LIVING TOGETHER IN URBAN CONTEXTS: PORT-CITIES VERSUS INNER ANATOLIAN PLACES (1880-1924)*

ABSTRACT: Cosmopolitanism is a concept which social scientists may be tempted to use in order to describe and analyze the social and cultural life in today's major urban cities. It is also an expression with historical depth and it was very familiar of travelers and writers experiencing the Eastern Mediterranean, the Ottoman, from an anthropological point of view if not always strictly political, world. In this text, I compare two Ottoman cities with diverse urban populations: Smyrna or İzmir and Diarbekir or Diyabakır, at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. I attempt to shed some empirical light on the concept of cosmopolitanism, underlining that diversity alone was not sufficient to qualify in the mind of Western observers but also in that of local social agents and commentators. Cosmopolitanism was a hierarchical social order whose fascinating power is all the more powerful, as one is free to examine it from a distance, both in social space and historical time.

KEY WORDS: Ottoman Empire, Nationalism, Cosmopolitanism, Ethnicity, Violence, Hierarchy, Centre, Periphery, Port Cities, Contemporary Greek History, Contemporary Armenian History.

RESUMEN: El cosmopolitismo es un concepto que los sociólogos están tentados de utilizar para la descripción y análisis de la vida social y cultural en los grandes centros urbanos de hoy. Es también la expresión de un concepto de trasfondo histórico que fue muy familiar a los viajeros y escritores que conocieron el Mediterráneo oriental en época otomana, desde un punto de vista antropológico, si no estrictamente político. En este trabajo se comparan dos ciudades otomanas con distinto tipos de

población urbana: Esmirna o İzmir y Diyarbakir a finales del s. XIX y prin-
cipios del XX. La intención es iluminar empíricamente, en lo posible, el
concepto de cosmopolitismo, subrayando que no basta sólo la diversidad
para denominarlo como tal en la mentalidad de los observadores occi-
dentales, sino que hay que tener en cuenta a los agentes sociales locales.
El cosmopolitismo es un orden social jerarquizado cuya capacidad de fas-
cinación es muy poderosa, cuando se tiene la libertad de examinarla
desde la distancia en cuanto al espacio social y el tiempo histórico.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Imperio otomano, Nacionalismo, Cosmopolitismo, Et-
nicismo, Violencia, Jerarquía, Centro y Periferia, Puertos, Historia de Gre-
cia contemporánea, Historia armenia contemporánea.

Comparing two cities of the Ottoman Empire may enable researchers to
find out major traits of the living side-by-side, if not always together (Lory,
1997), developed by different human groups in the late Ottoman Empire.
My hypothesis is that Western coastal cities had reached a different *modus
vivendi* than inner Anatolian ones. Fernand Braudel (1949, 1990⁹) made a
basic distinction between inner, mountainous places and the Mediterranean
shores. The aim of this article is to survey this difference, though distinction
between the Balkans and Anatolia may have been overemphasized for ins-
titutional or geopolitical reasons. The two continental edges, Eastern-Sou-
thern Europe and Asia Minor, are intimately close to each other and there was
no brutal anthropological rupture between the two but rather a swift conti-
nuum of attitudes and representations across the Ægean, the Marmara Sea
and the Bosporus[1]. Multiple cities were no exception but the rule on the Bal-
kans and in Anatolia until the outbursts of mass violence in the 20th century:
«To put it in a nutshell, cities had a multi-confessional, multilingual, and mul-
tiethnic population, which differed in most cases sharply from that of the su-
rroundings» (Sundhaussen, 2007).
    The two cities to be compared are Smyrna or İzmir and Diyarbakır, which
was known as Amidè in Ancient times. Understanding the coexistence of dif-

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[1] «Maps of Europe would include the Balkan but not Anatolia, maps of the Middle East
would include Anatolia but not the Balkan. […] Inescapably, centuries of prejudice have com-
pelled historians –and even geographers– to proceed to an arbitrary cut from North to South,
in the middle of the Ægean. […] This habit […] has completely distorted our vision of the in-
termediate region» (KITSIKIS [1985]: 16).

ferent groups in late Ottoman cities implies questioning all too clear-cut definitions of groups (Aymes, 2005). Nevertheless one could suggest that instead of being fascinated by a "functioning" society (Braude-Lewis, 1982), new analysis has to comprehend the ultimate phases of violent destruction of these social *loci*, removing the late Ottoman cities from the image of a picturesque mosaic to encompass tensions and moments of radical differentiation. Only articulating both everyday life normalcies with repeated and eventually lethal tensions would adequately render some echo of the past social phenomena.

In this approach, sources "from below" are favored in this text in a way oral history operates with contemporary witnesses and the memories they have of their past (Thompson, 1978). "History from below" is to be understood as clearly opposed to classical historiography as long and predominantly practiced[2]. It is a historiographical norm that came into being by isolated efforts first, Michelet was interested by individual and casual remembrances about the French revolution among his contemporaries, the German interest for *Volksgeist* and *Volkskultur* did contribute to see lower social layers as less insignificant than before and much later the French School of *les Annales* theoretically formalized this epistemological focus while today the Anglo-Saxon born oral history and cultural studies together with the German partly established *Historische Anthropologie* may express at best the later developments of that approach[3].

To put it in a nutshell, "history from below" disfavors male-only narratives, official or bureaucratic documents. It refuses cultural approaches that are mostly reduced to the sincere and strong but therefore not less erroneous belief in Western European cultural superiority, any disdain for economic or material phenomena compared to cultural, seen as a static and essential list of characteristics of human groups. It confers a new legitimacy to feelings, to individualities, opting for a a less abstract conception of groups and a relative rating of "outstanding men". Anecdotes, details, minor artifacts are seen as respectable and possibly meaningful human phenomena[4].

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[2] M. VÖLKEL, *Geschichtschreibung*, Cologne: Böhlau, 2006, chap. 13, pp. 321-372 («Universalisierung und Fragmentierung der Gegenwart»).

[3] R. VAN DÜLMEN, *Historische Anthropologie*, Cologne: Böhlau, 2002², pp. 5-9 («Der Mensch als Akteur der Geschichte»).

[4] A. CORBIN, *Le monde retrouvé de Louis-François Pinagot*, Paris: Flammarion, 2002: it is the paradigmatic book for a renewed interest focused on people deprived of official importance, remote from literacy and apparently without major impact on their surroundings.

