

Impact of start-up incentives to young unemployed workers on business survival

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of a Spanish programme fostering self-employment among youth unemployed workers. We use an administrative dataset (the Continuous Working Lives Sample) to study the survival of subsidized start-ups compared to those not subsidized. Our preliminary results suggest that the differences in survival rates after one year are due to selection bias. The programme excludes new self-employed workers that have been self-employed during the previous five years. This group of workers have a higher probability of exiting self-employment than those with no previous experience in self-employment. Once we take into account this effect, we find that the programme has no impact on business survival.

Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Evaluation, Youth unemployment

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1 Introduction

The dramatic growth of unemployment figures in Spain during the economic downturn has derived in reforms of labour market policies and new active labour market programmes¹. One of the most used is the promotion of self-employment as a means of reducing unemployment and increasing entrepreneurship. Although the expenditure in active labour market policies in Spain decreases during the economic downturn, the proportion of spending targeted to start-up programmes has increased. Therefore, while expenditure amounted to 770 million euro in 2006, it raised to 1,158 million euro in 2012, according to Eurostat, representing a 50.4% increase².

Start-up programmes are especially interesting because they have a double perspective. First, their aim is to improve the participants' labour market outcomes, returning them to employment and avoiding unemployment. Secondly, these programmes usually identify self-employment to entrepreneurship, suggesting that they have potential effects in terms of job creation by the business growth. Therefore, the results of start-up programmes are particularly important. However, the evidence is scarce mainly because of data limitations (Caliendo et al. 2015). In general, the existing evaluations conclude positive effects, improving participants' employment probabilities but results are limited in terms of job creation. For Sweden, Månsson and Delander (2011) state that start-up subsidies are one of the most successful labour market programmes. The authors evaluate a programme targeted to unemployed persons (or individuals at risk of becoming unemployed). It consists on a supplementary income during six months since the start-up. Participants should have some knowledge in starting and running a business or they have to participate in a training course. Additionally, they must present a business plan approved by an external expert. Results suggest that female participants have a higher success rate (in terms of being employed four years after participation) than male and female non-participants. In comparison to male participants, female participants are less successful. For France, (Désiage et al. 2010) found that tax cuts contribute to increase survival after two years and to turnover growth rate. The programme selected start-ups depending on entrepreneurs' and businesses' characteristics.

Although the evidence is scarce, the majority of the evaluations corresponds to German programmes. Caliendo and Kritikos (2010) study the results of start-up programmes targeted to unemployed individuals in Germany. Survival rates after 2.5 years are around 70%. The authors consider these rates as considerable although they note the possibility of deadweight losses. (Caliendo & Künn 2015) analyse the long-term effect of these programmes to foster self-employment among unemployed individuals. Comparing to non-participation, both programmes contributes to improve employment probabilities and earnings of participants after 5 years. (Wolff & Nivorozhkin 2012) evaluate a German programme fostering entrepreneurship among welfare recipients. They find that the programme is effective in terms of unemployment and dependency of welfare. (Caliendo & Künn 2011) find a similar result concluding that start-up subsidies are more effective for disadvantage groups in the labour market.

The most comprehensive evaluation is (Caliendo et al. 2015) because they have a control group and they can obtain indicators in terms of labour market outcomes and business performance. The authors evaluate a start-up subsidy launched in Germany in

¹ See OIT (2014) for a summary of Spanish labour reforms in recent years.

² In the same period of time, expenditure in ALMP decreases a 8.2%.

2009, comparing subsidized business to regular business founders and focusing on the business trajectory during 19 months. They find that subsidized founders have less employment and industry-specific experience and they have a higher probability of being necessity start-ups than non-subsidized founders. In terms of business performance, survival rates 19 months after start-up are higher for subsidized start-ups out of unemployment but performance in terms of income, business growth and innovation is better for regular business founders. This result is especially interesting since, as the authors explain, the programme has a positive result in terms of improving the participants' labour market outcomes but the impact in economic terms (job creation and innovation) is limited.

