of regiments had a geographical adscription.⁶ Secondly, even those fighting for independence sought to maintain some caste-differentiated battalions.

Regiments structured around caste allowed the crown to co-opt groups such as free blacks and noble Indians that could enhance their social prestige by dressing in uniform, parading and training. They provided some space for social mobility. Cecilia Méndez has asserted that as the armed forces that emerged during the republic made no use of caste categories and official documents made no references to race, this was a major change between the colonial and republican periods.⁷ She argues that the constant warfare that resulted from the *caudillo* state “opened new avenues of social ascent for plebeian sectors [...] not able to claim noble lineages of Spanish or Indian origin.”⁸ It must be considered, however, to what degree the irregular troops, known as *montoneras*, were incorporated into the army. Studies of independence have paid much attention to them in the Central Andes and they are considered to be the heroes of Peruvian participation in independence.⁹ But in spite of their importance during the campaigns and their ability to remain outside royalist control, they were not seen at the time as an integral part of the armed forces. Their position as mere auxiliaries, even as they played a key role, meant they were not properly integrated into the structure of the armed forces, even if some of their leaders were given the ranks of colonel and general.

This article focuses on the participation of subalterns in the armed forces before and during the wars of independence, using the cases of individuals as examples of how conflict provided access to increased opportunities. It also pays particular attention to how caste was understood in colonial times in the context of the armed forces, how this changed during the wars and varied in different regions, and ultimately how, although *casta* was no longer recorded after independence, some attempts at social differentiation continued to be made. So, on the one hand, colonial militias were not as segregated as they might initially seem and provided some space for social mobility, and, on the other, the republican armed forces were not as integrated, and efforts to maintain differences between

its members were made. The wars of independence and the *caudillo* conflicts that ensued allowed for some incorporation of subalterns into the armed forces, but this inclusion had limitations and could be reversed.

The armed forces at the end of the colonial period

During the second half of the eighteenth century, as a reaction to the growing threat of other European imperial powers, colonial authorities increased the strength and organization of the army in the Americas.¹⁰ By 1776 Peru had become highly militarized. Creoles, Indians, *mestizos* and free Afro-Peruvians were successfully incorporated into the ranks of the army. This impression of ‘militarization’, however, needs to be qualified as the large numbers that are included on the militia lists were not regular soldiers, but what have been often described as ‘paper armies’, men who appeared in documents, but who only participated in parades and training. They had the right to wear a uniform and occasionally to be judged in the military courts, but remained private men who carried out their normal business.¹¹

Following Cuba’s experience, a disciplined militia was established in Peru along the coastal provinces in the bishoprics of Lima, Trujillo, Huamanga and Arequipa, as well as the interior in Cuzco, La Paz and Charcas, with a force of 22,000 men.¹² The militias began their growth in 1760. Before the eighteenth century there had only been three companies and by mid-century they had grown to fourteen.¹³ Battalions organized by caste had existed since the end of the seventeenth century. The *Batallón de Pardos Libres*, the free black infantry militia, for instance, could trace its origin to 1698 and by 1803 it had 1,498 men in eleven companies.¹⁴ The participation of Afro-Peruvians continued to increase during the eighteenth century; four cavalry companies were added in 1729 and in 1762 an infantry and a cavalry company of mulattos were created.¹⁵ The *Compañía de Morenos Libres de Lima*, the free mulatto company of Lima, consisted of sixty mounted men and 480 infantry members, organized in four battalions.¹⁶ These companies were designated as ‘free’, because they were independent from other corps and had their own officials. In the case of Mexico, Ben Vinson has found that even though they were segregated by caste, they were not exclusively manned by Afro-descendants, but that they constituted the majority of members.¹⁷ Although similar work has not been carried out for Peru, in a list of donations given by individuals to the cause of the captive King in 1808 we find amongst the officials of the *Pardo* infantry a Dr. José de Armas, a lawyer of the Royal Court who gave 200 pesos. Even if he actually was a *Pardo*, which is difficult to believe considering he was a member of the lawyers’ corporation, he would

have needed to obtain an exemption to be allowed to practice law; and would have therefore not been considered black anymore.¹⁸

Alongside the free black militias set up on the coast, companies and battalions in the Andes were put under the command of noble Indians who coveted positions such as that of *maestre de campo*.¹⁹ The biggest growth in the militia took place after 1760 when 43 regiments with varied numbers of battalions and companies were set up in a single decade, and in the next twenty years some companies continued to be organized by caste, but they were the minority.²⁰ The post of officer ensured social standing was not lost when militias were not segregated. Noble companies, Indian and Spanish, as well as those set up by guilds, made sure they were manned by ‘social equals’.

There is no clarity on how much control colonial authorities exerted over the militias and there was great variation in terms of discipline and organization depending on time and place. During the administration of Viceroy Manuel Amat y Juniet militias were kept on high alert, parading regularly, and wealthy elite members outfitted regiments to obtain promotions to higher ranks.²¹ Indeed, in 1777 *visitador* Juan Antonio de Areche complained upon his arrival that Peru’s officer corps was larger than the one on the Peninsula, but that the militia was no more than a collection of “unarmed gangs lacking any knowledge of tactics and discipline.”²² When the Tupac Amaru revolt erupted the *visitador* took control of the war effort and instead of militias he used soldiers from Lima and troops raised by crown officials and loyal Indian caciques.²³ In the wake of the rebellion a major demobilization of the militia was ordered. As a result, in 1784 Spanish regular troops were sent to garrison the interior and by 1785 no more new companies or regiments were formed and changes were mainly to troop numbers.²⁴ As militias were reduced military investment grew and in places such as Cuzco a large proportion of the income from tribute was spent on supporting a standing army and a gunpowder store.²⁵

In spite of the growth of the regular army that accompanied the militia reduction, corps continued to meet. Documents such as the *Revista de Comisario* that took place in Arequipa on April 16, 1787, provide a detailed glimpse of the composition of an urban militia.²⁶ Officers were members of the local elites, while artisans were heavily represented amongst soldiers, and although one document is not enough to generalize on the militia in all the viceroyalty, the level of detail provided allows for some trends to be elucidated. The nine companies that were reviewed that day had on average 100 men each, including three officers: a captain, a lieutenant and a second lieutenant, who were the only ones to be referred to as *don*. No personal information was included for them, although the most junior amongst them, Pío Tristán, became an important actor in the wars of independence, defending the crown until 1824, and having important posts

during the republican period. Name, age, occupation, marital status, height and address of the other 868 men were recorded. Interestingly for an urban militia, 17 percent of its members were described as *paisanos*, and 66.5 percent were classed as artisans; which shows that the division between the city and its hinterland was not completely established. Permanent addresses were provided and they show great variation as in most cases even street names were included and only in three of the companies was a generic area given for all the members, one of which was made up exclusively of *labradores*.

