## Pulling strings: Using Rhetoric to Deal with Subjectivity in Argumentation

## Moviendo los hilos: Usando la retórica para tratar con la subjetividad en la argumentación

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**Abstract**: Subjectivity plays a major and inevitable role in argumentation. The judgment-systems of individual subjects are the source of judgments that can serve as reasons, premises and – interconnected – arguments. But because these judgmentsystems are different from subject to subject, problems can arise. Fogelin's deep disagreements and Wohlrapp's frame problems are examples. These problems cause failures of communication. Because convincing argumentation depends on a functioning communication, deep disagreements and frame problems cannot be worked at by using convincing arguments. New ways to look at things have to be learned and taught to find a common basis again. Here rhetorical devices are necessary to reestablish the mutual understanding needed for a functioning argumentation.

Keywords: Deep disagreements, frame-structures, judgment-systems, rhetoric, subjectivity.

**Resumen**: La subjetividad juega un rol mayor e inevitable en la argumentación. Los sistemas de juicios de los individuos son la fuente de los juicios que pueden funcionar como razones, premisas, e –interconectadamente– como argumentos. Pero porque estos sistemas de juicio son distintos de individuo a individuo, los problemas pueden aparecer. El concepto de Fogelin 'desacuerdos profundos' y el de Wohlrapp 'problemas de marcos' son ejemplos de esta posibilidad. Estos problemas causan fallos en la comunicación. Porque la convicción en la argumentación depende del funcionamiento de la comunicación, los desacuerdos profundos y los problemas de marco no pueden desparecer usando argumentos convincentes.

Palabras clave: Desacuerdos profundos, estructuras marcos, sistemas de juicio, retórica, subjetividad.

#### 1. Introduction

To a lot of people, rhetoric has a bad reputation. There seems to be something dishonest and dangerous about the ability to adapt one's words to one's audience so that they will have their greatest effect. That such means are necessary seems to diminish the quality of the argument. Why did the arguer have to persuade? Weren't his reasons good enough?<sup>1</sup>

It is certainly true that a good rhetorician can use what he has learned to deceive his audience. On the other hand, and that is what I will argue for in this paper, the rhetorician's abilities are vital instruments for argumentation to work as an inter-subjective enterprise. The attempt to argue without using rhetorical tools at least in the most time sense is in many cases doomed to fail. The reason I will present for this will be that argumentation depends on a functioning communication and that the role subjectivity plays in argumentation can cause problems that can only be solved by learning how to use the non-infected parts of communication to repair the problematic ones. Deep disagreements and frame problems are such problems. This is where rhetoric is needed.

In order to justify this claim, I will first try to show that and why it is the case that the subjectivity of the participants of an argumentation always plays some role in (almost) every argumentative encounter. I will then go on to discuss Fogelin's deep disagreements and Wohlrapp's framing problems as a specific problem caused by this role of subjectivity. Agreeing that these problems cannot be solved by what is understood as arguing in the conventional sense, I will turn to the idea of teaching a new point of view as a solution. I will then present an attempt to show that help can be expected from the side of rhetoric. At the end of my argumentation, I will try to widen the role rhetoric plays in the solving of deep disagreement so that it becomes possible to see how rhetoric is needed in argumentation to deal with the influence of subjectivity generally.

I would like to make two short remarks before I begin my argumentation: The concept of subjectivity I will use will be rather restricted, taking into account only differences in the respective subject's judgment-systems.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> As it is tiring for both me and my reader to write or read 'he/she' all the time, I am going to use 'she' in the examples and analogies/metaphors and 'he' in the rest of the text.

This makes my claim that subjectivity plays a role in every (or almost every) instance of argumentation rather modest and therefore easier to accept for philosophers coming from all directions.<sup>2</sup> During my argumentation I will presuppose a simplified holistic view on meaning and language. Most important here will be the idea that judgments are relational connections between concepts and concepts are (at least partly) the sum of the relational connections they are part of. I will also presuppose that words and sentences somehow refer to concepts and judgments.

### 2. Subjectivity

Even though informal logic has acknowledged that everyday- or normal argumentation cannot be described in the terms of formal logic and has broken with tradition by trying to find new approaches to argumentation, it has yet to completely get rid of every ghost from the past: We still tend to view subjectivity as something that should be banned from argumentation theory. We tend to criticize arguments or discussion in which conflicts between claims are taken for conflicts between people. To associate one's positions with ones self and therefore feel that one protects ones personality together with ones claims seems to be a mistake. We often seem to think that it is not only possible but also preferable to merely take the *role* of the proponent of- or opponent to a claim without getting personally involved in its fate.

It is not uncommon to do away with subjectivity in argumentation simply by stating that it should not play a role. First, it should not play a role for the arguer. He should not care whether he is right or wrong – he should simply argue to get nearer to the truth. Second, it should not play a role in the argument. An argument should be made out of reasons and appeal only to reason. Neither the subjectivity of the arguer nor the subjectivity of the other/ listener/audience should be important when the argument is being composed: An argument should be convincing, not persuading. This, as we shall see on the following pages, is neither possible nor good to assume or pursuit.

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 2}$  The concept of subjectivity that I will use is inspired by Wohlrapp's concept of subjectivity and makes explicit use of Brandom and Quine.

# 2.1. The Consequences of the Outcome of an Argument for the Arguer's Subjectivity

I believe that it is defensible to claim that an arguer who puts forward a claim in an argumentative situation thereby takes on three responsibilities:<sup>3</sup> He will be held responsible for providing reasons for his claim, for accepting other claims entailed by his statement and for dealing with contradictions that arise from what he claims and other well-believed or already established judgments.<sup>4</sup> And if he has ever argued before, then he probably knows all this – he therefore accepts all these responsibilities by *making* the claim.

Obviously the reasons he is going to provide can only come out of his own storage of endorsed judgments – and most probably he will use those judgments he believes to be knowledge or at least well grounded opinion. He will have to organize these judgments in a way that will give his claim a backing that is as good as possible, that is, there will be a connection established between his claim and those judgments meant to be the reasons for his claim. He will probably be faced with having to argue for at least some of the reasons he provides – therefore, he will have to be prepared to integrate even more of his beliefs into his reasoning. In addition, he will also have to be prepared to deal with the consequences of his claim.

In most cases an arguer will put forward claims he believes in and thinks that he can argue well for. Then one can assume that the claim is already part of an endorsed judgment-system. But even if a claim is put forward

<sup>3</sup> By now, the idea that our beliefs might be describable as an interconnected, relational system in which concepts get their meaning from their relation to other concepts is widely spread in the philosophic community. In his "Woodbridge Lectures", Robert B. Brandom provides an interpretation of Kant's theoretical philosophy, describing how endorsing a judgment means taking the responsibility to integrate this judgment into the unity of one's beliefs. (Brandom, 2007, lecture 1, p. 11) According to him, we make ourselves responsible for preserving the unity of the system by deciding between incompatible beliefs, by accepting at least all those judgments that are logically entailed by the one we endorsed and by making sure that the judgment is 'warranted' by being prepared to provide reasons for one's endorsement of the judgment. (Brandom, 2007, lecture 1, pp. 11-12) The three responsibilities presented here are inspired by this view.

<sup>4</sup> By 'claim' I mean –and will mean in all following usages of the word – a judgment articulated in one or more sentences that is supposed to be argued for. The arguments for the judgment are not included in the claim.

without serious intention - if the arguer is going to argue for his claim, he will be forced to organize judgments into an interconnected system. As we will see, this makes the subjectivity of the arguer an integral part of argumentation.

Let us pretend that the two possibilities of an argumentative activity's outcome are the acceptance or the refutation of the claim.<sup>5</sup>

We will start with the case of the arguer seeing his claim being refuted. If a claim has been refuted, we can say that now the arguer can be held responsible for rejecting the claim he endorsed earlier. What are the consequences of having to take back a claim?