For the Spanish case, Cueto and Mato (2006) analyse survival rates of participants in a self-employment programme although there was no control group. From a macroeconomic point of view, Mayor et al. (2015) evaluate the capitalization of unemployment benefits to become self-employed concluding the existence of a high dead-weight effect. In general, Spanish programmes tend to be general, targeted to all kind of unemployed individuals, limiting their impact. As Congregado et al. (2010) state "the new schemes of incentives approved by the Spanish Government for encouraging unemployed people to become own-account workers can only aspire, in the best case scenario, to reduce unemployment directly but not to create new employment."

2 Fostering self-employment among the youth

During the last years, self-employment has been promoted as a means of reducing unemployment and increasing entrepreneurship. The Spanish Government has launched several programmes to foster self-employment among the unemployed, and especially among the (unemployed) youth³. One of the main programmes is the one known as the 'Flat rate for young self-employed workers', launched in February 2013⁴, which consists in a reduction in the minimum contribution to the Social Security System.

Self-employed workers have their own contributory system to the Social Security. Workers aged under 47 can choose their contribution base between the limits of the minimum and maximum bases. The quota to be paid is the result of applying 26.5% to the contributory base. Young workers usually choose the minimum contribution base in order to pay the lowest amount⁵. Taking into account the minimum contribution bases for the period 2013-2015⁶, the quota amounts to € 234.4, € 232.1 and € 227.5, respectively for each year. The programme consists on a reduction over these quotas.

The evaluated programme has two main target groups distinguishing if the individual has previous self-employment experience during the last five years. If applicants have not been in self-employment during the previous five years, there is a discount of 80% in the minimum contribution to Social Security for the first six months. Subsequently, for the following six months, the reduction is 50% and, after the first year, participants

³ See the Strategy of Entrepreneurship and Youth Employment (*Estrategia de Emprendimiento y Empleo Joven*, <http://www.empleo.gob.es/es/garantiajuvenil/informate.html>).

⁴ Real Decreto-ley 4/2013, de 22 de febrero, de medidas de apoyo al emprendedor y de estímulo del crecimiento y de la creación de empleo. (BOE, February 23, 2013).

⁵ In fact, there is not advantages linked to higher contributory bases.

⁶ They are: 884.40€ in 2013; 875.70€ in 2014 and 858.60€ in 2015.


will continue to enjoy a discount of 30% in their contributions for the next 18 months. As we mentioned, the target group is formed by men up to age 30 and women up to 35.

If applicants have been in self-employment during the previous five years, there is a discount of 30% in the minimum contribution for common contingencies to Social Security for the first 30 months⁷ for men younger than 30 and women younger than 35.

The discounts are calculated for the minimum contribution bases. The following figure represents the contributions paid by workers entering self-employment in January 2013 along 3 years with and without the discounts.

For young workers without previous experience in self-employment during the last 5 years, considering the reductions, the contribution for the first six months is € 51 monthly, € 128 in the following six months and € 183 in the following 6 months (18 months for men up to age 30 and women up to 35). Summing up, savings amount to € 3,617 in a period of three years. In the case of young workers with previous experience in self-employment, the discount amounts to € 2,884.4.

Figure 1. Contribution to the Social Security (Self-employed workers, €/month)



Finally, we must also into account that the Government approved an extension of the programme in September 2013 to include men older than 30 and women older than 35 that have not been self-employed during the previous five years. In this paper, we will focus our analysis in the first period of the programme, between March and September.

⁷ During the first 15 months, the subsidy is a reduction in the contribution (paid by the Social Security) while the following 15 months, it is a bonus (paid by the PES).

2.1 Expected results

The aim of the programme is to foster self-employment among young individuals. However, this type of programmes usually has a high deadweight effect. Therefore, many of the beneficiaries of the programme would become self-employed although they had not received the subsidy. Unfortunately, the available data does not allow us to evaluate the effect of the programme in terms of inflows into self-employment.

