Recognition in Adam Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*

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ABSTRACT

There is an important role for recognition in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. There is recognition in the sympathetic process, in love and wealth accumulation. Because the sympathetic process is intersubjective as in the psychoanalytic literature, it is based on recognition of minds, which results from the mirroring process of mothers. Love, which is based on mutual regard, requires mutual recognition. Individuals are motivated with the need to form relationships, in which they recognize each other, as in the psychoanalytic literature on object relations theory, and philosophical writings. The third form of recognition is based on wealth accumulation, which gives esteem and admiration. Esteem results from recognition and is born out of interpersonal interactions. We contribute to the literature by highlighting the importance of recognition in the sympathetic process, in love and wealth accumulation based on psychoanalytic and philosophical literature.

KEYWORDS: Recognition, sympathy, love, achievement, Adam Smith.

Reconocimiento en *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* de Adam Smith

RESUMEN

Hay un papel importante para el reconocimiento en *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Se trata del reconocimiento en el proceso de simpatía, en el amor y la acumulación de riqueza. El proceso de simpatía se basa en el reconocimiento de las mentes, que resulta del proceso de reflejo de las madres en la infancia y es intersubjetivo en la literatura psicoanalítica. El amor, basado en el respeto mutuo, requiere reconocimiento mutuo. Los individuos están motivados con la necesidad de formar relaciones, en las que se reconocen mutuamente, como en la literatura psicoanalítica sobre la teoría de las relaciones objetales y las escrituras filosóficas. La forma de reconocimiento en la acumulación de riqueza se basa en que otorga estima y admiración. La estima es el resultado del reconocimiento y nace de las interacciones interpersonales. Contribuimos a la literatura destacando la importancia del reconocimiento en el proceso de simpatía, en el amor y la acumulación de riqueza que se presenta en la literatura psicoanalítica y filosófica.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Reconocimiento, simpatía, amor, logro, Adam Smith.

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Recognition plays an important role in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (hereafter *TMS*). We identified distinct forms of recognition in the *TMS*, which we elaborate on below. These different forms of recognition are based on the psychoanalytic and philosophical literatures. The first form, which occurs in the sympathetic process, is recognition of the mind of the other as in the intersubjective process described in the psychoanalytic literature. The second is mutual recognition that takes place in love relationships, as described by Hegel and the German philosopher Axel Honneth. The third type of recognition, based on Honneth, is recognition of the achievements of another that contribute to a shared value horizon of society, such as the value of wealth accumulation.

First, let us define the mind, subjectivity, and the self, since we will be using these terms throughout the paper. Even though the recognition of the mind is referred to in the psychoanalytic literature on intersubjectivity, it is not defined in that literature. In general, in the psychoanalytic literature, the mind is viewed as a psychological structure; it includes memory, thought, language, values, morality, capacity to imagine, create, consciousness and so forth. Subjectivity refers to intensity of attachment, our agency, consciousness of experiences, beliefs, desires, and feelings; it is an essential part of being and it is fluid, rather than structured. It is about one's knowledge of his unique self. The self is an ongoing accumulation of introjects that come from early object attachments. The self includes both the mind and subjectivity.

Starting with the sympathetic process, we should note that the sympathetic process which occurs between the spectator and the agent is an intersubjective one (Brown 2012, Özler and Gabrinetti 2018). In the psychoanalytic literature, one of the features of intersubjectivity is identified as recognition of the other's mind (Ogden 1985; Stern 1985; Benjamin 1988 y 1990; Stern et al. 1998). Another aspect of intersubjectivity is the creation of our subjectivities in the intersubjective process (Ogden 1992; Benjamin 1990).

Since one type of recognition refers to the recognition of the mind of another, we ask how we come understand or, recognize our minds and those of others. In the psychoanalytic literature, Winnicott (1971)

states that there is no such thing as a baby. In other words, a baby only exists with his mother. An important element that can be provided by a mother is mirroring, which is when the mother reflects a reasonably accurate perspective in her experience of the child's emotional state of being, back to the child. Mirroring serves the function of developing our subjectivities and helps babies to become aware of their state of minds. The child needs to find his mind in the mind of another to have awareness of his own mind, which occurs through mirroring. Caregivers instinctively "mark" their mirroring by using exaggerated facial and vocal patterns of affective, expressive displays. This is done to signal to the baby that it is the mother's version of the baby's state to indicate that this is not how she feels, but that she is aware of the baby's state. Mentalization (an individual's explicit and implicit interpretation of his and other's actions) by the mother's affective, interpersonal understanding of the child's state facilitates the child's capacity to mentalize. The child can explore the mind of the mother and learn about minds through this process. Children only become independent subjects if they are recognized as independent subjects having their own minds, and they in turn recognize the independent subjectivity of their mothers.

In the sympathetic process, self is constituted by being recognized by others. In the quote we give in the sympathy section, Smith states that one becomes aware of himself only when he is in society. Society is the mirror of an individual. In addition, the spectator and the agent recognize each other's minds through an imagination process. Smith refers to one putting oneself in another's situation through imagination. One's situation entails his entire being, not only the external circumstances.

Let us now turn to recognition in love. Honneth (1995) distinguishes three forms of recognition: love, rights and esteem. Of these, the first and the last are relevant for our project. Honneth starts with Hegel's view of love. Love is a relationship of mutual recognition, in which individuality is confirmed. Honneth adds to this view by describing love as a precarious balance between attachment and independence. This echoes the psychoanalytic object relations theory, which suggests that individuals are motivated with the need to form relationships, in which they recognize each other. According to Honneth, in the object relations

theory, love is portrayed as a form of recognition because the theory indicates that the successful affectional bonds depends on our capacity to strike a balance between symbiosis and independence, a capacity that is acquired in early childhood. Honneth focuses on Winnicott (1965; 1971) to describe the object relations theory, as we will describe later. Smith did not have the language of object relations theory and recognition, having written about a century before Hegel, and about three centuries before Honneth and Winnicott. However, he puts great emphasis on love in the *TMS* and there is clear evidence that he views love as being a component of mutual regard. We can't have mutual regard without recognizing the other.

