

Workers, Soldiers, Activists: Black Mobilization in Brazil and Spanish America, 1800-2000

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Comparisons of race relations in Brazil and North America (United States) have a long history. As Thomas Skidmore's classic *Black into White* made clear, Brazilian writers and intellectuals were already drawing such comparisons by the late 1800s; and Gilberto Freyre's direct observations of Jim Crow segregation in the United States south provided the implicit backdrop to his seminal portrait of Brazilian race relations in *Casa grande e senzala* (1933) and *Sobrados e mocambos* (1936). Meanwhile North American observers, ranging from former President Theodore Roosevelt to African-American writers and journalists, were commenting on patterns of race in Brazil and contrasting those patterns, either implicitly or explicitly, to race relations in the United States.¹

Such comparisons continued into the second half of the 1900s, generating an important body of scholarly literature to which Skidmore has been a major contributor. Beginning in 1972, at the same moment that Carl Degler was winning acclaim for his analysis of the "mulatto escape hatch" and his assertion that the "the mulatto was the key" to understanding differences between Brazil and the United States, Skidmore acknowledged the importance of the mulatto racial group but insisted that there was much more to the (comparative) story. In order to understand race in the two countries, he suggested, we have to move beyond race per se to consider multiple historical factors ("contrasting socio-economic contexts," demography, regional differences within each country, the role of the free black population during slavery) and "how these factors have fitted together."²

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Twenty years later, in 1993, Skidmore proposed a full-scale revision of the Brazil/United States comparison by questioning longstanding assumptions of a fundamental difference between the two racial systems. Noting the increase in the previous 10-20 years in the number and flexibility of racial categories and identities in US society, and proposals in Brazil to group *pardos* and *pretos* together in a single *negro* racial category, Skidmore asked whether the contrast between “bi-racial USA [and] multi-racial Brazil” was “still valid.”³

He concluded that article by predicting that, in the area of race, Brazil and the United States will “continue to offer historians and social scientists a rich panorama for comparative analysis.” Yet as he also recognized, the US/Brazil comparison is not without its pitfalls, particularly for our understanding of Brazil. When those comparisons began, at the turn of the twentieth century, racial exclusion and inequality were so extreme in the United States that Brazil could indeed look racially “democratic” by comparison. But if during the first half of the 1900s Brazil benefited from the comparison with the United States, during the second half of the century the balance shifted. Anti-racist movements and state action in the United States formed a new racial standard against which Brazil could now be measured and found to fall short.⁴

In both instances, condemnation (of the US during the first half of the 1900s and Brazil during the second) was surely justified. But using national comparisons in this way runs the risk of obscuring and minimizing shortcomings of the “model” society, as well as obscuring the genuine achievements in the society being condemned: for example, in the case of the Jim Crow US, the growth of the African-American middle and working classes that would generate the anti-racist movements of mid-century; or in the case of Brazilian racial democracy, the relatively high levels of cross-racial social contact and *convivência* that the US has yet to achieve and that form one of the most attractive aspects of Brazilian society.⁵

How might our understandings of race in Brazil change if we were to shift the comparative optic away from the United States and toward some other point(s) of reference? One model for such a shift is suggested by Skidmore’s work on an entirely different topic: the role of organized labor in national politics. In a 1979 essay, “Workers and Soldiers: Urban Labor Movements and Elite Responses in Twentieth-Century Latin America,” Skidmore compared labor/state relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile during the first half of the 1900s. As always, the analysis was sharp and provocative, questioning the “prevailing historical wisdom about passive masses [and] shrewdly manipulative elites” at the time. Skidmore concluded that “historians have underrated the mass mobilizations of urban workers” and the effects of those mobilizations on national politics.⁶

That essay was prescient in sounding several of the themes that would dominate Latin American labor historiography in the 1980s and 90s: in particular, the themes of worker agency and the impacts of that agency and of labor-based movements on national politics.⁷ The essay also followed a comparative approach that differs from Skidmore's work on race, comparing Brazil not to the United States but to its Spanish American neighbors. What if we were to apply that same comparative logic to the study of race? And what if we were to adopt as well that article's focus on non-elite agency, mass-based political mobilization, and the impacts of both on national politics?

The comparative literature on race in Brazil and the US not infrequently contrasts the experiences of recent (post-1950) black civil rights movements in the two countries, noting their greater strength and effectiveness in the United States.⁸ But when we shift the comparative frame away from the United States and toward Spanish America, we notice immediately a provocative finding of much of the recent research on the Spanish-speaking countries: that people of African ancestry have taken part in national politics not primarily through racially defined "black" movements but rather through larger cross-racial coalitions such as independence armies, labor movements, and reformist political parties. While those movements were not "racial" in character, the policies and programs that they enacted had important racial consequences, and large political consequences as well. What do we see when we compare some of those experiences of cross-racial mobilization to their counterparts in Brazil? What conclusions, and what new questions, might such a comparison suggest, both about Brazil and about Spanish America?

This essay seeks to explore some of the possibilities of intra-Latin American comparison by looking at four instances of popular mobilization in the region's history: the struggles for national independence; "popular liberal" movements in the 1800s; labor-based populism in the 1900s; and recent (post-1970) black civil rights movements.

Independence (Soldiers I)

In Spanish America, independence wars were momentous political events, both for the newly independent nations and for their slave and free black citizens. In Mexico, Cuba, Colombia, Venezuela, Argentina, and other countries, it was through military service in those wars that free blacks and mulattoes achieved their principal political objective: the striking down of the colonial caste laws that had consigned them to legal and social inferiority. And it was through military service that slaves took the first steps toward the abolition of

slavery, through the ending of the African slave trade and the Free Womb laws enacted at that time.⁹

Military service was initially channeled through the black militia units created by Spain during the 1600s and early 1700s and then expanded in the late 1700s. Especially during that period of expansion, militia units emerged as a potent vehicle of community mobilization and political action, lobbying Spanish officials for land rights, tax exemptions, legal *fueros*, and other concessions.¹⁰ When independence wars began in 1810, rebel leaders recognized in the militias a potent source of potential support, both political and military, and in most colonies quickly moved to strike down the racial laws that had been one of the main sources of free black discontent during the late colonial period.

As the independence wars dragged on, rebel leaders realized that they would need not just free black support to defeat Spain but support from slave troops and the slave population as well. Seeking that support, Chile and Argentina enacted gradual emancipation laws in 1811 and 1813, respectively; rewarding slave military service in the wars, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador did so shortly after independence, in 1821. (Having learned to its cost the importance of slave political and military support, Spain enacted a similar such law early in the first Cuban independence war, in 1870.) These laws provided that children of slave mothers would be born legally free, though required to serve their mother's master until the age of majority, at which point they would acquire full freedom. The laws thus represented a hard-fought compromise between the interests of the slave population, which desired immediate and unconditional freedom, and those of slave owners, who wished to continue appropriating their slaves' labor. Under the Free Womb laws, owners retained control over their slaves and their labor; slaves obtained their children's eventual freedom, while continuing to pursue their own individual freedom through purchase, military service, or other means.