A second aim of the programme is to facilitate the survival in self-employment and our paper focuses on this question. The subsidy is targeted to young individuals. The assumption behind is that young workers face more disadvantages to become self-employed than older workers and, in fact, youth self-employment rates are usually lower than those corresponding to older workers. We have different explanations for this fact. Firstly, young workers lack employment experience. This characteristic is a disadvantage in terms of business networks because they have little knowledge of potential customers, suppliers and competitors.

Moreover, young people usually have great financial constraints. Their financial means and wealth are low, which reduces the available resources for the business. Liquidity constraints and lack of financing are well-known problems for potential entrepreneurs. Extensive evidence found a negative correlation between the existence of problems to access to financing and the probability of entrepreneurship (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). The difficulties to access to funding are higher for some groups of people, such as unemployed workers, women or minorities. Young workers also face more difficulties to get access to funding.

The existence of these disadvantages justifies policies to help specific groups to become entrepreneurs, overcoming their weaknesses. The analysed subsidy tries to lessen barriers to entrepreneurship faced by young workers. The reduction of social security contributions for three years helps to decrease costs during the first phase of the business, making survival easier. At the same time, the subsidy can affect participants in several ways, not only by decreasing costs.

The reduction of the costs associated to self-employment can change the profile of individuals entering self-employment. The risk of failure can prevent individuals to enter self-employment, especially if the costs associated to the start-up are high and there is uncertainty about potential rewards. In this case, only individuals with access to funding would become entrepreneurs. This self-selection process means that individuals with entrepreneurial ability and good opportunities cannot become entrepreneurs if they do not have their own resources.

If financial barriers to entrepreneurship are reduced by decreasing the costs associated to the start-up, more individuals would be able to become self-employed workers. On the one hand, those people with a project but without funding have the opportunity to start-up their own business. On the other hand, low-qualified individuals can try to become self-employed as a way to improve their situation in the labour market since the risks associated to entrepreneurship are reduced. The subsidy can change the survival-of-the-fittest mechanism and low performing firms would be able to survive.

Under these assumptions, the subsidy can have a positive effect on survival. However, Caliendo et al. (2015) suggest the possibility of moral hazard in the short-term. While receiving the subsidy, individuals can reduce their efforts for the success of the start-up given that they have lower costs than non-subsidized people.

3 Data

For the purpose of the paper, we use data drawn from the Continuous Sample of Working Lives (CSWL, *Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales* in Spanish). The CSWL is an administrative dataset provided by the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. It contains information about a sample of individuals with any type of relationship to the Social Security, including data on the employment periods of workers and on their whole previous labour market trajectory.

We use the 2013 edition of the CSWL, selecting individuals who enter self-employment during this year. We have not information about the participation in the programme but there is data on the requirements so we can identify participants. Then, our estimates will be interpreted as the intention to treat, i.e., we focus on being eligible for the programme rather than on actual participation. However, given the conditions of the programme, it is probable that all the individuals fulfilling requirements receive the tax-benefit. Using the 2014 edition, we have followed our sample to obtain updated information about the self-employment period.

The different conditions of the programme depend on sex, age of the beneficiaries and previous experience in self-employment. In the case of men, we have to distinguish by age 30 and if they were self-employed workers during the previous five years. For women, the age threshold is 35. Thus, we can differentiate treatment and control groups to estimate the effect of the tax-benefit on the stability of individuals as own-account workers. The dataset contains information about the employment situation of workers. Therefore, we are able to study the survival in self-employment of participants and non-participants.

The number of observations is displayed in table 1 and their characteristics in table in Annex.