If the arguer has presented an argument for the claim that he is forced to take back, then what has to be rejected is not just the claim alone but the argument also. When arguing, we deal with a whole system of judgments, having been connected in order to provide backing for the claim. We deal with all the direct logical consequences of the claim and the backing of all the judgments the claim can be used for as a reason. If the claim is refuted, that means that there is something wrong with the system as a whole.<sup>6</sup>

This does not mean, of course, that all endorsed judgments connected to the claim have to be wrong. It does mean, however, that they are not as stable as they were before: Those judgments that were used as reasons for the claim did lead to that claim somehow, so they have to have been connected wrongly, or there are wrong ones among them. Those judgments the claim provided reasons for endorsing do not have these reasons anymore – they are less well grounded or have to be given up all together. All in all: The better connected the refuted claim was to other endorsed judgments, the greater is the impact that a refutation of that claim has on other endorsed judgments.

<sup>5</sup> I will use the words 'refutation/refute' to refer to the case in which a claim or judgment is found to be unsustainable in the inter-subjective setting of argumentation. I will use the words 'rejection/reject' in the case in which a subject takes a judgment out of his judgment-system that he has endorsed before and does not endorse any longer.

<sup>6</sup> In his "Web of Belief", Quine describes what happens when a belief that was held before is rejected: "But even that belief will have had some supporting evidence, however shaky; so in rejecting it we may have to reject also some tenuous belief that had helped to support it. Revision may thus progress downward as the evidence thins out." (Quine, 1978, p. 16). What does all of this have to do with the arguer's subjectivity?

It seems to be absurd to say that one endorsed judgment should define our being as subjects. But it seems to be just as absurd to say that the whole of our endorsed judgments should not have a part in the definition of our subjectivity. Our beliefs do not only have an impact on other beliefs we have, they also have an impact on how we act and how we feel about certain things. But what else than our beliefs, our actions and our feelings should be there to make up our personality? The whole of our beliefs does take a part in our personality.

The only claims we can seriously argue for are those that we can connect with a system of other judgments and the refutation of such claims will have an impact on that whole system. Because we were able to organize judgments in a way to support the claim, a rejection of the claim tells us something about our own endorsed judgments or the way we are prepared to systemize them.<sup>7</sup>

If, on the other hand, we win our case, can show the validity of our claim and therefore are now justified in keeping it, then something in our construction is right, approvable or acceptable. Again, the verdict on our claim has an effect on the whole system we constructed – a positive one this time – and therefore on our subjectivity. What had been in question before has now gained more security.

This has a further consequence: As we have to integrate our very own judgments into the argumentation in order to be able to take part, our role as proponent or opponent always turns into acting as parts of ourselves. Our system of judgments is connected to our emotions and actions in various ways. To have to take back a claim or to be able to keep it might mean to have to –for example – reevaluate our feelings and actions and thereby ourselves. The impact of the outcome of an argumentation might be un-

<sup>7</sup> Even if we argue without having believed in the claim before or even without believing in the claim while we argue (playing the devil's advocate), in order to argue for the claim we had to connect it with other judgments. The impact the refutation of the claim has will probably not be big but it still can be there: For judgments to be connectable their conceptual content in terms of meaning has to be compatible, even supporting of each other. If it is true that concepts get their meaning from their connection with other concepts, and if these connections are judgments, then whenever we argue we invest some of our endorsed judgments, simply because we have to produce a meaningful system. noticeably small or unpredictably big, but some (bigger or smaller) part of our subjectivity will always be involved.

#### 2.2. Subjectivity in Argumentation

In fact, if one takes a closer look at what we have said up till now, it seems that subjectivity plays an indispensible role in argumentation:

We said that the arguer connects judgments so that they will form a system that supports a claim. In accordance with holistic theories about judgment-systems, we can treat a judgment as a relational connection between concepts and concepts as gaining their meaning from the ensemble of judgments they are used in. The claim that is being argued for then is a judgment whose relational connection between concepts shall be justified by the other judgments. These other judgments are used in order to establish a meaning for the concepts that are used in the claim so that the relational connection the claim makes becomes possible, in the best case close to necessary.

Even if it would turn out that talking of concepts as *nothing* else than the ensemble of their connection to other concepts does not work, we can say that at least part of their meaning has to be constituted through these connections. That is because of how human communication works, of which argumentation is a special case. Arguing is a social process between human beings. And human beings do not transfer concepts and judgments into each other's heads using telepathy. Human beings mostly argue by formulating sentences composed out of words. And as we know, words can have a lot of different meanings; they can be used in reference to a lot of different things.<sup>8</sup> In addition, humans can be mistaken about the exact meaning of a word or it might not even be clear what exactly a word means – in a group of three people every single one of them might have a different understanding. We can use Quine's example of the physicists that discuss whether neutrinos have mass to make that clearer:

Are they discussing the same objects? They agree that the physical theory which they initially share, the preneutrino theory, needs emendation


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Especially philosophers know this from sad and exhausting experience.

in the light of an experimental result now confronting them. The one physicist is urging an emendation which involves positing a new category of particles, without mass. The other is urging an alternative emendation which involves positing a new category of particles with mass. The fact that both physicists use the word 'neutrino' is not significant. To discern two phases here, the first an agreement to what the objects are (viz. neutrinos) and the second a disagreement as to how they are (massless or massive) is absurd. (Quine, 1960, p. 16)

This means that at the beginning of an argumentation, even if all the claims are already put forward, nobody knows *exactly* what the claims of the others mean (and perhabs not even what their own claims mean). To find out what another means exactly (or exactly enough) when he uses a word, one has to listen to the way the word is used in the sentences the other utters. To find out what exactly the other means when he utters a sentence, one has to find out what he means by the words in the sentence.

Philosophers have described language as a network or a web, concepts being the knots and judgments the strings the knots are formed by. Analogously we can describe what happens when somebody justifies a claim using sentences as her trying to describe how to make a very small web to her interlocutor – a string-game.

What is a string-game? As this analogy will be used a lot and with varying but always similar purposes in the following pages, it is worthwhile spending a bit of time explaining it.



In a string-game, one uses her hands and a string to make a string-figure by weaving a web.<sup>9</sup> The string used in such a game is knotted together

 $<sup>^9</sup>$  Picture taken from http://www.deepfun.com/labels/string%20<br/>figures.html accessed: 04.05.2011.

at the ends. By making certain movements with the fingers, a two- or threedimensional web is woven. If the movements are carried out according to certain rules, a figure appears. It is rather easy to find instructions on how to make easy string figures in the internet. Trying to make one might help to understand the way we will use our analogy when we now return to the making of an argument.<sup>10</sup>

In our metaphor, the string-pieces in between the knots can be seen as analogous to judgments, the knots or crossings as concepts. The reader might be able to imagine that in order to get a certain piece of string into a certain position, there has to be a whole figure made, especially because the only way to determine a position in such a figure is relational. As she might have recognized while making her figure, moving certain pieces of string sometimes influenced the position of knots and pieces all over the figure.

Uttering a sentence is like claiming that there is a piece of string in between certain knots – like describing a movement of the fingers. The more sentences are uttered, the more obvious it becomes for the listener exactly where the knots are, what the words mean. If the figure is described successfully, the figure in between the hands of the listener (the argument in her head) is sufficiently close to be the same as the figure in between the hands of the arguer (the argument in her head) and the judgment that is the arguer's claim has been established (a certain piece of string between some knots in a certain position within the figure).<sup>11</sup> What this claim *means* depends on the argument. *Where* the certain piece of string is depends on the figure.

Of course, we enter argumentation already having a rather clear idea of what words and certain sentences mean. That makes things easier. But it is also the reason for the problems we will have to deal with in this paper: If a meaning of a word is already pre-established for a person, then the use of this word predetermines the possible connection the person can or will

 $^{\rm n}$  "Sufficiently" is, of course, very vague. It often depends, however, on the argumentative context how exact the transference of meaning has to be for the argument to do its work.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> If the reader has made a figure (even if it did not turn out quite right) she will have observed how the movements of her fingers caused the string to describe certain lines in space, thereby creating crossings and loose knots. Where these crossings and loose knots were located in space in relation to each other depended on the lines that were described by the strings. The figure was created by moving the string in a certain way, causing the knots to take certain positions, relational to each other.

be prepared to make to other words: The word for this person refers to a certain concept, the concept being composed of certain connections that belong to it and therefore have to be made.<sup>12</sup> If two people understand the meaning of a word differently, a few of these predetermined connections will be different. This does not have to become apparent – language is an inter-subjective enterprise and a lot of connections will be the same or very similar in most of the cases. We could talk about string-figures that are similar but not the same for years without ever noticing the differences.