However, if inspired by Thompson's reflections on the desirable demo-cratization of history writing, one has some special methodological questions to answer: There are hardly people still alive with a direct experience of the late Ottoman past. The Greek descendents of the former Ottoman Orthodox subjects have been socialized and educated in structures largely alien to the late Ottoman Empire. The same remark is valid for the Armenian group, especially when their rare heirs have moved to Western societies. Therefore one has to use written documents, left by former inhabitants of Smyrna and Diyarbakır, rather from the lower classes of the Ottoman Empire, though literacy was not a common trait in this society and no necessary, because of its limited effectiveness, social tool (Georgelin, 2007). There is a tension between the present focus on the grass roots and the existing documents taken into consideration while researching. Armenian- and Greek-language first-hand sources have been selected for this limited survey. This implies neither that the presence of other languages in the social and political settings is neglected, nor that researchers are entitled to turn a blind eye on religious groups that did not belong to the Orthodox or the Armenian Apostolic Churches. But still these two kinds of sources are rarely confronted, and that makes this approach innovative. They usually are different enough to give an idea of tensions between groups or, at least, differences of interest. It would be too easy to put their authors under a common "Christian" label. Similarities, if any, between the two are to be considered as significant because unanimity among Ottoman Christians was not usual but exceptional.

1.- Different Urban Contexts

Focusing on urban history has yet a long tradition in historiography and more precisely in Ottoman studies in any language. Cities meant a certain degree of centrality. Constantinople posted representatives of the central authorities in the bigger provincial towns, some consultation of the local population the local *meclis* took place in these cities. Action on the surroundings was decided from the urban sites, action about the plurality of population too. Smyrna was the hub from which Anatolia had contacts with the outside world, the world market economy, major Mediterranean ports like Alexandria or Marseilles and Western Europe. It was also a convenient gateway to Constantinople. It was too the first Anatolian city to develop a railway network, because of the Western capital massively invested in order to

get as fast as possible the raw materials, the agricultural products and the carpets made in the hinterland. Concentrating on Smyrna, one encounters all the non urban or suburban population that occasionally came or even commuted to Smyrna on a daily basis. As the linguistic usage still attests in today's Turkey, provincial cities are intimately connected with their surroundings. If one wants to locate one's village of provenience, the next bigger city is named first. This label does not imply that one used to live in the city itself and had an urban way of life. The whole neighborhood, that is rural areas in the district are meant too by this name. While surveying Diyarbakır, one gets in touch with the non urban areas in this part of Mesopotamia. The distinction between countryside and urban centers may even be artificial given the habits of spending the winter in town and the summer outside of the city for all human groups having the material possibility to do so or the semi nomadic life style, in the case of the Kurdish population, that implies such a habit. Cities are attracting historians' attention, especially those at the turn of the 19th century, because of the accelerating process of urbanization. Both cities, though starting from different situations, were attracting new-comers in search for economic, political in a broad sense, that is communal, and educational opportunities. Smyrna experienced one of the first industrialization steps in the Ottoman Empire, enabling Ottoman subjects to get jobs of a new kind. Smyrna and more evidently Diyarbakır had obvious links with the rural world: caravans of dromedaries were coming until the quay to unload the produce of the inner Anatolian lands and goats would be raised for dairy products. Diyarbakır was even closer to vegetable plots and orchards. The centripetal attraction towards the city was a strong phenomenon, especially in peace time.

"Cosmopolitanism" has certainly many aspects, but there is only a tenuous fade leading from situations to be observed in the Eastern Mediterranean and Eastern Europe in the Modern and Early Contemporary times, to the derogatory use of that term in European politics in the interwar years and its resurgence in our time in order to describe the evolution of globalized megalopolis, ironically enough situated in the Western world that time[5]. As far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned, some of its cities were perceived by Western travelers but also by locals as rich as the whole world from a human point of view. Constantinople and Alexandria, both seemingly

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[5]   R. Escallier, «Le cosmopolitisme méditerranéen: réflexions et interrogations», *Cahiers de la Méditerranée Moderne et Contemporaine* 67, July 2005 (http://revel.unice.fr/cmedi/document.html?id=120).

epitomized the religious, linguistic, economic, that is broadly speaking *habitus*-related diversity of the Mediterranean and even farther: Western Europe, Persia and Russia. This kaleidoscope did function though according to a social syntax and the chaos was only apparent. There was a subtle play of social hierarchies between human groups, whose boundaries were loosely defined before the prevalence of nationalism, reordered over the years according to the economic, cultural, political situation of the Ottoman Empire at home and on the international stage.

Ottoman cosmopolitanism was not defined only by its diversity, this cannot suffice. The presence of Western European Powers is a *sine qua non* criterion to qualify for the label, together with the induced possibility of having links with this outside world through educational facilities, job opportunities, local social milieus mimicking, adopting and adapting Western European social forms and material culture, transportation means, transoceanic ships for sure and even train connection with Vienna, Venice and major Western European cities for Constantinople. The later political vocabulary would make "Levantine" the symbol for an unstable, unreliable, unfaithful population, holding different passports, having an option as soon as political loyalty was at stake. Though irrelevant for the Ottoman age, the later cliché can in retrospect emphasize one aspect of cosmopolitan port cities of the Mediterranean: Smyrna, Salonica, Constantinople, Beirut, Alexandria, and possibly Odessa and Tangiers: there were non-national hubs where the indigenous sovereignty was limited either by international treaties like the Capitulations, International concessions, etc, and / or the blunt possibility of military intervention by foreign states.

Geography made living side-by-side quite different in the two cases. Coastal location empowered Westerners to keep an eye on the life in the city of Smyrna, in the concrete form of regular calls by military squadrons in the Ægean port. The Great Powers of that time were interested in the maintenance of public order, of smooth economic operations, largely taking place in their interest, and in the strict implementation of the Capitulations that ensured a judicial and fiscal extraterritorial status for their citizens and *protégé*s. Western diplomatic dispatches are straightforward in their cynicism: «The presence in Smyrna of our cruiser 'Jules Ferry' has had on all Ottoman circles, especially on the Muslim indigenous, the most exquisite effect»[6]. The Ionian

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[6]   MAE, Turquie Nouvelle Série n° 69, Home Policy, Asia Minor, Archipelago, vol. III, 1908-1909; Diplomatic dispatch sent by Henry Dallemagne, French Consul in Smyrna, to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris, July 26, 1909, n° 110, folio n° 146, "Ottoman National Holiday, July 23, Smyrna".

location accounted for demographic continuity with the Balkans and the Ar-
chipelago, which meant regular arrivals of Greek Orthodox immigrants al-
most until 1908. On the other hand, Diyarbakır's continental site excluded
direct access for outsiders, who could only witness and report about major
events (Meyrier, 2000) to little avail[7]. Remoteness allowed for a possible hi-
gher control by the Ottoman state of such places, though this possibility was
challenged by the local Kurdish *beys*, with whom the Ottoman state had to
negotiate, which it did in a sophisticated manner since Abdülhamit's reign
(1876-1909) (Georgeon, 2003).

