

PEREYASLAVSKAYA RADA 1654 YR.: CONTEMPORARY POLITICO-LEGAL STUDY

(Recibido 05-06-2017. Aprobado el 07-09-2017)

Nikolay N. Oleinik	Sergey V. Bogdanov	Vera V. Molayi	Alexander N. Oleinik	Vladimir G.Ostapjk	Pablo Chang Ibarra
<i>Belgorod State University,85, Pobedy St. Belgorod 308015, Russian Federation Email: oleinik@bsu.edu.ru</i>	<i>Belgorod State University,85, Pobedy St. Belgorod 308015, Russian Federation</i>	<i>Belgorod State University,85, Pobedy St. Belgorod 308015, Russian Federation</i>	<i>Belgorod State University,85, Pobedy St. Belgorod 308015, Russian Federation</i>	<i>Belgorod State University,85, Pobedy St. Belgorod 308015, Russian Federation</i>	<i>Belgorod State University,85, Pobedy St. Belgorod 308015, Russian Federation</i>

Abstract .The article gives the modern interpretation of the decisions of the Pereyaslavskaya Council of the year 1654. Particular is paid attention to the analysis of what was behind its decisions. Whether it was a reunion or the accession of Ukraine to the Russian State, and what significance it had for its further development.

In the article is based on new contemporary approaches and made the attempt to analyze and open the significance of Pereslavskoy Rada on 1654 year. It is given the contemporary interpretation of its solutions. Special attention is given to the analysis of the fact that stood behind these solutions, how they are related to the interests of Ukrainian people. The specific attention is focus on the analysis of that, there was this reunification or connection of the Ukraine to the Russian state and what value this had for their further development.

Keywords: Russian State, Ukraine, Pereyaslavskaya rada, reunion, join, Cossac army, Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

1. INTRODUCTION

Outstanding events in the medieval history of Eastern Europe were the national-liberation war of the Ukrainian people in 1648 under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the subsequent reunification of the two fraternal peoples of Eastern Orthodoxy, leading to the rise of a multinational Russian State. This explains the great interest with which domestic and foreign historians, representatives of other social sciences studied and still study these issues.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent Ukrainian and Russian States in the late 20th century led to a growth in the historical consciousness of various sections of the people of our States. It also stimulated the development of interest in our common historical past. Unfortunately, amidst the skyrocketing public interest in our common historical past and public interest in historical knowledge, there is a bias often observed in historical literature and especially journalism towards historical mythmaking, artificial politicization of the past, the use of achievements and gaps in historical science for the sake of today's short-term interests. People who do not have the required historical education and are generally distant from the historical science of Russia and Ukraine often try to analyze and comment on complex historical events on relations between these two states. (Kostomarov,

2004;Oleynik, 2016, 2017)

2. METHODOLOGY

Theoretic methodological study can be appreciating: the principle of historicism, implying account of specific historical conditions of the studied period, the principle of social approach, concluded in consideration of the socio-economic processes, practiced in Ukraine, taking into account the composed interests of various status of the population, the principle of objectivity - its main purpose is to provide the most objective knowledge about the past.

Can be suggested the Fundamental principle of historical research made structural-functional analysis, involving the study of historical events and processes as structurally dismembered integrity, each element has a specific functionality.

In terms of methodology, the following set of scientific methods used for writing the work:

a) General science: analysis, synthesis, by which managed to collect and analyze a variety of materials on the place and role of the glad Pereyaslavka; logic-allowed to build a strict sequence in discovering the place and role Pereyaslavka welcome in the history of Ukraine; structural and functional, made it possible to determine the nature of the interaction of the Ukrainian national elite with the other layers of the Ukrainian people.
b) special - historical periodization: studied to present subjects in chronological investigation; historical and systematic - used when considering Pereyaslavka glad as the most important part of the then current views and Ukrainian elites to the future of their country. Source base study provides a set of catching each other's different groups of empirical sources.

Problems associated with the entry of the troops Zaporizhzhya to the Moscow government actively investigated both in Ukraine and in Russia at various stages of their existence, as well as in foreign historiography.