As we have seen, the possibility of producing an argument depends on the possibility of integrating endorsed judgments into a system that will support the claim. The words used in the sentences that represent the argument will be used in a meaningful way. The arguer will represent judgments by these sentences and words whose concepts have predetermined connections. That the meanings of the words might be different for all the participants of the argumentation (even if they only differ in one or two connections) makes the argument subjective. Of course, if the connections that have to be used in order to establish the claim are shared by all participants of the argumentative situation, then the argument is also intersubjective. And if one could imagine that the connections would be shared by all people or would even be *necessarily* shared by all people, then the argument could be called objective. Often, it seems, the usage of our language will be so unproblematic that we can proceed as if we were using connections that have to be shared by all people because the connections we use are actually shared widely enough to talk of 'all' in a vague sense. Even more often that is the case in regard to only the group of people we present our argument to. Then – we could say – our arguing is convincing

<sup>12</sup> This view is inspired by Brandom's interpretation of Kant: As we remember, Brandom distinguished three different kinds of responsibilities. Whoever endorses a judgment has to integrate that judgment into his system of judgments by endorsing judgments entailed by the endorsed one, solving incompatibilities and connecting the judgment to already endorsed judgments by using them as reasons for it. How does one know which judgments entail which and which are incompatible? According to Brandom, this is determined by the conceptual content of the judgment: *"The concepts applied in judging articulate the content of the judgment (...) by specifying the material inferential and incompatibility relations that content stands in to other such contents."* (Brandom, 2007, lecture 1, p. 15) or convincing for that group.<sup>13</sup> But one thing is sure: Because every arguer only sees his own string-figure, he never knows with absolute certainty whether this is the case for any one connection. That means that as long as the meaning of all the words for all the people is not completely the same, subjectivity will have a place in argumentation.

#### 3. Deep Disagreements and Framing Problems

Human beings do not make every relational connection that is possible between concepts due to their place in the endorsed judgments of those beings. They do not even make every relational connection between concepts that would be necessary due to their place in the endorsed judgments of those beings. They do not even *remember* all the relational connections they have already made or are prepared to make all the time. This can cause one person to not understand another. Here is a variation of Fogelin's icecream example:<sup>14</sup>

- A: "I will go to the supermarket first and then to the drycleaners."
- B: "But we wanted to buy ice-cream."
- A: "Who says we won't?"
- B: "You should go to the drycleaners first."

Imagine A still does not understand, until B states: "Ice-cream melts if it is not put into the freezer fast." And now A gives in.

Here, B had assumed that a certain connection would be made by A that wasn't. B's argument did work, but only after she had reminded A of a connection that was presupposed in the argument and that A had not thought of before. If we want to put it into the terms of string-figure making, then B's description of how to make the figure was not sufficient for A to be able to make it too. There was a move missing in B's description. Things like

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> We will in the following speak of a 'convincing argument' if we want to speak of an argument in which only or almost only judgments are used that are shared by the participants of the argumentation. 'Convincing argument' is then short for: 'Argument that has the chance to be convincing in the present context'.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The ice-cream example can be found in Fogelin (1985, reprinted 2005).

this happen frequently and can usually be resolved quite quickly. In 1985, however, Fogelin thought about what happens if this isn't the case.

#### 3.1. Fogelin's Deep Disagreements

According to Fogelin, a normal case of argumentation presupposes broadly shared beliefs and procedures of resolving disagreements. As arguing is producing reasons for being able to say 'I know that (x)' (or perhaps: It is reasonable to claim (x)), and reasons have to be understood by the other, there need to be beliefs that are not doubted, that are shared by everybody taking part in the argumentative enterprise (Fogelin, 1986, reprinted, p. 6).

If that is the case, Fogelin calls it a normal argumentative context that allows argumentation. The reasons provided then work in a convincing way for the participants of the argumentation. He claims that the participants must share the beliefs used as reasons at least to the extent that makes it possible for them to accept the argument as convincing (Fogelin, 1986, reprinted, p. 6).

This part of Fogelin's argumentation should be understandable to us by now. We said that forming an argument means using judgments to establish the possibility or (close to) necessity of a further judgment. We understood judgments as relational connections between concepts and concepts as at least partly consisting of all their connections to other concepts. Thereby concepts determine the judgments they can be used in and those they cannot be used in. Therefore, in order to communicate a convincing argument, enough has to be shared so that the sentences and words used enable the one in the role of the listener to recapitulate the system of concepts and judgments the arguer tries to represent. In addition, enough of the judgments that are represented and understood have to be endorsed by the listener so that they can do their work as reasons for the claim to the listener.

After having established this, Fogelin goes on to ask himself what happens if such a normal argumentative context is not there to base a convincing argument on: "The answer that seems forced upon us is this: to the extent that the argumentative context becomes less normal, arguments, to that extent, become impossible. This is not the weak claim that in such contexts arguments cannot be settled. It is the stronger claim that the conditions for argument do not exist." (Fogelin, 1985, reprinted 2005, p. 7)

If something like that happens, Fogelin calls it a case of deep disagreement (Fogelin, 1986, reprinted, p. 6). In such a case, the participants in the should-be-argumentation can be as unbiased, free of prejudice, consistent, coherent, precise and rigorous as it is possible, all normal objections can be answered and all facts can be on the table – the disagreement still persists. The judgment-systems from which the arguers take their reasons are so different that their reasons cannot solve the disagreement (Fogelin, 1986, reprinted, p. 8). The conditions for arguing are not met.

Because deep disagreements appear when two people do not share such a network of framework propositions they would need to share to be able to argue convincingly, Fogelin claims that there is no rational way to resolve deep disagreements (Fogelin, 1986, reprinted, p. 8). "[*I*]*n the end, and sometimes the end is very near, we have to fall back on persuasion.* (....)" (Fogelin, 1985, reprinted 2005, p. 11)

Is that true? Is there no rational resolution to this? And what is that supposed to mean: *Fall back* on persuasion? To get a clearer picture here, we will have to take a closer look at the idea of framework propositions and translate the problem into our language.

#### 3.2. Wohlrapp on Frame Structures

In his book *Der Begriff des Arguments*, Harald Wohlrapp identifies the frame structure as a B[as A] structure – in a frame an object or state of affairs is recognized as being a certain way or belonging to a certain category (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 238).

According to Wohlrapp, we never recognize an object or a state of affairs completely, but always only a part of what could be experienced. That limits our possibilities in regard to the whole thing, but it also enables us to focus and to classify. This kind of classification is our understanding of something *as* something else but *not* as another – putting something in a frame is giving it a certain meaning (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 239).<sup>15</sup> To see

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> We should recognize here that this statement works very well with the idea we got from Brandom: That concepts are meaningful because of their relations to other concepts – a knot in a string figure is the point where two parts of string meet and its position is determined by the way all the other strings meet in the whole figure.

something in a frame makes certain connections to other (some)things more obvious than others, (close to) necessitates some and (close to) forbids others (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 240).<sup>16</sup> It is not impossible and not even uncommon to have more than one frame for a certain thing (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 240). A flower can be seen as a beautiful object, as a gift for the mother-in-law, as a living being, as the object of biological interest, etc.

To see something in a certain way determines the subject that sees it. On the other hand, the way the subject is determines the way something will probably be seen (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 241).<sup>17</sup> Of course, a lot of frames are often possible for a subject. (The artist *can* look at a flower thinking about its biology.) But some of them seem to be more easily at hand than others. (She *will* probably evaluate its beauty) (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 241). In addition not all frames are compatible and it does not need to be recognized by the one doing the framing that there is a frame at all (that there could be others) (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 241).

