Introduction

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In March 2004, under the general auspices of the Spanish Society of Analytic Philosophy (SEFA), the Department of Philosophy at the University of Murcia hosted a three-day workshop on the philosophy of John McDowell. This issue of **teorema** publishes the papers presented at the workshop, together with responses to each paper, speficically written for this issue by John McDowell. In addition, John McDowell has contributed a previously unpublished article.

A local team including Manuel Hernández Iglesias, Francisco Calvo Garzón, and Ángel García Rodríguez, led the organization of the workshop; but many other individuals and institutions provided necessary help. Special thanks are due, in the first place, to all participants in the workshop, particularly those who contributed papers for discussion. Among them, special acknowledgement must be made to John McDowell for his generous engagement in discussion with the other speakers. Thanks also go to the members of the scientific committee involved in the selection of the papers presented at the workshop: Juan José Acero, Josep Corbí, Tobies Grimaltos, Josep Macià, Daniel Quesada, Luis Valdés-Villanueva, and José Luis Zalabardo. On the institutional side, formal acknowledgement and gratitude must go to the following bodies. They are the *Fundación Cajamurcia*, both for the use of their premises and for liberal financial support; the *Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia*, for awarding a special grant (*acción especial BFF 2002-11610-E*) to help finance the event; and the University of Murcia, for further help with financing the workshop.

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The rest of this introduction will attempt to provide the background to the papers published here, paying special attention to those aspects of John McDowell's philosophy with which authors engage in their papers. Readers sufficiently familiar with the breadth and depth of the philosophy of John McDowell should simply skip the introduction, and move directly to the papers, and the subsequent responses.

In his article "The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument", John McDowell discusses the traditional problem of scepticism about the external world; or more precisely, the possibility of acquiring knowledge about the external world *through perception*. Arguments to the effect that something is a condition of possibility for thought or experience can be labelled, in Kantian spirit, "transcendental". Recent analytic philosophy has been particularly concerned with the nature and anti-sceptical power of such arguments. Thus, it has become commonplace to distinguish between the following two types: one, ambitious transcendental arguments, to the effect that the world *must be* a certain way as a condition of thought or experience; two, modest transcendental arguments, to the effect that the world must be *conceived* to be a certain way as a condition of thought or experience. It has also become commonplace to note their different anti-sceptical power: ambitious transcendental arguments would prove the falsity of the traditional sceptical claim that there is no external world; whereas the conclusion of modest transcendental arguments would be compatible, for all we can (or must) conceive, with the non-existence of an external world. However, this has not led to a general endorsement of ambitious transcendental arguments, for as Barry Stroud has persuasively argued, they crucially involve independently problematic anti-realist premises allowing the move from how our thought or experience in fact is, to how the world *must* be. For this reason, it has been widely accepted that a modest conclusion might well be all we can hope for in a transcendental strategy against scepticism.

In his article, McDowell proposes a new type of transcendental argument, different from the ambitious and modest types considered above. What sets McDowell's transcendental argument apart is that it does not aim to establish any theses, either about the large-scale layout of the world, or about the large-scale layout of our conception of the world. Rather, McDowell's transcendental argument is diagnostic in spirit, aiming to remove a prop upon which traditional scepticism about the possibility of acquiring knowledge about the external world through perception relies — namely, in McDowell's own words, "the thought that the warrant for a perceptual claim provided by an experience can never be that the experience reveals how things are".

McDowell's transcendental argument takes as its starting-point the unproblematic idea that "experience purports to be of objective reality", and concludes that the intelligibility of that idea requires that "we ... be able to make sense of an epistemically distinguished class of experiences, ... those in which how things are makes itself ... available to one" in perceptual experience. McDowell then relies on his disjunctive conception of experience (as developed in his "Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge" and "Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space") to clarify the move from the starting-point to the conclusion; and ultimately to show how, once the prop is removed, the traditional sceptical predicament simply "falls to the ground".

McDowell's transcendental argument has encountered strong opposition. In his article, McDowell defends it from an attack recently mounted by Crispin Wright; an attack based on the assimilation of McDowell's own argument to Moore's proof of an external world.