Among the Ukrainian historians who sought to explore and discover the reasons for entering the Ukrainian lands in the Moscow State, it should be noted works of NI Kostomarov. In his works devoted to the history of Ukraine in the 15-16 centuries and directly Pereyaslavka Rada 1654 and also to Bogdan Khmelnytsky large and varied factual material to reveal sufficient depth and detail the reasons for the uprising against the Polish-Ukrainian, The course of the liberation war policy. Particular attention in the work of NI Kostomarov paid to the analysis of reasons why Bogdan Khmelnytsky sought to join the Moscow State. The ideas and conclusions of NI Kostomarov on the causes and consequences of entering the Ukrainian state firmly reflected in the works of Ukrainian pre-revolutionary and Soviet historians in. With the ideas and conclusions of many foreign historians. Including Canadian historian Orest Subtensky, author of one of the most fundamental works dedicated to the history of Ukraine.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A talented military leader, organizer and recognized leader of a national-liberation war of the Ukrainian people against Polish nobility, B. Khmelnytsky was a brilliant politician as well. Unlike contemporary politicians in Ukraine and Russia, he understood that a lasting success in the fight against Poland (Rzeczpospolita) was not possible without a powerful and reliable ally.

Therefore, he constantly searched for these allies in the Crimean Khanate, Moldavia and Wallachia and other States. However, despite his attempts B. Khmelnytsky failed to establish a stable alliance with them (Grushevskiy, 2003, p. 319-329).

As an intelligent and realistic politician, he realized that a reliable ally of Ukraine might only be the Orthodox Moscow State. After his first appeal to King Alexei Mikhailovich on 8 June 1648, Khmelnytsky throughout the war maintained close ties with the Moscow Government, seeking the establishment of an anti-Polish alliance and the adoption of Ukraine into Russia. He repeatedly stressed the necessity of joining forces for the general protection of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, the Orthodox faith, dismissed the exaggerated and unrealistic ideas about the strength and power of the Polish State, pointed out the great benefits Russia stood to gain with the adoption of Ukraine under the protection of the King.

Negotiations with the Moscow Government began in January 1649, and then repeatedly renewed in 1650-1651 BC. However, no significant results were attained. The government of Alexei Mikhailovich was shaky as the Moscow State faced a fair share of its own problems. There were civil revolts, reorganization and rearmament of troops took place very slowly while the state treasury could barely make ends meet. Furthermore, Poland was not only an enemy but a potential ally in the fight against the predatory and insatiable Crimean Khanate, whose ally was the mighty Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Zaporozhye ambassadors were told that although he was ready to "grant" some Cossacks, the Tsar could not break the "eternal peace" with the King.

Gradually the most important State interests prevailed. The importance of integrating Ukraine into Russia was increasingly realized in Moscow in order to weaken Poland primarily but to also prevent a possible Ukrainian-Turkish Union and facilitate access to the black and Azov Seas. Of similar importance was the fact that Ukraine's adoption by the King strengthened the Moscow State with the experienced Cossack Army.

On 1 October 1653 a specially convened Assembly of the land, considering the dire situation of Ukraine, decided to take its Orthodox population "under the high hand" of the Tsar. Soon Boyar Buturlin V. Okolnichy I. Alferov and clerk (of the Boyar council) B. Lopukhin went to Pereyaslavl (now pereyaslav-Khmelnytskyi) where they were supposed to gather representatives from different sectors of the

Ukrainian people. Rumors about the purpose of the trip spread rapidly and the Russian Ambassadors were given gracious welcomes in the cities (Kostomarov, 2004, p. 471-472).