The third form of recognition we identified in the TMS is based on wealth accumulation, which gives esteem, according to Honneth. Esteem comes as the result of recognition and is born out of the interpersonal interaction. With individualization, esteem is accompanied by a felt confidence that one's abilities or achievements will be recognized as valuable by others. For this to occur an individual must do something that is valued by shared value horizon of a society. Wealth accumulation was an important component of the social value horizon in Scotland during Smith's time. Per Smith, we admire and value those who accumulate wealth. We show our wealth to gain the approbation and the recognition of others.

Our paper is not the only one that points out the importance of recognition in Smith's works. Kalyvas and Katznelson (2001) emphasize the role of speech in linking sympathy, and markets. O'Neill (2011) focuses on pathologies of misrecognition, namely in poverty, arguing that the poor are misrecognized in Smith. The contribution of this paper is to highlight the importance of recognition in love, wealth accumulation, and the sympathetic process, benefitting from the psychoanalytic literature and Honneth's writings.

After this introduction, the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains a review of recognition in the psychoanalytic literature. In section 3, we delineate recognition aspects of the sympathetic process in the *TMS*. Section 4 contains a description of recognition in Honneth, focusing on his conception of love and esteem. In section 5 we describe the preeminence of love in the *TMS* and posit it in terms of recognition.

Section 6 is an analysis of Smith's views on wealth from a recognition perspective. Our concluding remarks are in Section 7.

2. Recognition in psychoanalysis

Since we argue that the sympathetic process, and thereby morality is based on the recognition of the mind of another, in this section we describe how we come to recognize the mind of another.

First, let us note that the sympathetic process is intersubjective, and it involves the recognition of the mind of another, as stated in the psychoanalytic literature on intersubjectivity. Kohut's self-psychological approach was a precursor of intersubjective approach in psychoanalysis. He brought in the role of the analyst's subjectivity to the treatment situation in relation to the patient's subjectivity.[1] In his use of empathy, Kohut (1971; 1977) highlights the analyst's impact on the analytic situation. In this view, the analyst becomes an interactive participant in the analytic situation.[2] The interactive analytic situation is impacted by the analyst. As such, the observer is included in the field that is observed, as occurs in the sympathetic process.[3]

Different psychoanalysts emphasize different aspects of intersubjectivity. 1) Storolow and his collaborators (Stolorow and Atwood 1979; Storolow, Atwood and Brandchaft 1994) view intersubjectivity as *mutual influence* and regulation which starts at birth. 2) *Mutual recognition* of minds as separate, which develops later in infancy is the focus of Stern (1985; Stern et al. 1998) Ogden (1992a; 1992b) and Benjamin (1988; 1990). 3) Stern (1985) and Ogden (1992a; 1992b) highlight the creation of *shared meaning* in the intersubjective process. This creation is an achievement of a later development in infancy.

In this paper, we will only focus on the recognition aspect of intersubjectivity. In addition, only if the subject is recognized by another

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[1] See Teicholz (2001) and Bohleber (2013) for useful reviews of intersubjectivity in psychoanalytic literature.

[2] The same view can be found in Loewald (1988: 50-51): "The origin of individual psychic life...is a transindividual field, represented by the mother/infant matrix, not an individual unconscious and instincts residing in an individual". Similarly, each participant affects the other's experience in a patient-analyst system of mutual interaction (Hoffman 1983).

[3] Similarly, Jung (1968: 41-42) states that "in psychology, the means by which you study the psyche is not the psyche itself...The observer is the observed".

subject, does the subject exit. Because without recognition by another, one's autonomy, one's subjectivity, one's self-consciousness does not form. Hegel (1807: 111) describes intersubjectivity as follows: "self-consciousness [Hegel's term for independent subjectivity] exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged". Benjamin (1990: 39) writes: "The need for recognition involves this fundamental paradox: In the very moment of realizing our independent will, we are dependent on others to recognize it".

How do we develop the capacity to recognize our minds, our emotional states? From a psychoanalytic perspective, Winnicott (1971) posits that normal development in infancy and childhood takes place within a dyad in which two subjectivities meet (caregiver and the infant). According to Winnicott, there is no such thing as a baby alone, meaning that a baby exists in relation to its mother. The baby needs "good enough mothering."[4] An important function of the mother is mirroring (Winnicott 1971). Mirroring is the process during which the original caregiver "mirrors" back, or reflects back, to the child a reasonably accurate perspective in their experience of the child's personal or emotional state of being at a given moment ("You seem happy today" "It looks like you are upset with me" "It seems that might be difficult for you"). Mirroring is the process that facilitates attunement to the child by reflecting the child's inner state. As time and maturation move on, adults in close interactions provide the same sort of mirroring of these, and more complex, interactions for each other. The mirroring process between two people affirms their mutual experiences of each other and is often accompanied by a felt sense of being seen and valued. Over a lifetime, these interactions cumulatively begin to define an experienced sense of "self." Mirroring serves the function of developing our subjectivities. Winnicott states:

> What does a baby see when he or she looks at the mother's face? I am suggesting that, ordinarily, what the baby sees is himself or herself. In other words, the mother is looking at the baby and what she looks like is related to what she sees there. (Winnicott 1971: 151)

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[4] According to Winnicott (1971), "The good-enough enough 'mother'...is one who makes active adaptation to the infant's needs, an active adaptation that gradually lessens, according to the infant's growing ability to account for failure of adaptation and to tolerate the results of frustration" (Winnicott 1971: 13-14).