As in Spanish America, free Afro-Brazilians served in colonial militia units; and, as in Spanish America, those units were recruited into the independence forces that expelled Portuguese troops from Bahia in 1822-23. But in comparison to the Spanish American wars, which lasted for a decade or more and extended across vast swathes of territory, independence struggles in Brazil were much more limited in scope and did not require the extensive mobilization of free black troops. Except for a battalion of slave soldiers in Bahia, slaves were not mobilized at all.¹¹

Brazilian independence thus produced racial outcomes both different from and similar to those of Spanish American independence. While Spanish Americans were taking the first steps toward ending slavery, Brazil made no moves at all in that direction. On the contrary: at the same time that the newly independent

Spanish American nations were abolishing their African slave trades, more Africans arrived in Brazil (431,000 in the 1820s) than at any previous time in the country's history; and imports continued strong in the 1830s and 40s.¹² Thus while slavery was in full decline in independent Spanish America, it was growing to its highest levels ever in Brazil.

Outcomes for free Afro-Brazilians paralleled those in Spanish America: in declaring juridical and civic equality for all Brazilian citizens, the Constitution of 1824 effectively struck down the colonial caste laws.¹³ Yet this similarity does raise a comparative question: overturning the caste laws in Spanish America required a full-scale conflagration and widespread military mobilization.¹⁴ How, then, was such a momentous step taken in Brazil in the absence of those conditions? Was the issue of racial equality debated at all in the Constituent Assembly? If so, in what terms? Or was it simply imposed by Pedro I and his advisors?

Or, alternatively, did the writers of the 1824 constitution implicitly assume that, just as constitutional guarantees of citizenship and equality were understood not to apply to women and slaves, they did not apply to free blacks and mulattoes either? Such a possibility is suggested by the public order statutes handed down by the Ministry of Justice in 1825, which set different curfew hours for whites and blacks and called for police to repress all public gatherings that threatened public order, "especially gatherings of blacks, slave or free."¹⁵ But aside from such occasional slips, there is little evidence of federal or provincial efforts to enact or enforce racially discriminatory laws following independence, and one does find evidence of government efforts to enforce racial equality.¹⁶ From which we may conclude that the Constitution's guarantees of equality were intended to include blacks and mulattoes and thus did represent a rejection of colonial practice.

Why did Brazilian elites take this step? In the absence of research on this point, one hypothesis might be that, just as in Spanish America, black military service was a principal consideration in the decision to concede equality to free blacks.¹⁷ That military service would be aimed, however, not at the imperial metropole but at the enemy within: the country's slave population. By 1810 Brazil already had Latin America's largest slave population, both in absolute terms (over 700,000) and as a proportion of the national population (37 percent).¹⁸ And as we have seen, between 1820 and 1850 more Africans arrived in the country than ever before. Under these conditions Brazilian elites devoted considerable thought, not to say preoccupation, to the "state of domestic war" that existed between masters and their slaves, and to the possibility, fearsomely exemplified by Saint Domingue, that domestic war might escalate into public civil war.¹⁹ Should that happen, political and military support from the free black population would be absolutely essential in defeating the slaves. In an effort to

obtain such support, and to ensure that the free population would remain united in confronting potential slave rebellion, Brazilian elites conceded equality to free people of color.²⁰

Popular Liberalism (Soldiers II)

In Brazil as in Spanish America, striking down the caste laws opened the door to free black participation in national politics. Recent research on nineteenth-century politics in Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and other countries has underlined the importance of “popular liberal” movements in those countries and the role of free blacks and mulattoes in those movements. “Popular liberals” invoked the most radical and egalitarian aspects of liberal ideology and its calls for civic equality, democracy, and the rights of citizenship. Forging these elements into a harsh critique of the class and racial privileges embodied in colonialism, radical liberals found a receptive audience among those groups historically excluded from those privileges, prominent among whom were free blacks and mulattoes. In Mexico, black militia units from the Pacific coast propelled radical liberal Vicente Guerrero to national power in 1829, and then Liberal caudillo Juan Alvarez in 1855, under whose presidency party leaders initiated the Liberal Reform and wrote the Constitution of 1857. Black troops were similarly instrumental in bringing Liberal governments to power in Ecuador (José Urbina, 1852), Peru (Ramón Castilla, 1853), Colombia (José Hilario López, 1849), and in Venezuela, where Liberal forces fought against Conservatives under the rhetorical banner of “free land and free men” (land reform and the abolition of slavery).²¹

As those Liberal governments took power, they finished the job begun during the independence wars, freeing the remaining slaves and definitively abolishing slavery.²² Here we come to another difference between Spanish America and Brazil, one that suggests that Brazilian elites’ concession of equality to free blacks may well have had its hypothesized political effect. As in Spanish America, free Afro-Brazilians were distributed across all sectors of the political spectrum but were most visible in the camp of radical liberalism. During the 1820s and 30s, people of color were prominent in the anti-Portuguese and anti-monarchical street demonstrations in Rio de Janeiro and in the federalist rebellions in the Northeast, where “the most radical elements, those who imagined a republican Brazil, or at least a federalist Brazil, were pardos from poor or middling families.”²³ Questions of central authority and local autonomy became overlaid with those of race and class privilege: rebels in Maranhão charged that the rights of citizenship were enjoyed only by “the Whites and the Rich,” while “all the people of Color, whom they habitually despise, suffer the heavy yoke of

absolutism and slavery.” Rebels in Bahia in 1837 denounced the government’s “warring against us because they are whites, and in Bahia there must be no blacks and mulattos, especially in office, unless they are very rich and change their liberal opinions.”²⁴

In their political and racial dynamics, these federalist rebellions—the War of the Cabanos in Pernambuco (1832-35), the Cabanagem revolt in Pará (1835-40), the Balaiada in Maranhão (1835-40), the Sabinada in Bahia (1837-38)—were the Brazilian analogue of the Liberal/Conservative civil wars that convulsed much of Spanish America at the same time. But while in Spanish America those wars produced final abolition, in Brazil they did not. The rebellions did have destabilizing impacts on Brazilian slavery, in much the same way as the Spanish American independence and civil wars. Slaves took advantage of the fighting between rebel and government forces, and the resulting turmoil in the plantation zones, to flee to quilombos. Upon hearing the radical rhetoric of the rebel forces, many volunteered to join the rebels; in Maranhão and Pernambuco they formed the hard core of the rebel forces and were the last to lay down their arms. Even in the face of this slave support, however, none of the rebel movements ever called for or advocated abolition, and the rebels in Pará actively repressed slave rebellion and runaways. Nor was the victorious central government inclined (at that time) to take any action against the institution on which Brazilian society, polity, and economy were based.²⁵