Even though there is a wealth of personal detail in this *Revista* that were not usually included, such as occupation and permanent address, there is no mention of race or caste. References made to the militia during the uprising against the customs house in January 1780 describe many of its members as *mestizos*, mulattos, Indians and *cholos*.²⁷ Even if seven years later these were not the same individuals, people of the same social background would have been enlisted. The only descriptive category used in the Arequipa revista was height. Although the range was quite wide – from the 31-year-old muleteer Andrés Pacheco towering at 6.32 foot to the 30-year-old silversmith Carlos Gutiérrez who was only 4.02 foot high – the average was 5.09.²⁸

Documents recently studied by Cecilia Méndez on the Confederate army in the 1830s include even more information on the soldiers and show that height continued to be considered important to record. In the case she analyses it was noted alongside other physical characteristics, including striking features that could help identify individuals. The documents Méndez has unearthed include skin color descriptions that have a great range of variation aiming to illustrate the exact pigmentation of each man.²⁹ This type of description, however, was not a republican design but had been in use in the Andes since at least the early nineteenth century, as some *Filiaciones* for 1813 and 1815 show. These were certificates given to those enlisting in the militias and included two parts: a first part described each individual, noting the names of his parents, occupation, place of birth and current address, as well as his physical characteristics (hair, eyebrow, eye and skin color, the shape of the nose, face); a second part indicated that the new recruit knew and accepted the regulations and laws he had to abide by as a member of the corps.³⁰

Just like those for the Confederation, these documents described the men in detail and were used to ensure that if any of the recruits fled they could be identified. In the case of late colonial documents, they also guaranteed that the men would not be able to argue they did not know they needed the express permission of their superior to abandon their post.³¹ One of the *filiaciones* is for a *pardo libre* who served in the non-segregated militia of Piura and whose skin color was noted as *trigueño* (the color of wheat, the most common description

of skin color used in the republican period). Ramón Gallegos, a trader for Puno, was portrayed as the color of *almasigo* (earth colored), while white was used for a member of the regiment of the *Concordia Española* from Guamanga.³² Caste and skin tone were therefore not the same thing. It was possible to be a free *pardo*, serve in an integrated militia and be *trigueño*, just as it was possible to be described as white, blond and blue-eyed, and be an escaped slave sought through newspaper notices.³³ As skin color did not determine one's caste it was necessary to mark them both in the *filiaciones* from the colonial era.

Moreover, colonial understanding of caste was very different from the idea of biologically determined race that emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century. Even though this was also a social construction, the basis on which it was postulated was different from the one used to justify caste in that it aimed to be more closely associated with phenotype than caste ever was. Colonial society was divided between Spanish, Indian, *mestizos*, free blacks and slaves, as can be seen, for instance, in the census categories used in 1793, but the way in which caste worked was malleable, and who belonged to each of these was not exclusively decided by skin color.

Many authors working on the colonial period have asserted caste was a fluid category not determined by phenotype. Ruth Hill, for instance, defines caste as “a cluster of somatic, economic, linguistic, geographical, and other circumstances that varied from parish to parish, from town to town, and from person to person.”³⁴ A similar point is made by Karen Graubart when she states that “ethnic designation was, in fact, not conceptualized in a biologically determinist way, but rather culturally.”³⁵ The fluidity between groups in colonial times makes the use of race as biologically determined problematic. It is therefore not possible to assert that colonial militias were divided racially, or that this changed with the advent of the republic. What can be asserted is that by the second half of the eighteenth century the overwhelming majority of men found in the militias had been born in the viceroyalty and had varied racial backgrounds. Some were members of caste organized militias, some participated in their guild companies, while others were part of the urban militias of their city or province.³⁶ So, even though there were no more battalions set up by caste in the republican period, it may be queried how much of a real change this signified, given that, while some colonial battalions had been divided by caste, most were not. Participation in the militia had also given men the opportunity to mark their position in society. The wars of independence changed the colonial militias forever, but some aspects remained, particularly the desire of members of the militia to sustain their social standing and increase it through service.

Defending the Viceroyalty

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the great majority of the armed forces in Peru were local militias. The regular army was quite small, 1,681 men in total, of which only 61 were stationed outside the capital, 25 in the central Andes and 36 in Cuzco. The first impulse to professionalize these militias and create a more structured army came in 1809 when José Manuel de Goyeneche, a Creole from Arequipa recently returned from the Peninsula, organized the response to the creation of a Junta in La Paz.³⁷ He recruited almost exclusively in Cuzco, Puno and Arequipa, the recruits being his friends and relatives. Some – for example, his cousin Pío Tristán – were given positions of command. In his letters to Viceroy Fernando Abascal, he described his troops as having uniforms, but not much more when it came to being military, “as [the militia] was without order or regularity in terms of economic organization or discipline.”³⁸ He also assured the viceroy that he had received only four incomplete companies of so-called veterans and four hundred *paisanos* that had no uniforms and had never had a musket in their hands, although they had been paid as militia members for over eight months. To counter this he began daily training using the experience he had gained in the Peninsula.

These shortcomings notwithstanding, the uprising in La Paz was quelled without much effort. Calm in the Southern Andes did not last as the Junta of Buenos Aires created in May 1810 sent troops with the aim of controlling Upper Peru. Again Goyeneche resorted to reorganizing the militias, this time into battalions, each one with a commander, a major, an aide and three officers for every hundred men. The reinforcements sent from Lima were 400 of the regiments of *pardos* and 200 of *morenos*.³⁹ Royalist forces triumphed at the shores of Lake Titicaca, on June 20, 1811, but weeks later, as troops advanced, an Indian uprising took control of La Paz and, to combat it, men under the command of caciques Mateo Pumacagua and José Domingo Choquehuanca, who had proven their loyalty fighting Tupac Amaru, were sent from Cuzco and Puno. The former arrived with 3,000 men and the latter with 1,200, and they easily put down the uprising.⁴⁰

As Indian participation was widespread, strategic decisions were made taking this into account. Goyeneche refrained from attacking until harvest-time as it was known indigenous troops in the areas around Cochabamba would desert.⁴¹ Castelli, his counterpart from the River Plate, had abolished Indian tribute in the hope of gaining more support. This was not successful, however, because, as Maria Luisa Soux has shown, Indians from this area were not opposed to the payment of tribute, but against not knowing what was being done with their contribution in the absence of the King.⁴² In spite of its initial success this army,

organized by Creoles and manned nearly exclusively by Indians, was defeated in 1813 as it advanced on Tucumán. Pío Tristán, who was in charge of the advance guard, signed a capitulation of Salta promising never to fight again.