In this volume, STELIOS VIRVIDAKIS also discusses the nature and effectiveness of McDowell's transcendental argument, in a paper entitled "On McDowell's Conception of the 'Transcendental'". In the first part of his paper, Virvidakis takes issue with McDowell's claim that his is a *new* type of transcendental argument. According to Virvidakis, it is not new, for it must be seen either as an ambitious transcendental argument, implicitly assuming verificationist principles; or as a modest transcendental argument dealing with (in Virvidakis' own terms) "our own *understanding* of our epistemic predicament". In either case, the claim to novelty would be undermined.

In the second part of his paper, Virvidakis puts forward a different, though related, challenge to McDowell's transcendental argument. The context for the challenge is provided by an examination of McDowell's general recourse to a transcendental strategy, as part of his philosophical method. In particular, Virvidakis explores the *prima facie* tension between the apparently substantial results of McDowell's transcendental strategy and his committed defence of a Wittgensteinian therapeutic conception of philosophical enquiry, and concludes on a sceptical note about McDowell's ability to avoid the tension. The challenge issuing from this is that, even if McDowell's transcendental argument above were genuinely novel, it remains *prima facie* problematic that McDowell can avail himself of it, for it is not clear how its diagnostic spirit can be squared with the substantial results of his transcendental strategy as a whole.

JESÚS VEGA ENCABO's contribution to this volume, entitled "Appearances and Disjunctions", is also obliquely related to McDowell's article, which presents the transcendental argument above as inspired by Wilfrid Sellars' conception of experience. Although Vega Encabo does not explicitly consider the effectiveness of McDowell's transcendental argument, he does find a problem with the disjunctive conception of experience on which McDowell's transcendental argument crucially depends. Furthermore, this problem would affect the Sellarsian inspiration of McDowell's transcendental argument.

For McDowell, the disjunctive conception of appearances stands opposed to the "highest common factor" conception of experience, featuring in the argument from illusion in support of indirect perceptual realism. According to the highest common factor conception, it is a phenomenological fact that "the occurrence of deceptive cases [is] experientially indistinguishable from non-deceptive cases" [McDowell (1998a), p. 389]; which in turn supports the conclusion that, in deceptive and non-deceptive cases alike, the content of one's experience falls short of the facts: it is a mere appearance. Contrariwise, the gist of the disjunctive conception of appearances is that this

conclusion is not warranted by the phenomenological fact, for the phenome-
nological fact is a disjunction. In McDowell's own words, "an appearance
that such-and-such is the case can be *either* a mere appearance *or* the fact that
such-and-such is the case making itself perceptually manifest to someone"
[(1998a), p. 386; cfr. (1998b), p. 242]. The significance of this distinction is
that different conceptions of the nature of perceptual knowledge ensue. Ac-
cording to the highest common factor conception of experience, perceptually
knowing that *p* involves an inference from the content of the experience to
the wordly facts causing the experience. On the other hand, the disjunctive
conception of appearance allows for direct perceptual access to the facts, in
non-deceptive cases; and therefore makes the idea of direct (non-inferential)
perceptual knowledge intelligible.

Vega Encabo's main concern is that, as considered in the disjunctive
conception, non-deceptive appearances have an epistemically privileged
status that clashes with the Sellarsian thought that "in characterizing an epi-
sode or a state as that of *knowing* ... we are placing it in the logical space of rea-
sons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says" [Sellars (1997),
§36]. For, in Vega Encabo's own words, the Sellarsian thought means that
"every entitlement within the space of reasons [is] inferential", in stark con-
trast with the epistemic standing of experience in non-deceptive cases, ac-
cording to the disjunctive conception. For this reason, Vega Encabo concludes
that, disjunctively (and therefore, asymmetrically) conceived, experiences
cannot be part of "the logical space of reasons", as characterized by Sellars. It
would follow from here (something not explicitly considered by Vega Encabo)
that a transcendental argument based on the disjunctive conception of experi-
ence cannot be claimed to be inspired by Sellars, *pace* McDowell.