Why was abolition a core demand of radical liberalism in Spanish America but not in Brazil? Answering this question will require more research on radical liberalism in Brazil, asking questions similar to those driving the recent work on Spanish America: Who were the radical liberals? What was the racial and class composition of that movement? What were its relations—social, political, and economic—with the moderate and conservative groups against which it contended?²⁶

One reason for Brazilian liberals to distance themselves from abolition was a direct consequence of Brazilian independence and of the nation’s failure to abolish slavery or the African slave trade at that time. While slave populations in independent Spanish America were declining in number and becoming more Creole and less African, slave populations in Brazil were doing the opposite: growing in size and becoming more African, which was to say more alien, threatening, and potentially dangerous. As had become clear during the 1835 Muslim revolt in Salvador, even native-born Brazilian slaves shied away from political alliances with the Africans, whom they saw as culturally and ethnically different from themselves. This was even more the case with the native-born free population, who saw little commonality between themselves and enslaved Africans. As a result, the only rebels to call for abolition were those in Bahia,

and they only did so during the final days of the rebellion, in a desperate bid for slave support in the face of imminent defeat by government forces. Even then, their proposed abolition applied only to Brazilian-born slaves; Africans were to remain in chains.²⁷

The majority-African composition of Brazil's slave population undercut support not just for abolition but for radical liberalism as well. One effect of free black and slave participation in the federal rebellions of the 1830s was to alienate initial elite and middle-class support for those movements. As a result, while liberal forces in Spanish America generally won their civil wars, none of the Brazilian rebellions of the 1830s was successful. Unable (it appears—again, we need more research on these movements) to build alliances across the class, racial, and ethnic divisions created in Brazilian society by slavery, radical liberalism consistently went down to defeat. Abolition, when it came to Brazil, would have to come by some other route than Liberal/Conservative civil war and military mobilization.

Abolition (Activists I)

That route was defined and charted by a most unexpected (given Brazil's previous history) development: the only mass-based abolitionist movement in Latin America, and one of the largest such movements anywhere in the Western Hemisphere.²⁸ By 1870 the country was experiencing “a proliferation of emancipationist clubs, the beginnings of anti-slavery journalism, and frequent anti-slavery meetings.”²⁹ This initial mobilization, based mainly in the white, urban middle class, was instrumental in obtaining the passage of a Free Womb law in 1871. During the 1880s, the movement broadened its racial and class composition, drawing on middle-class Afro-Brazilian activists such as Luís Gama, José do Patrocínio, André Rebouças, and Luís Anselmo da Fonseca, and on urban workers. After Afro-Brazilian port workers in Ceará refused to load slaves on to ships bound for São Paulo, the state was swept in 1882 by a wave of abolitionist mobilization that persuaded owners to free almost every slave in the state. Similar campaigns were launched in towns and cities in southern Brazil and then spread into the countryside, where abolitionists in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and other provinces appealed to the slaves to join them in a campaign of massive civil disobedience. Slaves seized the opportunity, fleeing en masse from the plantations and taking refuge in free zones in nearby towns and cities.³⁰

Writing in June 1888, less than a month after the passage by Parliament of the Golden Law decreeing abolition, the São Paulo newspaper *Rebate* described the law as “no more than the legal sanctioning, so that public authority wouldn't be

discredited, of an act that had already been consummated by the mass revolt of the slaves.” “Quite rare in our land, the executive branch being the mere executor of a decree by the people,” the *Diário Popular* commented the day after the law was passed. The *Estado de S. Paulo* concurred: “A mass-based movement, deeply and profoundly of the people, and spread over the entire vastness of our country, we have but one example in our history, and that is the movement that on May 13, 1888, achieved its glorious ratification, and its recognition by the government.”³¹

The triumph of the abolitionist movement was unique not just in Brazilian history, but in all Latin America. Through peaceful, mass-based civic action, free and slave Brazilians came together to achieve what in almost every other American country (including Haiti and the United States) required years of warfare and bloodshed. This was an expression of political and civic democracy and coalition-building not to be forgotten or passed over lightly. It also marked the entry onto the political stage of a social group that had not hitherto exerted much influence on Brazilian politics but that would assume an ever greater role in the 1900s: urban workers.

Workers

Skidmore’s 1979 essay, “Workers and Soldiers,” was one of the first efforts to think in cross-national comparative terms about the labor movements that formed in Latin America (as in much of the Atlantic world) between 1880 and 1930.³² In Latin America that wave of unionization was driven by the dramatic expansion of the region’s export economies. On a scale greater than ever before, workers came together to produce, process, and transport massive quantities of export goods: meat and grains from Argentina and Uruguay; coffee from Brazil, Colombia, Central America, and the Caribbean; sugar from Cuba, Brazil, and other countries; oil from Mexico and Venezuela; bananas from Central America and Colombia; and other commodities.

These workers were of all races and ethnicities, ranging from native-born white, black, brown, and indigenous Latin Americans to immigrants from Europe, Asia, and the non-Hispanic Caribbean. As these workers migrated within their own countries or across the oceans to Latin America, they created multi-ethnic labor forces that varied greatly in composition from country to country but were almost always characterized by ethnic and cultural diversity.

The first generation of labor historians tended to see diversity, and perceived divisions among different racial and ethnic groups, as one of the principal obstacles to the construction of unions in the region.³³ There is certainly some truth

to that observation. Racial and ethnic differences were perceived as quite real by workers at the time, as they still are by many people today. Not a few employers exploited those differences to prevent unionization; in other cases, workers themselves refused to cross perceived ethnic boundaries to join with members of other groups.³⁴ But recent research has also called to our attention instances in which workers and organizers overcame those differences to create cross-racial labor movements, and the surprising frequency with which they did so.

Such research is most advanced in Cuba, where historians have noted both the extreme ethnic diversity of early-twentieth-century labor forces and workers' repeated efforts to mobilize across racial lines. On the sugar plantations, for example, workers were of all complexions and nationalities, including Chinese, Spaniards, Haitians, Jamaicans, and black, brown, and white Cubans. Under such circumstances, and especially in light of the rigors of the Cuban sugar economy, mobilizing across racial lines would seem an unlikely option. Yet as early as the 1902 sugar workers' strike, and continuing through the massive mobilizations of the 1930s, organizers worked to overcome the divisions among Cuban, Spanish, and West Indian workers. Many of those organizers were themselves Afro-Cuban, who by the 1930s and 40s emerged as some of the leading figures in the island's unions: Jesús Menéndez, head of the sugar workers' union; Arcelio Iglesias, head of the dock workers; Lázaro Peña, secretary-general of the national labor federation (CTC); Blas Roca, secretary-general of the Communist party; and others.³⁵

Cross-racial movements involving large numbers of Afro-Spanish Americans were by no means confined to Cuba. Oil workers' unions in Venezuela mobilized Venezuelan workers of all races alongside Afro-Caribbean workers from Dutch- and English-speaking islands. Banana worker unions along Colombia's Caribbean coast mobilized a work force drawn from the local Afro-Colombian population, indigenous laborers from the Guajira peninsula, and mestizo migrants from the highlands. So strong was the association between nonwhite racial status and the Colombian labor movement that when (mestizo) national labor leader Jorge Gaitán was scornfully dismissed by Conservative leaders as "el negro Gaitán," he embraced the term and made it a centerpiece of his rhetorical assaults on the *oligarquía*.³⁶

Initially opposed and repressed by national governments, by the 1930s and 40s these multiracial labor movements formed the core of populist political movements and ruling national political coalitions: Acción Democrática in Venezuela, the left-Liberal governments of Alfonso López in Colombia, Fulgencio Batista's administrations in Cuba, Luis Muñoz Marín's Partido Popular Democrático in Puerto Rico, and others. These governments were responsible for the populist social and economic programs enacted at that time, and responsible as well for

the doctrines of racial democracy that dominated mid-century Latin American racial thought.