He goes on to say that "When I look I am seen, so I exist" (Winnicott 1971: 154). Caregivers, instinctively, mark (exaggerate) their affect-mirroring by using facial and vocal pattern of affect expressive displays (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist and Target, 2004). A mother does this to signal to the child that it is her version of his response to indicate that this is not how she feels, not her realistic response, but her awareness of the baby's state, and that it is her reflection of the infant's affect:[5]

> The infant recognizes and uses this marked quality to 'decouple' or to differentiate the perceived emotion from its referent (parent) and to 'anchor' or 'own' the marked mirroring stimulus as expressing his or her own self-state. (Aron 2006: 358)

When a child does not find his mind in the mind of the mother, he is left without an awareness of his own mind and without an authentic, personalized and vitalized sense of self, creating disorders.[6]

How do we come to mentalize, to understand mental states of ourselves and of others? Mentalization was coined by Fonagy and colleagues (Fonagy et al. 2004) and has become a central concept in understanding development. It describes an individual's explicit and implicit interpretation of his and other's actions. This interpretation is done based on intentional mental states such as personal needs, desires, feelings, reasons and beliefs (Fonagy and Target 1996). It focuses on the affective interpersonal understanding of oneself and others, which helps one to develop a stable sense of self and enables a child to "read" other people's minds. The contingent and marked mirroring of a child's internal states facilitates the capacity to mentalize.[7] The child's general

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[5] A) The baby may be overwhelmed if an expression lacks markedness and matches the baby's state. The baby would feel it to be the parent's real emotion. It would make the baby's experience seem contagious, and even more dangerous. Instead of an experience of self, parental preoccupations that are experienced as unmetabolized alien introjects will reside, and the child is left without a sense of himself as a person in his own right. He will be prone to breakdowns of functioning, for example, regarding autonomy, separation, self-regulation, management of anger. B) If the mother's expressions have markedness but don't actually mirror the baby's self-states, he will internalize representation of a mismatched state as a part of himself. In cases where this is the usual experience, self-representations of the baby will have a precarious tie to the underlying emotional states, and his self will be empty. His whole emotional reality may feel like a pretense. C) If mirroring fails because it is unmarked or inaccurate or both, the baby is not able to find himself in the other and as a result is unable to achieve and understanding of his self-state or achieve control. This leads to incongruence and disorganization within the self, an alien-self will emerge.
[6] See previous endnote.
[7] Early understanding of mental states occurs in two modes (Fonagy and Target 1996). Psychic equivalence equates the internal world with the external. In the pretend mode, the child's mental

understanding of minds through the mediation of secure attachment is facilitated by the parents' capacity to observe the child's mind.[8] The child can explore the mind of the caregiver and learn about minds in the context of secure attachment.

Fonagy and most developmental psychologists and psychoanalysts propose that the capacity for mentalizing develops with maturation. In their insightful study, Fonagy et al. (2004) observed that children's understanding of mental states begins at about the age of three or four and mentalizing is embedded in the child's social world (see the same study for other approaches). The child needs repeated experience of three things to create a fully mentalized psychic reality: his current mental states, having these states represented in the object's (the caregiver's) mind, and the frame represented by the caregiver's normally external reality. Frame ("playing along," such as pretending a banana is a telephone) is essential, meaning:

> The child needs an adult or older child who will 'play along', so that the child can see his fantasy or idea represented in the adult's mind, reintroject this, and use it as a representation of his own thinking. (Fonagy et al. 2004: 266)

The child perceives his feelings and thoughts in the parent's mind: "Linking his internal state to a perception of that state outside offers a representation-a symbol- of the internal state: it corresponds to, yet it is not equivalent, to the state" (Fonagy et al. 2004: 266-67). The child is able to equate the real and the apparent and clarify the distinction between pretend and serious mode, when the omnipotent and omniscient parent playfully pretends. He can then know about his wish or idea and experience it. The child can see the parent adopting an as-if attitude to his intentional stance due to the parent's entry into the child's world in a playful way. This is an elaboration of mirroring by the parent.

Children become independent subjects only if they are recognized as such by their caregivers, which facilitates their having their own

state is separated from the external mode, and the internal state is viewed as having no implications for the external world. To arrive at mentalization, the child integrates these two modes. Inner and outer realities are seen as separate but linked.

[8] Children with secure attachments show some distress when the parents leave, but they compose themselves when the parents return. They feel protected. Adults with secure attachment have a positive view of themselves, others and relationships.

will, mind, and feelings, (Winnicott 1971; Benjamin 1990; Fonagy at al. 2004;). This notion is currently commonplace. Furthermore, a child becomes an independent subject only if he in turn recognizes the independent subjectivity of his caregiver.

Ogden (2004) conceptualizes intersubjectivity as dialectical and emphasizes the interdependence of subject and object, as opposed to viewing the analyst and the analyzed as separate subjects. The foundation of individual subjectivity is an intersubjective dialectic of being recognized and recognizing. When there is a failure, the dialectic tension collapses, each leaves the other alone; there is no participation in an interpersonal process in which each gives back to the other. In contrast:

> When the object becomes a subject, the recognition of oneself by the Other creates the conditions for a new way of being aware of one's own subjectivity, and subjectivity itself thereby altered. In other words, the experience of the recognition of one's own 'I-ness' by an Other (who is recognized as an experiencing 'I') creates an intersubjective dialectic through which one becomes aware of one's own subjectivity in a new way, i.e. one becomes 'self-conscious' in a way that the individual had not previously experienced. (Ogden 1992b: 662)