As Sellars' previous quote makes clear, the logical space of reasons is a
space of normative relations, such as warrant (for states of knowledge) or
correctness (for contentful states in general). McDowell makes use of Sellars'
notion in the context of his defence of "minimal empiricism" [(1996), p. xi]
— a view about the relation between thought (mind) and world as mediated
by experience. The crucial idea is that experience is a "tribunal" to which our
empirical (contentful) thinking is "answerable" [(1996), p. xii]. For McDow-
ell, this space of normative relations stands opposed, not to the space of natu-
ral relations *simpliciter*, but rather to a particular conception of nature,
according to which natural relations "are *different in kind* from the normative
relations that constitute the logical space of reasons" [(1996), p. xv].
McDowell calls it "the realm of law" [(1996), p. xv]. Ultimately, McDowell
seeks to undermine that conception of nature by exposing it as a prejudice:
there is an alternative conception where the relations proper to the space of
reasons are natural relations. McDowell's crucial idea here is that one's ini-
tiation into the space of reasons is a maturation of one's natural abilities. But

this naturalism of second nature does not entail a denial of the space of reasons *versus* realm of law dichotomy, for the former space is genuinely *sui generis* [(1996), p. xviii]. Rather, what the exposure of the prejudice means is that the *sui generis* character of the logical space of reasons is not incompatible with naturalism, properly understood.

McDowell's defence of the *sui generis* character of the logical space of reasons, in the context of his naturalism of second nature, is likely to cause frowning. For it is an alternative to a widespread conception, "bald naturalism", according to which "the logical space of reasons can be reconstructed out of" the realm of law [(1996), p. xviii]. Furthermore, frowning may turn into perplexity upon noticing that McDowell's position is also meant to be an alternative to what might look like the only option after rejecting bald naturalism, namely "rampant platonism" [(1996), p. 77]. Rampant platonism is a form of "supernaturalism" [(1996), p. 78], "picturing the space of reasons as an autonomous structure ... constituted independently of anything specifically human" [(1996), p. 77]. McDowell finds a common underlying assumption in bald naturalism and rampant platonism — namely, the picture of nature mentioned above, where the equation between the natural and the realm of law means that normative relations cannot be natural. It is common to both because the difference between bald naturalism and rampant platonism lies in that, once that picture of nature is in place, rampant platonism simply adds on the *sui generis* space of reasons. In opposition to this, McDowell's defence of the *sui generis* character of the logical space of reasons is an alternative to both, because it entails rejecting the underlying picture of nature.

Jennifer Church's paper, "Locating the Space of Reasons", engages with this aspect of McDowell's philosophy; ie, with the relationship between the space of reasons and the realm of law. As suggested, McDowell's view is one of stark contrast, for "the structure of the space of reasons can[not] be integrated into the layout of the realm of law" [(1996), p. 88]. But this may sound puzzling. One presumable source of the puzzle may lie in a sort of naturalist impulse, which McDowell's stark contrast would appear to put at risk. According to philosophers stirred by this impulse, the only way to save the reality of the space of reasons would require a reductionist move, connecting it appropriately to the realm of law — just what McDowell's picture disallows. However, this is not Church's viewpoint, for she explicitly endorses McDowell's anti-reductionist strategy. Rather, her concern is a residual puzzle about the relationship between the items in the space of reasons and the items in the realm of law, once realism and anti-reductionism are adopted. In opposition to McDowell's stark contrast, Church argues for (in her own words) "an ontology that is doubly constituting", in that "the very same facts can exist both within the space of reasons [...] and within the realm of law"; just like blushing or wincing are constituted by both the lawful and normative relations into which they enter.

As noted above, McDowell's defence of the *sui generis* character of the logical space of reasons is part of his defence of "minimal empiricism", a view about empirical content where experience plays the role of a tribunal to which thought is answerable. The gist of McDowell's conception of perceptual experience is that, to satisfy such a role, experience must justify empirical thought, and therefore must belong within the logical space of normative relations. On the assumption that the space of normative relations is the space proper to concept-using creatures, perceptual experience must be thoroughly conceptual. Let us call this view "conceptualism".