In order to be able to articulate the differences between frames the framing one knows of and those that he does not know of, Wohlrapp speaks of manifest and latent frames (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 246). A manifest frame is chosen consciously. When it is chosen, we say that we are going to talk about a certain aspect of something. In biology-class the teacher knows that the flowers she presents have been used in art class, but she asks her students not to think of that now.

That is different when it comes to latent frames. The one who sees an object in a latent frame does not know that there are other ways to see it.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Again, we can explain this to ourselves using what we already have thought about: If I make a judgment that connects two concepts, then these two concepts determine the judgments in which they can be used further for each other to a certain extent. Forming a knot between to strings determines their direction and thereby the number of strings to which they can be connected after the knot has been formed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> 241. We can understand this if we think back to our web. We said that the web of judgments is at least a manifestation of subjectivity. In order to integrate a judgment into an already established web of judgments, the way the web has been woven has to be considered. Not every judgment will fit equally well – not every weaving move is possible with half a string figure already in between my hands. If I have already classified that all birds have wings, then I will have to do a lot of work in order to be able to judge that the Kiwi before me is a bird. (Kiwis *are* birds, but evolution has taken their wings from them, leaving them with nothing but small stubs.)

He thinks he sees the thing itself, not only a certain aspect of it (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 246).<sup>18</sup> He is therefore not able to simply change the frame when he encounters a situation that does not work with it. He is not aware that he does not know (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 248).

According to Wohlrapp, everything "that can become content of a statement at all, can function as a frame and thereby designate an area of specific attention." (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 250) In argumentation, where we use language, frames are being placed or shown though predication. If a framing predication takes place, it determines the possibility, necessity or impossibility of certain other predications. Wohlrapp views the ensemble of these determinations as what the predicator *is* that is used in the predication (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 248): "The possibilities of a state of affairs B that are incorporated in a frame A compose a group G of possible statements. To make a statement about B that comes from the group G is talking about B in the frame A. I then call G the "inferential potential" of the frame A." (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 251).


Not every predication, however, is also the placing of a frame. Predications can take place inside or after a frame has been set. According to Wohlrapp, framing can best be compared to placing a term under a generic term. If somebody talks about B using only statements from group G, then he has framed B in the frame A.

If frames are latent, then the group G defines B for the person in question. The frame A then defines the possibilities for talking about B, and these possibilities have no alternative. A manifest frame also defines possibilities – but it has alternatives. If necessary, it is possible to change the aspect that is being talked about – another group of possibilities comes to the foreground (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 243).

According to Wohlrapp, if a latent frame is being made manifest as a frame and a new aspect is added to B then that changes all the aspects B had before (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 254). There is not only an addition to what B is. B becomes something else (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 254).

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 18}$  The judgments we are talking about then have forms like: [x necessarily is y] instead of forms like [x can be seen a y].

Why? To answer this question, Wohlrapp uses the duck-rabbit head made famous by Wittgenstein:<sup>19</sup> He points out that obviously the duck-rabbit head can be seen as a duck or as a rabbit, but not as both at the same time. If it is seen in the duck-frame, then the long thing at the side is a beak. If it is seen in the rabbit-frame, then the long thing is a pair of ears. It cannot be both – but at the same time neither saying that the thing is a pair of ears nor saying that it is a beak is *wrong*. Talking about it as a beak or a pair of ears is talking about it from a different angle (Wohlrapp, 2008, pp. 254-255). What is special about the duck-rabbit-head is that choosing an angle effects the whole thing – if I say: "What an ugly beak this thing has" then it is not possible to go on talking about the small bump at the other side as a mouth anymore" (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 255).



Then Wohlrapp shows us that adding another aspect to a thing changes all the already recognized frames. For simplicity's sake we will stay with the duck-rabbit head: To Susi, the picture above has always been that of a duck. Then a benevolent person somehow manages to show her the rabbit in the picture. Susi can see both now, rabbit and duck. Now Susi does not see the picture of a duck anymore, she sees the aspect 'duck' of the picture of the duck-rabbit head. She lost her state of not-knowing that she does not know. The latent frame 'duck' has been replaced by the two manifest frames 'duck' and 'rabbit' and the latent frame 'duck-rabbit head' (Wohlrapp, 2008, pp. 255-258).

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 19}$  Picture taken from: http://eponymousflower.blogspot.com/2010\_10\_24\_archive. html, accessed: 07.05.2011.

What happens if two latent frames get into conflict in an argument? In this case, both participants of an argument think that they are talking to each other, but they somehow talk past each other. And to each the other seems to be rather incompetent – after all: she is talking nonsense. Here, argumentation as convincing comes to a forced halt. The unnoticed frames cause the missing shared beliefs that Fogelin was worried about (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 255-258). As long as they are not recognized and worked at, there is no common ground from which the arguments of each participant could be evaluated (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 267).

If both participants know that the thing has various aspects there are possibilities to work with the frames. But that is possible only if every arguer has understood every frame in question (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 273). The question therefore is: How can latent frames become manifest?

#### 3.3. Deep Disagreements as Problems Caused by Latent Frames

As we remember Fogelin described deep disagreements as disagreements caused by differences in relevant framing propositions. Wohlrapp has specified this further for us by concretizing the notion of a frame and by bringing in the difference of latent and manifest frames. In the language we have established in this paper, we can explain to ourselves what a frame is in the following way now:

As every judgment that is being endorsed takes part in what a concept is, every judgment limits the number of possible other judgments this concept can be used in. The scope of this limitation might differ from judgment to judgment. A certain state of a concept can allow several further judgments that all will lead to consequences in the scope of still possible judgments that exclude each other. If we think back to when we made our string-figures we can easily see that a certain state in making a string-figure might allow certain further moves, but each of them determines the relation of the knots in space in a way that makes those relations impossible that would have been allowed by another move. If a certain network of judgments has been established in which a certain concept is being used, this can work the way Wohlrapp describes a frame works: concepts are being put into relational connections in a way that does not allow certain others that might be allowed if one/a few/ a number of connections were different. Everything that is then done with the concept will be done in the frame thus established.

How do different latent frames cause deep disagreements?

Imagine our arguer making her argument again, but this time imagine the arguer and the listener having two different latent frames for one of the concepts used at a prominent place in the argument. The arguer makes her argument (describes the making of the string-figure) and so far the listener can follow. Then the arguer uses a sentence (or more) that is meaningful to both her and the listener – but for the arguer the judgment(s) connected to the sentence have concepts in them different from those the listener connects to the sentence. The listener accepts the movement, but she makes a different one than the one the arguer intended (she follows the instructions but they translate in a different movement of her fingers). The next judgment the arguer uses might sound like it is made impossible by what the arguer has brought forward before (the string-figure the arguer made is now different from the one the listener made – the move the arguer can make is impossible for the listener). Or the next few judgments are still possible for both, but at some point the differences add up and a judgment of the arguer is impossible for the listener.

If the frames are manifest, if the relational connections between the concepts that caused the problem have the standing of only possible connections, then arguer and listener can go through the argument again, trying to find out where the fatal move was made. The listener or the arguer might notice that at a certain point one was able to choose between two or more possibilities and detect the spot from where the problem came. Then they will be relieved to be able to speak of a misunderstanding. But if the frames are latent, they each will be unable to find a mistake in their moves: The other one must simply be stupid.

The possibility that such a problem might appear in an argumentative situation is always there – judgment-systems of different people are different.

## 3.4. Teaching Instead of Arguing

A problem caused by a latent frame/a deep disagreement seems hardly to be solvable by argumentation – that is: by the use of to-be-convincing reasons. In order to make a convincing argument, communication has to work. In deep disagreements, this is not the case anymore. If I cannot know that the reasons I present will be understood in the right way, how can I present them?

