

Inclusive Institutions, Proximity and the Political Culture of Participation: an Empirical Investigation

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Resumen

En las últimas décadas, numerosos trabajos se han encargado de demostrar que las instituciones políticas son capaces de dejar un legado cultural altamente persistente. En la actualidad, España presenta una distribución geográfica considerablemente concentrada de rasgos culturales que están relacionados con la participación social y política. Este artículo estudia el posible origen histórico de estos patrones regionales y concluye que a) las regiones que experimentaron en su historia un sistema de instituciones políticas más inclusivas exhiben hoy mayores niveles de esta cultura de participación y que b) las instituciones inclusivas consiguen dejar un legado cultural más intenso cuando son más próximas al grueso de la población. La evidencia empírica de esta tesis es robusta incluso cuando se controla por otros posibles determinantes.

Summary

In the last decades, numerous studies have argued that political institutions are able to leave a persistent cultural legacy. Spain today presents a geographically concentrated distribution of societal traits that are related to social and political participation. This paper examines the possible historical origin of these regional patterns and concludes that a) those regions that historically experienced more inclusive political systems exhibit currently higher levels of this culture of participation and that b) inclusive institutions are able to leave a more intense cultural legacy when they are more proximate to the bulk of the population. The empirical evidence for this thesis is robust to controlling for other possible determinants.

Keywords: Political culture, social capital, democratic institutions, institutional performance

JEL: Z13, D70, N93, P16

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1. Introduction

Over the last decades, the study of the cultural aspects of a society has gained increasing interest within political economy. This increasing interest is due to the (re)discovery of culture (beliefs, values, traditions, customs...) as a fundamental element to explain the functioning and evolution of formal institutions (Schofield and Caballero, 2011; Kingston and Caballero, 2009; Caballero and Soto-Oñate, 2015) and economic performance through time (North, 1990, 2005; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993, Knack and Keefer, 1997).

Some well-known cultural traits within the research programs of political culture, social capital or institutional economics have been related to a better political and economic performance: personal independence, generalized trust, tolerance and social participation, among many others. Important works have pointed out the role of inclusive institutional frameworks on the development of these cultural traits (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2007; Tabellini, 2010), but little has been done with regard to what kind of institutions leave what kind of cultural traits. This article attempts to introduce and analyze the role of proximity on the depth of the imprint that inclusive institutions leave on culture.

Proximity refers to how close and transcendental the inclusive institutions are to the life of the broad majority of the population. If those inclusive institutions are proximate, they are supposed to be able to leave a more persistent and intensive cultural imprint on the society.

This paper examines the regional patterns across Spain in terms of what is called here political culture of participation and argues that they may partially find their roots in the distant past. The article provides evidence that a) past inclusive political experiences played a role on the difference of participation patterns across the Spanish regions and b) inclusive institutions were more able to leave this cultural imprint when they affected the political process at a more proximate level to the bulk of the population. It thus attempts to confirm the effect of inclusive institutions in the development of traits that favor social participation and to demonstrate the crucial role of proximity to leave this persistent imprint on culture.

For that purpose, it focuses on two historical institutional issues that presented significant differences across regions and serve as proxies to account for the

comparative level of inclusiveness in their political organization and the proximity of the political process to the population. The inclusiveness of political institutions at local level is proxied by the capacity of the towns to develop their own custom-based legal order in the High Middle Ages. At that time, the municipalities of some Iberian areas hosted a transcendental part of the political process for the everyday life of the population. At a different level of proximity, the top of the State, inclusiveness is proxied by the levels of constraints on the executive during the Modern Age in the different kingdoms.

Section 2 deepens the theory of political culture and builds a summary measure of political culture of participation. Section 3 deals with the regionally-distinctive political trajectories within Spain and identifies two institutional elements that serve to proxy the degree of inclusiveness at different levels of proximity. In section 4, the theses are empirically tested. Finally, the last section discusses the results and draws some concluding remarks.

2. Political culture of participation in the Spanish regions

A wide variety of studies on the political culture of Spaniards was published after the arrival of democracy to Spain. Important works were interested in the evolution of their political culture over time, especially in the effect on and of the transition to democracy (López Pintor, 1982; Benedicto, 1989; Montero and Torcal, 1990a; Botella, 1992). Other subsequent works revealed differences based on gender, age, level of education, income and occupation (Justel 1992; Morán and Benedicto, 1995; Morales, 1999; Ferrer et al., 2006; Morales et al., 2006), and across Spanish regions in terms of political culture (Montero and Torcal, 1990b; Frías, 2001) or social capital (Mota and Subirats, 2000; Mota, 2008).

Morán and Benedicto (1995) classify the traits that are usually studied in this research program along four categories:

- a) Individual-citizen as an actor. It includes the base of beliefs that shape the frame of reference on which individuals pose their relation with the collective system. They remark three main components: social values, basic political beliefs and experiences of political socialization.

- b) Citizen-politics linkage. It involves the set of relations that citizens have with the political realm in general and the political system in particular. The two main components are the attitudes toward personal political participation (interest in politics, habits of information on politics, etc.) and behavior of effective (conventional and non-conventional) political participation.
- c) Image of the political system. It covers the citizens' expectations and demands that the political system must fulfil.
- d) The results of institutional action. It comprehends the evaluation made by citizens on the consequences or results of the concrete functioning and especially the performance of government and other central actors.

This paper is focused on a set of cultural traits that will be called political culture of participation. We are not interested in all the previous categories. The traits that are considered in this work and in the building of a summary index are confined to the first two categories. These traits reveal the role of the individual as a political actor along with her links with the political realm and are more directly associated to political involvement and active participation¹. They are similar to those included in the concept of social capital, which in Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti's (1993) version also finds its roots in the political culture literature. These traits are of interest since they are associated in the literature to, among other issues, the practical performance of democratic institutions through political accountability, governmental effectiveness, the reduction of corruption, the overcoming of collective action problems, etc. (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Boix and Posner, 1996, 1998; Uslander, 2004; Nannicini et al., 2013).

With accordance to previous information, a variable is constructed to reflect the variation of these cultural traits across 50 Spanish provinces. For that purpose, three different sources are used: surveys from the Spanish *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (CIS hereafter), the World Values Survey² (WVS hereafter) and the European Social Survey³ (ESS hereafter).