On January 8 1654, an assembly of Cassock army officers was convened in Pereyaslav where the Zaporozhye army's intention to accept the protection and go into the service of the Tsar was confirmed. Using drums civilians were then called to the assembly. Khmelnytsky came forward and addressed the crowd: "Colonels, Captains, Sotniks (cassock lieutenants), Zaporozhye troops and all Orthodox Christians! For six years, we have lived without a sovereign, lived in constant battle and bloodshed with our persecutors and enemies, who are bent on wiping the church of God and the name of the Russian people off the face of the earth (Kostomarov, 2004, p. 472)... « Hetman people proposed that the people choose from among four strong ruling, willing to accept them under their protection: "first- the Turkish King... second - the Crimean Khan; the third-King of Poland...the fourth is an Orthodox Emperor of great Russia-Tsar and Grand Duke Alexei Mikhailovich of Russia, Monarch of the East, whom we have incessantly appealed to already for 6 years about our intentions... ". Having assessed the Turks, Tatars and Poles, Khmelnytsky concluded that "...we shall not seek asylum anywhere else than in the Imperial high hands of the Tsar; but if anyone disagrees with us, they are free to choose their own path. The protesters yelled: "... We choose the King of the Eastern Orthodox church ... It's better to die in his Godly faith than to die in the hands of enemies of Christ ... ". Pavlo Teterya, a Pereyaslav Colonel, went round the gathering asking: "Is this what we all will?"-"This is unanimous! » ... "O Lord, confirm, o God, strengthen us so that we may be forever united» (Grushevskiy, 2003, p. 325).

Shortly afterwards 284 Cossack representatives took the oath of allegiance to the Moscow State at the Uspensk Cathedral. This ceremony was also carried out between January and February in towns and cities of Ukraine with 127338 recorded to have taken the oath. As the unknown author of the Ukrainian Chronicles (Samovidec), By the entire nation of Ukraine usej hunting toe caused "and that" much joy among the people standing. So the decision of the Pereiaslav Council of Ukraine-Kyiv-left and became part of the Russian State.

In order to put into writing the verbal agreements reached in Pereyaslav, it was decided that representatives of the Zaporozhye army be sent to Moscow. In late January 1654 in Korsun and Chyhyryn B. Khmelnytsky, Vyhovsky and other

senior officers prepared documents for negotiations of "Articles" of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, or the March articles of 1654. They in their 11 paragraphs defined the character of the Ukrainian-Russian relations. The "Articles" were adopted and approved in Moscow on 21 March 1654 where Ukraine was represented by a delegation headed by Judge Advocate General Bogdanovic-Zarudnym and Pereyaslav Colonel Paul Teteria (Kostomarov, 2003, 476). Pursuant to the March Articles of 1654 Ukraine fully maintained its Cossack Hetman self-government, hundred-regiment administrative structure and its 60000 Cossack army. They provided for assistance by Russia to protect Ukraine from foreign invaders. Furthermore, Hetman had the right to diplomatic relations with all states, except Turkey and Poland. Lastly, the Tsar government confirmed the rights of officers and the higher clergy to own lands and estates. (Grushevskie, p. 325)

Having voluntarily become part of a friendly Eastern Slavic state on conditions of citizenship, Ukraine was ready to pay Russia for the assistance and protection with faithful Cossack service and annual monetary "tributes". Indeed, the sincerity of B. Khmelnytsky Hetman intentions was confirmed by his subsequent work; until his death he pursued internal and foreign policies that were not only honest but well-balanced in relation to Russia (Olejnik, 2002, p. 72).

Thus, the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty of 1654 provided Ukraine some autonomy within Russia, as well as, most importantly, substantial support in the international arena.

Signing a treaty with Ukraine in the middle of the 17th century, the Moscow Government believed from the onset that the foreign policy interests of the Russian State and Ukraine in its composition are inseparable from each other. In view of this, Russia protected these national and interrelated interests through all available means. Ukrainian autonomy was a matter of domestic policy within the system of state power in the Russian state. In challenging situations where the interests of the ruling classes and nobility of the Ukrainian and Russian society clashed, the relative autonomy of Ukraine enshrined by the March Articles disappeared (Olejnik, 2002, p. 74).

4. CONCLUSION

From a legal point of view Pereyaslav agreement best reflects the concept of voluntarily concluded (by the parties) suzerain - vassal agreements characteristic of the middle Ages.