Is that a reason to give up the whole enterprise? Turner and Wright do not believe that deep disagreements are not subject to rational resolution at all (Turner and Wright, 2005, pp. 26-35). They argue that in the case of a deep disagreement "[w]hat would be needed would be on the order of an education, a richer life, or therapy, nothing that could be accomplished epigrammatically." (Turner and Wright, 2005, p. 29). That is because one or both parties might lack the competence or the knowledge that is needed to even understand the topic of the argument fully - or what the other one is trying to say (Turner and Wright, 2005, p. 30). As the disagreement goes deep into the background-beliefs of the arguers, it is this background that must be altered in order to make a resolution of the disagreement possible. And there is a big difference between arguing in front of a shared background and trying to alter a background altogether (Turner and Wright, 2005, p. 31). In the second case, the work that has to be done has to be done without a functioning communication. Learning has to be done and education is not only gained through argument: "When we read books, take courses, sharpen our diagnostic skills in application, and simply knock about in the world with our eyes and ears open, we gain understanding in vast sweeps, not one proposition at a time." (Turner and Wright, 2005, pp. 26-35)

If communication does not work because the two participants of the argument speak too different a language then the language of at least one of the participants should be altered through teaching so that afterwards communication is possible again. It is very rational then to seek for a solution in these terms.

This sounds very much like what happened to Susi when she was shown the rabbit, but it is not completely the same yet. If one uses whichever method in order to alter one of the participants' language, his judgmentsystem and therefore the way he sees the world then an argument can be made that this means a loss of rationality. This is because the altering itself is not being reflected. In order to deal with the problem rationally, the aim is not to show Susi that she was wrong all along, that really the picture is one of a rabbit. The aim is to show Susi that the picture can also be seen as a rabbit, that it is not necessarily that of a duck.

The first step to solve deep disagreements seems to be to teach the possibility of another frame and thereby replace the latent frame with two (or more) manifest ones.

### 4. Teaching a New Possible Frame

#### 4.1. Dispositions for action

Judging is an action that can be compared to making a finger-movement in a string-game. Like a finger movement in a string-game changes the way the string-figure looks and determines the possibilities for further movements, making a judgment changes the way the argument (on a small scale) or judgment system (on a wide scale) looks and determines the possibilities for further judgments. This is because in judgments concepts are being brought into relational connection and concepts bring their own relational connections with them, determining each other's further use. If judging is such an action determined by the already established system of concepts and judgments that is the argument or judgment-system, and if the sentences and words an arguer uses are supposed to refer to judgments and concepts, then we are justified in using Quine's idea that language can be seen as a complex of present dispositions to verbal behavior – even though we would probably replace behavior with a word like action-taking or activity (Quine, 1967, p. 27). Each concept used in a judgment takes part in creating such dispositions and is in itself a determining unity of such dispositions.

All that we have done by translating what we have said before into dispositions to act is that we have changed the angle from which we look at our metaphorical string-figure. Before the figure was seen as representing all the movements that were already made. Now we look at the figure as representing all the movements that can possibly be made in the future and that will be made given that, for example, the arguer the listener tries to follow uses certain sentences. As the already made movements to some point determine those that will be made and as those that will be made to some point depend on those that have already been made, both ways to describe our metaphorical string-figure are connected.

#### 4.2. What Does that Mean: Teaching a New Possible Frame?

At the end of the last part of our paper we said that what has to be done is turn a latent frame into two manifest ones. Susi shall not judge [X is the picture of a duck and nothing else] anymore, instead she shall judge [X can be seen as the picture of a duck] and [X can be seen as the picture of a rabbit]. What has to be done to reach this goal is to make Susi endorse the judgment: [X can be seen as the picture of a rabbit]. This judgment is incompatible with the judgment [X is the picture of a duck and nothing else] – therefore, if one can make Susi endorse the rabbit-judgment, one can hold Susi responsible for changing the duck-judgment so that it becomes compatible with the rabbit-judgment.

How can another person reach Susi's system of judgments in order to make her change it in the wanted way? It is not like we could just stick our fingers into other people's string-figures. Fortunately, we have sentences and words as imprecise but at least usable tools. If we can teach someone a new word or way to use a word, we can hope that that changes his system of judgments because of the connection between words and concepts, judgements and sentences- now he acts as if he would represent new concepts and judgments. Wittgenstein has pointed out that someone's ability to use a word the right way is the only available sign of him understanding it (Wittgenstein, 1953, §146-149, pp.63-64). The tools we have for making Susi recognize the possible rabbit-frame are the same we have to teach Susi a new bit of language. We teach her a new way to use a concept – a new way to see the world.

Is it really that dramatic to teach a new frame? A framing problem appears when the difference in the concepts that are linked to the used word lead to judgments different enough to cause serious disagreements. That happens if the concepts are so different that whatever they represent is seen as a different object or state of affairs by each person. The duck-picture and the rabbit-picture are seen as different objects. Wittgenstein shows this by asking us to imagine that we see the duck-rabbit-head once surrounded by ducks and then surrounded by rabbits – it is possible to imagine that we

would first see a duck and then a rabbit without noticing that the drawing is the same.<sup>20</sup> The teaching of a new frame will involve changes in more than the judgments we want to establish for our concept. To change a concept means to change judgments and thereby other concepts. Teaching Susi to see the rabbit in the picture is also teaching her to see the ears, etc.

According to Wittgenstein, the only way to teach someone the use of a word is to make him see how others use the word – that is: To use the word in front of him.<sup>21</sup> If this is a simple means of translation, one can use words the person already knows and connects in the required way. "*But if a person has not yet got the concepts, I'll teach him to use the words by means of examples and exercises. – And when I do this, I do not communicate less to him than I know myself.*" (Wittgenstein, 1953, § 208, p. 89). Why do I not communicate less to him than I know myself? Well, using examples would in this case mean presenting sentences that are supposed to represent judgments that are part of what the concept is in our own system of judgments. To teach the meaning of a word, one can therefore only do the following: Show the other examples of how the word is used and then ask him to use it – hoping that he will get it right.

This can be seen and is seen by Wittgenstein as analogous to training –in fact, he seems to use educating and training as synonymous on different occasions (Wittgenstein, 1953, § 189, p. 82). This should make sense to us: If each concept can be viewed by us as a unity of dispositions to act/judge and as the outcome of earlier actions/judgments, then, indeed, one can in a broad sense speak of the teaching of a concept as training – just like one can call the teaching of making a certain string-figure the right way training: 'Move your fingers this way, see? No, this way!' (And then perhaps guide the hand a bit). This training, however, is rather difficult, for instead of directly teaching the concept, we have to teach a new use of the word – that is: we cannot take control of the whole concept, just try to establish certain connections, never knowing exactly what the other connections might be and how they might perhaps influence the outcome of our training.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Ibid. PPF § 125, p. 205.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Ibid. PI §54, p. 31.

#### 4.3. Turning to Rhetoric

In an argumentative situation that has run into a frame problem or a deep disagreement what is required is that the arguer or the arguers notice the problem, and that they then go on to teach each other their respective frames: If A and B have latent frames and they somehow succeed in making these frames understandable to each other, A and B both have to manifest frames afterwards and then can try to argue convincingly about for example - which frame is adequate. But how is that supposed to work?

Let us examine the situation using the model of an argumentation in form of a dialogue: Both participants will be able to recognize the problem only by its symptoms. That is: They will, after a period of arguing and discussing, perhaps get the feeling that the other does not take into account the reasons they provide, does not react to their utterances the right way. The reason the other one provides will appear irrelevant or absurd to them. All in all, the feeling that the other does not really know what she is talking about might appear.

In the best case, they are (or at least one of them is) aware of the fact that deep disagreements or frame problems can appear. Then they have reason to suspect that exactly this has happened. What can they do about it? They do not know where the problem is, how serious it is, how far apart their judgment-systems are. All they can do is try to explain their point of view. They have to step out of the process of trying to show that they are right by using judgments they believe to be shared in order to provide backing for their claim. Their goal is not to convince anymore, but to make their point of view understandable in order to make the latent frames manifest. The process of convincing arguing has to be interrupted.