The proximity of Greece made Smyrna a covetable city for the Kingdom
founded in 1830. This implied processing the region with the Hellenic ideo-
logical discourse, especially in the local community schools, and opened
eventually the way for direct military and administrative actions on the spot
from 1919 onward. Quite the opposite, Diyarbakır was a remote city and
could not be targeted by such territorial appetites, at least from the part of
Greece. Even Armenian pretensions on Diyarbakır, confused on purpose
with Ancient Dikranagerd (Sիգրանակերտը), were daring given the general
mixed tone of urban life there: according to the archives of the CAMS (Cen-
tre for Asia Minor Studies in Athens, cf. n. 12), «γενικά μέσα στην πόλη μιλού-
σαν τούρκικα» («Generally Turkish was spoken in the city»).

Smyrna was under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople,
little by little Hellenized during the 19th century (Anagnostopoulou, to be pu-
blished), while Diyarbakır was submitted to the equivalently Orthodox, but
certainly less Greek, Patriarchate of Antioch, though the former would have
liked to expand its sphere of influence on Antiochian lands, but with only
temporary successes. The use of the word Ἔλληνες to describe Greek Or-
thodox in Diayarbakır maintained in Greek encyclopaedia is most unfortu-
nate and misleading (Maschopoulos, 1929)[8]. Orthodox Christianity in practise
was certainly not the same in both locations and one may assert that belon-
ging to Antioch in such remote places implied being more strictly compelled
to œcumenicism than in Constantinople-ruled dioceses[9]. Arab nationalism

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[7]   There was a British Consulate too in Diyarbakır: «Վերապատուելի Թումաս Պոյաճեան»
(MGOUNT [1950]: 325-326). The links between Protestantism, educational work among Ottoman
subjects, and British diplomacy made Protestantism in the Ottoman Empire and British influence
inter-twinned affairs.

[8]   «35.000 inhabitants among which [...] about 1.000 Ἔλληνες (Hellenes) who came as
refugees on in 1923», p. 262, 2nd column.

[9]   Orthodox Christians would participate in major Christian events of whatever group. For
instance, at the formal arrival of the new Armenian Archbishop, Kharakhanian, in the city in

nurtured in Arabic speaking Orthodox milieus in *Bilad al-Sham* had no re-
levance in Diyarbakır, far away from any clear national ascription[10]. Accor-
ding to the sources used, Antioch functioned more as a partner in the local
dynamics than as an instance –even if only partly– in the service of a neigh-
bouring State.

The human groups and the languages present in both cities and their su-
rroundings were partly different in names and social contents. In Smyrna,
Greek was the practical *lingua franca* and French the distinguished one with,
then, international flavour, though certainly less practiced than some
Smyrniots pretended. Turkish too was also a major language, especially in the
bazaars and as soon as relations with the *hinterland* was necessary. Turkish
in Smyrna was rather a male language, associated with the world of econo-
mic necessities, and of course with the *vilayet* administration. Continuity with
the Balkans in this regard may be a reasonable hypothesis (Lory, 1997).
Greek authors who would take into account the Turkish aspects of former
Ottoman Smyrna are seldom, but do exist: «Smyrna, despite its Hellenic and
European population, was in its general type a large Turkish city. Narrow
streets, the so-called *sokak*, covered with *kaldırım*, and some wider, the so-
called *phardya sokakia*, covered with flat stones. There were not so few
phardya sokakia within Smyrna and they all bore without exception Helle-
nic and Christian names: Hayias Ekaterinis, Hayiou Tryphônos, Hayiou Di-
mitriou, Hayiou Stephanou in the Armenian Quarter, Evangelistrias»[11]. They
too are to be taken into consideration.

In Diyarbakır, the Greek language was an alien element, though slightly
present at the Greek Orthodox school and mostly used as a sacral language
at church, but beside others according to refugees' testimonies: «Meletios was
a speaker of Arabic and in the church he celebrated in Arabic. The only
Greek words which he used to say in the church were *Ειρήνη Πάσι*. I re-
member that well and I think I can still hear him saying that with his heavy

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1887: «Among the welcoming committee, there were even the official representatives of the
city's other Christian nations. […] Business had ceased in the market and the shops of (all) the
Christians were closed» (MGOUNT [1950]: 202).

[10]   Étienne FOUILLOUX, «Les chrétiens d'Orient menacés », in: Jean-Marie MAYEUR *ET AL.* (EDS.),
Histoire du christianisme des origines à nos jours, vol. 13: Guerres mondiales et totalitarismes
(1914-1958), Paris: Desclée-Fayard, 1990, 3rd part. The Russian influence on and the ideological
Arabization process of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch is mentioned in pp. 768 and 824.
The sources used for this paper never enable readers to include Diyarbakır as a whole in those
processes.

[11]   ΒΑΛΤΙΔΟΥ (1965): 13.

pronunciation»[12]. Living languages were Turkish, Armenian in its local dialect[13], Kurdish but also Arabic, which were the most used ones. Christians did not make any exception but took part in the local and well-shared multilingualism. Petros Yeôrgopoulos, the author of typescripts about the Lands of the Tigris River, was himself a former teacher of Ottoman Turkish at the local Orthodox school. But Armenian too was a major communicative tool in the Diyarbakır region, Armenians accounting for one third of the urban population[14], while the same language was only of limited practical use in Smyrna. Arabic was almost non-existent in Smyrna, like modern forms of Aramaic, in spite of the presence of a tiny Melkite community.

The visual cultures of the two cities made them very different places. Smyrna was an open city on the Mediterranean Sea. It is known by the panorama one had of the city arriving from the sea but also for the general view of the bay from the neighbouring hills (Mount Pagus or Kadifekale). The image of Smyrna for the outside world was one of openness. To some extent, it was the image of Smyrna's inhabitants themselves, most often silencing the existence of less airy neighbourhoods, occupied by people of any creed. On the contrary, Diyarbakır was a closed city, surrounded by walls made out of black stone. One could get out only through four gates. Social

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[12]   Centre for Asia Minor Studies [CAMS] (Athens), Archive of the Oral Tradition (AOT), File Diyarbakır (ChT 2), "Ecclesiastical organization", interview of Christos Papadopoulos (born in 1901 in Diyarbakır, considered as a good informant, remembering many things in 1956) by Eleni Gazi, on January 1st, 1965, in Athens.