Joaquín de la Pezuela, an academy-trained artilleryman, replaced Goyeneche. He described in his diary the troops he encountered at the headquarters at Oruro as mostly indigenous:

The officers were dressed with a white round hat; a jacket with no emblem; and covered in a cape they took guard; there were never seen in the house of the General nor in the one of their superiors, even though their customs differed little from that of their subalterns, except one or two. The troop had no clothes the majority of soldiers with the feet on the ground; all with white round hats and covered in *ponchos* or *mantas*; with no instruction but the most basic. They could exercise well with their muskets and maneuver as a battalion. Discipline was unknown. The minority could speak Spanish, except for the few Limeños and from Arequipa all others spoke only the indigenous tongue. They did not eat from the general provisions, and it was impossible to make them to because most of them were there with their women o girls, without it being possible to make them leave as they would undoubtedly desert. These women all of them Indian or *cholas* cooked for them as they were used to, potatoes, *chuño* and maize; they looked for the food themselves and stole it in the Indian towns.⁴³

Recruitment had taken place nearly exclusively in Cuzco and Puno, areas with large indigenous populations, while the men from Lima and Arequipa came from urban militias, similar to those described in the 1787 *Revista*, although a small number of *pardos* and *morenos* had also been sent from Lima and the coast.

These initial campaigns were vital to the development of the army as they provided a training ground for the most prominent republican leaders. This was the case of Agustín Gamarra and Andrés de Santa Cruz, who both enlisted in 1809. Gamarra was born in Cuzco to a well-established family of notaries who had held public office for over a century, seamlessly passing it from one generation to the next.⁴⁴ Information on his mother is more scant, but some of his biographers assert she was indigenous.⁴⁵ He studied at the school of San Buenaventura in Cuzco, and, according one of his supporters, he was fluent in Quechua, Latin and French.⁴⁶ Andrés de Santa Cruz, who had studied in the same school, was the son of a Creole *Maestre de Campo* from Huamanga who had fought against Tupac Catari in the area of La Paz in the 1780s. Although his

mother was the daughter of the *cacique* of Huarina, his birth certificate specified he was Spanish.⁴⁷ This is an example of how the descendants of noble Indians were classed in different ways and how fluid categories used at the time were.⁴⁸

Both Gamarra and Santa Cruz made their names in the campaigns of Upper Peru in the eighteen teens with armies manned by *mestizos*, Indians and Afro-descendants. In the midst of this campaign an uprising broke out in Cuzco under the command of Mateo Pumacagua, the *cacique* of Chinchero who had been a loyal servant of the crown for decades. He had been instrumental in the defeat of Tupac Amaru and only three years before had taken his loyal Indian troops to La Paz to aid Goyeneche.⁴⁹ For his labors he had been granted the rank of Brigadier General and he was the first Cuzqueño named *Intendente*, albeit temporarily.⁵⁰ The 1814 rebellion showed that discontent with the non-implementation of the Cadiz constitution was widespread. Amongst the most anticipated reforms were the removal of distinctions between Spaniard and Indian, and the creation of a new system of elected local councils.⁵¹ Some of these changes had been rolled out in the Andes and had led to conflict in communities over elections and tribute, making the situation even more explosive.⁵² Although the rebellion lasted just over six months, at the brief height of its success rebels controlled Huamanga, Puno, La Paz and Arequipa, and proposed an independent Peruvian empire with an Inca at its head, spanning the continent, and with Cuzco as its capital.⁵³ The revolt was manned by members of the lower middle class who had suffered most from the cost of the war, were frustrated by high taxation, widespread corruption, and the failure to implement the promised constitutional reforms; returned veterans from the campaigns in Upper Peru in Cuzco and Puno (where the whole garrison defected); and Indians who resented the assault on their traditional rights, particularly the encroachment by Creoles and *mestizos* of *cacicazgos*.⁵⁴

Indians fought on both sides during this conflict. This was because of the heterogeneity of the colonial Andean world, where, even though theoretically an Indian Republic existed, not all Indians reacted in the same way when the crown was threatened. John Fisher has noted the importance of regionalism in these conflicts in the Southern Andes.⁵⁵ The geographical correlation of the choices taken by Indians can be seen for instance when those in the valleys around Cochabamba mobilized nearly exclusively against the crown, whilst the people of Arequipa repeatedly defended it, providing men and funds. This illustrates how regional issues had more importance in terms of which side was backed, than belonging to a certain racial group. In Cuzco, Puno and La Paz, where elites were divided, support for both sides was found.

The situation in northern Peru was very different as a professional army was not developed. Nevertheless militias in these areas continued to meet regularly,

some saw action in the campaigns against the Juntas of Quito and Santiago and some battalions of *pardos* and *morenos* from Lima were sent to Upper Peru. The militias were not professionalized even when the level of threat increased, after the army headed by José de San Martín crossed the Andes and defeated the royalists at Chacabuco in 1817. Reinforcement militia companies of *pardos* and *morenos* were recalled from Upper Peru to defend Tacna and Arica, and help was sought from recently pacified Venezuela.⁵⁶ While Arequipa continued to sustain the viceroyalty, providing funds and troops, local men were especially sought after because of their horsemanship.⁵⁷

When Callao was blockaded in January 1819, and marines organized by William Miller onboard the ships commanded by Thomas Cochrane began to terrorize the coast, the defense of the viceroyalty remained exclusively in the hands of militias.⁵⁸ This proved to be problematic as these incursions were successful in gaining support in provinces north of Lima. In April, 500 men disembarked in Huacho and took the town of Huaura where local Indians were eager to support them and trade. After defeating the small number of royalists and the free Zambo militia, they proceeded to recruit slaves from the nearby *haciendas*, promising freedom in exchange.⁵⁹ In coastal Peru, both sides sought support from Afro-descendant populations. Colonial authorities had been organizing battalions of free blacks from the early eighteenth century, but in contrast to Buenos Aires they had not been compelled to recruit slaves and offer them freedom in exchange for service.⁶⁰ This innovation was brought by the *Ejército Unido* under San Martín and was very successful, as many slaves enlisted encouraged by the prospect of obtaining their freedom. San Martín pursued this strategy when he disembarked in September 1820, allowing the more than one hundred men taken a year previously to travel back home with the aim of convincing family and friends to join his cause.⁶¹ According to the 1793 *Guía de Forasteros* there were 40,337 slaves and 41,404 free blacks in Peru, and both groups were concentrated on the coast.⁶² This made it possible for both sides to have a pool from which to recruit. But as the free *pardo* and *moreno* militias had begun their mobilization from 1809, a decade later only slaves remained to be recruited and, with liberty being offered, they had good reasons to join the independence movement.