Fogelin claimed that "[I]n the end, and sometimes the end is very near, we have to fall back on persuasion (...)" (Fogelin, 1985, reprinted 2005, p. 11) He seems to be right, but the negative connotation this sentence seems to have in his paper might be unjustified. In a situation in which the resources of mutual understanding are not enough to engage in the often highly rule-restricted activity of arguing anymore, all resources of communication have to be used to reestablish this understanding. Now, all depends on communicating in the most effective way possible. There is a field of research in argumentation-theory that engages in finding out how to do just that. Johnson says that *"[r]hetoric is now widely conceived as the study of effective communication."* (Johnson, 2000, p. 268) If he is right, then we know where to turn next.

#### 5. Rhetoric

#### 5.1. Teacher and Pupil

In an argument supposed to conform to the ideal of a convincing argument, arguer and listener/audience/opponent are supposed to play as small a role as possible. If brought to its extreme, in an ideal convincing argument it is only reasons that count and reason that they count for. But in the situation of teaching, teacher and pupil are the focus of attention.

What has to be understood by the teacher in order to succeed in teaching a new frame is the subjectivity of the pupil – as that is what the teacher has to deal with in order to create the change that is needed. In our situation – a latent frame has to be made manifest – this already implies that the roles of teacher and pupil will both be taken by all participants of the argumentative situation. If the teacher has to understand the pupil's subjectivity, and it is this subjectivity (the different system of judgments) that causes the problem, then both (or all) participants have to teach their own view and at the same time try to understand that of the other (or others).<sup>22</sup>

What is essential for success in teaching is that the pupil is willing to be taught and therefore that he trusts the teacher: We said that the system of endorsed judgments the pupil holds is at least a manifestation of his subjectivity. That means that what the teacher is doing by trying to teach the pupil a new frame is changing the pupil's subjectivity. It is the pupil who has to hand over the power of changing him to the teacher. As the teacher is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> In order to not complicate matters further, we will neglect this aspect in the following, but it should be kept in mind by the reader. Tindale points out that in the Bakhtinian model of rhetorical argumentation the arguer himself is changed by his attempt to persuade the audience because he has to understand his audience in order to make a good attempt to persuade – that is: He has to learn their point of view to some extent (Tindale, 2004, p. 101).

only able to present communicative devices to the pupil, it is also the pupil who has to try deliberately to understand what is supposed to be taught, to use the help offered by the teacher.

Two things therefore have to become most important to the arguer who takes the role of the teacher in order to solve a frame-problem or deep disagreement: 1) The subjectivity of the pupil, his system of judgments and the connections of said system to his actions and emotions. 2) His own relationship to the pupil, his ability to present himself to the pupil as a trustworthy person who can be allowed to try and change the subjectivity of the pupil.

As rhetoric pays special attention to the adaption of argumentation to a specific audience, subjectivity of the audience and relationship to the audience are major topics here: "*Of the means of persuasion supplied by the speech itself there are three kinds. The first kind reside in the character (ethos) of the speaker; the second consist in producing a certain (the right) attitude in the hearer; the third appertain to the argument proper, in so far as it actually or seemingly demonstrates.*" (Aristotle, Cooper transl. 1932, book 1 part 2, p. 8).

This is how Aristotle introduces the organization of rhetoric into working with three different modes: *ethos, pathos* and *logos*. The considerations of the last section direct our attention to *ethos*, the concern with the way the arguer/teacher presents himself and *pathos*, the way that the arguer/ teacher can deal with the emotions – or in our case the whole subjectivity – of the pupil/audience.

Tindale gives a short introduction of both in his book *Rhetorical Argumentation* (Tindale, 2004).

Rhetorical *ethos* is the 'consideration of the character'. The goal in our context is to show the arguer's credibility and good character. Referring to Leff, Tindale presents the goal of *ethotic* argument as three-dimensional (Tindale, 2004, pp. 20-21). One goal of the arguer is that of reaching a certain communion with the audience and thereby gain their trust (Embodiment). He has to construct his own personality before the audience through that which is being said or written, making for example prejudices against him seem absurd or give them more plausibility (Enactment). All this creates a certain situation that frames what is being said or written and in the best case unites speaker and audience (teacher and pupil) so that the

speaker is "*among his audience rather than beyond them*" (Evocation). (Tindale, 2004, p. 21). To us this means that the teacher has to present himself as a reliable and trustworthy person due to his effort to teach. By creating communion between himself and his pupil, he can engage the pupil in the process of understanding that he wants to evoke. From this point of view, it is not his task to force a certain view upon the pupil but to help the pupil to educate himself, make himself understand (Tindale, 2004, pp. 75-76).

Modern accounts of rhetoric, like the one Tindale shows us, use the category of *pathos* to deal with the specific audience the speaker addresses. Tindale presents the goal of *pathos* as understanding the audience so that one is able to use what one has found to compose one's presentation according to this understanding (Tindale, 2004, p. 21). For our purposes we can therefore say that the *pathotic* aspect of rhetorical argumentation proposes composing what is being said in a way that takes the listener's subjectivity into account by paying attention to the effects that can be expected for certain argumentational acts on this specific audience or pupil.

All this should show us that the teaching situation we described seems to demand very similar abilities from the teacher as the situation of argumentation described from a rhetorical point of view. In both cases, the addressee of what is being said and the relationship between addressing person and addressee come into the foreground.

This similarity becomes even more striking when Tindale explains the idea of invitational rhetoric: Its goal is to make the audience persuade themselves, to have them do their part in the process of understanding and thereby arrive at the desired conclusion (Tindale, 2004, p. 50). For that, the arguer has to create a certain environment for the audience, he has to give it the possibility of understanding what has not yet been understood, but he cannot try to do the whole task by himself. The audience has to be highly engaged in what is going on, it has to take part, accept the invitation of the arguer (Tindale, 2004, p. 89 ff).

All this should remind us of what we discovered in Wittgenstein's account of teaching and his idea that *"if a person has not yet got the concepts"* one has to *"teach him to use the words by means of examples and exercises"* (Wittgenstein, 1953, § 208 p.89). We remember that he goes on to point out that this is the only thing one can do. A teacher cannot force his pupil to understand and he cannot guarantee success, but he can try to help by using his own ability to present what is supposed to be understood in examples and try to make the pupil teach himself through exercises.

### 5.2. Using Vagueness

In order to change the way one or more concepts can be used, the whole string-figure or web of judgments has to be changed at least a bit. That is because the position of a knot or the meaning of a concept depends on all the other positions of all the other knots or all the other meanings of all the other concepts our knot/concept is somehow connected to: *"To begin with, a correct demonstration is one that conforms to rules which are made explicit in formalized systems; argumentation, in contrast, flows out of a natural language. Thus, while signs used in a demonstration are supposed to be completely free from ambiguity, the language upon which argumentation must rely possesses ambiguities that cannot be worked out in advance" (Perelman, 1982, p. 9).* 

In convincing argumentation the fact that words can be understood in different ways lead to misunderstandings and deep disagreements. In rhetoric, the same vagueness can be used to create new or stimulating combinations of words that will have an effect on the audience/pupil. That concepts are vague can easily be understood. If concepts at least partly consist of the sum of the judgments they are used in, and if words refer to concepts, then it depends on which judgments are most fresh in the mind as to how one will understand a word. And as we have noted earlier, no one actually makes all the judgments made possible by the way one's concepts are - not even all those that would be necessary. And one might forget ones one has already made.

That means: If we now say that the meaning of a concept can be understood like the position a knot has in a string-figure, then we can easily see that the strings the knot consists of do not determine its position completely. Each knot can be moved – either by making an actual move in the game or even by only altering the length of the strings, heightening or diminishing the tension of some of them. Analogously to these two possibilities there are at least two effects a teacher can aim for, using the vagueness of concepts: The establishment of new and already possible judgments that will gently shift the concept(s) in question into the right direction (a move in the game) - or the emphasizing of already made judgments that have been in the back of the pupil's mind and are now being pulled forward and thereby change the concept's position within the range in which it can already move (making a string a bit shorter and another one a bit longer, changing the tension on these strings).