Regardless of how the Pereyaslav agreement and its implications for Ukraine may be assessed, there remains no doubt that B. Khmelnytsky and the Ukrainian people made the right choice in 1654; Ukraine simply had no better way of enhancing its development during this historical period.

Unfortunately, neither the Russian nor Ukrainian original copies (which had the same legal force) of the March 1654 Articles can be found in the archives. This situation has led to the development of varied approaches to the analysis of important political act which played a huge role in the history of Russia and a fateful role in the history of Ukraine.

The entry of Ukraine into the multinational Russia actually saved ethnic Ukrainians from extermination and extinction; it also created the necessary conditions for the inclusion of Ukrainians in a single state which subsequently enhanced a growth in their population and an increase the territory of Ukraine.

This was equally beneficial to Russia since it contributed to the further development of Russia and the growth of its power. The increased population and the combined economies also provided conditions for the establishment of combat-ready armed forces.

Eventually the stronger army permitted successors of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich to defeat his previously mighty neighbors; Sweden, the Polish-Lithuanian State, the Crimean Khanate, seriously weaken their formidable opponent-the Ottoman Empire for possession of the Black Sea territories, the Northern Caucasus and Trans Caucasus, develop the vast spaces of Siberia, far East and Central Asia and eventually will become a leading country in the world.

The long and arduous process of historic friendship between Ukraine and Russia in the XVII century is yet to receive a precise characterization accepted by all historians. There exists a number of terms in reference to it. The often-used terms are the reunification of Ukraine with Russia, the accession of Ukraine to Russia or the entry of Ukraine into the Russian State. In our view, each of these terms reflects one side of this process, one point of view, but does not have a universal value. "Reunification" means overcoming historical cleavages two brotherly East Slavic peoples, who were for centuries within different States. The term "accession" and "entry" more likely emphasize the political aspects of the problem, i.e. especially the

inclusion of part of Ukraine (Dnipro left bank and Kiev) as part of the Russian State.

REFERENCES

Grushevskiy, M. Illyustrirovannaya istoriya Ukrainy s prilozheniyami i dopolneniyami. - Donetsk: OOO PKF «BAO», 2003. - 305-331 p. (In Ukrainian)

Istoriya Ukraini. Nove bachennya. U 2-kh t. - T. 1. - Kiyv: vid-vo «Ukraina», 1995. - 152-200. P. (In Ukrainian)
3. Kostomarov, N.I. Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy. V 3-kh t. - K.: Raduga, 2004. - 664 p. (In Russian)

Kudriashova, V., "Is There a Successor Generation in the Former Soviet Union?", 1999, 125 p.
4. Oleynik, N.N., Istoriya Ukrainy: Kurs lektsiy / Pod red. Oleynika N. N.: Konsum, 2002. - S.66-107. (In Russian)

Oleynik, N.N., 2016. - Nauchnyye vedomosti, Pereyaslavskaya rada 1654 goda: sovremennoye politiko-pravovoye issledovaniye, 28, issue 22 (165):267-277 (In Russian).

Oleynik, N.N., 2017 Vosveshenia Kharkova I previashenia ego b biedushie adminitratibnie,

promishleno torgobi I kulturniy obrasobatelnoe sent rossikoe imperii c\sssp // Nauchnie vedomosti NIU Belgu, -1 (41), S 80-88 (In Russian)

Oleynik, N.N., 2012. Pereyaslavskaya Rada: yeye istoricheskoye znacheniyeye i perspektivy razvitiya vostochno-slavyanskoy tsivilizatsii. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov: NTU «KHPI», 2012, 140-145 p. (In Ukrainian)

Payne, R. "The Clash with Distant Cultures: Values, Interests and Force in American Foreign Policy" 1995. 285p

Shlapentokh, D., From Russian to Ukrainian Eurasianism: the new 'historical' friends and enemies, 2013, 79 p. (In Russian).

Yegorov, I. "Social Sciences and Humanities in Ukrainian Society: The Difficulty of Integration into International Structures", 328 p.