[13]   A racist assessment of this dialect is to be found in MGOUNT (1950): 453, according to which less than half of the vocabulary used was in fact Armenian and the situation is seen as a decaying process because of the Ottoman Turkish sovereignty and the constant links, economic but also matrimonial, with non Armenian Christians in the region. Supposedly Armenians from elsewhere were not able to understand this dialect, a not all too rare situation since the standard Western Armenian language was defined in Constantinople and not on any Armenian soil. The general tone of this short text following a vocabulary list is that of ethno-nationalism: «For example, languages are likely to change in urban contexts through multiplied contacts, as an appreciation about Diyarbakır reminds us: "During centuries, the Armenian population in Amida underwent constant changes. Trade and submission conditions in favour of the dominant element compelled Armenians to often use its language, with which common Turkish words turned usual in our daily conversation; apart from that, one has to add trade-, neighbourhood- and sometimes even marriage-links with non Armenian but Christian nations and here we have a provincial dialect, of which not even the half bore an Armenian character; in addition, a plain pronunciation gave it its major characteristic. Uttering only a short sentence is sufficient, whatever one's degree of Armenian literacy, and the person talking immediately reveals his / her origin from Amida. And if it happens that two Armenian women talk together, an Armenian from elsewhere will not understand a word"» (MGOUNT, 1950).

[14]   KATVALIAN (1977) and GHAZARIAN (1977): 375-377.

room found an extension on the roofs of Diyarbakır, where all families of any creed, who spent summer nights, protected from other people's glances by white sheets used as protection screens, quite much the way Aleppo experienced it until the fifties as refugees expressed in their testimonies years later: «On summer nights, whole families slept outside on the *dami* [roof] of the house»[15]. The memory of sceneries of the left behind places diverges greatly in both cases. This divergence stresses the proclaimed higher openness of Smyrna, possibly shared by a high number of inhabitants of any creed.

While Smyrna counted approximately 300.000 inhabitants at the turn of the century, Diyarbakır had only 30.000. The social control was of a different nature in the two locations. At least in some portions of Smyrna, anonymity was possible. (Orthodox) Christians were a majority in *Gâvur İzmir*, while they were a minority in Diyarbakır (some 60 families, approximately 300 or 400 people). The quantity did influence the quality of the coexistence. The general tune was not determined by similar groups in the two cities: Diyarbakır was never covered by Hellenic or Armenian flags. Smyrna was a major transportation hub and one of the integration gates of the Ottoman Empire in the world-wide capitalist system (Frangakis-Syrett, 1992). Diyarbakır was a more self-centred, active on the continental commercial roads with links to Persia, Mesopotamia, and especially the Arab lands in general. It had less direct business-contacts with the outside world.

Hence the two cities under scrutiny were very different. Although both diverse and plural, they displayed distinct atmospheres and diverging local accommodations between groups in space and time, without synchrony despite the same central government and the same valid legal dispositions. In fact, Diyarbakir was deprived of Western influence. It was a "more Ottoman" city, an inner city, whose geographical position has only slightly changed since then and no border city like Smyrna had turned in 1913, it had no other horizon than the Ottoman lands, the next foreign independent countries being at that time the Persian and the more remote Russian empires. Cosmopolitanism does not therefore strictly apply to Diyarbakir. This is puzzling though, because by doing so the human diversity of such places is underrated, which is not what social sciences have to be about. One must recognize that there was a racist touch about the cosmopolitan air, some city-dwellers at places like Smyrna would take pride in, as if local and indigenous groups were less promising, challenging, possibly enriching by any means than port cities.

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[15]   CAMS, AOT, ChT 2, "Climate", interview of Damianos Papadopoulos (born in 18 in Argana Maden, considered as a good informant) by Eleni Gazi on January 25th, 1965, in Athens.

Social structures were different in the two cities. Tribal Kurds dominated the surroundings of Diyarbakır, more than ever after the Armenian peasants were erased in 1915. As far as sources allow for interpretation, any person had to fit in the hierarchical structure established in the neighbourhood that is being submitted to or protected by a local *derebey*. In the Smyrna area, though hierarchies were certainly of importance, it did not have the feudal-like traits of the Diyarbakır region. In Smyrna, individuals and wealthy families had social control on others. These qualities could be acquired by capitalist activities and liberal education. The nature of social hierarchies was submitted to different criteria in the two different places.

2.- Religious Groups in Urban Settings

Though Greek Orthodox, Jews, Armenians, and of course Muslim Turkish speakers were present in both cities, what was common to people living in so different places but a same name that established a fuzzy brotherhood across the distances? Whatever the difficulty of accounting for the comparability of the two urban contexts, one has to admit that religious groups are sustained by a strongly legitimate discourse, "Holy Scripts", that regulates the relation between true mankind and God. It establishes sameness among believers and regulates otherness in the overall state-sustained Muslim framework (Krämer, 2006): the '*umma* defined by the Koran, Christianity by the New Testament and Judaism by the Torah functioned with the same written canons, whatever the place. The discourse could minor the differences within the one experienced religious group: the word "Christian" in narratives from Diyarbakır clearly refers to any form of Christianity, while in Western Asia Minor it was likely to designate Greek Orthodox people only. It seems that Christianity was once perceived, until the end in Diyarbakır, the same way as today in Aleppo or Beirut, as a comprehensive label, while the Ottoman Greek Orthodox group embarked upon the process of Hellenization, tended to use the word in a more restrictive way, excluding non Orthodox from their group.

The permanence of religious discourses emphasizing borders and their empire-wide politicization in the 19th century prepared for confrontations. It is naive to idealize the functioning of a sacral, almost theocratic Ottoman society. Today's consumption trends, both in Greece and Turkey, promote images and sounds of the allegedly colourful and flavoursome Ottoman past and these may distort historians' approach. The two phenomena, co-existence

and outbursts of violence, constituted a *continuum* in the Ottoman society, though 1908 is quoted by all witnesses as the watershed. Smyrna's own Greek Orthodox Archbishop experienced the landing of Hellenic troops on May, 15th 1919 as a divine fulfilment. The tensions in Diyarbakır were partly imported from Constantinople: the Hamidian massacres of the mid-1890s and the persecutions of local Greek Orthodox and other Christian denominations, to the extent of almost annihilation in the Armenian case[16]. Interestingly even Orthodox Christians would agree on the radical "treatment" of the Armenians. Was Turkish nationalism really an imported product in Diyarbakır, while Ziya Gökalp, said to be of Kurdish descent, was a native of this city?