According to McDowell, conceptualism is an alternative to two other possible views about the relation between thought and experience. One, a view that abandons the existence of rational (normative) relations between thought and experience, allowing only for causal relations — a proponent of which is Donald Davidson. Two, a view that conceives of the rational relations between thought and experience as involving a crossing of the boundary of the conceptual — the Myth of the Given. Both Davidson's view and the Myth of the Given are attempts to preserve a role for experience in empirical thought; but neither manages to safeguard the *desiderata* implicit in the idea of a tribunal — namely, that the relationship between thought and experience must be both rational (normative) and conceptual.

Conceptualism is therefore central to McDowell's general project of showing that, despite belonging in a *sui generis* space, the notion of empirical content (and therefore some form of empiricism) is not philosophically problematic. It is, indeed, one of the theses that has received more attention from his critics. In this volume, two papers engage with it.

COSTAS PAGONDIOTIS, in his paper "McDowell's Transcendental Empiricism and the Theory-Ladenness of Experience", discusses McDowell's notion of perceptual experience, and its relation to belief. On the one hand, according to McDowell, perceptual experience is different from the belief it rationally grounds. On the other hand, if he is to avoid idealism, experiencing a fact must be distinguished from the sheer obtaining of a fact. An initially plausible suggestion might be that experience consists in an attitude to the facts, an attitude different from that of active endorsement typical of belief — namely, awareness. However, Pagondiotis rejects the idea that the difference between perceptual experience and belief is a matter of different attitudes to the same content (a fact). Instead, he suggests, it is a matter of different contents. On the assumption that the content of a belief is conceptual, the former might be expected to lead to the thesis that the content of perception must be non-conceptual. However, Pagondiotis argues that the difference between perceptual experience and belief is that the former involves *more* conceptual content, and explains this in terms of the fact that, in experience, the world is presented as affording active exploration.

Unlike Pagondiotis, STELLA GONZÁLEZ ARNAL takes issue with conceptualism in her paper "Non-Articulable Content and the Realm of Reasons". In recent years, McDowell has defended conceptualism from two main attacks: one stemming from the fine-grained nature of perception; the other, from the similarity between the perceptual abilities of adults and those of animals and small children. In her paper, González Arnal considers a different challenge to conceptualism, stemming from our experience as embodied, skilful agents in the world. Drawing on the work of Michael Polanyi, González Arnal argues that our active engagement in the world necessarily includes a tacit dimension, one that cannot be the focus of our awareness, and therefore cannot be articulated linguistically. The challenge to McDowell can then be presented as a sort of paradox. On the assumption that the conceptual can be equated with the linguistic, the previous point about a tacit dimension in our experience as agents means that the latter must count as non-conceptual. However, given that our apprehension of the world as embodied, skilful agents is subject to normative constraints, our experience as agents belongs in the logical space of reasons. Now, González Arnal submits, so conceived, our experience of the world as agents clashes with McDowell's view of the space of reasons as thoroughly conceptual. González Arnal's solution to the paradox is to qualify McDowell's conception, allowing for a novel layer of experiential content, one that is not linguistically articulable, but is normative.

As already noted, McDowell's conceptualism is partly an attack on the Myth of the Given. But the Myth of the Given has also been McDowell's target in a different respect. According to his reading of Wittgenstein's private language argument, "the 'private linguist' succumbs to a version of the dualism of scheme and given: his thought is ... that a stream of consciousness is made up of non-conceptual items that justify conceptualizations of them" [(1998c), p. 280]. This involves a conception of the mental, the "inner life", as "the 'in itself', brutely alien to concepts" [(1998d), p. 307]. That is, a conception of mental content which involves a non-conceptual item awaiting conceptualization by the mind. McDowell's influential commentary on Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* has sought to dislodge it.

In this volume, William Child and Josep Lluís Prades take up McDowell's reading of Wittgenstein's conception of the mental. The background is provided by what McDowell dubs "the master thesis" [(1998e), p. 270], according to which mental contents, like signposts, stand in need of interpretation, for the idea of accord between mental contents and extra-mental reality to apply. The reference to signposts tries to capture the relationship established by Wittgenstein between rule-following and the nature of intentional states (such as belief or expectation). For the relevant notion of accord is present at both levels: one, in the relation between a rule (eg, a linguistic rule) and its application; two, in the relation between an intentional state and its conditions of satisfac-

tion (ie, between the "that"-clause and a wordly state of affairs). Thus, what the master thesis asserts is that both rule-following and intentionality require an interpretation of the uninterpreted items in one's mind.