The supporters of the crown had been successful in maintaining control over the viceroyalty, to a large degree thanks to Indians and Creoles in the southern Andes. The people from Cuzco, and particularly Arequipa, were prepared to supply funds and men for this enterprise. In spite of the fact that some Indians, especially in the areas outside Cochabamba and La Paz, were against the continuation of viceregal control, most of the time (with the exception of the 1814 uprising) support in the Southern Andes made it possible for the crown to resist

attack. On the coast the situation was different. Even though free blacks had been militia members very early on, slaves had not been generally incorporated into the armed forces, so the possibility of acquiring their freedom through service provided by the *Ejército Unido* made many sway over to the side of independence. As Peter Blanchard has pointed out, the allure of the language of freedom used by those fighting for independence was very significant.⁶³

Impact of Independence

Once in Peru, San Martín sought an understanding with the viceregal government and did not engage in direct military action. Instead, his lieutenant, Juan Antonio Alvarez de Arenales, marched to the highlands with 600 men, aiming to form guerilla parties or *montoneras* similar to those with whom he had fought in Cochabamba and La Paz, and, just like the Indians in Upper Peru, those in the Central Andes also backed independence.⁶⁴ Arenales was immediately supported in the town of Tarma and in some valleys in the central Andes such as Yauyos; guerillas took control never to relinquish it.⁶⁵ Indigenous response to this enlistment was not homogeneous and was mostly related to local dynamics. In peripheral regions where the crown had traditionally been very weak they were much more likely to support independence. Such was the case of the Indians from Cajatambo who enlisted as soon as San Martín disembarked and joined his troops in Supe. British doctor James Paroissen described them as “Indians who spoke no Spanish.”⁶⁶

Discontent also started to fester amongst the royalists; when General José de La Serna arrived to take his post as head of the army he disbanded two experienced military regiments from Cuzco, including the one that had defeated Pumacagua, allegedly to allow for the promotion of his peninsular subalterns.⁶⁷ This had a detrimental effect as ambitious officers saw their path to promotion thwarted. One of these was Agustín Gamarra, who in March 1820 was accused of conspiracy. After a distinguished career, he was seen with suspicion because of his lenient treatment of those accused of participating in the Pumacagua rebellion when he was a member of the ‘peace junta’ in charge of judging and sentencing.⁶⁸ He was discharged from his post and spent the next two years carrying out dangerous missions in Upper Peru; in 1818 he was made temporary accountant in Puno.

Two years later, a captain in his regiment declared Gamarra to be in contact with San Martín, alleging Gamarra had agreed to join the Liberator with his men.⁶⁹ Never formally tried because of lack of evidence,⁷⁰ his accuser assured the judge he had seen a collection of letters that showed Gamarra had encouraged a

colleague to join the battalion “Peruvian Union,” and “expressed his discontent with La Serna who had already placed twenty eight Europeans delaying the promotion and merits of Americans.”⁷¹ He said Gamarra had even insinuated to his friend he should join him, but when he was asked what he meant, he backtracked and declared it all to be a joke. With no real proof, he was placed under close watch and his career advancement halted.

Viceroy Pezuela, with whom he had fought in 1813, wrote: “I am in agreement with the result of the investigation against Gamarra and other Indians, accused of *infidencias*.”⁷² As punishment he was sent to Lima; to be kept under surveillance he was made aide-de-camp to the viceroy. In a private interview Gamarra confided to Pezuela that he was grateful for the treatment he had received and asked to be allowed back to Puno to recruit 700 men. That same night of December 5, after “making his feelings towards the King and his cause evident” to the viceroy, Gamarra left the capital under the cover of darkness and joined San Martín.⁷³ By 1820 it had become clear to ambitious men like Gamarra that loyalty was not going to pay.

San Martín gave Gamarra a commission at his same rank and a position of influence in the newly established Protectorate that covered the north and the capital. The royalists who held the south and Upper Peru had evacuated Lima because it could not be defended, and as the majority of their troops were indigenous they held a clear advantage in the highlands. Their attempts to recruit slaves had been unsuccessful and the defection of the north in December 1820 had shown the militias could not be counted upon.⁷⁴ The protectorate organized militias modeled on the colonial ones that were divided between *pardos*, *blancos de caballería*, *morenos libres*, *esclavos*, and *patricios*.⁷⁵ This was an important continuity that challenges the idea that as soon as independence was declared racial categories ceased to be used. A Peruvian legion of the guard consisting of a regiment of hussars was also created. William Miller was put in charge of its organization and in his memoirs he described how he created the regiment from “the deserters from the enemy [he] selected forty good non-commissioned officers, and from two to three hundred privates. An equal number of mulattos and mestizos were soon recruited in Lima, and six hundred Indians were sent from the interior.”⁷⁶

The first Peruvian battalions drew heavily on the men who had changed sides as well as mulattoes, *mestizos* and Indians from the Northern provinces. In the south large numbers of Indians remained with the royalists, serving under the government La Serna organized in December 1821 in Cuzco. The royalists held power over the central and southern Andes for three more years with the support from the elites, merchants and artisans who had benefited from the war economy that bolstered the trade of tailors, blacksmiths, muleteers and merchants who

provided goods for the royalist army.⁷⁷ The royalists also counted on the support from many indigenous groups in the south, although some like the *Morochucos* from Ayacucho repeatedly changed sides. In February 1822, General Andrés García Camba described how they approached General José Carratalá asking to be forgiven for having joined those who fought for independence and this was granted because, even though they were prone to changes of heart, their support was crucial to control the road between Cuzco and the coast.⁷⁸

After months in charge of the north and central coast, but unable to defeat the royalists, San Martín left power to a Peruvian Congress elected in 1822. Dominated by the liberals, it appointed a triumvirate to the executive and invested all its political capital in sending troops to the southern coast with the aim of attacking the royalists at their perceived weakest point. To defend the capital, militias were once again put together, even though previous efforts had not been very successful. Echoing colonial corps and those created during the Protectorate, they were divided between *patricios* and *peruanos*.⁷⁹ These new denominations maintained the segregation of battalions. The names were different from those of the previous year, as a decree had changed the name of the battalions of *pardo* militias to that of *patricios*; *peruanos*, on the other hand, was the designation commonly given to Indians after San Martín's stay in Peru.⁸⁰

Of the 3,859 men sent to fight the royalists in the middle ports, 1,200 were Chilean, 1,959 from Buenos Aires and 700 of the Peruvian legion under the command of Miller, who described them as follows:

Three-fourths of the legion were aborigines, and many of them could not speak any language but their own, the Quechua, when they joined the corps; but they soon learned the words of command in Spanish, and their duty as soldiers, all of which was taught agreeably to the Spanish regulations. They are generally of rather low stature, robust and beardless, with a bright brown complexion. The rest of the men were mulattos, some blacks and a few white creoles, who were generally non-commissioned officers.⁸¹

The first campaign of *Intermedios* was a complete disaster with all the troops killed or disbanded.⁸² After news of the defeat a new president was appointed and a second campaign organized, this time with 5,000 men.⁸³ Under the command of Santa Cruz and Gamarra this army, made up mainly by Peruvians, advanced to La Paz and Oruro, but in spite of some initial success they failed to join forces and were scattered and pursued by the royalists. With the collapse of these two initiatives, all the efforts made to create a 'Peruvian' army to obtain independence lay in tatters.