According to the sources from below selected for this paper, the major shift in relation between Muslims and non Muslims is located in 1908. Few, if any, witnesses quote the second constitutional period otherwise than the real beginning of the end. Bewildering enough, the abolition of the lower legal status of *zimmi* as it is defined both by the *Kuran*, and the Muslim Turkish social practice which was timidly initiated in 1839 in the *Gülhane* Imperial Edict, precised in the *Hatt-ı Hümayun* or Imperial Rescript of Reform in 1856 and twice most officially anchored in the *Meşrutiyet* authored by Mithat Paşa and Krikor Odian in 1876, suspended two years later by the Padişah Abdülhamit II, and finally reinforced by the Young Turkish coup in 1908, had a major negative impact on the practical status of non Muslims in the Ottoman empire. In fact, organizing an integrative hierarchy proved more protective for the Non-Muslims that proclaiming equality under the law without social support of the majority, and deprived of cultural legitimacy because of its religious incongruity (Heyberger, 2003)[17]. The sheer fact that legal equality had to be reasserted on so many occasions clearly indicates how little practical implementation those new arrangements decided in Constantinople found in the Ottoman domains outside of port cities, that lived under the control and within the then Great Powers' sphere of economic interests. The parliamentary elections held from 1908 onwards made it clear that Christians could have found a powerful legal tool to voice their opinions because of their more vivid corporate culture and finally gain more power, had they taken place without illegal pressures. The diffuse threat to the old anthro-

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[16]   Mgrdich Margosyan's literary production bears testimony of the remaining Armenian presence in republican Diyarbakır. Տիգրիս Ափերէն [*From the Banks of the River Tigris*], Istanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 1999.

[17]   Bernard HEYBERGER (ED.), *Chrétiens du monde arabe, Un archipel en terre d'Islam*, Paris: Autrement, 2003, p. 17.

pological system granting Muslims a higher social and symbolic position could not be accepted (Georgelin, 2005)[18]. Ottoman Muslim politicians and local notables saw the Eastern *vilayet* but also the Ægean coastline less firmly Ottoman than before. In the episodes of violence that occurred at different times in the two regions, the firm belief, though partly artificially created and nurtured, that the Muslim *ümmet* was endangered was a powerful incentives for perpetrators. The First World War times annulled the principle of legal equality in Diyarbakır and since no foreign occupation menaced local leaders, survival for non Muslim there was a matter of personal talent and chance in keeping a low enough profile and finding the right protection. The context of the Hellenic Administration and of the Greek-Turkish War in the West legitimated cruelty towards civilians in 1922 and in the following months. Equality before the law as well as secularization could be accepted and even approved by segments of the remaining population, once the non Muslims were reduced to political and economic insignificance.

The differences between various religious groups did not impede the sharing of a social environment, of social codes, clothing codes, and even intermarriages, though they certainly were not the favourite ones, even in Smyrna (Georgelin, 2007). People went to the same places if they could afford studying: first to Constantinople, and then to the Western countries with a preference for France and Germany, and possibly to Russia[19]. Getting access to the learned culture of one's ascribed group was a major contributing factor inviting to the cult of national unity: the belief in the existence of one Armenian nation, one language to be known, in spite of the dialect used on the spot and the existence of other languages similarly used in the real context. Nationalist texts like that of Dikran Mgount –unintentionally– prove that discrepancy. One standardized folk culture was to be honoured, while Ottoman experienced social life was quite the opposite. Greek had no social existence in Diyarbakır, unless one knew it, because of some ancestors, who had migrated from the Black Sea region, of formal education, or of religious duties. It was still certainly not the same language known in the three cases. A one label was worshipped: "Greek language", which had little reality and no homogeneity in Diyarbakır.

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18   Georgelin (2005): X, 174 ff.
19   The itinerary of the Boyajian family, from Diayarbakır, who was closely linked to the setting up of the Ottoman Protestant *millet* is revealing in that respect, Constantinople and London were major locations where education, inspiration and resources could be found (Mgount [1950]: 325ff).

Smyrna was a protected place after the Hellenic independence. Safety was especially established in the city itself, while the outskirts experienced endemic brigandage. In Smyrna, some Greek Orthodox would be bold enough to publicly utter their political divergence with the local authorities. It was a place where demonstrations and strikes could peacefully take place. It was a vivid urban society with a blossoming of associations, reinforced by the restoration of the Ottoman constitution in 1908. Needless to say, demonstrations were not part of everyday life in Upper Mesopotamia. The difficult political adaptation of Inner Anatolians in Greece made it clear in retrospect that authority was not to be discussed in the former place of residence. The obviously authoritarian traits of the Armenian political life in Syria and Lebanon until today function in a same way. Rather than divisions along collective religious lines, one can perceive regional differences in the political culture.

3.- Ottoman Territory and Urban Groups

The Ottoman space was no motionless fortress. This was no place where people developed roots like immobile trees. Whatever the discourses about autochthony, contemporary or developed in retrospect, populations were moving around from one city to the other and from one region to the other. The irony of these social and geographic phenomena was that they affected populations, that did not perceive themselves as nomads and would strongly differentiate themselves from neighbouring populations with an openly nomadic way of life. Speaking of Diyarbakır means speaking about the other places where people went to do business or study, and even emigrated to: Aleppo, Mosul, Erzurum, Constantinople, Urfa, Dasmascus and Antioch in the Orthodox case, Van and Echmiadzin in the Armenian Apostolic one. Exchangees bore testimony of that now extinct human geography: «The trade of Diayarbakır, imports and exports, took place with Syria and mainly Aleppo. From there, sugar, coffee, tea, petroleum, matches, stuffs, and other luxury articles, items made out of glass, etc., would come. The main product of Diyarbakır, silk, would go to Aleppo. That was the great trade, wholesale trade as they used to say. The small transactions took place with the Kurdish and Armenian villages in the region»[20]. Even villagers, even female villagers

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[20]   CAMS, AOT, ChT 2, "Elements of Economy. Relations and Exchanges", interview of Damianos Papadopoulos by Eleni Gazi, on February 1st, 1965, in Athens.

had an idea at least about the archbishop's sea, the most famous places of pilgrimage or the next larger market places, the places to which men emigrated, from which they got money, possibly letters and eventually an invitation.

The same is to be said about Smyrna. Greek Orthodox in Smyrna knew that their own direct forefathers had come from another places, even if in the same time the discourse about the Hellenic character of the spot stressed the millennium-long continuity of the Greek presence there, re-arranging history, like a "Zambelian" gesture, to bridge the post-Byzantine absence of Orthodox people in the region (Koubourlis, 2005). Smyrna's people were the connected Ottomans with overseas if any in the Ottoman Empire. Sea roads reached until the United States whose economic and cultural presence was a major fact in the late Ottoman Empire. Land roads were getting quicker: railways were developed from the middle of the 19th century. Caravans of dromedaries related the sea port with inner places in Anatolia. Were the patterns the same for all groups? Possibly not. Sources in Armenian and Greek always stress the fact that Christians were first in move. Muslim were said to migrate less easily. But there were special experiences of Muslim mobility: because of new postings in the imperial civil service, new appointments in the army, new settlements of *muhacir*s, and migrations of Kurds or Turks caused by the Russian army's advance and to some extent organized by the Ottoman State.