According to Stern (1985), intersubjectivity is about recognition of the mind of the self and the other, which starts emerging towards the end of age one. In this approach, an infant can recognize the separateness of mind in self and other, only after the subjective self has been established. The ability for this recognition requires prior development along linguistic, relational, cognitive, and affective paths as well as mutual regulations between the infant and primary care takers. According to Stern, there is a core or physical sense of self that occurs before a subjective sense of self develops and long before the infant can recognize his mind and the other's mind. Even though the infant can make distinctions between actions that result from the other's body and his own body, he does not yet recognize intentionality, or the presence of minds. The capacity for recognition requires that the primary caretakers regulate the infant well enough over time. Through this regulation, some sense of predictability is established about what might emerge from the other and from the infant. As a result, between the ages of seven and nine months old, the subjective self emerges

which is built upon the core self. The infant's simultaneous recognition that the other has a separate, unique and a parallel inner life is tied to the development of the subjective self. Stern calls this recognition intersubjective relatedness. The acquisition of language also makes it possible to have shared meaning: "the acquisition of language is potent in the service of union and togetherness. In fact, every word learned is the by-product of uniting two mentalities in a common symbol system, a forging of shared meaning" (Stern 1985: 172). In referring to intersubjectivity, Benjamin (1990) states:

> Intersubjective theory postulates that the other must be recognized as another subject in order for the self to fully experience his or her subjectivity in the other's presence. This means that we have a need for recognition and that we have a capacity to recognize others in return, thus making mutual recognition possible. (Benjamin 1990: 35)

She also states that Hegel claims, 'in trying to establish itself as an independent entity, the self must... recognize the other as a subject like itself in order to be recognized by the other" (Benjamin 1990: 36). Benjamin (1988) defines intersubjectivity as mutual recognition, which occurs later in infancy. Recognition is possible only if we concurrently and first recognize the other and the other must recognize us. Otherwise, the recognition that we have will be worthless. Recognition is part of human development. She introduces the notion of intersubjective mental space co-created by both subjects, which she calls the "third." There is an affirmation that human beings are linked by a third in the reciprocal affirmation of the other. This "third" allows the suffering of other humans to matter, independent of their origins or status, because it is contained in the experience of the third. It means being able to perceive things from the other's perspective. The possibility of mutual recognition and mental space for thought is due to the shared third. Two people have a common third. They surrender to the third and have dialogical relationship. Then, they may reflect on their interactions. When she talks about this form of moral thirds, she states that it is based on the essence of intersubjectivity itself and it is a consequence of mutual recognition.

Sandler (1995) refers to recognition as the "moment of meeting." In that moment, one's self-gestalt meets and matches the way one was

known by another. Winnicott (1971) describes a similar interactive process between a therapist and a child. They alternate in making drawings, which Winnicott calls "squiggles." Each embellishes the drawings of the other. This brings them both to a shared awareness. In this process, "the child becomes aware that another is aware of what the child is aware of within" (Sandler 1995: 589). Winnicott calls this a "sacred moment." Through the reoccurrence of these moments one comes to know oneself as one is known through the other. Kohut rarely uses the concept of recognition. However, he highlights the developmental process of mirroring (Kohut 1971: 1977).

3. Sympathy, intersubjectivity and recognition

The sympathetic process is an intersubjective one between a spectator and an agent, as such in the sympathetic process in which there are two subjectivities involved. By definition, the presence of two subjectivities creates an intersubjective field, which entails recognition. Any human interaction, whether it is between infant and mother, between adults, or in the market place, opens the possibility for recognition to take place. When there is a failure in caregiving and the infant is not recognized, various forms of pathologies emerge,[9] when there is no recognition of the other's needs, willingness in the market place trade does not occur, and when there is no recognition, there is no identity formation and consensual morality. For consensual morality to emerge, there needs to be a recognition of the actor by the spectator and the spectator by the actor. Otherwise, there would not be any room to reach a consensus.

First, it is important to note that in the *TMS* there is a clear sense that our selves are constituted through recognition. Smith views society as a mirror which enables us to know who we are. Without a mirror a human being would not be aware of his behavior, character or his deformity because he does not have the society as a mirror. Yet, when he

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[9] For example, when the mother is not "good enough" she repeatedly fails to comprehend the infant through the infant's gestures, and substitutes her own gestures, which is given sense by the compliance of the infant. The true self, which is a sense of self based on spontaneous authentic experience, is defensively replaced by a false self by the baby. In the extreme cases, false-self hides the true self to the point that "spontaneity is not feature in the infant's living experiences" (Winnicott 1965: 147).

comes into the society, he has the society as a mirror, which allows him to see the propriety or impropriety of his behavior, and his deformities and beauties. In Smith's words:

> Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. All these are objects which he cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to which he is provided with no mirror which can present them to his view. Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before. It is placed in the countenance and behavior of those he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and when they disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here that he first views the propriety and impropriety of his own passions, the beauty and deformity of his own mind. (1759: 129)

This quotation speaks to the formation of subjectivity through recognition. In addition to not knowing who he is, if a man were a stranger to society from birth, he would not have a moral sense:

> Bring him into society, and all his own passions will immediately become the causes of new passions. He will observe that mankind approves of some of them, and are disgusted by others. (Smith 1759:129)

A spectator is not an actual bystander but is a creation of the agent's imagination, though the imagined spectator owes its existence to real spectators that have been experienced throughout life. The impartiality of spectators is crucial. The spectators achieve impartiality by imagining that they are being spectated by other spectators. According to Smith, we are each other's spectators, who mitigate our self-interest when we imagine that other spectators observe us at a distance. Even when the spectator is internalized, there is a recognition of the spectator's separate place in our mind as there is in our recognition of our superego.[10]

The spectator, through an imaginative process, puts himself in the agent's situation and forms an idea about how the agent is affected in a given situation, and "an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought

[10] It has been argued that the impartial spectator is a pre-cursor of the superego Raphael 2007, Ozler and Gabrinetti 2018.

of his situation" (Smith 1759: 13), though the spectator might have the experience in a weaker degree.[11] In this process, in order to be able to put himself into the agent's situation, the spectator must be able to recognize the agent as a separate being.