Lima was briefly taken by the royalists in June 1823 and, with confusion reigning, part of the administration relocated to Trujillo. In Callao, Antonio José de Sucre held the fortress with 1,000 Peruvian militias, 1,000 men from Buenos Aires (the remnants of the Army of the Andes), and 3,000 Colombia troops. British businessman Robert Proctor described the men as “in general short, excepting the grenadier companies, and the *mestizos*, of half and half Spanish extraction.”⁸⁴ With most of the Peruvian troops captured or dispersed in the Intermedios campaigns, the Colombian contingent became even more essential, especially after the troops from Buenos Aires stationed in Callao mutinied in February 1824, protesting against lack of pay and refusing to travel north as petitioned by Bolívar.⁸⁵ Blanchard has shown how, according to British reports, the mutiny was due to the 7th and 8th Regiments of Buenos Aires, which contained a great number of emancipated slaves; he has also revealed how official documents filed in Argentina stated that only one hundred of the mutineers were from the army of the Andes and that most were blacks recruited in Peruvian haciendas.⁸⁶ Both sources agree that most of those who mutinied were of African descent and that they were responsible for handing over the castles to the royalists who, taking advantage of the situation, once again captured Lima and ransacked it. Proctor described the estimated 3,000 men who came with General José de Canterac into Lima as

composed of four regiments of infantry, and about 500 cavalry. [...] Three battalions of the infantry formed almost entirely of Indians, who were scarcely above five feet high, excepting the grenadier companies, which were composed of unusually tall men with long beards. The officers did not appear to me all better than those of the patriots. The fourth battalion, called the battalion of Arequipa, was composed of Negroes. The cavalry were chiefly Spaniards.⁸⁷

Proctor details the racial diversity amongst the royalist forces that took the capital, and it is important to note that blacks and Indians fought on both sides. The two forces met for the first time at the esplanade of Junín in August 1824. This was a 45-minute engagement, with not a single shot fired, and was decided in favor of the cause of independence. Four months later the final battle was fought in Ayacucho. There a carefully chosen position in the esplanade of Quinua gave the United Armies the edge over the numerically larger royalist army that had to come down a hill to the battleground. An army of 5,380 men defeated one of nearly 8,000, which had amongst its ranks many militia men from the southern Andes recruited from Potosí to Cuzco. The battle was won in large part because the Indigenous troops refused to follow their leaders into the treacherous descent

and fled en masse.⁸⁸ When the royalists capitulated, only 751 officers returned to Spain while 1,512 went back to their home provinces of Lima, Arequipa, Huamanga, Cochabamba, La Paz, Potosí and Salta, amongst others.⁸⁹

The arrival of outside forces, first from Buenos Aires and Chile with San Martín, kick-started the fight for independence. Later men from Colombia who came with Sucre and Bolívar bolstered the cause, together with troops raised in the northern and central coastal and Andean regions of Peru. The composition of the armies was heterogeneous and reflected the realities of their places of origin. Once in Peru the greatest success in recruitment was on the coast where most of the slaves lived. Some ambitious officers such as Gamarra changed sides when it became apparent that the forces fighting for independence offered better opportunities. The new government tried to emulate the colonial urban militias and both the Protectorate and the Constitutional governments sought to incorporate all adult men into the armed forces. Interestingly, in both cases the idea of having segregated companies was maintained, changing the description of *pardos* for that of “patricians”.

The question of “popular” participation in the wars of independence has for long been at the center of Peruvian historiography. Although traditional narratives of the wars stated that the whole “nation” took part in the “glorious quest for freedom,” not much effort went into detailing the terms of the participation of those at the lower levels of society, who were mostly limited to the *montoneras*.⁹⁰ In the 1970s Bonilla and Spalding questioned whether the participation by Peruvians in the process of independence had been quite as important, arguing that independence was actually brought about by external forces.⁹¹ This notion has been further complicated by the works of Blanchard, Méndez, O’Phelan, and Walker, who have sought to provide evidence on how popular sectors participated all along in many different capacities, fighting for all sides.⁹² The motivations of subaltern actors remain elusive, but need to be understood in the context of a society mobilized for war, in which choices were limited by the options available at the moment decisions were being taken. There were different ways of participating, ranging from forced conscription to a more clientelistic and autonomous incorporation.

Republican developments

The armed forces that emerged from this prolonged conflict were quite diverse, in terms of geographical origin, racial and socioeconomic background. At the time of capitulation there were nearly 15,000 men in active service (taking both sides into consideration), and the process of decommissioning was long

and tortuous. Even with so many soldiers in service a new order for the creation of a “civic militia” was given in 1825, requiring all men between 15 and 50 to enlist.⁹³ This decree given by Bolívar did not make any provision for regiments to be segregated, thus departing from the earlier actions of the Protectorate and the Constitutional regimes that had emulated colonial authorities by creating separate companies for different caste groups. Between 1825 and 1826 men were needed to combat the last remnants of opposition to independence in Upper Peru and Callao, and only two years later, after having fought together in Ayacucho, Peru and Colombia were at war. Conflict continued to simmer during the 1830s and 1840s, first through civil war and later due to the attempts to establish a confederation between Peru and Bolivia.⁹⁴

This continuing conflict ensured that the army and the militia remained on high alert for the first two decades after independence with large numbers of men being mobilized. Urban militias remained the backbone of the armed forces while factional armies fought each other. In the republican period caste-segregated militia corps had disappeared and emphasis was placed on the equality of men fighting as citizens.⁹⁵ This did not preclude efforts to maintain difference. In urban areas the militia became a space for citizens. The army, on the other hand, was increasingly conceived by elites as a place to send those who could be classed as *vagos y mal entretenidos*, who needed to be coerced to participate in the state. Militias progressively became the preserve of the *gente decente* and, as a decree given in October 1830 shows, the post of officials in the militia was to be given only to men of recognized fortune who could maintain their position with decorum and without recourse to public funding.⁹⁶ Another decree given in 1835 allowed all professional men to be part of the militia, without actually having to serve.⁹⁷ *Montoneras* continued to play an important role in the civil wars during the republic, but they were seldom seen as an integral part of the armed forces. Being nearly exclusively manned by Indians and rural dwellers, it was important to keep these men of different origin separate from the main corps where ‘social equals’ served.