With the master thesis in place, the following dilemma looks compulsory: either there is an unending regress of interpretations that makes the idea of determinate meaning (of a rule, or an intentional state) problematic; or there is a final interpretation connecting mental items with their meaning. According to Saul Kripke's celebrated reconstruction of Wittgenstein's argument, Wittgenstein accepts the dilemma, which in turn leads him to a paradox about meaning. For, as there is no final interpretation, any putative interpretation can be further interpreted, thereby jeopardizing the very idea of determinate meaning. *Contra* Kripke, McDowell's key contribution is that the dilemma is not compulsory: instead, he claims, Wittgenstein has shown a way of avoiding the dilemma, insofar as "there is a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an *interpretation*" [Wittgenstein (2001), §201].

On this basis, McDowell then goes on to undermine other aspects of Kripke's reconstruction. According to Kripke, once the dilemma is accepted, the only way out for Wittgenstein is to accept that grasping a rule correctly is (in McDowell's terms) a matter of "a social practice of mutual recognition and acceptance" [(1998e), p. 269]. Hence, Wittgenstein's insistence on the role played by the community in rule-following. Although McDowell also stresses the role of the community, he disagrees with Kripke's reconstruction. In the latter, the role of the community is consistent with the acceptance of the dilemma in the previous paragraph. However, for McDowell, there is a direct link between the thesis that following a rule is a communal practice and the thesis that following a rule is *not* a matter of interpretation — namely, following a rule is a matter of being initiated into certain communal practices. Therefore, *contra* Kripke, the role of the community is incompatible with the thesis that grasping a rule is a matter of interpretation, and ultimately with the master thesis on which that thesis is based.

Against this background, Josep Lluís Prades' paper "Varieties of Internal Relations: Intention, Expression and Norms" queries certain aspects of McDowell's reading of Wittgenstein's account of rule-following and intentionality. In particular, he finds no parallel in Wittgenstein between the thesis that grasping a rule (eg, a linguistic rule) is not a matter of interpretation, and the nature of intentional states in general. For McDowell, there must be such a parallel if the thesis that grasping a rule is not a matter of interpretation is to be invoked to dislodge the master thesis. But Prades finds a problem here, concerning the intentionality of creatures that are not part of a relevant (ie, linguistic) community, such as babies or isolated animals. It is beyond doubt that such creatures have some, albeit primitive, intentional states. But if McDowell's parallel between rule-following and intentionality is accepted, then, insofar as those creatures are not part of a relevant (linguistic) commu-

nity, they must lack intentionality. In order to avoid this conclusion, the main thrust of Prades' paper is his development of an alternative Wittgensteinian account of intentionality, according to which (in Prades' own words) "expressive behaviour is the proto-phenomenon of intentionality".

Moving further on, McDowell's critique of the view about mental content embodied in the master thesis is not a rejection of the very idea of mental content. Therefore, how are mental contents to be understood, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, in accordance with the rejection of both the thesis that grasping a rule is a matter of interpretation and the master thesis?

WILLIAM CHILD's paper "On Having a Meaning Before One's Mind" presents two different interpretations of Wittgenstein's account of mental content; in particular, of his account of what it is for the meaning *of a word* to come to mind. First, a two-component view, according to which for the meaning of a word to come to mind is for someone to have an intentionality-free, conscious experience, plus the ability to apply it on different occasions. Second, McDowell's anti-constructivist view, according to which Wittgenstein does not offer a positive explanation of what it is for the meaning of a word to come to mind, but rather attacks a misconception of the phenomenon in question, one in which what comes to mind must be an uninterpreted item. Against both these views, Child puts forward a Wittgensteinian middle-way, one that is different both from the commitment to the master thesis contained in the two-component view, and from the anti-constructivist view of the phenomenon as basic. In particular, *contra* McDowell's anti-constructivism, Child presses the point that Wittgenstein offers "illumination" of the phenomenon, and therefore cannot take it as basic.