4.- (Ottoman) Cities and Diversity

Cities produce diversities, various people are likely to converge to a city and once within the city they are likely to produce new differences. This constant urban mobility causes the suspicion of nationalists towards cities, perceived as alien to "authentic" human existence, denaturalizing people (Mattenklott, 1997). New-comers are not the same as former city-dwellers. Orthodox Christians in Diyarbakır were not the same in 1914 and in 1924. As Uğur Üngör put it, the upheaval concerned all Christians: «By autumn 1915, the Christian population of Diayarbekir province was thoroughly disposed, deported, and critically reduced in numbers»[21]. The number of Armenians in this city fell dramatically in the same period, because of the "ethnic engineering" which took place (Dündar, 2006).

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[21] Üngör (2005): 63.

Even in less tense periods, the same phenomena can be observed. The Armenian population of Smyrna remained at some 6.000 to 8.000 people during the 19th century. This stability is delusive though. People emigrated from Smyrna, while others were migrating first for seasonal work, *gurbet*, and then on a more stable basis from inner provinces. Marriages into more attractive groups would also decrease the number of Apostolic Armenians. Urban populations are likely to be changing ones, putting in question the relationship between unstable groups.

One-faith-only, or one-religious-ascription-only places are unlikely to exist in larger urban contexts, in absence of strict regulations. In Smyrna the neighbourhood called in Greek *Armeniá*, and Հայինգ in Armenian, was not inhabited only by Armenian Apostolic Christians but by Greek Orthodox and Jews too, while Armenians were to be found elsewhere in the urban fabrics. The neighbourhood was however the place where collective equipments and institutions were concentrated and during day-time, some Armenian children would converge to this place down town to attend Armenian schools. Moreover the main Armenian Apostolic church, Սուրբ Ստեփանոս, was located at the heart of the district and had therefore a symbolic centrality which happened to be central too in geographic terms, allotting a city-wide visibility to the rather small urban group. In the same way, place names, grossly ascribing whole neighbourhoods to one group, blurred many religious groups in Smyrna, which as a result went almost unnoticed like Shiite Muslims or Melkite Christians, not to mention atheists or persons indifferent to religion, belonging to a liberal bourgeoisie, close to the Freemasonry, that had a vibrant existence in Smyrna.

Groups interacted on a daily basis in the economic sphere. It should be noted that in the late Ottoman history, groups were associated, symbolically and often practically, with some domains of human activity. That was an ominous symbolic association, which would entail a radical ethnicization of social and economic relations. Class conflicts were experienced as ethno-religious struggle in the late decennials of the Empire. Armenians in the Diyarbakır region were famous cultivators. Greek Orthodox in the city were craftsmen, business-men and were renowned, in a well-founded manner or not, for their affluence. The Muslim population was said to be indifferent or maintained out of lucrative occupations. According to informants of the CAMS, «Αρμένιοι και Σύροι κυρίως τις είχανε και κάνανε το εμπόριο του μεταξιού» («Armenians and Syrians owned [the mulberries] and traded silk»). Because of their larger number in Smyrna, Greek Orthodox were present at every level of the social ladder. Nevertheless they were perceived as an affluent group

by the other groups. Armenians in Smyrna were perceived as an affluent group, while social differences were to be observed within the group.

The logics of distinction, in a Mediterranean world where displayed appearances were of utmost importance, affected the religious division among Smyrna's inhabitants (Georgelin, 2005). A common admiration for similar standards went across denominations lines: speaking or ignoring French, wearing Western clothes or not, and being informed about political issues in the Empire and in the outside world. In the other *modus*, celebrating the fourteenth of July, or the impressive Orthodox Easter liturgy, taking part in the *ramazan* evenings were public statements of one's activities, social status, political aspirations, and presence in the urban fabrics. On such occasions, taking part in the others' religious life was, to some limited extent, possible and even foreseen by local codes.

That was especially the case if higher authority embodying (Christian) Orthodoxy was absent, as in the surroundings of Diyarbakır: Orthodox villagers at Bakos would mourn according to the local Muslim ways in order to honour the Kurdish *derebey* in power, whose son had passed away[22]. Temporary collective conversations even occurred during the Hamidian massacres, to be reversed once order was restored, again with the support of the local Muslim *derebey*s. In Smyrna, individual cases may be found such as that of a Turkish boy who could attend the local Greek Orthodox school in the region of Smyrna and would have to learn Orthodox prayers at school, as part of the education, quite to the amusement of the Greek Orthodox monographer reporting about the phenomenon. Knowing about the others' festivals and showing friendly disposition on those occasions were a basic social process of maintaining social coherence on a modest level.

5.- DESTROYING PLURALITY

Open violence terminated the existence of both plural Ottoman cities, Smyrna and Diyarbakır. However, this took place neither in the same time nor in the same forms. While Diyarbakır and even more its surroundings were renowned for their daily roughness and the strained relations between

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[22]   Π. ΓΕΩΡΓΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ (1965): 22-23.
[23]   The change in the human geography cannot be overemphasized. Today's Turkey is not the Ottoman empire: «the exodus of Asia Minor Greeks deprives the Patriarchate in Constantinople of most of its flock» (p. 750), «massive extermination and the survivors' exile reduced to almost nothing the Armenian community of Turkey» (p. 766).

Muslims and non Muslims, Smyrna and its *hinterland* were considered in late imperial times as one of the most peaceful places (Mayeur et al., 1990)[23].

Diyarbakır was one of the hardest hit cities already between 1894 and 1896 when collective violence, supported by the local governments and armed forces, targeted whole Armenian populations. Western reports and local Armenian and Orthodox narratives are plentiful and mutually coherent for their most part. Some 2.000 to 3.000 people died and hundreds of shops were destroyed in November1895. Neighboring villages, for instance Alibunar and Kıtırbıl, were looted and Armenian inhabitants assassinated, churches turning in places of collective assassination by fire (Jongerden, Mgount [1950])[24]. Groups were targeted as religious entities. The outburst of violence in Diyarbakır was experienced and interpreted along religious lines. Religion was invoked to galvanize perpetrators. During an attack, Kurds and Turks alike shouted the *salvatı*, a prayer in honor of the Prophet of Islam and its descendents, to gain more momentum (Mgount [1950]: 216).

Collective retaliations, sustained by the *vali* and the military commander, targeted the Armenian group for the political activities of some younger males who loudly supported the perspective of political reforms for the six Eastern *vilayet*s with a substantial Armenian population, as the French Consul suggested in his dispatch: «The news that the reforms had been accepted produced much uproar among local Muslims»[25]. Questioning the social order dividing between the rulers and the ruled (called derogatively *gâvur* in Turkish but also *fıllah* in Kurdish, which describes precisely the socio-economic role of Armenians in those areas as peasants, that is the original meaning of the word in Arabic) was not legitimate for many Muslims neither in Diyarbakır, nor elsewhere in more "advanced" Ottoman centers, be it in the form of overall reform edicts or in that of local guaranties for a greater Armenian autonomy on a determined territorial base. Yet, most cases of massacres, the ones who experienced a narrow escape could do so thanks to members of the other group, who in some way defected from their sphere of allegiance and established for some time an individual perception of the desperate situation others were confronted with: «Around noon, the crowd came to our quarter in order to attack our house; two noble-hearted and Armenian-

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[24]   «In the city: 2.000 Christians massacred during the days of the events; 1.500 Christians wounded of whom approximately 1.000 died or remained infirm» (Armenia, issue n° 54-55-56, 8-12-15 February 1896, quoted in Dikran MGOUNT [1950]: 222).