As said above, the considered measures are referred to those two categories and will be confined to those available for Spain at regional level. From the first category, we

¹ Some traits that are usually included in the broader concept of civic culture, such as satisfaction with performance of politicians and support to the system, are left aside.

² From WVS we use the waves from 1991 -first wave in which Spain is included- to 2005.

³ From ESS we take every available wave: 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012.

include indicators about generalized interpersonal trust, associative participation and the socialization process at home. A single variable for generalized trust is obtained by computing the principal component of this information from WVS⁴ and ESS⁵. Associative participation (*association*)⁶ is measured by the participation in twelve kinds of voluntary associations. The measures that account for the socialization process are the frequency in which conversations on politics were held at home when the respondent was child or adolescent (*polhome*)⁷ and the importance of encouraging in children the value of independence (*independence*) and the value of obedience (*obedience*)⁸. The last two, though they do not explicitly refer to politics, are supposed to account for the horizontality or the verticality of the relations within the society.

The second dimension is measured by their interest in politics (*intpol*)⁹, their feeling of being informed about politicians' activities (*infogov*)¹⁰, their information habits about politics (*infopol*)¹¹ and participation in unconventional political actions (*action*)¹².

⁴ From the question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" Two options are offered: "Most people can be trusted" and "Can't be too careful".

⁵ From similar question to WVS' one: "Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted".

⁶ From CIS (1998). We obtain this information from question: "From following associations and organizations, can you tell me about each of these organizations whether you belong, whether you have ever belonged or whether you never belonged to...?". Being the kinds of associations listed: "sport associations and groups", "local or regional societies", "religious associations", "educative, artistic and cultural associations and groups", "juvenile organizations or groups", "charitable associations", "ecologist associations", "labor unions", "political parties", "human rights organizations", "pacifist movement's association", "feminist associations". We use the provincial percentage of people who answer that they belong to it for each case and extract the principal component from all organizations.

⁷ From CIS's (2000) question: "¿Could you tell me if you remember, when you were child or adolescent, how frequent conversations about politics were held at home?" Being the options "very frequently", "sometimes", "rarely" and "practically never". This variable consider the proportion of respondents who answer "very frequently" and "sometimes".

⁸ Past two variables come from WVS' question: "Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five". The offered qualities are: independence, hard work, feeling of responsibility, imagination, tolerance and respect for other people, thrift, obedience, perseverance, religious faith, and unselfishness.

⁹ From surveys CIS (1992), CIS (1998) and CIS (2002). The three of them ask the same question is asked: "Generally speaking, would you say that you are interested in politics a lot, considerably, a little or nothing at all?" We use the provincial percentage of people who answer "A lot" or "quite" and create a single variable from the principal component of all of them.

¹⁰ From surveys CIS (1998) and CIS (2002). Both surveys ask "Generally speaking, would you consider you are very informed, quite informed, a little informed or not informed at all about the activities developed by your autonomous community's government? ¿what about the activities of your autonomous community's parliament? ¿what about your city council's activities?". We use the provincial percentage of people who answer "Very informed" or "quite informed" and create a single variable from the principal component of all of them.

¹¹ From survey CIS (1992) we use the question "Could you tell me how often you read general-information newspapers? How often do you listen the news on the radio? How often do you watch the news on TV?" And from CIS (2010) we use the slightly different question "Now, I would like to make

A summary variable called *Participation Index* is obtained from the first principal component of all these measures -*intpol*, *infogov*, *infopol*, *action*, *polhome*, *obedience*, *independence*, *trust* and *association*. The principal component analysis returns a normalized variable, so this index shows mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Its highest value is reached in Gipuzkoa (2.64) and the lowest one in Jaén (-1.78). Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of the resulting variable. The highest values are located in northern Spain, especially in the northeast.

<< *Insert Figure 1* >>

3. Historical institutions in the origins of political culture disparities

Although culture evolves with contemporaneous events, there also exists a persistent or slow-moving component that reflects historical experiences and is able to condition its evolutionary path (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Roland, 2004; Portes, 2005). In the last decades, important empirical studies were conducted on some highly persistent cultural traits that find their roots in a distant past (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008; Tabellini, 2010; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Alesina et al., 2013; Giuliano and Nunn, 2013). This cultural legacy is able to persist even after the original circumstances have long ago disappeared. Part of these works pointed out political experiences as powerful factors that deeply shape culture.

you some questions about newspapers, radio and television. ¿how often do you listen or watch the news in radio or television? Apart from news, do you listen or watch other shows about politics in radio or television? Apart from sport press, do you read newspaper (in paper or the Internet)? ¿Do you use internet in order to get information about politics or society?”. We use provincial percentage of people who answer “Everyday” and create a single variable from all media in both surveys.

¹² From surveys CIS (2000), CIS (2008) and CIS (2011). The three of them ask a similar question: “I am going to read a list with some possible actions that people may pursue in order to make known their opinion about an issue. I would like you to tell me, for each of them, whether you have realized it on many occasions, sometime or never”. However, surveys do not present the same options every year. CIS (2002) offers “signing a petition”, “participating in a demonstration”, “sending a letter to the media to expose a problem”, “visiting public officer or political representatives”, “participating in a strike”, “occupying buildings, participating in a lock-down or blocking the traffic”, “spraying graffiti or damaging traffic signs or other urban furniture” and “using personal violence to confront other demonstrators or the police”. CIS (2008) presents “participating in a demonstration”, “buying or refusing to buy a product for ethical reasons or to protect the environment”, “participating in a strike” and “occupying buildings, participating in a lock-down or blocking the traffic”. CIS (2011) offers “participating in a demonstration”, “buying or refusing to buy a product for ethical reasons or to protect the environment”, “participating in a strike”, “occupying buildings, participating in a lock-down or blocking the traffic” and “participating in a discussion forum or group about politics in the Internet”. For every year, provincial average of each action is computed and one summary indicator is built by extracting the principal component from all available actions. Finally, one single variable -*action*- is created by obtaining the principal component of the three years.

The causality relation between formal institutions and deep elements of culture (beliefs, values, attitudes...) acts in both directions, and both directions have been covered in the social sciences. Important institutionalists in History, Economics, Political Science and Sociology have focused on how cultural elements, also called informal institutions, are of fundamental importance for institutional path-dependence or affect the future of institutional transplants (Denzau and North, 1995; Roland, 2004; Portes, 2005; North, 2005). Others were centered on how political experiences leave a long-term, persistent cultural legacy (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008; Tabellini, 2010; Becker et al., 2014).