The spectator compares his own feelings to the feelings he imagines the agent has. Sympathy is a concordance between the actual feelings of the agent and the imagined feelings of the actor by the spectator, and it gives pleasure. The spectator can sympathize with the feelings, motives and actions of the agent.[12] Mutual sympathy is a foundational element of Smith's moral structure. Within Smith's structure, sympathy is pleasurable and mutual sympathy engenders pleasure through sympathetic feelings. Mutual sympathy is also a source of satisfaction, and not being able to sympathize is disagreeable. This process bears a strong resemblance to the mirroring process in the modern psychoanalytic literature. While Smith was not aware that he was speaking of a larger psychological process, we conclude that Smith's depiction embodies this recognized psychological process from modern psychoanalysis and developmental psychology.

If there is not a concordance of sentiments reached by both the actor and the spectator, they work together to achieve it. This is motivated by Smith's assertion that there is a desire for mutual sympathy. The spectator works hard at putting himself in the agent's position and by paying attention to every detail, and in so doing must undertake their imaginary change of situation as well as possible. If he does not initially sympathize he works at ironing out differences. The spectator attempts to change his perspective and feelings because he desires mutual sympathy.[13] During this process, the spectator recognizes the agent's mind.

The agent desires a more complete sympathy and works hard to gain it. Griswold (1999) gives the following reasons for this increased

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[11] Freud (1930: 89) makes an analogous statement. "We shall always consider other people's distress objectively- that is to place ourselves, with our own wants and sensibilities, in *their* conditions, and then to examine what occasions we should find in them for experiencing happiness or unhappiness".

[12] Through the use of imagination, sympathy engenders both cognitive and emotional experiences between the spectator and agent. It has a cognitive dimension in that the formation of any idea in the agent's experience is an intellectual undertaking. At the same time sympathy also has an emotional dimension because we feel at least similar to what the agent feels.

[13] Brodie (2006) likens this effort on the part of the spectator to "critique" and "improvement." He states that these two basic concepts of the Enlightenment underly Smith's description of the spectator.

effort. The agent has more invested in the situation, thus he has more at stake than the spectator. While the spectator's emotions are imaginary, the actor's emotions are related to the real situation. The agent also wants to avoid the pain of solitude: "The horror of solitude drives him back into society" (Smith 1759: 99). An additional factor motivating the agent for concordance of sentiments is his yearning for approbation. Towards this end the agent adjusts his passions. He does this under the critical eye of the spectator. In this process, the agent recognizes the mind of the spectator through imagination. It is only by recognizing the mind of the spectator he can know how to adjust his passions.

Sympathy is spectatorial in an interdependent relationship. It is through the sympathetic process that emotions are communicated and understood. The agent and the spectator continually exchange information about their judgment of other people's sentiments and their own sentiments. Sympathetic process guides judgment, and it is a dynamic process. In the larger context of human culture, we are all spectators and actors working together to form a consensual morality. Sympathy is not "automatic, passive and mindless" because both the actor and the spectator work hard to reach a concordance of sentiments through the sympathetic process (Radner 1980).

By observing others and having experiences, we form general rules, and from these general rules we learn what is approved or disapproved of. By using the general rules, we correct "the misrepresentations of self-love concerning what is fit and proper to be done in our particular situation" (Smith 1759: 186). It is the regard to the general rules or its disregard which distinguishes a worthless fellow from an honorable man., morality is founded upon general rules. Smith likens the general rules to the laws of the Deity "promulgated by those vicegerents which he has thus set up within us" (1759: 192). The vicegerents punish the violations of the general laws by self-condemnation and shame.

Sympathy is a social practice in which ordinary people encounter one another. Moral life is a social practice. Sympathy has a socializing feature, as well as a character-constituting feature.[14] As in the psychoanalytic literature reviewed above, in the sympathetic process, a new awareness of one's own subjectivity which is constituted intersubjectively develops.

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[14] "...sympathy in Adam Smith's sense is a socializing agent" (Raphael1985: 31).

Sympathy socializes both the agent and the spectator, since the first would like to be the object of sympathy and the second would like to sympathize. Moral exchanges, therefore, create sociality and establish a general consensus about what is morally approved.

Smith's sympathy is an intersubjective one. First, as in the psychoanalytic literature on intersubjectivity, in the sympathetic process there are two subjectivities involved. As in Stolorow and Atwood (1979), Kohut (1982) and Storolow, Atwood and Brandchaft (1994) in the dynamic interaction between the spectator and the agent whilst they are adjusting their sentiments there is mutual influence. Second, the agent and the spectator have a mutual recognition by putting themselves in each other's position as in (Stern 1985; Ogden 1994). There is a dialectical interplay between the agent and the spectator. Recognition is possible when the other recognizes us, and we recognize them. Third, morality that is created through the concordance of sentiments in the sympathetic process allows for the creation of a shared meaning as in Stern (1985) and Ogden (1992).

Focusing on recognition, through the dynamic interaction between the spectator and the agent, recognition is achieved by placing themselves in each other's situations through imagination. The spectator imagines what the agent would be feeling; the agent imagines how the spectator would be responding. In this process, there is the first and necessary recognition that they have separate minds.[15] This is the same process that is elucidated in Stern (1985), Ogden (1994; 2004) and Stern et al. (1998). There is also a mutual recognition, as in Stern (1985), Stern et al. (1998) and Benjamin (1998; 2004; 2011) of the other in this process and the potential for reciprocal affirmation (Benjamin 1998; 2004; 2011). Through this process, the agent and the spectator come to recognize their intersubjective relatedness as we see in Stern (1985) and Stern et al. (1998).