[25]   Diplomatic dispatch of Gustave Meyrier, consul of France in Diyarbakır, to Paul Cambon, ambassador of France in Constantinople, on October 30th, 1895: «La nouvelle que les réformes sont acceptées a produit une grande excitation parmi les musulmans» (MEYRIER: 82).

friendly Turkish neighbors, Şakir effendi and an old man who was the head of the Post Office (*posta müdürü*, whose name I don't remember), they ordered us to open our door [...] they commanded the crowd which was following them to go away»[26]. Even if such occurrences are quoted as *captatio benevolentiæ*, the phenomenon is worth being stated as such. Traces of such behavior bring nuances in the main narrative, though do they suffice to revise it in a politically more comfortable way? On the contrary, Smyrna did not experience any trouble in that time. There were no Hamidian regiments in Smyrna either. Locals perceived only echoes and consequences, sometimes in the form of Armenian deportees, refugees and orphans reaching the Ægean city. The American but also German orphanages at Smyrna retained the traces of the inner Anatolian crisis of 1894-1896 for decades.

Smyrna was relatively spared during World War I, neither experiencing massive deportations of Greek Orthodox, who were targeted on the coastline by the CUP government. The near-by settlement of Vourla / Urla was emptied during the conflict. It did not see the deportation or murders that Armenians elsewhere in the Empire had to go through, in such close areas as Bursa / Broussa and Tekirdağ / Rodosto, for instance. The role of the powerful *vali*, Rahmi bey, possibly resisting orders from the capital for personal reasons, made all the difference (Georgelin [2002]: 380). Most inhabitants of the city could live the surface demise of the Committee Union and Progress and the Armistice of Moudros, on October 30, 1918, although trust would prove impossible to re-establish between the new Ottoman government and the non-Muslim majority in the city. That was not the case of Diyarbakır which was a ravaged city in 1918, deprived of its Armenian population and most of its Christian population, with a few individual exceptions only. The centrally decided destruction of the non Muslim presence, and the zealous implementation by the local governor, Dr. Mehmet Reşit, of this political scheme had violently reshaped the city. As a result, Diyarbakır was dramatically impoverished[27], while Smyrna could resume, to a large extent, its activities and even function as a base for relief actions for Ottoman Christians trying to restart a normal life in the defeated Empire.

The final destruction of Smyrna occurred in 1922. Though the context was not that of Diyarbakır's, the result was the same for the port-city too: non-Muslims were either robbed and slaughtered after the arrival of the Tur-

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[26]   MGOUNT (1950): 227.
[27]   «War and genocide had destroyed the very economic fabric of Diyarbekir» (ÜNGÖR [2005]: 94).

kish nationalist troops or massively expelled after the city was burnt down, while valid males had to stay to reconstruct the areas that the Hellenic armies left behind in Western Asia Minor. Smyrna was destroyed and its population changed within a few weeks: the privileged peaceful atmosphere only maintained the illusion of a possible continuation of the Ottoman *modus vivendi* after the Great War.

It may be argued that if the latter city had remained under Hellenic administration, its Hellenization would have made life for non Greek Orthodox people difficult or impossible. It may not be within the task of historians to concentrate on possibilities though. Still, the case of Thessaloniki does not give the Hellenic State of the Hellenic population credit for a special dedication to religious plurality. As far as Smyrna and Thessaloniki are concerned, the principle of a population exchange had indeed already firmly established itself in the minds of Eleftherios Venizelos and the Turkish Ottoman élite after the Balkan Wars. Both states were against the religiously plural *status quo*, that people knew how to maintain in their daily life, whatever its precarious and discriminatory character, especially so in the Ottoman East for non Muslims.

Smyrna and Diayarbakır are legitimate terms of comparison, though even the search for legitimacy accounting for a comparison has already been questioned (Détienne, 2000), in order to counter almost autistic specialization in social sciences, especially historiography[28]. Both Smyrna and Diyarbakır were cities of importance, despite their different sizes, at local and imperial levels. And they were remarkable for an outsider because they used to be shelter for population groups that did not always, through their daily but also life-long activities, share the same religious beliefs and practices, linguistic norms and fluencies, and last but not least experiences of space. There were differences between the cities though. The social climate was rougher in Diyarbakır and the progressive abolition of the *Şeriat* as far as the hierarchy between Muslims and non-Muslims were concerned was never accepted in the local social practice. While Smyrna was known throughout the Empire as *Gâvur İzmir*, such an adjective would have been incongruous in Diyarbakır, despite the high percentage of Christians in both the urban and rural populations. The outbursts of violence that destroyed the late Ottoman social equilibrium took place at different times in the two locations. While Diyarbakır was a major place where Hamidian massacres took place, Smyrna remained a safe place for non Muslims, even turning into a refuge for orphans from inner pro-

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[28]   Marcel Detienne, *Comparer l'incomparable*, Paris: Seuil, 2000.

vinces, through the numerous charitable organizations at home in the port city. While Diyarbakır experienced the fiercest form of demographic engineering in the war time, Smyrna itself –not its surroundings though, like Ayvalık / Kydonies or the Çeşme / Erythrea peninsula– remained relatively spared. The defeat of the Hellenic troops in September 1922 was followed by the expulsion of the Greek Orthodox population, the slaughter of all Armenians identified as such and the destruction of the material basis of its semi-colonial economy that triggered off the emigration of most Western passport holders. While remaining Orthodox Christians could be "exchanged" in 1924 in Diyarbakır, and a tiny Armenian Apostolic community survived there in the first years of the Turkish Republic, Smyrna was definitely cleansed of undesirable *Rum* and *Ermeni* at the end of 1922.

6.- FURTHER QUESTIONS

The religious nature of collective self-definitions, expressed when needed, was a potential basis for nationalist and possibly secular developments. The other groups in the two cities, Muslims and Jews in their heterogeneity, would deserve more attention when researching this process. Whether a "functioning system" or not (certainly too mechanistic a wording), one has to admit that a dynamic balance existed among religious groups in the late Ottoman empire. This dynamic was made of tensions and power relations. The social balance did not take the same forms in inner as in coastal cities, which is evidenced by the examples of Diyarbakır and Smyrna. The local situations were progressively integrated in overall discourses that would eventually radicalize existing tensions, with different consequences due to geopolitics.