As noted above, McDowell's conceptualism is arrived at in the context of his defence of "minimal empiricism" — to repeat, a view about the relation between thought and reality, where experience plays a justificatory role. It is in this context that, as he states in the opening sentence of *Mind and World*, "concepts mediate the relation between minds and the world" [(1996), p. 3]. In other words, the mediation provided by conceptual experience must be justificatory, and therefore normative.

Now, this idea of mediation may suggest an indirect relation between thought and reality, where concepts act as intermediaries, surrogates of reality, adequately relating thought to reality when one's thoughts are true. But McDowell has resisted such a suggestion: the mediating role of concepts does not entail a denial of what we might call "direct realism", something he usually expresses through the image of openness to the way the world is. Indeed, he has emphasized that only a mediating role of concepts, in the justificatory and normative sense that he accepts, can guarantee a proper defence of the idea of "openness to the layout of reality" [(1996), p. 26]. Thus, he has argued that such alternative accounts of the relation between thought and experi-

ence as Davidson's causal (but not justificatory) mediation, cannot conceive of experience as "transparent" [(1996), p. 145], insofar as there is no account of how the contents of thought, supposedly the result of a "mere" causal relation, are correct.

The notion of the conceptual used by McDowell is a Fregean notion: "the right gloss on 'conceptual' is ... 'belonging to the realm of Fregean sense'" [(1996), p. 107]. Combined with the idea that a Fregean sense is a mode of presentation, the gist of minimal empiricism is, then, that empirical thought involves a mode of presentation of the world, where the mode of presentation is what is captured and embodied in the content of one's thought. But what more can be said about these modes of presentation?

According to descriptivism, a mode of presentation is a descriptive specification of an object, something with the following linguistic form — "the such-and-such". At first sight, it might look as if McDowell ought to be sympathetic to the descriptivist gloss on the Fregean notion of sense (itself a gloss on the notion of the conceptual), for McDowell has emphasized the close connection between the conceptual and the linguistic. But if this were the right way to understand McDowell's notion of the conceptual, then his defence of minimal empiricism as a form of direct realism would be in jeopardy. It is a lasting lesson of Russell's treatment of the semantic features of descriptions (and the sentences containing them) that they are meaningful even when they do not refer; indeed, that their semantic role is not to refer to an object (the semantic role of names). The significance of this for McDowell's minimal empiricism would be that a thought that such-and-such is the case would be meaningful independently of whether it depicts reality. But then, far from allowing for an image of (conceptual) experience as openness to the world, the descriptivist gloss on the conceptual would make the relation between thought and reality problematic, contrary to McDowell's objectives.

Now, in papers prior to *Mind and World*, McDowell has questioned the connection between descriptivism and Fregean sense. An upshot of the descriptivist gloss on the Fregean notion of sense would be that the latter is incapable of dealing with singular thoughts, thoughts "that would not be available to be thought or expressed if the relevant object, or objects, did not exist" [(1998f), p. 204]. For, insofar as (on the descriptivist account) the content of a thought includes a description, and the logical form of descriptions is given by Russell's analysis, the content of a thought does not include an essential reference to objects. However, McDowell, together with Gareth Evans, has argued that the essentials of Frege's notion of sense can be used in an account of singular thoughts. The gist of the view defended by Evans and McDowell is that Fregean senses are individuated *de re*, ie by reference to an object.

SARAH SAWYER's paper "The Role of Object-Dependent Content in Psychological Explanation" is a contribution to this area of McDowell's philosophy. The background to Sawyer's paper is provided by a contrast between two

views of singular thought. One in which singular thought is explained as a function of two independent components: a conceptual content, plus a (non-conceptual) context (including objects). The other, in which the components of singular thoughts are fully conceptual, but *de re* (ie, exploiting the presence of a wordly object), contents. Sawyer's immediate concern is with the idea that the former, dual-component view is preferable, because it can better accommodate our intuitions about the psychological explanations of intentional action; for instance, the idea of a minimal set of sufficient conditions for action, operative across different contexts. Sawyer's paper criticizes this line of argument: according to her, minimal sets of sufficient conditions for intentional action support the dual-component view, only under a mistaken conception of a minimal set. It is mistaken in that it does not allow for the crucial idea that minimal sets include absences. But once this is properly acknowledged, Sawyer concludes, the Evans-McDowell view of singular thought, and its role in psychological explanations of action, is vindicated.