Although caste was no longer recognized as a viable marker to differentiate within militia companies, there was still a commitment to keeping social distance. Agustín Gamarra, for instance, endeavored to maintain the space between elites and the rest by separating companies by occupation and particularly with the creation of the battalions of merchants. The *Batallón Comercio* first reappeared in legislation given by him in 1838 and was reinforced when he once more took power in 1841.⁹⁸ A colonial battalion along these lines had existed since 1767, made up of nine companies with troop numbers that depended on the number of merchants resident in the city at any given point.⁹⁹ The revival of this kind of

division between militia corps was opposed in the press, where it was described as an effort to create battalions of nobles and of plebeians.¹⁰⁰

Just as these divisions between militia companies sought to separate men to preserve their place, caste separations in the colonial militia had more to do with this wish to establish boundaries between people who considered themselves socially different than with racial segregation understood biologically. It aimed to allow the participation in the militia of groups of men who wanted to preserve and enhance their position in society. Free blacks benefited, as being part of the militias could enhance their social standing, especially if they rose up the ranks in the free *pardo* and *moreno* battalions; they could also serve in integrated militias where their caste was no longer the issue that bound men together. In the same way Creoles and noble Indians coveted the distinction of being officers as it could increase their prestige.

Independence brought a change to this, as now all men were required to enlist and it became more difficult to maintain social position in the context of war. This was nevertheless attempted, and during both the Protectorate and the first Peruvian government militia companies were still separated by caste. Although Bolívar did not continue with this, the desire to maintain social distance did not end, as Gamarra's efforts to reintroduce it in the 1830s and 40s shows. Another separation that was maintained throughout this period was the one between the *montoneras* and the regular army, which ensured that people from different social standing did not have to serve together. The wars of independence brought much in terms of social change, and the sheer number of people involved from all social backgrounds made it impossible for the colonial system to survive intact. Nevertheless efforts to reintroduce some level of social divisions within the army remained and show how the forces that emerged in the republic were influenced by men who, like Gamarra, had trained in the colonial militia. Also present was a need to describe men's physical characteristics, using during the Confederation the same system of colonial classification, as has been shown by the *filiaciones* studied by Méndez.¹⁰¹

Caste as a marker of difference within the armed forces, which had existed for some segregated battalions, disappeared after independence; attempts were nevertheless made to recreate a certain degree of differentiation that reflected the desire of some to maintain a more prestigious social position in society. So, although much changed with independence, much also remained the same, as there was still a strong desire to ensure that "social standing" remained. It is therefore important when looking at the colonial period not to assume that caste terminology can be translated to current understandings of race, as the segregation being attempted in that period was more linked to the desire to be amongst "social equals"; these divisions should not be seen as static, since it was possible

to move from each category. By the same token, the republican period must also be explored with care; for, even as the formal differences between castes were eliminated, the desire to segregate people did not disappear.

NOTES

- 1 This research was carried out with the support of the Centre for Order, Conflict and Violence at Yale University. Previous versions were presented at the *Race, Culture and Social Hierarchy in Peruvian History Workshop*, Institute for the Study of the Americas, London, March 10, 2008; at the 2007 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, September 5-8, 2007; the XII Encuentro de Latinoamericanistas Españoles, Santander, September 21-23, 2006; and the conference *New Elites, Old Regimes: Trajectories of Imperial Change, 1700-1850*, at the Yale Center for International and Area Studies, April 28-29, 2006. I thank all the participants for their useful comments. Iñigo García-Bryce, Shane Weller and Gerardo Leibner, as well as the two anonymous reviewers, have helped me improve this work; all shortcomings remain my own.
- 2 Jorge Basadre, *La Iniciación de la República* (Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, [1929] 2002), I, 137-39. Víctor Villanueva, *Ejército peruano: del caudillaje anárquico al militarismo reformista* (Lima: Mejía Baca, 1973).
- 3 Important work on the colonial militia has been carried out by Leon G. Campell, *The Military and Society in Colonial Peru 1750-1810* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1978) and Juan Marchena Fernández, "The Social World of the Military in Peru and New Granada: The Colonial Oligarchies in Conflict, 1750-1810," in *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*, ed. John R. Fisher, Allan J. Kuethe, and Anthony McFarlane (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990). The work of Clément Thibaud, *Repúblicas en Armas: Los ejércitos bolivarianos en la Guerra de Independencia en Colombia y Venezuela* (Bogotá: IFEA, Plantea, 2003), elaborates on the process of how the colonial militias turned into the armies of independence. Celia Wu Brading noted on the colonial background of most "Peruvian" officers, and how this was different from the Argentine and Venezuelan cases. *Generales y Diplomáticos, Gran Bretaña y el Perú 1820-1840* (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú PUCP, 1993), 32.
- 4 See Charles Walker, *Smoldering Ashes, Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780-1840* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); Mark Thurner, *From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradictions of Postcolonial Nationmaking in Andean Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); Sarah Chambers, *From Subjects to Citizens: Honor, Gender and Politics in Arequipa, Peru, 1780-1854* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1999); David Cahill, *From Rebellion to Independence in the Andes: Soundings from Southern Peru, 1750-1830* (Amsterdam: Askant, 2002); and Cecilia Méndez, *The Plebeian Republic: The Huanta Rebellion and the Making of the Peruvian State, 1820-1850* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).

- 5 For a discussion of *caudillismo* see Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, *The Caudillo of the Andes: Andrés de Santa Cruz* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Here I have tried to bridge this gap between the study of the colonial militias and the republican army.
- 6 Information on the creation of the different bodies of militias and their numbers can be found in *Guía de Forasteros de Lima* (Lima: Imprenta de los Huérfanos, 1793), 301-48.
- 7 Cecilia Méndez Gastelumendi, “Ritos de violencia: Soldados, guerrilleros y mujeres en la Guerra de la Confederación Perú-Boliviana,” paper presented at the XXVII Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, September 5-8, 2007.
- 8 Méndez, *The Plebeian Republic*, 23.
- 9 For more on these guerillas see Ella Dunbar Temple, ed., “Guerrillas y Montoneras Patriotas,” *CDIP*, vol. 5, and Ezequiel Beltrán Gallardo, *Las guerrillas de Yauyos en la emancipación del Perú. 1820-1824* (Lima: Editores técnicos asociados, 1977).
- 10 The disastrous participation in the Seven Years War (1756-63), the loss of Havana and Manila in 1762 to the British, and the humiliating terms of the treaty of Paris of 1763 are credited with having made the Spanish crown change its military policy in its colonies. Campell, *The Military and Society*, 21.
- 11 The right to be tried in the corporate court varied widely according to time and place; more often than not, however, it was granted only to officers in active service. See Marchena Fernández, “The Social World of the Military,” 58.
- 12 Campell, *The Military and Society*, 46. *Reglamento para las Milicias de infantería y caballería de las islas de Cuba que debe obedecerse en todo lo adaptable a las tropas y milicias del Reyno del Perú, San Lorenzo 21 Octubre 1768* (Lima: no publisher, 1779).
- 13 *Guía de Forasteros de Lima* (Lima: Imprenta de los Huérfanos, 1793), 301-48.
- 14 *Guía de Forasteros de Lima* (Lima: Imprenta de los Huérfanos, 1803), 304.
- 15 There is no study for Peru that can be compared to Ben Vinson III’s work on Mexico, from where parallels in institutional design can be drawn. See *Bearing Arms for His Majesty: The Free Colored Militia in Colonial Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
- 16 *Guía de Forasteros de Lima* (1803), 304.
- 17 Vinson, *Bearing Arms for His Majesty*, 17.
- 18 Raúl Palacios Rodríguez, “Notas sobre el ‘Fidelismo’ en la Minerva Peruana,” *Boletín del Instituto Riva Agüero* (Lima) 8 (1971): 770.
- 19 David T. Garret, *Shadows of Empire: the Indian Nobility of Cusco, 1750-1825* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 175.
- 20 *Guía de Forasteros de Lima* (1793), 301-48.
- 21 For details on daily training see José Ragas, “El discreto encanto de la milicia. Ejército y sociedad en el Perú borbónico,” in *El Virrey Amat y su tiempo*, ed. Carlos Pardo-Figueroa Thays and Joseph Dager Alva (Lima: PUCP-Instituto Riva Agüero, 2004), 220. For corporate and elite creation of militias see Pablo Ortemberg, “Rituel et pouvoir: sens et usages des liturgies civiques. De la Vice-royauté du Pérou à l’orée de la République (Lima, 1735-1828),” 2 t, 816pp. (PhD: l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 2008). A revealing document of these preparations is Antonio Elexpuru, *Compendio de las prevenciones que el Excelentísimo Señor Don Manuel de Amat y Juniet, Virrey, Gobernador, y Capitán General de estos Reinos del Perú, y Chile, hizo para la defensa*