## 5.3. Two Examples of How Rhetorical Devices Can Help

How can communication be used effectively in order to encourage a pupil to endorse new judgments or pay more attention to ones already made? We will now look at two rhetorical devices, the creating of presence and the use of analogies and metaphors as examples of how rhetorical figures and techniques can help to make teaching effective or even possible. Those two have been chosen because they can easily be illustrated by the device we used in our own paper up till now: The string-figure. In both cases, we will try to show how the two wittgensteinian moves – the giving of examples and the giving of exercises – can be made in a rhetorical approach.

## 5.4. Presence

Attention is not paid equally to every judgment one has made all the time. Similar to the way we see a three-dimensional figure only from one angle and therefore direct more attention to what is in the foreground, one might only concentrate on certain parts of a concept, leaving others in the background. As the only thing the teacher can work with in order to help his pupil understand is what the pupil already has in his judgment-system, a most important part of what has to be done is to direct the attention to those parts that the teacher wants to use. Here the creation of presence comes into play.

Perelman writes that "[c]hoosing to single out certain things for presentation in a speech draws the attention of the audience to them and thereby gives them a presence that prevents them from being neglected." (Perelman, 1982, p. 35) This happens through an artful use of language – according to Perelman here rhetoric is the "art of literary expression". (Perelman, 1982, p. 35) Aristotle describes the use of actuality (energeia) regarding this - by implying activity, the pupil is made to see things as almost alive or as animated. Aristotle for example praises the way Homer uses his metaphors (Perelman, 1982, pp. 210-211): "[*Of the spears, many ...] Stuck fast in the earth, still panting to sate themselves with his flesh.*" (Aristotle, Cooper transl., 1932, book 3 part 11, p. 211). One could try to explain the effect of such language in the following way: By portraying what is talked about as in action, even alive, an emotional connection is being established to the topic or aspect in question. Through action and emotion the thing or happening in question gets anthropomorphized and becomes a better subject to human emotions. If a thing is made present to us, then we are involved in the contemplation of it not only with our rationality but also with our emotions and imagination. That makes it easy to pull every judgment we are prepared to endorse about it into the foreground.

The usage of certain words, the description of something that the targeted concept is supposed to represent in a certain way, can direct the attention of the pupil to a part of the concept's content - certain judgments about it. Creating presence works like making strings shorter or longer, gently shifting the position of the knot, making it a bit more fit for a certain string-connection with other knots. (Did the reader just see how presence works? If the author did well, the reader could see the knot move – and made the connection to concepts herself.)

In addition it should be rather easy to recognize that making two aspects of one object or two objects present immediately one after the other prepares the ground for connecting them – and even more: As the listener will often assume that an arguer or teacher chooses his words with care, it might encourage the listener or pupil to search for a possible connection himself. It may not even be necessary to state the judgment that one wanted to show as being possible. As we can see here the element of exercise enters the picture: If the teacher leaves the pupil with only part of such a demonstration, the pupil will have to finish it himself, thereby becoming his own teacher. In addition, this deepens the relationship of teacher and pupil, creating trust as the pupil sees that what the teacher presents helps him to figure things out by himself.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> This thought is taken from an explanation Tindale gives for the figure of allusion (evoking something without expressively naming it) (Tindale, 2004, pp. 68-76).

#### 5.5. Analogies and Metaphors

Both analogies and metaphors use similarities in relationships or structures to show that certain further connections are possible. A relational structure that is well known to the listener/pupil and acknowledged by the arguer/teacher as similar to the structure he wants the listener/pupil to understand is being used to show how the structure that is supposed to be understood can appear. Perelman teaches us that the well known part of the analogy or metaphor is called the *phoros* and the part that shall be understood is the *theme* (Perelman, 1982, pp. 114-115).

The reader surely can imagine that an especially hard move in a string figure, once learned, can much more easily be repeated while making another string figure than when it first had to be learned. We can try to understand what an analogy or a metaphor does in the situation of teaching using this, our own, analogy. In the context of string-figures, the teacher can ask the pupil to think back to a string-figure she already can make. She points out similarities between a certain state in the making of this figure (the *phoros*) and a certain state in the making of the new figure (the *theme*). Then she points out that in the old figure a certain move was possible and that the same move can now be made in the new figure. Like in the teaching of a string-figure, in an analogy similarities are being pointed out. Then one shows that a certain further judgment was possible in the *phoros* and encourages the pupil to make a similar judgment regarding the *theme*.

Of course this implies that there has to be a similarity between *phoros* and *theme* that is already recognized by the pupil or easily recognizable. This similarity is supposed to carry the weight of the further comparison that the teacher encourages his student to make.

Each analogy, by the choice of the *phoros*, highlights a certain aspect of the conceptual content of the *theme*. This can of course be criticized if the highlighting it does is judged to be inappropriate in the context: "*With good reason Max Black has emphasized that describing battle with terms borrowed from chess disregards all the horrors of war*." (Perelman, 1982, p. 119) That means that the use of a metaphor or analogy by itself is not a device to convince – to do so it would have to be accompanied with enough reasons as to why it is adequate. It is rather a device that the teacher can use to show his pupil the way he thinks – the connections he makes. He gives an example of those sentences with which he would represent judgments he endorses. But because sentences can be misunderstood easily, he tries to clarify the kind of connection he wants to see being made by referring to a different area in the system of judgments where a similar kind of connection can be assumed for both him and his pupil.

Perelman understands a metaphor as a condensed analogy that fuses *theme* and *phoros*. The example above could for example be used as a metaphor: "*I could not do anything else – I had to sacrifice a pawn*" (Perelman, 1982, p. 120). If a new analogy has been well established in the course of teaching, then the teacher can turn it into a metaphor, allowing him a "*back and forth movement wherein the theme and the phoros become, so to speak, invisible*." (Perelman, 1982, p. 121) This has the effect of connecting the giving of an example with the giving of an exercise. The pupil himself then has to complete the analogy, playing his own role in the working of the example and thereby showing himself how the connection he is supposed to see can work.<sup>24</sup>

## 5.6. The Role of Rhetorical Argumentation in the Solving of Deep Disagreements/Frame Problems

Rhetoric cannot be viewed as working in a mechanical way. The context of a deep disagreement or frame problem is inscrutable to the participants of the argumentation in which it arose – that is *why* it is a deep disagreement or frame problem. When the signs of such a problem become noticeable, they do not bring with them the exact description of what the problem is. It is not even possible to predict how deeply the differences are woven into the judgment-systems of all the individuals.

As Wohlrapp pointed out, latent frames can be connected to the subjectivity of a person in a weaker or stronger way (Wohlrapp, 2008, p. 246). The stronger the connection of a judgment, the bigger the consequences of having to change that judgment for the whole system. If a latent frame is connected very strongly with the subjectivity of a person, Wohlrapp calls it a primary frame. If such a frame becomes manifest, the whole subject

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> This is explained in Tindale's *Rhetorical Argumentation* (Tindale, 2004, p. 75).

that had the frame is in question and the following argumentative encounter about which frame is more suited in the context of the argument is at the same time a discussion about the individual that has the frame. It is therefore extremely difficult to make such frames manifest and sometimes it might be close to impossible.

That means that participants of an argumentation that are faced with a deep disagreement or frame problem, by stepping out of the mode of arguing convincingly and entering the mode of teaching or rhetorical argumentation, also step out of the clear, predictable and rather easily evaluable area of precise rules and standards and into the rather vague domain of phronesis and creative use of language. They do not know where the problem lies and whether it is solvable with the amount of time and effort they can put into it until they have found and solved it. All they have to navigate here is their knowledge of how to explain their own thinking as effectively as possible and how to understand thinking foreign to their own. Rhetoric is the theoretical approach to this knowledge. It identifies and explains devices that will help with this navigation. It makes one aware of the ever-present possibility of the other legitimate point of view. It emphasizes the importance of the audience and of the relationship between arguer and audience. It is therefore the rhetorical arguer that is most likely to succeed in helping to make a latent frame manifest or solving a deep disagreement and thereby allowing the return into the realms of convincing argument.