It would thus be short-sighted to neglect this bidirectionality. Having this in mind, this work is focused on the phenomena included in the second category. It is specifically concerned on the effect of inclusive institutions on the development of those cultural traits favorable to social and political participation and cooperation that we have seen in Section 2.

This section reveals the distinctive political paths that regions followed before the unification processes of the 18th and 19th centuries. According to our approach, the different political experiences in their historical trajectories could have given rise to different regional cultural patterns of participation that are still noticeable today.

We focus on two different periods in Spanish history that permit us to establish an interregional comparison in terms of political institutions. In each period, we can find institutional elements that present significant differences across regions and reveal information on the level of inclusiveness of the political institutional system and the level of proximity of the political process.

Inclusiveness is the level to which the members of a population condition political decision making and/or their interests are reflected in the institutions and public policy. In its concrete form, inclusiveness is usually associated with more democratic institutions, rule of law, separation of powers, or a set of individual rights and liberties for civil, political and economic matters. Those institutional environments where participation is permitted and even requested are more able to make participation and cooperation traditions to flourish. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to think that in systems in which the political process were more proximate -i.e. in which the bulk of the important political decisions were made at a closer level to the population-, the inclusive institutional environment could result more capable to generate the dynamics

of political participation and the schemes of thought about the Political that left a persistent imprint in the local culture. This proximity of the political process makes reference not only to the geographical space but also to its location within the strata of the State hierarchy and its distance with regard to the bulk of the population.

As said above, in order to assess the effect of inclusiveness and the proximity of institutions on the development of these cultural traits, two scenarios of the Spanish history will be analyzed. These scenarios illustrate the level of inclusiveness of the institutional systems in the regions at two different levels of the State hierarchy. The inclusiveness of political institutions at local level is proxied by the capacity of the towns to develop their own custom-based legal order in the High Middle Ages. At a different level of proximity, the top of the State, inclusiveness is proxied by the levels of constraints on the executive during the Modern Age in the different kingdoms. The following subsections assess both political experiences.

3.1. State-level inclusiveness: Constraints on the executive in the Early Modern Age

The disparities among the political systems that coexisted within early modern Spain are broadly known. Even though the same monarch held both crowns -Castile and Aragon-, they were separate regimes, with different political institutions, bodies, traditions, etc. However, drawing a solid comparative assessment about the inclusiveness of these different systems is a difficult task. Diverse ways of accounting for the different elements of political organization have emerged within political economy, and the level of constitutional and parliamentary constraints on the executive was considered a key aspect. Thereby, they attempted to compare the extent to which the executive power was monitored and constrained by an organized body, such as a parliament or equivalent.

Our assessment about the institutional environment in early modern Spanish regions relies on Tabellini's (2010) work. Tabellini evaluated past political institutions in the regions of five countries –including Spain- with regard to their constraints on the executive in the years 1600, 1700, 1750, 1800 and 1850. Following Polity IV methodology -see Tabellini's 2005 working paper-, he assigns values from 1 to 7 to his evaluation of constraints on the executive, being 1 “unlimited authority” and 7 “accountable executive, constrained by checks and balances”. Between both extremes

other situations are defined: 3, if executive have to face real but limited constraints –e.g. a legislative body with more than consultative functions-; and 5, when executive power is subject to substantial constraints –e.g. a legislature that often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action or refuses funds to the executive. Even values correspond to transitions between them. The values proposed by Tabellini to the Spanish regions (autonomous communities) are presented in the first columns of Table 1. He assigned a higher value to current autonomous communities of Aragon, Catalonia and Valencian Community in years 1600 and 1700 due to the presence of stronger legislative Courts (the *Cortes*), as opposed to those in the Crown of Castile and the equivalent body in Kingdom of Mallorca.

<<Insert Table 1>>

However this part of Spanish history remains controversial in historiography. The traditional liberal perspective that sees the early modern Castilian Crown as absolutist, unconstrained and highly centralized was strongly contested (e.g., Jago 1981; Thompson 1982; Fernández-Albadalejo 1984; Fortea 1991). Revisionist historians have argued that, although the Castilian *Cortes* were actually debilitated over time, the power of the monarch still was constrained by the power of the elites of the main cities. Eventually, fiscal matters were bargained directly between individual cities' elites and the monarch with no need to summon the *Cortes*. Yet still something can be said on the differences. Although the Crown of Castile should not be considered as a strongly centralized state, during the early modern age “the centralization and the tendency to absolutism are much greater than in the Crown of Aragon” (Le Flem et al. 1989, p. 185). The Castilian Crown certainly faced to important constraints in fiscal policy; however, in eastern Kingdoms, the *Cortes* had a much broader role. For instance, as Gil (1993) put it, “the *Cortes* of Aragon preserved their status as the highest legislative organ. The *Cortes* of Castile, in contrast, had early lost this power to the king and his Royal Council. Exclusive royal law-making was practically non-existent in Aragon, and if the viceroy had powers to issue pragmatics, these had to be subordinated to the higher principles established in the *fueros*¹³. [...] the *Cortes* not only dealt with fiscal matters [...], but also with legislative issues and, by extension, political questions in general”.

¹³ Here it refers to the *Fueros Generales de Aragón*. They ruled in a territorial scope in the whole Kingdom of Aragon. Do not confuse with the municipal *fueros*, which will be introduced in the next subsection.

Therefore, Tabellini's comparative assessment of these systems remains useful for our purposes, but needs to be slightly revised.

Following Tabellini's methodology and starting from the valuation of his indicator, the values for the level of constraints has been modified in a new variable in order to take into account the most extended view in the current Hispanist historiography. On the one hand, the Crown of Castile could not be considered as centralized, unconstrained and absolutist, and, on the other hand, the new modified variable has to express the difference in terms of constraints between the Crown of Castile and the Crown of Aragon before the Decrees of Nueva Planta. Therefore, the resulting valuation is the one presented in the two last columns of Table 1. The punctuation for the Crown of Castile is elevated from 1 to 2 in 1600, and that of the Crown of Aragon is maintained in 3 in 1700 to express that distance contained in Gil (1993).