- de la Guerra contra Portugal, e Inglaterra: sacado de los Decretos, Ordenes y demás Papeles que pasan en la Secretaria de Cartas a mi cargo* (Lima: sin imprenta, 1763), f. 2v. John Carter Brown Library.
- 22 Leon G. Campell, "The Army of Peru and the Tupac Amaru Revolt, 1780-1783," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 56:1 (1976): 31-57, 40-45.
 - 23 Garret, *Shadows of Empire*, 190-99, and Campell, "The Army of Peru," 47.
 - 24 Campell, "The Army of Peru," 51.
 - 25 Garret, *Shadows of Empire*, 213, 243.
 - 26 *Revista de Comisario de milicias de Arequipa tomada el 16 de Abril de 1787 por Antonio de Rivero*, document in the Archivo Histórico Militar de Lima. I thank Celia Lazarte and Iñigo García-Bryce for their help locating this document.
 - 27 David Cahill refers to the race and caste of the participants in his "Taxonomy of a colonial 'riot': the Arequipa disturbances of 1780," in *From Rebellion to Independence in the Andes* (Amsterdam: Askant, CDELA, 2002), 95-118, and especially 108, 109.
 - 28 Similar documents have been found in Mexico. See Agustín Grajales, "Perfil social y demográfico de milicianos provinciales de Puebla de los Ángeles a fines del siglo XVII," paper presented at the XV AHILA Conference in Leiden Holand, August 29, 2008.
 - 29 Méndez "Ritos de violencia."
 - 30 These documents can be found in the Archivo Histórico del Museo de Arqueología, Antropología e Historia del Perú. I thank Elizabeth Lopez Polastri for all her help navigating the collection.
 - 31 See D001755, D001820, D001826 for examples.
 - 32 Ibid.
 - 33 *Gaceta del Gobierno de Lima*, 13 July 1816 (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1971), vol. I, p. 456.
 - 34 Ruth Hill, *Hierarchy, Commerce and Fraud in Bourbon Spanish America: A Postal Inspector's Exposé* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2005), 4, and especially chapter 5, "Before Race: Hierarchy in Bourbon Spanish America," 197-237.
 - 35 Karen Graubart, *With our Labor and Sweat: Indigenous Women and the Formation of Colonial Society in Peru 1550-1700* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2007), 8.
 - 36 Leon G. Campbell asserts that the variation was that the forces became more Americanized. See "The Changing Racial and Administrative Structure of the Peruvian Military under the Later Bourbons," *The Americas* 32, no. 2 (1975): 117-33.
 - 37 For a biography of Goyeneche see Luis Herreros de Tejada, *El Teniente General D. José Manuel de Goyeneche primer conde de Guaqui* (Barcelona: Oliva de Villanueva, 1923).
 - 38 Fernando Díaz Venteo, *Las Campañas Militares del Virrey Abascal* (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1948), 66.
 - 39 Díaz Venteo quotes a letter from Goyeneche to Abascal from December 1810; *Las Campañas Militares*, 162, 165.
 - 40 José Fernando de Abascal y Sousa, *Memoria de Gobierno* (Sevilla: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1944), 364.
 - 41 Díaz Venteo, *Las Campañas Militares*, 175.

- 42 María Luisa Soux, “Los discursos de Castelli y la sublevación indígena de 1810-1811,” in *La Republica Peregrina: Hombres de armas y letras en América del Sur 1800-1884*, ed. Carmen Mc Evoy and Ana María Stiven (Lima: IEP, IFEA, 2007), 237.
- 43 Joaquín de la Pezuela, “Compendio de los sucesos ocurridos en el ejército del Perú y sus provincias desde que el General Pezuela tomó el mando de él,” in *CDIP* (Lima: Comisión Nacional del Sesquicentenario, 1971) 26:1, p. 248.
- 44 Katryn Burns and Margareth Najarro, “Parentesco, escritura y poder: los Gamarra y la escritura pública en el Cuzco,” *Revista del archivo del Cuzco*, 16 (2004), 113-36.
- 45 See Margarita Guerra Martinière, *Agustín Gamarra* (Lima: Editorial Universitaria, 1964), 6.
- 46 Felipe Pardo y Aliaga, “Semblanzas Peruanas,” *Boletín de la Academia Chilena de Historia*, (Santiago) 32 (1945): 66.
- 47 Cristóbal Aljovín, “A break with the past? Santa Cruz and the Constitution,” in *Political Cultures in the Andes 1750-1950*, ed. Nils Jacobsen and Cristóbal Aljovín (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 98. David Garret explains at length the process through which Creoles and Spaniards married noble Indians, often to gain access to *cacicazgos*; see *Shadows of Empire*, 141.
- 48 For more on Santa Cruz and his fluid identity see Sobrevilla Perea, *The Caudillo of the Andes*.
- 49 For a detailed but dated account of the rebellion see Jorge Cornejo Bouroncle, *Pumacahua. La revolución del Cuzco de 1814. Estudio Documentado* (Cuzco: no publisher, 1956). For a more updated and succinct version see, Walker, *Smoldering Ashes*, 97-105 and David Cahill and Scarlett O’Phelan, “Forging their own History: Indian Insurgency in the Southern Peruvian Sierra, 1815,” *Bulletin of Latin American Review* II:2 (1992): 125-67.
- 50 Víctor Peralta Ruiz, *En defensa de la autoridad. Política y cultura bajo el gobierno del virrey Abascal. Perú 1806-1816* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas Instituto de Historia, 2002). Chapter 4 is dedicated to the Cuzco uprising.
- 51 Garrett, *Shadows of Empire*, 246.
- 52 Nuria Sala i Vila details the way in which Indians in this area were radicalized. See “La constitución de Cádiz y su impacto en el gobierno de las comunidades indígenas en el virreinato del Perú,” *Boletín Americanista* (Barcelona 1993): 51-71.
- 53 John Fisher, “Royalism, Regionalism, and Rebellion in Colonial Peru, 1808-1815,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 59 (1979): 254.
- 54 Cahill, “Illicit repartos and first families: southern Peru 1780-1824,” in *From Rebellion to Independence*, 43-58.
- 55 Fisher, “Royalism, Regionalism, and Rebellion” and “The Royalist Regime in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1820-1824,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32, no.1 (2000), 55-84.
- 56 *Ibid.*, 251, 253, 254.
- 57 For a detailed study of Arequipa’s participation in providing men see Cristina Mazzeo, “Las vicisitudes de la Guerra de la independencia del Perú 1817-1824,” *Cuadernos de Investigación* (Lima: Instituto Riva-Agüero, 2000).
- 58 Pezuela, *Memoria de Gobierno*, 411, and John Miller, *Memoirs of General Miller in the Service of the Republic of Peru*, 2 vols (London: Longman, 1828), vol. 1, 187.