The causes and consequences of these developments require much more research attention than they have received to date. It is clear, for example, that black workers were numerically important in organized labor and in populism. It is far less clear whether racial questions emerged in those movements, and if so, how they were dealt with. To what degree, and in what ways, did workers and their movements openly discuss and confront questions of racial difference? To what degree were Latin American labor movements formally or informally racially egalitarian? How did the racial composition of those movements' leadership compare to the racial composition of the members? And what was the relationship, if any, between the multiracial character of the region's labor movements and the adoption of racial democracy as a core element of national identity? Like social security, public health, state-provided housing, and other populist reforms, was racial democracy a project formulated and "granted" to unions by national political and intellectual elites? Was it a "bottom-up" product of cross-racial contact and egalitarian practices in popular movements?³⁷ Or did it emerge from other sources?

If such research is necessary for Spanish America, it is needed even more for Brazil. Brazil is the archetypal case of a Latin American country with a racially mixed labor force and labor movement that eventually came to form the electoral basis of national populism. And perhaps more than in any other Latin American country, that populist movement, and national thought and practice, are closely associated with the ideal of racial democracy. What then, have been the racial dynamics of that labor movement and of national populism over time?

As with Latin American labor historiography more generally, early historians of the Brazilian labor movement tended to stress the theme of racial and ethnic division within the working class, and the obstacles that such division posed to successful mobilization.³⁸ And indeed, studies of movements in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo have found ample evidence of racial tension and conflict between European immigrants and native-born Brazilians, and of employers' exploitation of those conflicts to break initial efforts toward unionization.³⁹ Those findings make all the more imperative, then, research on how workers were eventually able to overcome those divisions to build the racially inclusive movements of the 1930s and 40s. Such research must also address whether the racial tensions of the early 1900s persisted in later decades. We need to ask the same questions of Brazilian unions and labor movements that we ask of Spanish American movements: Did they talk openly about race? Did the racial composition of the leadership reflect that of the members? Is there evidence of racial tension and conflict? And what was organized labor's relationship, if any, to concepts

of racial democracy? Might such concepts have emerged in part out of racially egalitarian ideology and practice among workers and their movements? Were workers and their movements talking about racial egalitarianism during those years in any explicit way?

Black Movements (Activists II)

In Brazil and Spanish America alike, populist movements supported by organized labor instituted social and economic programs that had profound consequences for their national societies. State-promoted industrialization generated economic growth and job opportunities for working and middle classes. And increased government expenditure for education, health care, housing, and other social goods distributed the results of that growth and opportunity more broadly than in previous generations.

The racial impacts of those policies were striking. Because of the availability of census data on race, they are most clearly documented for Brazil, where the number of Afro-Brazilian high school graduates increased from 51,000 in 1950 to 3.3 million in 1991, and the number of college graduates from 4,000 to 600,000. As a result of increased access to higher education, by 1991, 3.5 million Afro-Brazilians (12 percent of the black and brown labor force) were working in white-collar occupations.⁴⁰ Still, this was well below the number of whites working in such occupations (8.6 million, 34 percent of all white workers); and as they competed for white-collar employment and advancement, Afro-Brazilians found themselves significantly disadvantaged. As many studies from the 1970s through the present have made clear, black and brown earnings lagged significantly behind those of white people with comparable education, experience, and other qualifications; and those racial disparities tended to increase at higher levels of the job market. The more education and experience black and brown workers acquired, the further behind their white competitors they fell, both in relative and absolute terms.⁴¹

Armed with both statistical and real-life evidence of the barriers obstructing their full integration into Brazilian society, a generation of activists, most of them with high school or college education, began to create new black movements in the 1970s. Those movements have attracted a good deal of scholarly attention, one of the principal conclusions of which has been that Afro-Brazilian movements have been relatively weak and less effective in achieving their goals than their North American counterparts (and partial inspiration), the US civil rights movement.⁴²

Evaluations of Brazil's black movements look quite different, however, if we compare them not to the US civil rights movement but to their analogues in Spanish America. Beginning in the 1970s, at the same time as the black movements in Brazil, black activists in Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Peru, and Uruguay launched movements aimed at combating discrimination and inequality. In Colombia, those movements also sought to defend historic Afro-Colombian land rights in the Pacific rain forests of the Chocó region. These movements have had some significant impact on national debates about race, particularly in terms of raising the question of whether racial democracy accurately describes race relations in Spanish American countries, or whether it represents an ideal yet to be achieved in practice. Black movements in Colombia also succeeded in writing protections of black land titles into the Constitution of 1991, along with provisions mandating research and teaching on Afro-Colombian history and culture.⁴³

On balance, however, black movements in Spanish America have attracted less support, and achieved much less in policy terms, than their counterparts in Brazil. Afro-Brazilian movements do not draw on a large political following, nor have they displayed much ability to turn out votes. In light of those limitations, however, their achievements are all the more striking. During the 1980s they provoked a national debate on racial democracy that, by the 1990s, had reached a consensus that the national ideology simply did not correspond to the realities of Brazilian race relations. That consensus led President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1996 to proclaim racial equality as one of the goals of his National Human Rights Program. He convened an Interministerial Working Group of politicians, civil servants, and representatives from civil society to design and propose policies to achieve those goals. Among those policies were race-based affirmative action programs aimed at increasing black representation in education and employment. When those programs proved too controversial to be enacted by Congress, they started to be adopted piecemeal in the early 2000s by individual federal and state agencies (e.g., the Ministries of Agrarian Development, Justice, and Foreign Relations), universities, and private firms.⁴⁴ Through the Ministry of Agrarian Development, the government has also moved to enforce land rights for former *quilombo* communities to a greater degree than in Colombia, where constitutional protections remain largely unenforced, or in other countries (e.g., Venezuela, Ecuador, and the Central American countries) where black land ownership is equally vulnerable and has no state protection.