From this data, we rebuild his variable *pc_institutions*, principal component of all the periods assessed, just as he built it in his work. Figure 2 represents the geographical distribution of this variable –*State level inclusiveness in the Modern Age*. It takes value 1.98 for Aragon, Catalonia and Valencian Community and -0.495 for the rest.

<<Figure 2>>

3.2. Local-level inclusiveness: Municipal autonomy in High Middle Ages

Important works remarked the relevance of political experiences at local level in the development of persistent cultural patterns (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008, 2011; Giuliano and Nunn, 2013).

Italy's case is deeply studied and provides us with some guidance. Banfield (1958), Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) considered that in order to understand the origin of current societal traits disparities across Italian regions it is necessary to refer to their local political experiences in the Middle Ages. During the eleventh century, the Normans invaded the southern part of Italy and set “a feudal monarchy, which continued in some forms or another until the Italian unification in 1861” (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008). This regime, highly hierarchical and bureaucratic, precluded the formation of independent city-states. Even “any glimmerings of communal autonomy were extinguished as soon as they appeared” (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993, p. 123), hindering, by that, the development of

civic traits –considered both under the concept of social capital and political culture of participation. However, in northern city-states, “those who governed the communal republics acknowledged legitimate limits on their rule. Elaborate legal codes were promulgated to confine the violence of the overmighty. In this sense, the structure of authority in the communal republics was fundamentally more liberal and egalitarian than in contemporary regimes elsewhere in Europe, including, of course, the South of Italy itself [...] The practices of civic republicanism provided a breadth of popular involvement in public decision making without parallel in the medieval world” (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993, p. 125). From this perspective, it is understood that the effects of these historical institutional configurations have persisted until the present day by way of culture.

We do not find in Spain free city-state cases in the Italian sense, but there did exist other kinds of inclusive experiences at municipal level during the High Middle Ages that presented clear regional disparities.

During the process of the so-called *Reconquista* (the Christian Reconquest), the Iberian Peninsula lived a peculiar period in terms of socio-political organization. Significant events of this time, like the existence of a weak central and integrative power or the needs to repopulate the new conquered areas, gave rise to a wide range of political and legal arrangements at local level across Medieval Spain. At this time, the municipalities were endowed with great competences, to the extent that in some areas the bulk of the important political decisions were located in the municipal corporations.

Attempting to unidimensionally condensate in a single variable the enormous organizational diversity at that time is also a tough challenge. However, it may seem reasonable to do a rough evaluation of the different levels of autonomy and inclusiveness in the law-making process. Drawing on the history of Spanish law, the fact that will help us to assess municipal inclusiveness in the High Middle Ages is the capacity of the town to develop its own legal order.

In the early stages of the Reconquest, the towns that were founded or were repopulated were provided with a kind of contract, similar to small constitutions, called *fueros*, *cartas forales* or *cartas pueblas*, in which a series of rights and freedoms were granted to the inhabitants. They were intended to make more attractive the new reconquered areas and consolidate positions against the Muslim raids.

The first documents granted were very limited and are known as *Fueros Breves* (brief *Fueros*). They were fundamentally used in the center and northern areas of the Iberian Peninsula. This legislative corpus was insufficient to cover all the normative necessity that the daily life required. Therefore, it had to be covered by other complementary legal code or completed by the local political agents.

Later, in more advanced stages of the Reconquest, the *fueros extensos* (extensive *fueros*) became more common. The elites of the kingdoms tended to offer more complete legal orders and, from certain moment on, large codes were imposed with territorial scope either as complementary texts or definitively displacing the local codes.

Until the eventually imposition of these large codes of territorial scope, extensive areas of the Iberian geography in its northern half were in the need to complete autonomously their own local law –endowed only with a *brief fuero*–, either by the relatively direct and active participation of an important proportion of the population, the use of political delegates or throughout the judicial creation of law. However, this was only so in the northeastern part of the Iberian Peninsula, since the western kingdoms opted to complement the local orders with the Visigothic private law as an underlying corpus.

The ancient Visigothic code *Liber Iudiciorum* regulated the “particular relations of all kinds, procedural and criminal” (García-Gallo, 1979, p. 259). It was an extensive and ambitious legal order that, given its romanist roots, granted the power to legislate to the monarch (Gacto et al., 2009, p. 188; Orduña, 2003, p. 108). Although the *Liber Iudiciorum* corresponds to the Visigothic period, previous to the Muslim invasion, these monarchs opted for its validity after the Christian Reconquest. The validity of this code implied generally the impossibility of developing an entire legal tradition based on the customs of the population and evolving according to the new requirements.

According to García-Gallo, “in stark contrast to the Visigothic system, centered on the validity of *Liber Iudiciorum*, we find what we could characterize as free law; that is, an always-in-progress legal order, within which the norms to be applied are freely seek for each case, and for any dispute judges judge freely according to their «free will»” (García-Gallo, 1979, p. 377). They created or formalized the law with accordance to what is “in the mind of the population”, even when it was not previously formulated. Except in rare cases, “it never was a capricious and arbitrary decision by the judge, since the people would have never accepted such a regime” (García-Gallo, 1979, p. 369).

With regard to the expansion of this judicial creation of law, “it had deep roots in Castile¹⁴, Navarra and Aragon” (Gacto et al., 2009, pp. 121-122). Although not by the judicial process, in Basque provinces (Gacto et al., 2009, p. 204) and Catalonia (García-Gallo, 1979, p. 445) custom-based legislation was also developed by local political agents.

We thus take into account here the regency of a customary-based legislation locally developed as a measure of inclusiveness at municipal level. We build a dummy variable that takes value 1 in the current autonomous communities of Cantabria, Madrid, La Rioja, Basque Country, Navarra, Aragon, and Catalonia, along with the provinces Burgos, Valladolid, Avila, Segovia, Soria, and Guadalajara, as presented in Figure 3. This variable attempts to capture the comparative autonomy in the elaboration of local law in the towns of the province. These are places that enjoyed a *fuero breve* and did not have an extensive legal code -such as the *Liber Iudiciorum*- to complement it. Therefore, the population was configuring their own legislative framework by an explicit protodemocratic political process and/or the judicial creation of law. Under this environment, comparatively more inclusive, the population as a whole was more influent on the political process than in the rest of the territories.

<< *Insert Figure 3* >>

4. Empirical analysis

4.1. *Historical political institutions and political culture*

This paper attempts to demonstrate in the first place that there exist empirical reasons to believe that the current regional differences in these political culture traits have, at least partly, a historical and essentially political origin. However, as Almond (1990) suggests, the causality chain linking culture and political structure operates in both directions.