- 59 Pezuela, *Memoria de Gobierno*, 430.
- 60 Peter Blanchard, "The Language of Liberation: Slave Voices in the Wars of Independence," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 82:3.
- 61 This took place in November 1820; see Miller, *Memoirs*, vol. 1, p. 275.
- 62 Hipólito Unanue, *Guía Política, Eclesiástica y Militar del Virreynato del Perú para el año de 1793* (Lima: Cofide, 1985), 178.
- 63 Blanchard, "The Language of Liberation," 500.
- 64 Spies kept the viceroy up to speed with the movements of the newly arrived forces; see Pezuela, *Memoria de Gobierno*, 791.
- 65 Beltrán Gallardo, *Las guerrillas de Yauyos*.
- 66 James Paroissien, "Anotaciones para un Diario, Agosto 18 de 1820- Marzo 19 de 1821," in *CDIP, Memorias, diarios, crónicas*, vol. 2, p. 588.
- 67 Fisher, "The Royalist Regime", 68, also notes that García Camba mentioned in his *Memoirs* the reluctance of creoles to serve under peninsulars.
- 68 For more of this see Manuel de Mendiburu, *Diccionario histórico-biográfico del Perú* (Lima, Imprenta "Enrique Palacios", 1931-34), 328, 329.
- 69 "Instrucciones de los testigos de la conspiración que hizo el Coronel Agustín Gamarra y otros oficiales, tomadas por el General Pedro Antonio de Olañeta, Dionisio Aldazabal y José María Valdés, 15 marzo 1820", in *CDIP*, doc. 224, 6:4, 295-296.
- 70 "Oficio al Virrey sobre la conspiración de Gamarra y otros oficiales," in *CDIP*, doc. 228, 6:4, 299.
- 71 "Instrucción de los acusados de conspiración contra la Monarquía," in *CIDP*, doc. 230, 6:4, 300.
- 72 This is an old Spanish word that can be roughly translated as an indiscretion that was a misdemeanor; see "Oficio del Virrey Joaquín de la Pezuela al General Ramírez," in *CDIP*, doc. 231, 6:4, p. 301.
- 73 Pezuela narrates the whole episode in great detail in his *Memoria*, 819-21.
- 74 For their failure in slave recruitment see Mazzeo, "Las vicisitudes de la Guerra", Appendix 1, where there is a list of slaves recruited for the defense of Lima, 60.
- 75 For more on the militias during the Protectorate see Gustavo Montoya, *La Independencia del Perú y el fantasma de la revolución* (Lima: IEP, 2002), 122.
- 76 Miller, *Memoirs*, vol. 1, 345, 346.
- 77 *Ibid.*, 115.
- 78 Andrés García Camba, *Apuntes para la Historia de la Revolución del Perú sacados de los trabajos del Estado Mayor del Ejército de Operaciones* (Lima: Imprenta tomada de los enemigos, 1824), 26.
- 79 "Decreto disponiendo alistamiento," Lima, 8 Febrero 1823, in *CDIP*, VI: 9, 16.
- 80 For the full text of the decree see <http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/LeyesXIX/1822156.pdf>
- 81 Miller, *Memoirs*, II, 9-11.
- 82 It is surprisingly difficult to find information on this campaign and the most used description of it is the one by Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán, *Historia del Perú Independiente, Primer periodo 1819-1822* (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Courier de La Plata, 1888).

- 83 Miller notes that all these men were Peruvians, but he makes no comments on their racial background; see *Memoirs*, II, 61.
- 84 Robert Proctor, *Narrative of a Journey across the Cordillera of the Andes and of a Residence in Lima and other parts of Peru in the years 1823 and 1824* (London: Thomas Davidson, 1825), 139.
- 85 Enrique Martínez, *Exposición documentada sobre las causas de la Insurrección de las tropas de los Andes en las fortalezas del Callao el 4 de febrero de 1824* (Santiago: Imprenta Nacional, 1824).
- 86 Peter Blanchard, “An Unlikely Independence Hero: Argentina’s ‘El Negro Falucho,’” prepared for delivery at the 2007 Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Montreal, September 5-8, 2007.
- 87 Proctor, *Narrative of a Journey*, 356.
- 88 For accounts of the battle see O’Connor, *Un Irlandés con Bolívar*, 109, and Miller, *Memoirs*, vol. II.
- 89 For complete lists see, “Relación de los generales, jefes y oficiales del ejército español tomados por el Ejército Unido Libertador en consecuencia de la batalla y capitulación de Ayacucho, con expresión de los que se van para Europa y los que se quedan en el país,” in *CDIP*, 6:9, 241-252.
- 90 For current historiography, see Carlos Contreras, “La Independencia del Perú. Balance de la Historiografía Contemporánea,” in *Debates sobre las independencias iberoamericanas*, ed. Manuel Chust and José Antonio Serrano (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2007), 99-117.
- 91 Heraclio Bonilla y Karen Spalding, “La independencia en el Perú: las palabras y los hechos,” in Bonilla, ed., *La independencia en el Perú* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP), 1972).
- 92 Peter Blanchard, *Under the Flags of Freedom: Slave Soldiers and the Wars of Independence in Spanish America* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2008); Méndez, *The Plebeian Republic*; Scarlett O’Phelan, *Rebellions and Revolts in Eighteenth-Century Peru and Upper Peru* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1985), Walker, *Smoldering Ashes*.
- 93 For the full text of the law see <http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/LeyesXIX/1825003.pdf>.
- 94 For the history of the Confederation see Sobrevilla Perea, *The Caudillo of the Andes*.
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