As we survey recent policy outcomes, the Brazil/Spanish America comparison not only revises our evaluation of Brazil's black movements but also raises a series of research questions on the Spanish American countries. Black movements in those countries arose in response to conditions similar to those in

Brazil: increasing black access to higher education, combined with continuing racial barriers in employment that prevent black and brown people from fully enjoying the fruits of their educational achievements. But if the conditions that gave rise to the Spanish American movements were similar to those obtaining in Brazil, why have black movements in Spanish America received less support than in Brazil? Are levels of vocational, educational, and other forms of inequality in those countries lower than in Brazil, thus generating less sense of racial grievance? Are racial boundaries and identities less clearly defined than in Brazil, again lowering Afro-Spanish Americans' sense of racial grievance? Is repression of racial movements greater than in Brazil, making it more difficult for them to function? Are potential leaders of Afro-Spanish American movements more effectively co-opted than in Brazil, thus depriving black movements of leadership? Or to put it more positively, are alternative forms of mobilization—political parties, labor unions, civic organizations, religious organizations—more open to black initiative and concerns in Spanish America than in Brazil? Are those organizations in Spanish America already addressing racial issues more effectively than similar organizations in Brazil, thus reducing the perceived need for racially defined black movements?

The recent wave of scholarship on post-1970 indigenous movements in Spanish America has greatly increased our understanding of the origins of those movements and how they have reshaped politics in the region.⁴⁵ We now need similar research on black movements in Spanish America, based in part on questions deriving from the indigenous experience and in part on comparisons with black movements in Brazil.

Conclusions and Questions

This essay began by suggesting that shifting our comparative optic away from the United States and toward Spanish America will lead to new conclusions and new questions about race in Brazil and Spanish America. Does that turn out to be true?

When we look at the history of race in Brazil in relation not to the United States but to Spanish America, the first change that we notice is that Brazil no longer looks strange and exotic. When North American historians and social scientists consider race in Brazil, it is very hard for us, even with the best will in the world, to avoid positing the United States as the norm and Brazil as the deviant case. Thus, we ask, if the United States and Brazil both had slavery, and the US subsequently developed full-fledged racial segregation imposed by the state, then why didn't Brazil? If Brazil and the United States both had marked

racial inequalities in the 1900s, and the United States developed active civil rights and Black Power movements in the second half of the century, then why didn't Brazil?⁴⁶

But when we look at Brazil in relation to Spanish America, its racial history no longer looks so strange and unfamiliar. Rather, we see that it is perfectly normal for post-emancipation societies to *not* develop formalized, state-imposed systems of racial segregation; what demands explanation is not why societies fail to adopt racial segregation, but rather why they do. And when we look at Brazil and Spanish America in relation to each other, we see that it is not the norm for societies to develop strong, racially defined political movements, even in the face of deeply entrenched racial inequality. Our comparative question then becomes not why Latin American nations failed to develop such movements, but rather why the United States did.⁴⁷

Given the commonalities in their histories of Iberian colonialism, of slave law based on Roman precedents, of caste laws based on late medieval precedents, of Catholicism, of plantation agriculture, of African slavery, and of widespread race mixture, it is hardly surprising to find broad overlap between the racial histories of Brazil and the Spanish American nations. That broad overlap in turn makes the occasional divergences all the more striking.

The first such divergence was the racial outcomes of Spanish American and Brazilian independence. Historians of Latin America have long noted the distinctiveness of Brazil's relatively non-violent road to independence, and the consequences of that process. While Spanish American vicerealties disintegrated into nations and provinces driven by decades of on-again, off-again civil war, Brazil retained its territorial integrity. While the Spanish American nations embraced republicanism, Brazil remained a monarchy. And while Spanish American nations ended the slave trade and began the gradual abolition of slavery, Brazil imported more Africans than ever before.

Amidst these differences, we identified one important similarity: the overturning of the caste laws, and official declarations of full civic and racial equality, in Brazil and Spanish America alike. Those declarations reflect the similar grievances and resentments of free nonwhites in both regions, more or less equally oppressed by colonial racial laws. Yet in Spanish America those laws fell as part of a much larger process of social and political dislocation caused by the independence wars, while in Brazil the laws were quietly struck down as part of a relatively smooth transition to independence. How do we explain that outcome in Brazil, in the absence of the factors driving civic equality in Spanish America? Was it the result of reform imposed from above, demanded from below, or some combination of the two? Did the overturning of caste laws in Spanish America play any role in inspiring similar action in Brazil? The

consequences of the Haitian Revolution were well known in Brazil; what about the consequences of the Spanish American revolutions? We need research on the debates (if any) in the Constituent Assembly, and in Brazilian society more generally, on this momentous change.⁴⁸

We need research as well on the social and political consequences of civic equality. In both Spanish America and Brazil one of the principal such consequences was the strengthening of liberalism's radical, "popular" wing. While popular liberal movements went on to play central roles in politics and state-building in Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Peru, in Brazil those movements were defeated and tamed early (in the 1830s and 40s) and conclusively. One reason for that defeat was the greater strength and stability of the Brazilian state, as compared to its Spanish American counterparts; but another was the refusal of Brazil's radical liberals to embrace the cause of anti-slavery and to make common cause with the slave population. In Spanish America, popular liberals appealed directly to the slave and *liberto* populations and sought to enlist them in liberal movements. In Brazil, by contrast, even radical liberals stopped short of reaching out to a slave population that, by the 1830s, was still majority African. In so doing, they denied themselves a potential source of support that might have strengthened their position in Brazilian politics.

One of the consequences of the defeat of radical liberalism in Brazil was the survival of slavery in that country into the 1880s—a third major difference between Brazil and Spanish America (leaving aside Cuba, which remained under Spanish rule and where slavery therefore persisted until 1886). And a fourth major difference: the way in which Brazilian slavery was ultimately overturned. While in Spanish America abolition began as a result of the independence wars and ended as a product of competition between Liberal and Conservative parties, in Brazil slavery was abolished through the efforts of an abolitionist movement that, in comparison to the Spanish American nations, was unique in its composition—multi-class and multiracial, its methods—parliamentary lobbying and non-violent civil disobedience, and its impact—the peaceful and definitive abolition of the Americas' second-largest slave system.

How was this result achieved? Through abolitionist reformers reversing the strategy followed by Brazil's radical liberals a half-century earlier. Rather than turning their backs on the slaves, abolitionists reached out to a slave population that was now a much smaller proportion of the national population, and much more Brazilian in composition, than had been the case in the 1830s. The result was a cross-class, cross-racial coalition that achieved one of the greatest social and political advances in Brazilian history.