The case that is proposed here is a so-called natural experiment, in which it is possible to study political culture in isolation from political institutions. As we have seen above,

¹⁴ In that context, by mentioning Castile the author refers to current provinces Ávila, Burgos, Guadalajara, La Rioja, Madrid, Santander, Segovia, Soria and part of Palencia and Valladolid.

regions followed substantially distinctive political paths, showing relevant disparities in terms of institutional features that have been associated with the development of these cultural traits. These regionally distinctive political paths end with the unification process, i.e. the Bourbon centralization in the eighteenth century and the constitutional and administrative unification processes of the Liberal State in the nineteenth century. This fact is of fundamental importance, since it homogenizes the formal institutional environment for all regions. Thus we do not consider formal institutions to transmit variation since then. This is how we theoretically isolate subsequent political culture from the effect of subsequent formal political institutions. However, this is a very strong assumption, since certain regionally-distinctive formal institutional features did transcend after unification, and subsection 4.2 deals with this.

The theses to be demonstrated are, as posed in the introduction, that a) past inclusive political experiences led to the different patterns of participation in the current Spanish regions and b) inclusive institutions are more able to leave this cultural imprint when they affect to the political process at a more proximate level to the bulk of the population. In this section, we deal with the relation between the measures of participation and the historical institutions separately and then we argue about the capacity that inclusive institutions have to generate these cultural traits depending on their proximity.

<< *Insert Table 2* >>

Table 2 provides the correlation coefficients between our participation measures and the historical political variables presented in section 3 –*Local_incl* and *State_incl*. We can see how both historical institutional factors present a positive relationship with the summary measure of political culture of participation and its components except *obedience*, with which they are negatively correlated. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3 report ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions of the summary measure for political culture of participation –*Participation Index*- on the historical political variables, *Local inclusiveness in Middle Ages*, and *State inclusiveness in the Modern Age*. Both historical variables' coefficients present a positive and highly significant effect on the development of these cultural traits. The following exercises introduce sets of controls in the regressions to assess the robustness of the results.

<< *Insert Table 3* >>

In the rest of the columns of the Table 3, prolonged historical factors that could have left a cultural imprint are introduced as control variables: comparative economic development, literacy and access to land. These three issues will be captured in 1860, when main political transformations towards unification can be said to be completed. In this way, we account for the starting conditions at the moment of unification. Modernization theory asserts that culture evolves with socioeconomic conditions. Although a persistent component still remains, “economic development is associated with shifts away from absolute norms and values toward values that are increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, and participatory” (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). In these columns, regressions are controlled for an estimate of *GDP per capita in 1860* (Carreras et al., 2005). Additionally, education also stands out as one of the main factors that improve political culture of participation. This alternative must thus be controlled for, and it is done by including provincial *Literacy rates in 1860* (DGIGE, 1863), proportion of people that can read and write on the overall population. Finally, inequality in its various forms is supposed to affect negatively to these traits (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Kyriacou and López-Velásquez, 2014). A control variable related to the access to land in 1860, when Spain was an essentially agrarian society, provides information on this issue. *Access to land in 1860* is the proportion of land owners over the population employed in agrarian activities in the province (DGIGE, 1863). Appendix I and Appendix II present, respectively, the descriptions and the main descriptive statistics of all the used variables. In these two regressions conducted with controls of past socioeconomic conditions, political variables’ coefficients remain highly significant, present the expected sign and do not show important alteration from those obtained in the first two regressions of Table 3.

<< *Insert Table 4* >>

Another concern is that current provincial levels of these cultural traits may simply reflect current socioeconomic conditions, such as provincial level of income, education or income inequality. However, we must also expect these issues to be endogenous to the considered cultural traits. Due to reverse causality, one must be careful when interpreting the outcomes. What we are able to assess is whether the historical political institutions had a distinctive effect on current cultural traits beyond that contained in the effect of these contemporary variables. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 introduce a

control variable for current provincial income levels: the logarithm of the average annual *GDP per capita* of the province between 1998 and 2008. While current levels of income are highly significant, historical political variables' coefficients are strongly affected in its significance and size, but still *Local inclusiveness in Middle Ages* seems to have a distinctive effect on the cultural traits that is not contained in that of current economic development. Columns (3) and (4) introduce the current *Level of education*, the average proportion of active population with post-compulsory education during the period 1998-2008, and only *Local inclusiveness*' coefficient shows a high significance and the expected effect. Regressions in columns (5) and (6) control for the current **level of inequality** by including the variable the average Gini coefficient of household expenditure by equivalent person between 1998 and 2005¹⁵, and again only *Local inclusiveness* remains significant. Finally, in regressions (7) and (8), all these controls are included and, only the variable for *Local inclusiveness* remains significant but the size of its coefficient was considerably altered.

Table 5 includes geographical factors as controls, which were also suggested to have a role in shaping individual preferences and cultural traits. The geographical control variables included in the regressions are *Latitude*, *Longitude*, *Altitude*, *Coast Density* – length of the coast divided by the province's area- and **Ruggedness** of the terrain. Once again, political variable's coefficients remain significant and present no big alteration with regard to the basic model.

<< *Insert Table 5* >>

The second thesis made reference to the level of proximity of the political process and asserted that those inclusive institutions that are more proximate to the bulk of the population are more able to leave this cultural imprint. When both historical institutional variables are included in the same regression and we make them compete, as in the Table 6, *Local level inclusiveness* is always significant and *State level inclusiveness* is not. It means that our proxy for inclusiveness at the top of the State has no distinctive effect when the municipal experiences are taking into account. Even in spite of being further in time, the municipal experiences of inclusiveness in the Middle Ages seem to have been able to leave this cultural legacy in a more intense and persistent way or, perhaps, the only one capable to do it.

¹⁵ Unfortunately, last data that IVIE provides corresponds to 2005.