A consequence of McDowell's defence of Fregean *de re* senses is that the Fregean notion of sense is not adequately glossed in descriptivist terms: the descriptivist cannot account for the semantic differences between sentences containing descriptions and sentences containing singular terms; whereas a Fregean can capture the semantic peculiarities of sentences containing singular terms in virtue of the *de re* individuation of senses. Therefore, there is no objection to McDowell's version of realism, stemming from his Fregean gloss on the conceptual — ie, that which belongs in the realm of Fregean sense.

Nonetheless, critics have often pointed out the difficulty in seeing McDowell's defence of "minimal empiricism" as a version of realism. In this volume, the issue of realism is explicitly considered by DAN LÓPEZ DE SA; in particular, in relation to the nature of moral values. McDowell's writings on the nature of values (aesthetic or moral) can be taken as a defence of realism; although he prefers other, negative, labels, such as "anti-anti-realism" [cfr. the Preface to *Mind, Value and* Reality, p. viii], or "anti-non-cognitivism" [(1998g), p. 213], in view of the indirect character of his argumentative strategy, directed at the removal of misconceptions present in certain (popular) arguments and views. One such view of the nature of moral values is J. L. Mackie's error-theory.

In McDowell's own terms, Mackie starts with the phenomenological claim that value "typically presents itself ... as something residing in an object and available to be encountered", but concludes that "the appearance is illusory: value is not found in the world, but projected into it, a mere reflection of subjective responses" [(1998h), p. 112]. The move to this conclusion relies crucially on relating the phenomenological claim to a perceptual claim, in the sense that "values [are] brutely and absolutely *there*" [(1998i), p. 132],

just as the primary qualities encountered in perception are conceived to be. For, once the reality of values is conceived as akin to the case of primary qualities, the obvious fact that values are not independent of human sensibility makes it plausible that the phenomenological claim must be corrected — ie, values are not simply there, but are projections of our subjective responses.

McDowell's counter-argument to Mackie has been to criticize the analogy between values and primary qualities; instead, secondary qualities provide a better model. For, although secondary qualities cannot "be adequately understood otherwise than in terms of dispositions to give rise to subjective states", this does not entail that they are "a mere figment of the subjective state", rather than being "there to be experienced" [(1998i), p. 136]. Thus, McDowell is employing a distinction between two different senses of the subjective, to the effect that the uncontroversial fact that values (like secondary qualities) are linked to certain human responses (subjective in the first sense) does not entail the controversial conception of values (and secondary qualities) as not being there (the second sense). On the basis of this distinction, McDowell claims that "[s]hifting to a secondary quality analogy renders irrelevant any worry about how something that is brutely *there* could nevertheless stand in an internal relation to some exercises of human sensibility" [(1998i), p. 146].

López de Sa's paper "Values *versus* Secondary Qualities" fits here. The worry McDowell refers to in the previous quote was voiced in Mackie's argument from queerness, according to which to avoid postulating such weird entities as values (weird in that they are both brutely there and internally related to human attitudes, for instance when they motivate us to take a certain course of action), the proposed projectivist correction of the phenomenological claim must be accepted. In this respect, the gist of McDowell's reply in defence of the reality of values is that a secondary quality analogy makes such worries irrelevant; it was only a mistaken conception of the idea that values are there that made such worries look definitive. However, López de Sa, focusing on the moral case, claims in his paper that McDowell's argument for evaluative realism is too short. Building on recent work on the nature of response-dependent properties, López de Sa argues that McDowell's conception of values as response-dependent properties cannot provide an adequate reply to the argument from queerness and at the same time amount to a defence of evaluative realism.[*]

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NOTE

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