During the first half of the 1900s, workers in Brazil and Spanish America alike created cross-racial labor movements that brought populist regimes to

power. Enacting various combinations of social and economic reforms, those regimes produced the conditions for a visible expansion in black working and middle classes. Black middle classes in particular provided the social base for the “new” black movements that appeared in Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and other countries in the 1970s and 80s. And here we arrive at a final difference between Brazil and Spanish America: that the post-1970 Afro-Brazilian movements have been greater in their membership and their policy effects than black movements anywhere else in Latin America. Far from being a hemispheric laggard in combating racism and inequality, as comparisons with the United States tend to suggest, Brazil may in fact be a hemispheric leader.⁴⁹

Such a conclusion, if true, tends to confirm a long-standing tenet of US/Brazil (and US/South Africa) comparisons: that openly discriminatory racial systems are more likely to produce race-based political mobilization. The massive scale and open brutality of Brazilian slavery, lasting longer than in any other American society, generated Latin America’s only mass-based abolitionist movement. And just as state-mandated segregation and inequality created the context for the rise of the US civil rights movement, so did the overt inequality of present-day Brazilian race relations, amply documented in national censuses and government statistics, prompt the creation of Latin America’s largest and most successful black political movement.

Should the relative weakness of such movements in Spanish America be taken as evidence of lower inequality and greater racial integration in those countries? This is one of the questions that future researchers need to answer. Are Spanish American nations closer to the goal of racial democracy than Brazil, and thus (relatively) less in need of black movements? And if so, how did they get there? Was it through “softer” and/or more egalitarian systems of race relations? Was it that multiracial movements of soldiers (in the independence and civil wars) and workers (participating in labor movements and voting for populist governments), enacting progressive political and economic reforms, enabled the Spanish American nations to make greater progress toward racial democracy than Brazil? These are some questions waiting for answers.

NOTES

1. Thomas E. Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought* (2nd ed., Durham, 1993); George Reid Andrews, “Brazilian Racial Democracy, 1900-90: An American Counterpart,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 31, 3 (1996): 483-507; David J. Hellwig, ed., *African-American Reflections on Brazil’s Racial Paradise* (Philadelphia, 1992), 15-83.

2. Carl Degler, *Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States* (New York, 1971); Thomas E. Skidmore, "Toward a Comparative Analysis of Race Relations since Abolition in Brazil and the United States," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 4, 1 (1972): 1-28.
3. Thomas E. Skidmore, "Bi-racial U.S.A. vs. Multi-racial Brazil: Is the Contrast Still Valid?" *Journal of Latin American Studies* 25, 2 (1993): 373-86. For further exploration of Skidmore's question, see G. Reginald Daniel, *Race and Multiraciality in Brazil and the United States: Converging Paths?* (University Park, Pennsylvania, 2006).
4. Thomas E. Skidmore, "Racial Mixture and Affirmative Action: The Cases of Brazil and the United States," *American Historical Review* 108, 5 (2003), 1391-96; see also George Reid Andrews, "Racial Inequality in Brazil and the United States: A Statistical Comparison," *Journal of Social History* 26, 2 (1992): 229-63; Michael Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power: The Movimento Negro of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil, 1945-1988* (Princeton, 1994); France Winddance Twine, *Racism in a Racial Democracy: The Maintenance of White Supremacy in Brazil* (Minneapolis, 1998); Hellwig, *African-American Reflections*, 145-58, 173-248.
5. On the importance, and statistical measurement, of cross-racial social intercourse, see Edward Telles, *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil* (Princeton, 2004), esp. 173-214.
6. Thomas E. Skidmore, "Workers and Soldiers: Urban Labor Movements and Elite Responses in Twentieth-Century Latin America," in Virginia Bernhard, ed., *Elites, Masses, and Modernization in Latin America, 1850-1930* (Austin, 1979), 79-126.
7. See for example, Charles Bergquist, *Organized Labor in Latin America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia* (Stanford, 1986); Peter Winn, *Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism* (New York, 1986); Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Berkeley, 1991); John French, *The Brazilian Workers' ABC: Class Conflicts and Alliances in Modern São Paulo* (Chapel Hill, 1992). Similar in approach, but dealing with peasants rather than workers, is Florencia Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley, 1995).
8. See for example, Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power*; Anthony Marx, *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of the United States, South Africa and Brazil* (Cambridge and New York, 1998).
9. On slave and free black service in the Spanish American independence wars, see Theodore G. Vincent, *The Legacy of Vicente Guerrero, Mexico's First Black Indian President* (Gainesville, 2001); Alfonso Múnera, *El fracaso de la nación: Región, clase y raza en el Caribe colombiano, 1717-1821* (Bogotá, 1998); Marixa Lasso, *Myths of Harmony: Race and Republicanism during the Age of Revolution, Colombia, 1795-1831* (Pittsburgh, 2007); Ada Ferrer, *Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868-1898* (Chapel Hill, 1999); Jorge Pelfort, *150 años: Abolición de la esclavitud en el Uruguay* (Montevideo, 1996).
10. For a detailed treatment of this lobbying process, see Ben Vinson III, *Bearing Arms for His Majesty: The Free-Colored Militia in Colonial Mexico* (Stanford, 2002), 132-98;

- or, summarizing earlier literature, Peter Voelz, *Slave and Soldier: The Military Impact of Blacks in the Colonial Americas* (New York, 1993), 407-70.
11. Hendrik Kraay, *Race, State, and Armed Forces in Independence-Era Brazil: Bahia, 1790s-1840s* (Stanford, 2001), 82-114, 127-30.
 12. Herbert S. Klein, *The Atlantic Slave Trade* (Cambridge and New York, 1999), 211. Argentina and Uruguay re-opened their slave trades for several years in the 1830s. George Reid Andrews, *The Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires, 1800-1900* (Madison, 1980), 75, 243.
 13. Ex-slaves had full legal and civil rights but could not serve as electors or in Parliament.
 14. See also the case of the United States, where “substantial progress toward greater (never yet full) racial equality has come only when three factors have concurred. Progress has come only (1) in the wake of a large-scale war requiring extensive economic and military mobilization of African Americans for success; (2) when ... American leaders [have justified] such wars and their attendant sacrifices by emphasizing the nation’s inclusive, egalitarian and democratic traditions; and (3) when the nation has possessed domestic political movements willing and able to bring pressure upon national leaders to live up to that justificatory rhetoric by instituting domestic reforms.” Philip A. Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith, *The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America* (Chicago, 1999), 3-4. One could argue that these conditions were present, to greater or lesser degree, in the Spanish American countries during and after independence and account for the progress toward racial equality made at that time.
 15. Thomas H. Holloway, *Policing Rio de Janeiro: Repression and Resistance in a 19th-Century City* (Stanford, 1993), 48.
 16. For example, the government’s abolition of racially segregated militia units in 1831 and creation of a racially integrated National Guard. Kraay, *Race, State, and Armed Forces*, 218-51. Or its attempts (generally unsuccessful) to combat racial segregation in Catholic religious brotherhoods. João José Reis, *A morte é uma festa: Ritos fúnebres e revolta popular no Brasil do século XIX* (São Paulo, 1991), 54; Robert E. Conrad, *Children of God’s Fire: A Documentary History of Black Slavery in Brazil* (Princeton, 1983), 221. On continuing color distinctions in nineteenth-century brotherhoods, see Elizabeth W. Kiddy, *Blacks of the Rosary: Memory and History in Minas Gerais, Brazil* (University Park, Pennsylvania, 2005), 149-57.
 17. On the importance of black military service, see Kraay, *Race, State, and Armed Forces*; Marcus J.M. de Carvalho, “Os negros armados pelos brancos e suas independências no Nordeste (1817-1848),” in István Jancsó, ed., *Independência: História e historiografia* (São Paulo, 2005), 881-914; Luiz Geraldo Silva, “Aspirações barrocas e radicalismo ilustrado: Raça e nação em Pernambuco no tempo da Independência (1817-1823),” in Jancsó, *Independência*, 915-34.
 18. George Reid Andrews, *Afro-Latin America, 1800-2000* (New York, 2004), 41.
 19. The phrase is from an advisor to King João VI, writing in 1818. Conrad, *Children of God’s Fire*, 359. On uneasiness concerning Haiti, see Luiz Mott, “A revolução dos negros do Haiti e o Brasil,” *História: Questões e Debate* 3, 4 (1982): 55-63; Carlos Eugênio Líbano Soares and Flávio Gomes, “Sedições, haitianismo e conexões no Brasil escravista,”