<< *Insert Table 6* >>

4.2. *About the unification assumption: The persistence of the historical private law*

As mentioned above, the assumption of perfect institutional integration in the empirical strategy is too simple. An issue that could raise doubts is the continuity of part of the historical formal institutions that were regionally distinctive and may have functioned as an alternative origin and factor of persistence. Formal differences in private law actually transcended and they have not been taken into account in the stylized outline of the case. In order to isolate the direct effect of local inclusiveness on these cultural traits from the possible effect of these distinctive legal orders, strategically-reduced samples will be used. These sub-samples represent critical zones in where we can observe variability in ***Local level inclusiveness*** within a specific civil code. The effect of our historical political variables on the ***Participation Index*** is assessed in two sub-samples:

A) Those regions in which Castilian private code already formally ruled before the processes of unification: all the provinces under the Crown of Castile except Basque Country and Navarre. The geographic location of this critical zone of 35 observations is illustrated in Figure 4.A). In column (1) of Table 7, we can see how ***Local Inclusiveness*** remains highly significant and its coefficient shows the expected sign. However, the size of their coefficients was notoriously altered.

B) Those provinces of critical zone A plus Catalan provinces and Balearic Islands are included here. Despite the unification of both Crowns under the political institutions of Castile, Mallorca and Catalonia maintained their civil codes. If we consider that the Catalan and Balearic legal orders share common roots, we could identify them as belonging to a common legal family within which we can observe variation in our variable ***Local Inclusiveness*** (see Figure 4.B). In column (2), we conduct the same regression on this new subsample and control for the fixed effects of these legal codes by including the dummy ***Castilian Private Law***, which takes value 1 in the critical zone A. Results are again satisfactory: ***Local Inclusiveness***' coefficient is significant and ***Castilian Private Law*** is not.

<< *Insert Figure 4* >>

<< *Insert Table 7* >>

4.3. On the causality relations

In our narrative, early political institutions were treated as exogenous accidents that subsequently gave rise to cultural traits. A legitimate question is to what extent we can consider political paths to be accidental or rather they had actually something to do with previous cultural circumstances; that is to say, whether political structure is exogenous or endogenous with regard to political culture. If the exogeneity of the historical political pasts is not demonstrated we cannot confirm a causality relation from the political structure to the political culture.

Municipal organization had actually an important exogenous component due to the impact of the Christian Reconquest. The Muslim invasion and the Christian Reconquest marked a break with previous political organization in the Iberian Peninsula. The subsequent local political configuration results as a consequence of the different needs of warfare and repopulation, the different identity of the individuals or organizations in charge of them -clergymen, military organizations, free peasants, etc.- and the different power imbalances.

In the first stages of the Reconquest, repopulation in the northeastern quarter of the Iberian Peninsula was more spontaneous. The need to make appealing for settlers the new conquered territories, uninhabited and desolated by war, led the monarchs to offer better arrangements for those areas. That was materialized into a broad set of civil and political rights and freedoms and the granting of land ownership to the settler who first ploughed it. In the last stages of the Reconquest process towards the south, the increasingly powerful religious-military orders, nobility and royal power were mainly the organizations in charge of not only the Reconquest but also the repopulation, the selection of legal orders and the distribution of land in the new areas, giving rise to a highly concentrated distribution of land and more politically hierarchical societies. This means that, as war was progressing toward the south, political organizations were more and more hierarchical and the distribution of economic resources and political power was more and more concentrated, with this being reflected in the local legal codes. We can thus recognize an important component of exogeneity in the political institutions that were set across regions in the Middle Ages.

5. Discussion and concluding remarks

Tons of ink have been devoted to the characteristics that citizenry should have to make democracy work. Previous research has remarked the importance of an active citizenry more interested in political matters, more informed and conscious, more willing to hold the political elites accountable, etc. This research has been focused on what we have called here political culture of participation, and a set of variables has been used to account for its interregional variability within Spain. However, we must not forget that they are only proxies for a broader cultural environment. This work did not aim to make a comprehensive description of the political culture but to account for its regional variation.

This paper addressed the origins of these differences in political culture across Spanish regions and suggested the inclusiveness and the proximity of historical political institutions as a principal factor. For that purpose, it delved into Spanish history and exposed the different political paths that regions followed. As proxies to account for the comparative level of inclusiveness in the political organization and the proximity of the political process, two factors were considered: the capacity of the municipalities to develop a customary-based legal order in the Middle Ages and the constraints on the executive at the top of the State in the Modern Age.

Both historical political experiences are positively correlated to the distribution of these cultural traits. The OLS regressions show a significant effect of both facts, but not both of them present the same robustness to the inclusion of other important determinants of culture, such as economic prosperity, education, inequality or geographical factors. The variable for State-level political inclusiveness -constraints on the executive- resulted not to be robust to the inclusion of some of these controls. Moreover, when we make both variables to compete in the same regression, our proxy for State-level inclusiveness loses all its significance to the measure of local-level inclusiveness. This means that constraints on the executive have no distinctive effect on the development of these traits apart from that related to municipal level inclusiveness. This is consistent with Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti and Guiso, Sapieza and Zingales' perspective, who pointed out that prolonged experiences of horizontal cooperation and citizens' empowerment at local level were the factors that left this persistent legacy in northern Italy. In turn, an open-access environment for the elites at the top of the political hierarchy may be insufficient to bring about cooperation and participation dynamics in the lower strata of society.

This work contributes to a growing body of research that demonstrates that political institutions may leave a highly persistent cultural legacy and invite to the reinterpretation of previous works on institutional path-dependence. Nevertheless, many unknowns still remain. Further research could be aimed at understanding the specific political elements that gave rise to the distinctive development of these cultural traits and the mechanism through which they operate. Understanding the dialectical relation between democratic institutions and political culture of participation will be of great usefulness for policy design.