It is also important to point out that sympathetic process operates in the markets and as such, markets are also sites of recognition, which is a topic for future research. Both in markets and in the sympathetic

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[15] In his *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel (1807: 229) states that, "Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it *is* only by being acknowledged or recognized". Self-knowledge, including one's sense of freedom and sense of self, is understanding ourselves as an independent self-consciousness requires the recognition of another.

process, individuals interact with each other. This interaction is based on mutual recognition. In the marketplace, each trader is a spectator of other traders. The mutual exchange of information takes place between them. In the sympathetic process, the information that is exchanged are sentiments, while in the marketplace, the information exchanged is the prices that the traders are willing to trade at. In the marketplace, traders recognize each other and influence each other to agree on a price that is approved of by the impartial spectator. The agents work hard to achieve consensual prices. The prices that are traded at are the shared meaning.

4. Recognition in Honneth

In addition to the important inclusion of recognition in the sympathetic process, there are two other aspects of Smith's works that are relevant for recognition: love and wealth accumulation. In order to elucidate these two aspects of recognition, we will briefly review Honneth's approach to recognition.

First, let us make a few brief remarks about recognition in philosophy. Recognition is an important way of respecting and valuing another person, and it is fundamental to understanding ourselves. It also requires that the person who is being recognized judges the recognizer as capable of conferring recognition. In practical philosophy, the concept of recognition has played a central role. The person who acted in estimable ways could lead a good life in the ethics of classical antiquity. In the Scottish Enlightenment, desirable virtues were acquired by public recognition or disapproval. According to Kant, the concept of respect meant treating everyone as an end in himself. It is not until Hegel (1807) that the concept of recognition did become a cornerstone of ethics. Since about late 1970s, the idea that there needs to be recognition of the differences between individuals or groups as emerged, notably in feminist ethics (Taylor 1992). The concept is used to refer to caring and loving concern between the mother and the child in the feminist literature (Hirschman 1989). Habermas (1990) and Wingert (1993) use it to refer to the mutual respect for the equality and particularity of others. Finally, recognition is also used in reference to how societal solidarity emerges through the esteem of unfamiliar modes of life (Taylor 1992).

Honneth (1995) distinguishes three forms of recognition: love, which gives self-confidence, rights, which give self-respect, and solidarity which gives self-esteem. Of these, love and esteem are the ones that are relevant for our analysis of Smith's works. Below we fist review Honneth's views on love, to be followed by a review of esteem.

4.1. Love

Love here does not only refer to intimate sexual relationship but to any primary relationships where there are strong emotional attachments among people. This notion was originally referred to in the historical literature by Hegel (1807). Hegel's view of love is that it is a relationship of mutual recognition, in which individuality is confirmed. Honneth (1995: 96) cites Hegel's idea of love as "being oneself in another", and describes Hegel's view on love as follows:

> Love represents the first stage of reciprocal recognition, because in it subjects mutually confirm each other with regard to the concrete nature of their needs and thereby recognize each other as needy creatures. In the reciprocal experience of loving, both subjects know themselves to be united in their neediness, in their dependence on each other. (Honneth 1995: 95)

Honneth argues that this view of love as a precarious balance between attachment and independence is the same as in the psychoanalytic object-relations theory. Good reviews of this literature can be found in Eagle (2011), and Fonagy and Target (2003). Object relations theory suggests that individuals are motivated with the need to form relationships. This is a deviation from Freud's view that libido is motivated with sexual and aggressive drives.

Honneth argues that object relations theory portrays love as a form of recognition. The object relations theory indicates that the success of affectional bonds depends on our capacity to strike a balance between symbiosis and independence, a capacity acquired in early childhood. He particularly focuses on Winnicott (1965; 1971). According to Winnicott, at the beginning of every human life, there is symbiosis between the primary caregiver (we will use mother) and child, an undifferentiated intersubjectivity.[16] In this stage mother (object) and child (subject) are

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[16] Winnicott calls this stage as "absolute dependency" (1965).

completely dependent on each other to meet their needs and are not able to separate themselves from each other.[17] This phase ends once each of them starts having a newfound independence, for example when the mother can again turn to her social field, and the child slowly becomes able to endure the mother's absences. At the same as the child starts experiencing the mother as outside his omnipotent control, he also becomes aware of this dependence.[18] In this stage, in order to work through this dependency, the child starts to become destructive. The destruction mechanism operates as follows: By becoming aggressive towards the mother, such as biting her, the child unconsciously tests whether the object belongs to reality.[19] If the mother survives this, without taking revenge, without withdrawing her love, the "subject may now have started to live a life in the world of objects" (Winnicott 197: 121). The mother becomes a being in her own right; the child integrates his aggressive impulses and starts being able to love her and accept his own dependence on the mother.[20] If the mother's love is lasting, the child develops a sense of "confidence" that his needs will be met, under the umbrella of the mother's intersubjective reliability.[21]

Honneth follows Benjamin (1988) and introduces Hegel's concept of struggle for recognition in referring to the process described by Winnicott as a struggle. Honneth concludes that recognition that is found in love as described by Hegel, can be described as a communicative arc suspended between the experience of being merged and the experience of being able to be alone, not only as an intersubjective state.

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[17] Due to the essential nature of "holding" during this phase, Winnicott refers to this as the "holding phase" (1965).

[18] This new stage is labelled as "relative dependence" (Winnicott 1965).

[19] Winnicott (1971) describes this process as the child's attempt to "destroy" the object.

[20] Winnicott describes this process as "object usage" (Winnicott 1971). In addition, the child starts using "transitional" objects. With "transitional phenomena," Winnicott is referring to the strong tendency of children to develop affectively charged relationships to objects in their environment, such as toys or a blanket. (Winnicott 1971). These act as surrogates for the mother, who has been lost to external reality. The child relates to these objects both affectionately and destructively. Transitional objects mediate between the awareness of separateness and the primary experience of being merged. The child symbolically attempts to bridge the painful gap between outer and inner reality.