- Novos Estudos CEBRAP* 63 (2002), 131-44. On similar fears in Cuba and other parts of Spanish America, see María Dolores González-Ripoll Navarro et al., *El rumor de Haití en Cuba: Temor, raza y rebeldía, 1789-1844* (Madrid, 2005); David Geggus, ed., *The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World* (Columbia, S.C., 2001).
20. Though on the continuing struggles to define the scope and terms of that equality, see Richard Graham, "Free African Brazilians and the State in Slavery Times," in Michael Hanchard, ed., *Racial Politics in Contemporary Brazil* (Durham, 1999), 30-58; Hebe Maria Mattos, *Escravidão e cidadania no Brasil monárquico* (Rio de Janeiro, 2000); Keila Grinberg, *O fiador dos brasileiros: Cidadania, escravidão e direito civil no tempo de Antonio Pereira Rebouças* (Rio de Janeiro, 2002).
 21. On radical liberalism, see Peter Guardino, *Peasants, Politics, and the Formation of Mexico's National State: Guerrero, 1800-1857* (Stanford, 1996); Vincent, *Legacy of Vicente Guerrero*; Margarita Pacheco, *La fiesta liberal en Cali* (Cali, 1992); James Sanders, *Contentious Republicans: Popular Politics, Race, and Class in Nineteenth-Century Colombia* (Durham, 2004); Lasso, *Myths of Harmony*.
 22. Slavery was abolished by liberal governments in Mexico (1829), Uruguay (1842), Colombia (1852), Argentina (1853), Peru (1854), and Venezuela (1854).
 23. Reis, *A morte é uma festa*, 44. See also Carlos Eugênio Líbano Soares, *A capoeira escrava e outras tradições rebeldes no Rio de Janeiro (1808-1850)* (2nd. ed., Campinas, 2002), 336-55; Gladys Sabina Ribeiro, *A liberdade em construção: Identidade nacional e conflitos antilusitanos no Primeiro Reinado* (Rio de Janeiro, 2002), 243-325; Jeffrey Mosher, "Political Moibilization, Party Ideology, and Lusophobia in Nineteenth-Century Brazil: Pernambuco, 1822-1850," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 80 4 (2000), 881-912. Anti-Portuguese sentiment and movements in Brazil offer striking similarities to anti-Spanish agitation in Mexico at the same time. See Harold Sims, *The Expulsion of Mexico's Spaniards, 1820-1836* (Pittsburgh, 1990).
 24. Maria Januária Vilela Santos, *A Balaçada e a insurreição de escravos no Maranhão* (São Paulo, 1983), 51; Hendrik Kraay, "'As Terrifying as Unexpected': The Bahian Sabinada, 1837-1838," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 72, 3 (1992), 517. On race and radical liberalism in Rio de Janeiro, see Ribeiro, *A liberdade em construção*; Ivana Stolze Lima, *Cores, marcas e falas: Sentidos da mestiçagem no Império do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 2003), 31-87.
 25. On these rebellions, see Matthias Röhrig Assunção, "El Imperio bajo amenaza: La Regencia y las revueltas regionales," in Jonathan Israel et al., *Acuarela de Brasil: 500 años después* (Salamanca, 1999), 51-65; Santos, *Balaçada*; Kraay, "As Terrifying as Unexpected"; Jeffrey Mosher, "Challenging Authority: Political Violence and the Regency in Pernambuco, Brazil, 1831-1835," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 37, 2 (2000), 33-57; David Cleary, "'Lost Altogether to the Civilized World': Race and the *Cabanagem* in Northern Brazil, 1750-1850," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40, 1 (1998), 109-35; Matthias Röhrig Assunção, "Elite Politics and Popular Rebellion in the Construction of Post-Colonial Order: The Case of Maranhão, Brazil, 1820-1841," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 31, 1 (1999), 1-38.