The frailty of the late Ottoman "balance" is to be underlined. It should prevent today's researchers to simplify, in a positive or a negative way, the late Ottoman society but also the present heir-societies seen as "solutions" to problems that could have been defined and faced in different ways. The treatment of Ottoman Armenians from 1915 onwards, the destruction of *Gâvur İzmir*, and the compulsory Exchange of populations of Lausanne in 1923 were not ineluctable outputs of Ottoman history. The articulation of locally fuelled hatred and imported political radicalisms, wrapped in locally easily understandable religious slogans, deserves further attention (Kévorkian, 2006). It is questionable whether the dynamics of cohabitation are the same in other diverse cities of the same "intermediate region" (*Μέση περιοχή*), as

Dimitris Kitsikis put it, like Constantinople, Damascus, Beirut or Odessa, which had similarities with the two poles of religious diversity just scrutinized above.

Hervé GEORGELIN

117, route de Maisons
78 400 CHATOU (France)
hgeorgelin@gmail.com

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APPENDIX

1. Diyarbakır. Armenian language as seen by an Armenian nationalist (D. MGOUNT [1950]: 452-452)[29].

    «During centuries, the Armenian population in Amida underwent constant changes. Trade and submission conditions in favour of the dominant element compelled Armenians to often use its language, with which common Turkish words turned usual in our daily conversation; apart from that, one has to add trade-, neighbourhood- and sometimes even marriage-links with non Armenian but Christian nations and here we have a provincial dialect, of which not even the half bore an Armenian character; in addition, a plain pronunciation gave it its major characteristic. Uttering only a short sentence is sufficient, whatever one's degree of Armenian literacy, and the person talking immediately reveals his / her origin from Amida. And if it happens that two Armenian women talk together, an Armenian from elsewhere will not understand a word». [Short comment: Living side-by-side was poisonous for the national self. The Armenian language should not be divided in dialects and words or sounds deemed foreign have to be expurgated. Diyarbakır is in Armenia, its proper name is Amida. The document provides us with information not only about social life on the shores of the River Tigris but also about how Armenian nationalism reshapes and interprets the plural Ottoman past, that is history of Ottoman Armenians too. People in the situation were unlikely to have felt such an aversion to their immediate environment].

2. The European War and its impact in Diyarbakır for an Orthodox teacher of Ottoman Turkish (Π. ΓΕΩΡΓΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ [1965]: 33f)[30].

    «We came back to Diyarbakır for the school year start. Before our arrival, the Turks had set the market on fire. The shops, in their majority, belonged to Christians (6 August 1914). In our town, the market was in the centre of the city and there were no houses where families would live, and for that reason, there was no casualty […] Later one day, by chance, I met the Education Secretary General in the market and he friendly greeted me and he soon told me these following words: "we have put you on the list of exempted.

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[29]   Our own translation from Western Armenian into English.
[30]   Our own translation from Modern Greek into English.

That means that we won't mobilise you and therefore since the schools won't function during war-time, you may go and work in any business until the war is over"». [Short comment: Violence was a major trait of Ottoman late history much more so and earlier in Inner Anatolia than in Constantinople or Smyrna. The religious divides had an impact on the repartition of economic roles, which was redesigned from 1913 onwards in order to create a "Millî İktisat" (national economy), by dispossessing non Muslims. Personal links existed though, strengthened by a common high command of Ottoman Turkish, like those between the school-teacher and the Ottoman civil servant, and could happily ease tensions for some individuals whose ascribed group was especially targeted].

3. Informant about Diyarbakır selected by the Centre for Asia Minor Studies, Athens, Lands of the River Tigris, file "XT 2"[31].

Diyarbakır, Region of Diyarbakır
CAMS: Heleni Karatza
29 November 1956
Papadopoulos Christos

Informant's Identification Note

«Christos Papadopoulos was born in Diyarbakır in 1901. His father worked as a schoolteacher and was then ordained a priest. He went to the Hellenic primary school of Diyarbakır and to the Turkish high-school. He speaks Greek well. There, he used to speak Arabic and Pontic Greek too, because he lived in Argana Maden for a while. He left with the [Compulsory Population] Exchange in 1924. He remembers a lot of things and seems to be a co-operative informant. He used to be an employee in a Turkish trading company. He works here together with his brother in a stationery- and book-shop at Davaki Street 73». [Short comment: The informant interviewed belonged to a privileged cultural elite (strongly combining knowledge and religious background) which could adapt smoothly to Greece, thanks to his knowledge of Modern Greek. His language skills reveal the plural social life in Inner Anatolia, very different from the Helladic normalcy. Like many Greek

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[31]   Our own translation from Modern Greek into English.

Orthodox from Inner Anatolia, he was exchanged and not violently expelled and had to bear the consequences for the Exchange, although no military action or imperative on the spot could account for it. Heleni Karatza's tone is empathetic towards the interviewee. She is ready to report the complex aspects of the informants' biography].

4. Unexpected sides of Smyrna, as revealed by a literary author (Βαλτιδου [1965])[32].

[p. 9] «We used to call the Hellenes' children, over there in Smyrna, *Rômnakia*. Smyrna was a city with numerous groups of children: *Rômnakia* and *Armenakia. Phrangakia* and *Evraigakia. Tourkakia* and *Youroukakia* and even *Mantzourakia*. All, until today, are strolling over there like ants. All of them but the *Rômnakia* and the *Armenakia*, the unfortunate. The remnants of that great destruction (*της μεγάλης καταστροφής*) were transferred to Greece as if they were merchandise» [Short comment: Smyrna's plural population was a given, locals would not dare denying. There was neither a Christian nor a Muslim homogeneous group. The author tried to encompass all groups with the same affection (suggested by the suffix *-akia*) in her memorial text but she immediately added that history had not treated all groups the same way. Coming to Greece is negatively connoted].

[p. 13] «Smyrna, despite its Hellenic and European population, was in its general type a large Turkish city. Narrow streets, the so-called *sokak*, covered with *kaldırım*, and some wider, the so-called *phardya sokakia*, covered with flat stones. There were not so few *phardya sokakia* within Smyrna and they all bore without exception Hellenic and Christian names: Hayias Ekaterinis, Hayiou Tryphônos, Hayiou Dimitriou, Hayiou Stephanou in the Armenian Quarter, Evangelistrias» [Short comment: The author is hard put to it, when she has to qualify her birthplace according to national categories, as if those were not efficient enough to describe it. Religious names are a safer marker of ascription and places with a Christian character were likely to have a more modern aspect in her memory. But what about the Ottoman administrative centre and its obvious urban modernity (*konak*, barracks, etc.)?]

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[32]   Our own translation from Modern Greek into English.