Table 1. Number of observations per period and group

	No previous experience in self-employment			
	Men <30	Men ≥30	Women <35	Women ≥35
January - February	157	621	211	284
March - September	980	2,187	1,136	972
	With previous experience in self-employment			
	Men <30	Men ≥30	Women <35	Women ≥35
January - February	90	719	76	218
March - September	393	3,085	418	1,069

Source: own elaboration from the CSWL.

4 Identification strategy

We use a diff-in-diffs strategy over different periods within 2013 (January-February vs. March-September) and different groups in terms of programme eligibility (young workers vs. older workers). We perform a graphical analysis and we use a Cox-proportional hazar model for exits from self-employment.

Following Angrist and Pischke (2009), we assume an additive structure for potential outcomes in the no-treatment state:

$$E(Y_{0ist}|s, t) = \gamma_s + \lambda_t$$

Where s denotes group and t denotes period. In the absence of subsidy, business survival is determined by the sum of a time-invariant group effect and a period effect that is common to all the groups.

Assuming that the effect of the programme is additive, the potential outcome when treated ($D_{st} = 1$) is:

$$E(Y_{1ist}|s, t) = \gamma_s + \lambda_t + \beta D_{st} + \varepsilon_{ist}, \text{ being } E(\varepsilon_{ist}|s, t) = 0$$

We define two periods: in January and February 2013, there is no programme while from March to September the programme is available for young workers. During the first period (January and February) there is not programme so we observe the outcome without treatment for all the groups (Y_0). We use this period to estimate the trend over periods of time. Then, the time effect for other groups is cleared because we assume that time trend is parallel across groups.

In the second period we observe the outcome with treatment (Y_1). From this outcome, we can remove the time effect and the group effects to obtain the programme effect.

$$y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_{E1}(Eligible)_{it} + \beta_A(Age)_{it} + \beta_P(Period\ M - S)_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Results will be divided up by gender and previous experience in self-employment in order to gain homogeneity between eligible and non-eligible individuals. Therefore, we will estimate the impact of the programme for each one. We use older workers as control group to identify the differences across groups.


Group composition can change over time. To reduce the impact of this questions, we run regressions adding a large set of covariates (age, level of education, sector of activity, country of birth, working time, unemployment experience, elapsed time from the last employment period to self-employment and region of residence).

5 Results

Figure 2 shows the survival rate for each period and for the population according to their previous experience in self-employment in the last 5 years. We find that workers without previous self-employment experience have much lower survival rates than those with previous self-employment experience⁸. We obtain the same gap if we consider men, women, young workers and older workers. This result, together with the characteristics of the programme (supporting with a high reduction in taxes workers without previous experience in self-employment), lead us to estimate effects separately for both groups of workers.

⁸ Other authors that obtain a negative effect of previous self-employment experience on survival are Oberschachtsiek (2012) or van Praag (2003).

Figure 2. Kaplan-Meier Survivor function by group and date of start-up



Source: own elaboration from the CSWL.

5.1 Individuals with previous experience in self-employment


Figure 3 shows the survivor function for workers with previous experience in self-employment in the last 5 years. Regarding men, survival rates in the first period (January-February) are 50.8% six months after the start-up and 36.8% after one year in the case of older workers. The rates for young men are lower (37.8% and 27.8% respectively). For the second period (March-September), rates are more similar for older and young workers with a gap of 5 pp six months after start-up (49% and 44.6%, respectively) and 2 pp after one year (29.2% and 27.1%, respectively).

Rates are quite similar for men and women. Therefore, we found similar gaps for older and young women during the two analysed periods. In January-February, survival rates after six months are 50.2% for older women and 49.3% for young women. Rates are 40% and 34.7%, respectively, one year after the start-up. In the second period, March-September, the figures are a bit smaller but the gap between groups are similar.

In the case of men, we observe that the trajectories overlap and only older workers in January-February show a different pattern, with higher survival rates than the other groups. Therefore, the survival is lower for men in the second period than in the first one while we do not observe a difference between periods in the case of young men.