[21] In addition, the child develops a basic "capacity to be alone" (Winnicott 1971).

4.2. Esteem

This type of recognition requires an intersubjectively shared value horizon. Individuals are granted esteem, and social prestige, inter-subjectively, based on the degree which they help to realize culturally defined values. In addition, individuals are recognized based on the socially defined worth of their characteristics, accomplishments and abilities:

> Prestige or standing signifies only the degree of social recognition the individual earns for his or her form of self-realization by thus contributing, to a certain extent, to the practical realization of society's abstractly defined goals. With regard to this...individualized system of recognition relations, everything now depends, therefore, on the definition of generalized value horizon, which is supposed to be open to various forms of self-realization and yet, at the same time, must also be able to serve as an overarching system of esteem. (Honneth 1995: 126)

The worth of an individual depends on the dominant interpretations of societal goals in each historical case. There is an ongoing cultural conflict, permanent struggle, because different groups attempt to publicly show that their accomplishments or ways of life are especially valuable. As long as recognition found in esteem is organized in terms of status groups, only the group itself is the addressee of esteem. Within the group, because the individual knows himself to be esteemed by all others to the same degree, interactions within the group has the character of solidarity. The reason is that subjects sympathize, mutually, with their different forms of life because among themselves they esteem each other symmetrically; everyone is "given the chance to experience oneself to be recognized" (Honneth 1995: 130). Solidarity generates an intersubjective value horizon in which individuals learn to recognize the trait and abilities of the others to the same degree. With individualization, social esteem is accompanied by a felt confidence that one's abilities or achievements will be recognized as valuable by others. The individual no longer attributes the respect he receives to the group but refers them positively back to himself. It is possible to talk about societal solidarity to the extent that every member of a society is in a position to esteem himself.

5. Love and recognition in the *TMS*

Having written the *TMS* almost a century before Hegel, and about three centuries before Honneth and Winnicott wrote their seminal works, Smith did not have the vocabulary of intersubjectivity and re-cognition to apply to love relationships. He could not have written about love in terms of intersubjectivity and recognition. However, Smith puts great emphasis on love in the *TMS*: "Love is an agreeable... passion" (Smith 1759: 19). "The agreeable passions of love and joy can satisfy and support the heart without any auxiliary pleasure," he writes (Smith 1759: 19). Making a strong statement about love, Smith states: "There is in love a strong mixture of humanity, generosity, kindness, friendship, esteem" (Smith 1759: 41). Smith wrote not only about love between two people, but also about love in society.

There is clear evidence in the *TMS* that love involves mutuality. People have a mutual regard for each other:

> Their [people who love each other] mutual regard renders them happy in one another, and sympathy, with this mutual regard, makes them agreeable to every other person. With what pleasure do we look upon a family, through the whole of which reign mutual love and esteem, where the parents and children are companions for one another, without any other difference than what is made by respectful affection on the one side, and kind indulgence on the other. (Smith 1759: 48)

Even though Smith did not articulate it in terms of recognition, to have "mutual regard," people who have love towards each other must mutually recognize each other. Smith states that the love of parents for their children is praise-worthy. Even when it is excessive, it is never odious. Excessive love might be hurtful for children, and a source of inconvenience to parents. However, "we easily pardon it, and never regard it with hatred and detestation" (Smith 1759: 64).

Love is constructed as a mutual feeling. Smith's view is that "I judge...your love by my love" (*TMS*: 20). Similarly, our love for our neighbor is the same thing as our neighbor's love for us. In Smith's view to the person who feels it, love is agreeable and delightful. Smith states that the love of a lover appears to others as "ridiculous." At the same time, "its intentions are seldom mischievous" (1759: 41). According to Smith, even excessive love is something we sympathize with.

Society is happy when there is love:

> Where the necessary assistance is reciprocally afforded from love, from gratitude, from friendship, and esteem, the society flourishes and is happy. All the different members of it are bound together by the agreeable bands of love and affection, and are, as it were, drawn to one common centre of mutual good offices. (Smith 1759: 100)

Smith states that a man desires to be lovely, not only to be loved. He wants to be the proper and natural object of love, he wants to be recognized in a love relationship. We are disposed to desire to be objects of love and admiration when we have love and admiration for others. Putting it in terms of recognition, we can say that it is only when we recognize others that we will also be recognized by them.

Men have a desire for praise-worthiness not only praise. There is a love of praise-worthiness. Men have a desire to be approved of. We love to be "honorable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, and superiority of our own characters" (Smith 1759: 158). However, "Humanity does not desire to be great, but to be beloved." (Smith 1759: 194). Smith discusses at length the importance of praiseworthiness, and being lovely, which every man desires from others. In other words, a man desires recognition. The love of praiseworthiness is the desire of rendering ourselves the proper objects of those sentiments [the favorable sentiments of our brethren] (Smith 1759: 147). We want to be praiseworthy, a desire that Nature endows us with. He states that:

> The jurisdiction of the man without, is founded altogether in the desire of actual praise, and in the aversion to actual blame. The jurisdiction of the man within, is founded altogether in the desire of praise-worthiness... in the desire of possessing those qualities, and performing those actions, which we love and admire in other people. (Smith 1759: 150)

Smith also writes on friendship in the *TMS*. (Uyl and Griswold 1996; Ozler and Gabrinetti 2018). He views that the impartial spectator would be pleased with friendship, even when it is expressed to those who are not connected to us. Even when these emotions are excessive, they are not regarded with aversion. Smith sees friendships as a basic human need. The harmony of friendship and the affections of friends are felt even by the "rudest vulgar man." Because friends enter

our resentment and our joy, they are useful. Friendship is based on consensual validation. Smith sees friendship coming from a desire to be related and genuine love. Being excluded from friendship makes us feel excluded from "the best and most comfortable of all social enjoyments". (Smith 1759: 286)

Smith also sees friendships as useful. We are more anxious to communicate our disagreeable passions such as resentment because we expect more indulgence from a friend than from a stranger. This utility, however is limited. In adversity we should go into the and seek society, not the sympathy of friends. Friends restore us to tranquility, which is an important component of happiness according to Smith. The good opinion and trust of friends relieves a man about any doubt he might have about himself. Smith seems to be idealizing friendships.