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Appendix I. Variable's description, aggregation and source

Table 7

Variables' description, aggregation and source

Variable	Description	Aggregation	Source
Variables on political culture of participation			
<i>infopol</i>	Information habits about politics	Province	CIS (1992, 2010)
<i>infogov</i>	Feeling of being informed about politicians' activities	Province	CIS (1998, 2002)
<i>intpol</i>	Interest in politics	Province	CIS (1992, 1998, 2002)
<i>association</i>	Participation in twelve kinds of associations	Province	CIS (2002)
<i>action</i>	Participation in alternative ways of political actions	Province	CIS (2000, 2008, 2011)
<i>polhome</i>	Frequency in which conversations on politics were held at home when the respondent was child or adolescent	Province	CIS (2000)
<i>obedience</i>	Importance of encouraging obedience in children	Community	WVS
<i>independence</i>	Importance of encouraging independence in children	Community	WVS
<i>trust</i>	Generalized interpersonal trust	Community	WVS and ESS
<i>Participation Index</i>	Principal component from all political culture variables	Province	Own
Variables on historical political institutions			
<i>Local inclusiveness in Middle Ages</i>	Local development of a customary-based legal order in the High Middle Ages	Province	Based on Barrero and Alonso (1989), García- Gallo (1979), Gacto et al. (2009)
<i>State inclusiveness in the Modern Age</i>	Assessment of constraints on the executive during 1600-1850, based on Tabellini (2010)	Province	Tabellini (2010)
Control variables			
<i>GDP per capita in 1860</i>	Relative index of GDP per capita in 1860 imputed to the province (Spain=100)	Community	Carreras et al. (2005)
<i>Literacy rates in 1860</i>	Percentage of population in the province that could read and write in 1860	Province	DGIGE (1863)
<i>Access to land in 1860</i>	Proportion of land owners over the population employed in agrarian activities in the province in 1860	Province	DGIGE (1863)
<i>GDP per capita 1998-2008</i>	Log of the annual average GDP per capita of the province between 1998 and 2008	Province	INE
<i>Level of education 1998-2008</i>	Percentage of population that completed postcompulsory education between 1998 and 2008	Province	Fundación Bancaja and IVIE (2014)
<i>Level of inequality 1998-2005</i>	Average Gini coefficient of household expenditure by equivalent person between 1998 and 2005	Community	Fundación Caixa Galicia and IVIE (2009)
<i>Latitude</i>	Latitude (degrees) of the capital of the province	Province	AEMET (2013)
<i>Longitude</i>	Longitude (degrees) of the capital of the province	Province	AEMET (2013)
<i>Altitude</i>	Altitude in meters of the capital of the province	Province	AEMET (2012)
<i>Coast density</i>	Province's coast length divided by province area	Province	Based on INE (2003)
<i>Ruggedness</i>	Terrain Ruggedness Index	Province	Goerlich and Cantarino (2010)
<i>Castilian private law</i>	Castilian private law before unification	Province	Own

Appendix II. Main descriptive statistics

Table 8
Main descriptive statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean/freq.	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>infopol</i>	50	0	1	-1.91	2.26
<i>infogov</i>	50	0	1	-2.18	3.16
<i>intpol</i>	50	0	1	-2.07	2.07
<i>association</i>	50	0	1	-0.31	0.52
<i>action</i>	50	0	1	-2.17	2.37
<i>polhome</i>	50	0.18	0.08	0	0.4
<i>obedience</i>	50	0.41	0.07	0.28	0.53
<i>independence</i>	50	0.31	0.06	0.23	0.44
<i>trust</i>	50	0	1	-1.69	1.90
<i>Participation Index</i>	50	0	1	-1.78	2.64
<i>Local inclusiveness in the Middle Ages</i>	50	20*			
<i>State inclusiveness in the Modern Age</i>	50	0	1	-0.50	1.98
<i>Literacy rate in 1860</i>	50	0.21	0.08	0.10	0.41
<i>GDP per capita in 1860</i>	50	97.55	37.09	51.3	309.7
<i>Access to land in 1860</i>	50	0.35	0.10	0.14	0.52
<i>GDP per capita 1998-2008</i>	50	9.76	0.21	9.43	10.19
<i>Level of education 1998-2008</i>	50	0.76	0.06	0.57	0.86
<i>Level of inequality (Gini) 1998-2005</i>	50	0.30	0.02	0.26	0.34
<i>Latitude</i>	50	40.10	3.16	28.2	43.5
<i>Longitude</i>	50	3.84	3.73	-2.82	16.25
<i>Altitude</i>	50	0.37	0.368	0.01	1.13
<i>Coast Density</i>	50	0.03	0.06	0	0.29
<i>Ruggedness Index</i>	50	33.52	14.80	9.43	75.25
<i>Castilian private law</i>	50	35*			

*Instead of mean, frequency of times the dummy variable takes value 1 is displayed.

Appendix III. Maps of Spanish autonomous communities and provinces

Figure 5
Map of Spanish autonomous communities





Figure 6
Map of Spanish provinces



Tables

Table 1

Level of constraints on the executive in the Spanish regions in 1600, 1700, 1750, 1800 and 1850

Crown	Autonomous Community	Tabellini (2010)					Revised	
		1600	1700	1750	1800	1850	1600	1700
Crown of Castile	Andalusia	1	1	1	2	4	2	2
	Asturias	1	1	1	2	4	2	2
	Balearic Islands	1	1	1	2	4	2	2
	Canary Islands	1	1	1	2	4	2	2
	Cantabria	1	1	1	2	4	2	2
	Castile and Leon	1	1	1	2	4	2	2
	Castile-La Mancha	1	1	1	2	4	2	2
	Extremadura	1	1	1	2	4	2	2
	Galicia	1	1	1	2	4	2	2
	La Rioja	1	1	1	2	4	2	2
	Madrid	1	1	1	2	4	2	2
	Murcia	1	1	1	2	4	2	2
	Navarre	1	1	1	2	4	2	2
Basque Country	1	1	1	2	4	2	2	
Crown of Aragon	Aragon	3	2	1	2	4	3	3
	Catalonia	3	2	1	2	4	3	3
	Valencian Community	3	2	1	2	4	3	3

Table 2
Participation measures and historical political variables: coefficients of linear correlation

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]	[12]
	<i>Local_incl</i>	<i>State_incl</i>	<i>Part. Index</i>	<i>infopol</i>	<i>intpol</i>	<i>infogov</i>	<i>action</i>	<i>trust</i>	<i>obedience</i>	<i>independ.</i>	<i>polhome</i>	<i>association</i>
[1] <i>Local_incl</i>	1											
[2] <i>State_incl</i>	0.3062**	1										
[3] <i>Part. Index</i>	0.6533***	0.3408**	1									
[4] <i>infopol</i>	0.4202***	0.1678	0.6091***	1								
[5] <i>intpol</i>	0.3509	0.033	0.6223***	0.4945***	1							
[6] <i>infogov</i>	0.345	0.068	0.7403***	0.3858***	0.7028***	1						
[7] <i>action</i>	0.4858***	0.0752	0.5484***	0.2563*	0.3106**	0.3595**	1					
[8] <i>trust</i>	0.3462	0.1001	0.5220***	0.2357*	-0.047	0.2088	0.1890	1				
[9] <i>obedience</i>	-0.559***	-0.343	-0.678***	-0.310**	-0.085	-0.268*	-0.134	-0.664***	1			
[10] <i>independence</i>	0.4857***	0.4461***	0.6907***	0.2470*	0.2279	0.3326**	0.3034**	0.3372**	-0.629***	1		
[11] <i>polhome</i>	0.3006	0.4675***	0.6191***	0.2603*	0.2743*	0.4223***	0.2129	0.2091	-0.409***	0.5158***	1	
[12] <i>association</i>	0.4055***	0.1891	0.5860***	0.2559	0.3941***	0.3946***	0.4244***	0.2436*	-0.304**	0.2222	0.1256	1

*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.