For women, the survival rates for young and older workers overlap in the second period (March-September). Rates are higher for both groups in the first one (January-February) although a small gap in favour of older workers is also observed.

Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier Survivor function by group and date of start-up



The differences in differences estimation suggest similar results than the graphical analysis and they are similar considered control variables. In the case of men, the impact is positive although statistically significant at 10%. Therefore, those young men who start their business being eligible for the programme (from March to September) have a higher probability of survival than non-eligible workers. For women, our estimation is not significant. Thus, survival rates of young self-employed women are not affected by the programme.

Table 2. Effect of the programme on survival probability

	H.R.	Std. Err.	H.R.	Std. Err.
Men				
Age: < 30	1.362**	0.169	1.056	0.145
Period: March-September	1.162***	0.056	1.165***	0.058
Age*Period	0.792*	0.109	0.785*	0.112
Women				
Age: < 35	1.109	0.174	0.930	0.166
Period: March-September	1.220**	0.106	1.225**	0.111
Age*Period	0.918	0.156	0.881	0.155
Control variables		no		yes

* denotes significant at the 10% level (** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level).

Source: own elaboration from the CSWL.

An additional result of the programme is related to the probability of being employed at the end of the observation window. Even in the case of exiting self-employment, the experience as self-employed worker can help to find other job (as paid employee or in other self-employment spell). To evaluate this possibility, we estimate the likelihood of being employed in the last observed moment.


5.2 Individuals without previous experience in self-employment

Figure 4 shows the survivor function for workers without previous experience in self-employment in the last 5 years. With respect to men, survival rates in the first period (January-February) are 79.5% six months after the start-up and 67.4% after one year in

the case of older workers. The rates for young men are higher after six months (80.8%) but smaller after one year (60.1%). For the second period (March-September), rates are more similar for older and young workers with a gap of only 1 pp six months after start-up (73.4% and 74.8%, respectively) and 4 pp after one year (59.1% and 60.1%, respectively).

In the case of women, rates are similar than those of men. In January-February, survival rates after six months are 81.6% for older women and 79.9% for young women. Rates are 71.2% and 63.2%, respectively, one year after the start-up. In the second period, March-September, the figures are 78.4% and 63.1% in the case of older women and 76.8% and 58.4% in the case of young women.

Figure 4. Kaplan-Meier Survivor function by group and date of start-up



The diff-in-diffs regressions (Table 3) confirm the findings. According to our estimations, the programme does not affect survival in self-employment.

Table 3. Effect of the programme on survival probability

	H.R.	Std. Err.	H.R.	Std. Err.
Men				
Age: < 30	1.181	0.147	0.984	0.139
Period: March-September	1.260***	0.084	1.261***	0.087
Age*Period	0.994	0.133	0.972	0.135
Women				
Age: < 35	1.345**	0.167	1.200	0.185
Period: March-September	1.229**	0.120	1.219*	0.123
Age*Period	0.838	0.115	0.822	
Control variables		no		yes

* denotes significant at the 10% level (** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level).

Source: own elaboration from the CSWL.

6 Conclusions

During this economic crisis the Spanish Government has launched a number of programmes to improve the employment probabilities of unemployed workers. In this context, self-employment policies have become a major part of these programmes. The reduction in Social Security contributions is a common measure.

The aim of this paper was to evaluate the ‘flat rate for self-employed workers’, consisting in a reduction of Social Security contributions along three years, initially targeted to young workers. Using the Continuous Sample of Working Lives, an administrative dataset of Social Security registers, we have selected new entrants into self-employment in 2013. Taking into account the characteristics of the programme, we are able to identify the participants and compare them to non-participants to estimate the impact on business survival.

Our estimations show as a general pattern that the programme has not effect on the survival of new businesses. There is only an exception showing a positive effect in the case of young men with previous self-employment experience.