26. For comparable research on the Conservative Party, see Jeffrey D. Needell, *The Party of Order: The Conservatives, the State, and Slavery in the Brazilian Monarchy, 1831-1871* (Stanford, 2006); on the radical liberals, 40-47, 61-69, 75-86, 97-102.
27. Kraay, "'As Terrifying as Unexpected,'" 518.
28. Brazil was "the only non-English-speaking country to develop a full-blown, Anglo-American-style" abolitionist movement. Seymour Drescher, "Brazilian Abolition in Comparative Perspective," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 68, 3 (1988), 450.
29. Robert E. Conrad, *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 1850-1888* (Berkeley, 1972), 85.
30. On abolition, see Conrad, *Destruction of Brazilian Slavery*; Robert Brent Toplin, *The Abolition of Slavery in Brazil* (New York, 1971); Maria Helena P.T. Machado, *O plano e o pânico: Os movimentos sociais na década da Abolição* (Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, 1994); Eduardo da Silva, *As camélias do Leblon e abolição da escravatura* (São Paulo, 2003); Maria Helena P.T. Machado, "From Slave Rebels to Strikebreakers: The Quilombo of Jabaquara and the Problem of Citizenship in Late-Nineteenth-Century Brazil," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 86, 2 (2006), 247-74; Dale Graden, *From Slavery to Freedom in Brazil: Bahia, 1835-1900* (Albuquerque, 2006).
31. All quotations from George Reid Andrews, *Blacks and Whites in São Paulo, Brazil, 1888-1988* (Madison, 1991), 40-41. For an alternative reading of abolition, see Barbara Weinstein, "The Decline of the Progressive Planter and the Rise of Subaltern Agency: Shifting Narratives of Slave Emancipation in Brazil," in Gilbert M. Joseph, ed., *Reclaiming the Political in Latin American History* (Durham, 2001), 81-101.
32. For other such efforts, see Robert J. Alexander, *Organized Labor in Latin America* (New York, 1965); Hobart Spalding, *Organized Labor in Latin America* (New York, 1977); Bergquist, *Labor in Latin America*; Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*.
33. Spalding, *Organized Labor*, 14-15; Julio Godío, *Historia del movimiento obrero latinoamericano* (Mexico City, 1980), vol. 1, 92-100; Bergquist, *Labor in Latin America*, 11.
34. On both counts (employer exploitation of ethnic differences, and worker consciousness of such differences), see Philippe Bourgois, *Ethnicity at Work: Divided Labor on a Central American Banana Plantation* (Baltimore, 1989); Lara Putnam, *The Company They Kept: Migrants and the Politics of Gender in Caribbean Costa Rica, 1870-1960* (Chapel Hill, 2002), 71-75, 112-203 passim.
35. Rebecca J. Scott, *Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 206-11; Alejandro de la Fuente, *A Nation for All: Race, Politics and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Cuba* (Chapel Hill, 2001), 189-98; Barry Carr, "Identity, Class, and Nation: Black Immigrant Workers, Cuban Communism and the Sugar Insurgency, 1925-1934," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 78, 1 (1998), 83-116.
36. Paul Nehru Tennessee, *Venezuela, los obreros petroleros y la lucha por la democracia* (Madrid and Caracas, 1979), 218-21; Catherine LeGrand, "El conflicto de las bananeras," in Alvaro Tirado Mejía, ed., *Nueva historia de Colombia* (Bogotá, 1989), vol. 3, 183-218; W. John Green, "'Vibrations of the Collective': The Popular Ideology of Gaitanismo on Colombia's Atlantic Coast, 1944-1948," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 76, 2 (1996), 293-311.

37. This intriguing possibility is suggested by Kit McPhee, "Standing at the Altar of the Nation: Afro-Brazilians, Immigrants, and Racial Democracy in a Brazilian Port City, 1888-1937" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Melbourne, 2004).
38. See for example, Sheldon Leslie Maram, *Anarquistas, imigrantes, e movimento operário brasileiro, 1890-1920* (Rio de Janeiro, 1979); Boris Fausto, *Trabalho urbano e conflito social, 1890-1920* (São Paulo, 1977).
39. Sidney Chalhoub, *Trabalho, lar e botequim: O cotidiano dos trabalhadores no Rio de Janeiro da Belle Époque* (São Paulo, 1986), 58-88, 101-11; Maria Lúcia Caira Gitahy, *Ventos do mar: Trabalhadores do porto, movimento operário e cultura urbana em Santos, 1889-1914* (São Paulo, 1992), 79-91; McPhee, "Standing at the Altar," 109-24.
40. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (hereafter IBGE), *Brasil: Censo demográfico [1950]* (Rio de Janeiro, 1956), 24; IBGE, *Censo demográfico 1991: Características gerais* (Rio de Janeiro, 1996), 209-10, 215-16; IBGE, *Censo demográfico 1991: Mão de obra* (Rio de Janeiro, 1996), 223. White-collar employment is represented by the "administrativas" and "técnicas, científicas, artísticas e assemelhadas" vocational categories, which did not exist in the census of 1950.
41. For the most important such studies, see Nelson do Valle Silva, "Black-White Income Differentials: Brazil, 1960" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1978); Carlos Hasenbalg, *Discriminação e desigualdades raciais no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1979); Lúcia Elena García Oliveira et al., *O lugar do negro na força de trabalho* (Rio de Janeiro, 1985); Peggy A. Lovell, "Race, Gender, and Development in Brazil," *Latin American Research Review* 29, 2 (1994): 7-35; Telles, *Race in Another America*.
42. Howard Winant, *Racial Conditions: Politics, Theory, Comparisons* (Minneapolis, 1994), 148-69; Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power*; Marx, *Making Race and Nation*; Telles, *Race in Another America*, 235-36. On the weakness of Brazil's black movements, see also John Burdick, "The Lost Constituency of Brazil's Black Movements," *Latin American Perspectives* 25, 1 (1998): 136-55.
43. On black movements in Spanish America, see Mala Htun, "Minority Representation in Latin American Politics: Colombia in Comparative Perspective" (unpublished ms., 2005); Kaysha Corinealdi, "Black Organizing in 20th-Century Panama: Combating Internal and External Challenges" (undergraduate honors thesis, Swarthmore College, 2002); Luis Ferreira, *El movimiento negro en Uruguay (1988-1998)* (Montevideo, 2003); Romero Jorge Rodríguez, *Racismo y derechos humanos en Uruguay* (Montevideo, 2003).
44. Skidmore, "Racial Mixture and Affirmative Action"; Mala Htun, "From 'Racial Democracy' to Affirmative Action: Changing State Policy on Race in Brazil," *Latin American Research Review* 39, 1 (2004): 60-89; Telles, *Race in Another America*, 47-78. For an impassioned critique of recent moves toward affirmative action in Brazil, see Peter Fry et al., eds., *Divisões perigosas: Políticas raciais no Brasil contemporâneo* (Rio de Janeiro, 2007).
45. Brooke Larson, *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910* (Cambridge and New York, 2004); Deborah Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge* (Cambridge and New York, 2005); Donna Lee Van Cott, *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics* (Cambridge and New York, 2005).

46. These are the questions driving, among others, Degler, *Neither Black nor White*; Hanchard, *Orpheus as Power*; Marx, *Making Race and Nation*.
47. For a brilliant example of this perspective and approach, see Scott, *Degrees of Freedom*.
48. For a useful start in this direction, see Andréa Sleiman, “*Seriam todos cidadãos?: Os impasses na construção da cidadania nos primórdios do constitucionalismo no Brasil (1823-1824)*,” in Jancsó, *Independência*, 829-47.
49. Another hemispheric leader, not always seen as such, in the struggle against racial inequality is Cuba. On the history of anti-racist mobilization there, see among others Tomás Fernández Robaina, *El negro en Cuba, 1902-1958* (Havana, 1985); Aline Helg, *Our Rightful Share: The Afro-Cuban Struggle for Equality, 1886-1912* (Chapel Hill, 1995); Ferrer, *Insurgent Cuba*; Scott, *Degrees of Freedom*; de la Fuente, *A Nation for All*. A commitment to anti-racism continues under the current Communist regime, de la Fuente shows, though he argues that that commitment is greatly undercut by the government’s refusal to discuss race openly or to combat deep-seated racist images and stereotypes. *A Nation for All*, 335-39; see also Mark Sawyer, *Racial Politics in Post-Revolutionary Cuba* (Cambridge and New York, 2005). On present-day rap music as a form of racial protest, and government efforts to co-opt that protest, see Sujatha Fernandes, *Cuba Represent! Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures* (Durham, 2006), 85-134.