Table 3

The impact of political institutions on political culture of participation:
controlling for economic development, education and inequality in 1860

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>Participation Index</i>			
<i>Local Inclusiveness in Middle Ages</i>	1.32***		1.53***	
	(0.24)		(0.31)	
<i>State Inclusiveness in Modern Age</i>		0.34**		0.483***
		(0.14)		(0.14)
<i>GDP per capita 1860</i>			0.00	0.003
			(0.00)	(0.01)
<i>Literacy rate in 1860</i>			-2.60	4.118**
			(1.62)	(1.77)
<i>Access to land 1860</i>			-1.79	-2.35*
			(1.12)	(1.39)
<i>_cons</i>	-0.53***	0.00	0.32	-0.282
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.59)	(0.65)
N	50	50	50	50
adj. R ²	0.4149	0.0977	0.449	0.2301

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; robust errors in column (3) and uncorrected errors in the rest.
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Estimation method: OLS.

Table 4

The impact of political institutions on political culture of participation:
controlling for current economic development, education and inequality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	<i>Participation Index</i>							
<i>Local inclusiveness Middle Ages</i>	0.573*		1.11***		0.78***		0.527*	
	(0.30)		(0.26)		(0.23)		(0.30)	
<i>State inclusiveness Modern Age</i>		0.067		0.221		0.154		0.065
		(0.13)		(0.15)		(0.13)		(0.13)
<i>GDP per capita (1998-2008)</i>	2.44***	3.32***					1.09	1.80**
	(0.73)	(0.55)					(0.91)	(0.75)
<i>Level of education (1998-2008)</i>			3.75**	7.4***			1.086	1.412
			(1.77)	(2.50)			(1.71)	(1.83)
<i>Level of inequality (Gini) (1998-2005)</i>					-23.3***	-31.8***	-17.31**	-17.8**
					(5.71)	(5.32)	(6.83)	(6.59)
<i>_cons</i>	-24.03***	-32.4***	-3.3**	-5.6***	6.76***	9.64***	-6.434	-13.24
	(7.01)	(5.28)	(1.33)	(1.89)	(1.79)	(1.64)	(9.74)	(8.49)
N	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
adj. R ²	0.5440	0.5108	0.4618	0.2792	0.5822	0.5004	0.6045	0.5771

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Estimation method: OLS.

Table 5
The impact of political institutions on political culture of participation: controlling for geographic factors

	(1)	(2)
	<i>Participation Index</i>	
<i>Local Inclusiveness in Middle Ages</i>	1.155*** (0.26)	
<i>State Inclusiveness in Modern Age</i>		0.211 (0.16)
<i>Latitude</i>	0.063* (0.04)	0.118** (0.05)
<i>Longitude</i>	-0.008 (0.03)	-0.022 (0.05)
<i>Altitude</i>	-0.556 (0.34)	0.074 (0.41)
<i>Coast Density</i>	1.073 (1.03)	2.007 (2.52)
<i>Ruggedness Index</i>	0.015** (0.01)	0.025** (0.01)
<i>_cons</i>	-3.27** (1.47)	-5.55*** (2.03)
N	50	50
adj. R ²	0.5874	0.3231

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; robust errors in columns (1) and uncorrected errors in (2). *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Estimation method: OLS.

Table 6
The impact of political institutions on political culture of participation: the role of proximity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>Participation Index</i>			
<i>Local Inclusiveness in Middle Ages</i>	1.224*** (0.26)	1.37*** (0.38)	0.524* (0.30)	1.12*** (0.27)
<i>State Inclusiveness in Modern Age</i>	0.155 (0.12)	0.14 (0.14)	0.062 (0.13)	0.089 (0.13)
<i>GDP per capita 1860</i>		0.002 (0.004)		
<i>Literacy rate in 1860</i>		-1.433 (2.04)		
<i>Access to land 1860</i>		-2.129* (1.19)		
<i>GDP per capita 1998-2008</i>			0.984 (0.94)	
<i>Level of education 1998-2008</i>			1.006 (1.78)	
<i>Level of inequality (Gini) 1998-2005</i>			-17.36** (6.87)	
<i>Latitude</i>				0.070* (0.04)
<i>Longitude</i>				0.006 (0.03)
<i>Altitude</i>				-0.487 (0.33)
<i>Coast Density</i>				1.288 (1.09)
<i>Ruggedness Index</i>				0.015** (0.01)
<i>_cons</i>	-0.49*** (0.11)	0.332 (0.63)	-5.325 (10.26)	-3.64** (1.45)
N	50	50	50	50
adj. R ²	0.4487	0.5044	0.6077	0.5917

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Estimation method: OLS.

Table 7
 On the unification assumptions:
 The persistence of the historical private law

	(1)	(2)
	<i>Participation Index</i>	
<i>Local Inclusiveness in Middle Ages</i>	0.81*** (0.25)	0.84*** (0.28)
<i>Castilian Private Law</i>		-0.61 (0.46)
<i>_cons</i>	-0.58*** (0.13)	0.02 (0.45)
N	35	40
adj. R ²	0.2133	0.3180

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: robust errors in column (2) and uncorrected errors in the column (1). *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Estimation method: OLS. Columns (1) shows reduced samples according to Figure 4.A) and column (2) according to 4.B).

Figures

Figure 1
 Geographical distribution of the *Participation Index*




Figure 2
 State-level inclusiveness: Constraints on the executive, 1600-1850




Figure 3
 Local inclusiveness in High Middle Ages: Presence of custom-based law at municipal level




Figure 4
 Critical zones where historical variables' effect can be isolated from the effect of civil codes