#### 6. Rhetoric and Subjectivity

Up till now, we looked at a dramatic case of problems caused by the role subjectivity plays in argumentation: Deep disagreements and frame problems. Here rhetoric seemed to be the answer. But is that all? Fogelin spoke of normal and not normal argumentative circumstances and we acted as if there was a strict difference between convincing argument and teaching under the use of rhetorical argument. Is the demarcation between those two clear? Does something like an *ideal* normal argumentative context exist? And if not – what does that mean for the role of rhetoric in argumentation?

#### 6.1. The Normal Argumentative Context

"I shall say that an argument, or better, an argumentative exchange is normal when it takes place within a context of broadly shared beliefs and preferences." (Fogelin, 1985, reprinted 2005, p. 6). That is the core of Fogelin's description of what a normal argumentative exchange is that provides a normal context for an argument. In our language, as we already have acknowledged, this would mean that the participants of the argumentation have very similar system of judgments. In the first part of the paper we said that in a case where the similarity between the judgment-systems is big enough to prevent serious problems with communication, we can speak of convincing argumentation. Our question now is how similar these systems have to be in order to be sure that communication-problems *cannot* arise.

The reader might agree that it is possible to construct cases everywhere in between a serious frame problem and a small misunderstanding such as the ice-cream-problem we described in chapter two. Are there differences in kind, not in degree?

We said that deep disagreements are most probably frame-problems caused by latent frames and therefore –at least initially - not identifiable as such by the participants of the argument. We claimed that if the symptoms of deep disagreements/frame problems are caused by manifest frames then they can be treated as complicated cases of not- or mis-understanding. But the symptoms do not tell the participants whether they are confronted with a misunderstanding or a deep disagreement. They only tell them that something in the communicative element of the argumentation is wrong.<sup>25</sup>

The only way for the participants of an argumentation to be completely safe from problems in communication that make the exchange of convincing argument stutter seems to be taking Fogelin's definition to its extremes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> In "Knowing when Disagreements are Deep", David M. Adams makes the point that as deep disagreements are such disagreements that are unsolvable by normal discourse, it is therefore only possible to know for sure that a disagreement is deep if all resources of rational discourse have failed. Because nobody can know whether all resources have been tried, it is never possible to know for sure that there is a deep disagreement (Adams, 2005, p. 76). One can of course also argue the other way around: As long as a rational way to solve the problem has not been found, one cannot be sure that there is one. ("Rational" here used to refer to convincing arguments)

Complete safety is reached when there are no differences at all between two judgment-systems anymore. But if two judgment-systems are completely the same, then there is no need to argue. Every judgment one makes will be made by the other too.

In most argumentative situations subjects with differences in their judgment-systems interact with one another. Every single one of those individuals will have manifest as well as latent frames. In addition, the individuals' attention on certain judgments will differ, they might forget or have forgotten what they are normally willing to endorse. Whether we are willing to call the situation normal in the sense Fogelin does then depends on how great the impact of these differences is on the argumentative exchange. We will probably call an argumentative situation normal even if a lot of small misunderstandings arise. If a deep disagreement shows its ugly face, we will not want to call the situation normal anymore.

Fogelin might be right in claiming that we can call a situation in which the broadness of the shared beliefs is enough to enable the participants to communicate effectively normal. On the other hand, a situation in which the arguer does not exactly know how normal the situation he argues in is can also be rightfully called normal - he is not able to look into other peoples heads and cannot know whether they will understand him right. There is no argumentative situation in which subjectivity does not play a role. And the probability of two subjects with identical or almost identical systems of judgments is extremely low. Therefore the danger that a problem in communication might hinder the convincing argumentation is always there, threatening in a higher or lower degree.

#### 6.2. Rhetoric's rightful place

An arguer presents his arguments. There seems to be nothing wrong with that sentence –of course he does. If seen from the perspective we have gained during the course of this paper, however, it is not such an easy task as it might seem at first sight. An arguer *tries* to present an argument, that is sure, and he utters sentences meant to represent certain judgments that are part of this argument, that is also sure. If his listeners (or readers etc.) are willing to engage in an argumentation, then in most cases, there will

be an argument presented to them.<sup>26</sup> But is the argument that the arguer tries to present and the argument that the other participants acknowledge as presented the same argument? Is it similar enough to fulfill its function? And who is responsible for taking care of a sufficient similarity between them?

There is the famous principle of charity, of course, that gives some of this responsibility to the other participants. They have the duty to try and understand the argument in a favorable way. But the respective other in an argumentation can only understand an argument in a charitable way if he can understand it at all. It is the arguer who has to present his arguments in a form that is understandable, who has to try to make himself as clear as possible. He has to make an effort in order to present the judgments he wants to present so that his listeners will know which move to make next in their own string-game. When he presents his argument, he is therefore taking a double-role; that of a convincing arguer and that of a teacher of what he means by the sentences he utters or writes down.

Depending on the context, these roles will have more or less weight in his performance. The more heterogeneous or different from him the addressee of his argument becomes, the more he has to engage in a teaching position, making clear what he means by his sentences before expecting them to form a convincing argument. Rhetoric provides the means for all this. It is rhetoric that he will have to use as a part of his argumentative performance.

#### 6.3. A much-too-short Remark: Subjectivity and Rhetoric

Argumentation is an inter-subjective enterprise. It is therefore not enough that someone has a good judgment-structure, a harmonious string-figure in his head – he also has to communicate it. An argument can only be created by a subject that somehow invests judgments it endorses into it– even if the judgments brought into the arguments are not being endorsed themselves,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> There might be cases in which the communication is so dysfunctional that all that they see or hear is utter and complete nonsense and gibberish. Then from their point of view there is no argument presented to them.

the subject still has to understand them, therefore invest concepts it understands and these concepts then are connected to endorsed judgments. If an arguer tries to present his argument to an opponent or audience he always makes more or less of an attempt to transfer a private part of reasoning into the inter-subjective sphere. There is reason to say: This transition is the moment when whatever-it-was-before turns into an argument. But in the inter-subjective sphere there are no concepts and judgments to work with, there are only words and sentences and pictures etc. That argumentation is an inter-subjective enterprise makes it dependent on communication. And that communication works does not go without saying. There are too few words and too many concepts; there are always more subjects than intersubjective spheres. That is why part of the presentation of the argument has to be the teaching of the judgments used in it, and along with that the teaching of the concepts used in them. It is rhetoric that gives us theoretical insight into this area and rhetorical features that do this work.

But can one not say that it is the convincing argument that is really the argument? That the rhetorical part of the argument's presentation is really just the real argument's servant, necessary perhaps, but not really part of the deal? To answer this, two remarks can be made:

- Understanding the possibility of a claimed judgment is a necessary part and a precondition to accepting its necessity, advantageousness or truth. Learning how a certain perspective works is part of recognizing that it is the right perspective.
- 2. It does not seem to be possible to distinguish the communicative use of words and sentences used to present an argument from their convincing use. Such a distinction might not even make much sense. And the concepts and judgments that form the argument do not seem to be an argument as long as they cannot be presented in the intersubjective sphere due to communication. Is there something like a private argument?<sup>27</sup>

 $<sup>^{27}</sup>$  I am here playing with Wittgenstein's notion of a private language (Wittgenstein, 1953, § 243-315, pp. 95-111).

It might make sense to distinguish the rhetorical and the convincing part of an argument for some theoretical purposes, but in the end, and for the single argument, presented by an arguer and acknowledged by a member of the audience or an opponent, it will probably be impossible to identify what belongs to what. Teaching the meaning of an argument and making it convincing means teaching the possibility of certain judgments and showing that they work together to give reason for a further judgment – the meaning of which depends on those of the reason-giving judgments. The ability to teach meaning though communication – an ability that is studied by rhetoric-belongs to the inter-subjective enterprise of argumentation just as essentially as subjectivity does.

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