Although the programme reduces the costs associated to self-employment significantly, it does not affect survival. Explanations of this result can be related to the lack of profiling of the programme. In fact, it is available for all new self-employed young workers and there are not requirements linked to training or business viability plans. It consists exclusively on a reduction in Social Security contributions, without elements of training or counselling.

Nevertheless, we must also take into account that the consequences of youth self-employment should be analysed in terms of labour trajectory. In our observation window, we do not observe significant effects on employment probabilities, neither. It is also necessary to evaluate the programme in the long-term, but our estimations show the lack of impact in terms of self-employment survival or employment probability. Taking into account the results of other evaluations, we have to stress the importance of the design of the programme, in terms of eligibility or requirements to participate.

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Table A. 1. Statistical descriptives (men)

	men	men	men	men	men	men	men	men
	< 30	< 30	< 30	< 30	>30	>30	>30	>30
	not in SE	not in SE	in SE	in SE	not in SE	not in SE	in SE	in SE
	Jan-Feb	Mar-Sep	Jan-Feb	Mar-Sep	Jan-Feb	Mar-Sep	Jan-Feb	Mar-Sep
Age	25.5	25.1	25.7	25.7	41.3	41.2	42.9	43.5
Born in Spain	0.848	0.856	0.759	0.755	0.772	0.764	0.822	0.800
Primary	0.620	0.621	0.674	0.686	0.515	0.542	0.534	0.582
Professional secondary	0.127	0.147	0.116	0.130	0.234	0.200	0.241	0.209
Secondary	0.113	0.093	0.081	0.108	0.099	0.097	0.109	0.093
University	0.140	0.139	0.128	0.076	0.152	0.161	0.116	0.116
first employment	0.172	0.177	0.000	0.000	0.035	0.049	0.000	0.000
< 1 year	0.217	0.211	0.233	0.163	0.026	0.028	0.013	0.017
1 - 2 years	0.121	0.122	0.156	0.158	0.037	0.024	0.021	0.019
2 - 5 years	0.217	0.278	0.300	0.331	0.095	0.114	0.095	0.089
5 - 10 years	0.261	0.195	0.311	0.318	0.229	0.225	0.214	0.207
> 10 years	0.013	0.017	0.000	0.031	0.578	0.560	0.658	0.668
first employment	0.172	0.177	0.000	0.000	0.035	0.049	0.000	0.000
< 3 months	0.331	0.333	0.744	0.575	0.419	0.366	0.668	0.548
3 - 6 months	0.121	0.089	0.144	0.150	0.129	0.120	0.114	0.168
6 months - 1 year	0.159	0.126	0.067	0.181	0.124	0.151	0.079	0.160
1 - 2 years	0.102	0.133	0.022	0.059	0.126	0.144	0.075	0.079
2 - 3 years	0.045	0.045	0.011	0.028	0.053	0.058	0.043	0.025
3 - 5 years	0.051	0.066	0.011	0.008	0.068	0.059	0.021	0.020
> 5 years	0.019	0.033	0.000	0.000	0.047	0.053	0.000	0.000
Any unemployment period	0.516	0.506	0.411	0.461	0.820	0.845	0.722	0.757
Agriculture	0.064	0.060	0.022	0.051	0.040	0.047	0.040	0.033
Industry	0.070	0.034	0.067	0.023	0.043	0.038	0.040	0.035
Construction	0.115	0.154	0.256	0.303	0.196	0.208	0.385	0.381
Retail trade	0.217	0.246	0.133	0.209	0.232	0.238	0.145	0.147
Hospitality	0.166	0.134	0.078	0.125	0.135	0.134	0.068	0.088
Transport	0.076	0.043	0.111	0.033	0.056	0.057	0.043	0.033
Health	0.032	0.017	0.000	0.003	0.016	0.016	0.008	0.007
Education	0.000	0.028	0.033	0.025	0.024	0.028	0.040	0.034
Financial services	0.032	0.027	0.022	0.013	0.027	0.020	0.013	0.010
Business services	0.089	0.143	0.078	0.084	0.150	0.140	0.115	0.135
Other services	0.140	0.115	0.200	0.132	0.079	0.074	0.102	0.097
Sample size	157	980	90	393	621	2187	719	3085

Source: own elaboration from the CSWL.