Smith also views that the attachment we have for friends is based upon the love of virtue is the most virtuous, as well as being permanent and secure. Attachments based on our good behavior and conduct are most respectable. This can exist only among men of virtue. The necessity of mutual accommodation, among well-disposed people, produces a friendship that is like the ones found in families.

Overall, Smith views love as an important source of human connectedness. It makes people happy and society is happy, and it flourishes. There is mutual regard in love. We want to be loved but being lovable is more important.

6. Wealth and recognition in the TMS

Smith's primary interest in his economics magnum opus, the *Wealth of Nations*, was in productivity increase, economic growth and increase of the wealth of nations. This desire was shared by other citizens during the Scottish Enlightenment. Scots were poor. There were intense debates about conditions that may lead to economic growth, and Smith was the key contributor in understanding the sources of wealth generation.

Having wealth was an important component of the Scottish social value horizon. Smith describes this as follows. We want to have the admiration and respect of mankind, which is a highly desired object.

Studying wisdom and practicing virtue is one of the roads to have admiration. However, only a small group of people are steady admirers of virtuous people because:

> The great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers, and, what may seem more extraordinary, most frequently the disinterested admirers and worshippers, of wealth and greatness. (Smith 1759: 73)

Smith asks:

> For to what purpose is all the toil and bustle of this world? what is the end of avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power, and preheminence? (1759: 61)

Smith's answer to the above question is:

> To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages which we can propose to derive from it. (1759: 61)

We show off our wealth because we want to be recognized, observed and have the approbation of others. What interests us is not the pleasure or the ease wealth would give us, but vanity. But vanity makes us believe that having wealth will make us have the "attention of the world" and approbation.

> It is because mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than our sorrow, that we make a parade of our riches, and conceal our poverty. (Smith 1759: 60-61)

There is shame in poverty. The poor man "feels that it either places him out of the sight of mankind, or, that if they take any notice of him, they have, however, scarce any fellow-feeling with the misery and distress which he suffers" (Smith 1759: 61). The poor man is afraid of being disapproved and overlooked. He is "mortified" with the thought of these inflictions.

We show our wealth to be sympathized, because it is easier for others to sympathize with our joy rather than our sorrow. Smith states:

> It is because mankind is disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with our sorrow, that we make parade of our riches, and conceal our poverty. Nothing is so mortifying as to be obliged to

expose our distress to the view of the public, and to feel, that though
our situation is open to the eyes of all mankind, no mortal conceives
for us the half of what we suffer. Nay, it is chiefly from this regard to
the sentiments of mankind, that we pursue riches and avoid poverty.
(1759: 60-61)

This disposition of mankind to admire the rich and to at least
neglect the poor is necessary for the establishment and maintenance
of the distinction of ranks and order of society, though it might lead to
a corruption of our moral sentiments. The world gives more attention
to the rich:

Wisdom and virtue are by no means the sole objects of respect;
nor vice and folly, of contempt. We frequently see the respectful
attentions of the world more strongly directed towards the rich and
the great, than towards the wise and the virtuous. (Smith 1759: 72)

It is not moral to say that wealth and greatness devoid of merit
and virtue deserve respect. However, they are the natural objects of our
respect.

Those exalted stations [wealth and greatness] may, no doubt, be
completely degraded by vice and folly. But the vice and folly must be
very great, before they can operate this complete degradation (Smith
1759: 73-74).

Wealth is not only a source of recognition, but also is a source of
pleasure:

The pleasures of wealth and greatness...view, strike the imagination
as something grand and beautiful and noble, of which the attainment
is well worth all the toil and anxiety which we are so apt to bestow
upon it. (Smith 1759: 214)

We also believe that others will go along with our agreeable
emotions that our situation makes us feel.

At the thought of [others going along with our emotions], his heart
seems to swell and dilate itself within him, and he is fonder of
his wealth, upon this account, than for all the other advantages it
procures him. (Smith 1759: 61-62)

In the Wealth of Nations (herein WN), Smith states that "the desire
of bettering our condition... comes with us from the womb, and never

leaves us till we go into the grave (Smith 1776: 341). The desire to better our condition leads to wealth accumulation, which gives us approbation and recognition. The drive of individuals for accumulation is explained by approval and recognition in an intersubjective context.

7. Concluding remarks

We have argued that there is recognition in the sympathetic process, in love and wealth accumulation in the *TMS*, benefitting from psychoanalytic literature, and Honneth's writings.

The sympathetic process is intersubjective and as such, is based on recognition of minds. We clarified the meaning of recognition from a psychoanalytic perspective as a process, which results from the mirroring process of mothers. Recognition serves to develop our subjectivities. Recognition of other's minds requires mentalization. This is the result of a mother's ability to mentalize a child's state of mind.

Love is an important component of the *TMS*. Smith views love as based on mutual regard, which requires mutual recognition. One way to conceptualize the presence of recognition in love is through Honneth's writings, where he views that it is a capacity acquired in early childhood based on the object relations theory, especially Winnicott.

Wealth accumulation, an important component of social value horizon during the Scottish Enlightenment, was shared by Smith as an equally important value. According to Smith, the reason we accumulate wealth is to have the admiration and recognition of others.

In sum, having written a century before Hegel, and three centuries before Honneth and Winnicott, even though he did not have the language for it, in the *TMS*, Smith was writing about different forms of recognition.

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