Table A. 2. Statistical descriptives (women)

	women	women	women	women	women	women	women	women
	< 35	< 35	< 35	< 35	>35	>35	>35	>35
	not in SE	not in SE	in SE	in SE	not in SE	not in SE	in SE	in SE
	Jan-Feb	Mar-Sep	Jan-Feb	Mar-Sep	Jan-Feb	Mar-Sep	Jan-Feb	Mar-Sep
Age	28.5	27.7	29.1	29.1	45.2	43.7	45.3	45.0
Born in Spain	0.779	0.783	0.811	0.820	0.824	0.803	0.797	0.797
Primary	0.371	0.437	0.459	0.408	0.460	0.457	0.452	0.416
Professional secondary	0.185	0.167	0.108	0.183	0.162	0.229	0.214	0.232
Secondary	0.132	0.127	0.108	0.105	0.122	0.121	0.086	0.109
University	0.312	0.269	0.324	0.303	0.255	0.194	0.248	0.243
first employment	0.161	0.141	0.000	0.000	0.077	0.064	0.000	0.000
< 1 year	0.147	0.197	0.105	0.139	0.046	0.041	0.064	0.031
1 - 2 years	0.081	0.093	0.079	0.117	0.025	0.037	0.028	0.025
2 - 5 years	0.336	0.254	0.434	0.318	0.141	0.138	0.083	0.118
5 - 10 years	0.209	0.254	0.276	0.333	0.254	0.265	0.335	0.294
> 10 years	0.066	0.061	0.105	0.093	0.458	0.455	0.491	0.532
first employment	0.161	0.141	0.000	0.000	0.077	0.064	0.000	0.000
< 3 months	0.379	0.379	0.711	0.622	0.303	0.336	0.647	0.551
3 - 6 months	0.118	0.092	0.079	0.146	0.063	0.099	0.110	0.136
6 months - 1 year	0.104	0.136	0.118	0.156	0.113	0.108	0.147	0.190
1 - 2 years	0.104	0.115	0.039	0.043	0.092	0.131	0.041	0.073
2 - 3 years	0.047	0.050	0.013	0.014	0.067	0.069	0.018	0.022
3 - 5 years	0.062	0.052	0.039	0.019	0.088	0.057	0.037	0.028
> 5 years	0.024	0.035	0.000	0.000	0.197	0.137	0.000	0.000
Any unemployment period	0.559	0.562	0.461	0.514	0.761	0.779	0.661	0.669
Agriculture	0.033	0.021	0.026	0.031	0.042	0.042	0.028	0.024
Industry	0.033	0.022	0.000	0.010	0.042	0.029	0.023	0.031
Construction	0.024	0.011	0.013	0.022	0.021	0.022	0.032	0.021
Retail trade	0.246	0.261	0.184	0.206	0.306	0.310	0.261	0.249
Hospitality	0.137	0.143	0.105	0.132	0.162	0.192	0.101	0.171
Transport	0.028	0.011	0.000	0.007	0.014	0.013	0.009	0.006
Health	0.066	0.080	0.105	0.091	0.035	0.041	0.037	0.016
Education	0.028	0.047	0.039	0.065	0.035	0.046	0.106	0.098
Financial services	0.047	0.041	0.039	0.026	0.021	0.036	0.046	0.020
Business services	0.190	0.173	0.237	0.208	0.194	0.146	0.248	0.232
Other services	0.166	0.189	0.250	0.203	0.127	0.122	0.110	0.133
Sample size	211	1136	76	418	284	972	218	1069

Source: own elaboration from the CSWL.