

Imagination and cinema: the notion of anthropos from the figure of the spectator

Imaginación y cine: la noción de anthropos desde la figura del espectador

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ABSTRACT

The present work is presented as an approach between the notion of the imaginary with the theory of the film viewer, formulated in 1956 by Edgar Morin, in his classic text *The cinema or the imaginary man* and enlarged by Francesco Casetti with the thesis of the enunciation in the cinema. In this way, the main objective of this article is to capture theoretical bases from the reflection of both conceptualizations. Thus, this initiatory work aims to be an epistemological contribution to future research projects. For this, at the methodological level, an initial theoretical path is developed that has its anchor -and its respective critical reading- in the contributions of Gilbert Durand and Cornelius Castoriadis, in the permanent concern of both for “drawing” those elements inherent in *anthropos* that allow the construction of their historical-social environment from subjectivity. The latter conceived as intrinsic peculiarity to the human being. It is concluded that through an artificial-imaginary state the viewer feels close and is able to recognize the reality of the images that the big screen offers him, coming into direct contact with his fantasies, fears and dreams. In other words, here the double dimension of the film is observed as an artifact and as a subjective experience.

Keywords: cinema, spectator, imagination, subjectivity, Edgar Morin

RESUMEN

El presente trabajo se plantea como un acercamiento entre la noción del imaginario con la teoría del espectador cinematográfico, formulada en 1956 por Edgar Morin, en su clásico texto *El cine o el hombre imaginario* y ampliada por Francesco Casetti con la tesis de la enunciación en el cine. De este modo, el objetivo principal de este artículo es plasmar unas bases teóricas provenientes de la reflexión de ambas conceptualizaciones. Así este trabajo iniciático pretende ser un aporte epistemológico para futuros proyectos investigativos. Para ello, a nivel metodológico, se desarrolla un recorrido teórico inicial que tiene su anclaje -y su respectiva lectura crítica- en los aportes de Gilbert Durand y Cornelius Castoriadis, en la permanente preocupación de ambos por “dibujar” aquellos elementos inherentes al *anthropos* que permiten la construcción de su entorno histórico-social desde la subjetividad. Esta última concebida como particularidad intrínseca al ser humano. Se concluye que a través de un estado artificial-imaginario el espectador se siente cercano y es capaz de reconocer la realidad de las imágenes que la gran pantalla le ofrece, entrando en contacto directo con sus fantasías, miedos y sueños. Dicho de otra manera, aquí se observa la doble dimensión del filme como artefacto y como experiencia subjetiva.

Palabras clave: cine, espectador, imaginación, subjetividad, Edgar Morin.

INTRODUCTION

Understanding the human being, writing about him or thinking about him, is (not) an easy task. Drawing sketches on us, a deep autobiography, an abstraction of oneself, how to do and where to start if it is so complex just to remember our own history of which we are protagonists. The Being proudly boasts its intellectual capacity, boasts its reasoning, its broad cognitive abilities is one of the standards of the human species. At present, the Being lives in a world of opulence of information and knowledge, pays homage to the operational and technological. Sadly, for humanity, this Being has more knowledge but less wisdom that guides the harmonious and philanthropic transit of the planet and its inhabitants. Not to forget the atomic bombs created thanks to engineering and technique knowing that they are capable of annihilating entire cities.

The human being is a gregarious species that needs to be in constant interaction with others. Therefore, the Being has the particularity that it uses mediations to live in society. Although it is presented as an individual entity, it cannot reach its total and complex development without the relationship with others in the pre-given environment it inhabits. The Being is indisputably social because it inherently possesses various faculties, such as language, - in which it will deepen sink later - that transform it into an entity completely suitable for living in society.

Homo sapiens (from Latin homo: man, sapiens: wise) is a symbolic Being, of rituals, ceremonies, customs, traditions and that lives within a great mythical mantle that gives meaning to his actions. For this reason, humans, being symbolic entities or 'symbolic animals', in the words of Ernst Cassirer (1995), make the difference with the rest of the animals their vast capacity for symbolization. In no way will an object be found isolated from something else, that is to say that a word and a symbol will never be abandoned, they will always be in a constant relationship that precedes and sends them. "Man is always on the verge of invoicing very complex symbolic systems in order to encourage his communion with the alien" (González, 2012: 215-216). This question is because the human being from the moment he is born establishes close relations with the world, which is composed of language, artistic manifestations, science, traditions, myths, religious

dogmas, etc. that constitute the thick symbolic network that conditions, but that never determines (Castoriadis, 2013) the human becoming.

"The symbol's own work is not limited to 'meaning' people, events or objects, but is to 'conceive' and 'animate' them: to give them life in the midst of the sway of everyday life" (Duch & Chillón, 2012: 170). It is in the middle of this symbolic universe where there is a mixture of innumerable experiences and experiences, the latter understood as the fabric that sustains those experiences, which happen individually or that are socially apprehended thanks to the gregarious characteristic of the human being.

From the heterogeneous symbolic world, the most diverse human relationships arise, since certain societies share a universe of symbols, which is demarcated by various cultural codes that allow individuals to travel smoothly in an explicit space-time dimension. In other words, the symbolic universe is a complex map designed by and for humanity, meaning that the human being does not have the key to access the natural world itself, but can enter the universe of symbols that he himself has created to know, understand and settle in nature. "Literally, subjects must figure out their reality, segregated by the devilish gust that imagination, sensitivity and understanding entail. They live, then, in a symbolic world urged by images and concepts, first of all articulated by language - rhetorical, symbolic and logomitic - and substantiated in expressions: myth, art, religion, common sense, science" (Duch & Chillón, 2012: 240).

Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (2006) develop a thorough reflection on the important role played by symbolic universes in the construction of reality. In addition, these are the ones that consistently constitute the positions, roles and various relationships that are urged in the social. "Symbolic universes are social products that have a history. To understand their meaning, it is necessary to understand the history of their production, which is all the more important because these products of human consciousness, by their very nature, are presented as mature and inevitable totalities" (Berger & Luckmann, 2006: 124-125).

This is the powerful symbolic dimension in which it is clear that the human being, because it

is a 'symbolic animal', has the total capacity to grasp reality, manipulate it, mold it and interpret it, thus transcending the mere sensory limits. This human suitability is what facilitates the abstraction of an object or something, to which, subsequently, another symbolically loaded content is assigned. Therefore, the symbolic motive is something that has a clearly patent and latent content, the latter is polysemic and semantically inexhaustible. Likewise, it follows that the symbol is characterized by being an abstract expression to the point that it is not known how it originated. Thus, as the symbol deepens more and more, it is noticed that it is dark and foggy. In short, thanks to socially accepted conventions, symbols are images that carry various categories grouped into the sensory reality they represent. It is important that it is clear that all symbols do not represent the same in all cultures, so these symbols vary temporarily and socially.

In the work *The symbolic imagination* its author, Gilbert Durand, states very clearly that the symbol is a representation that makes a secret sense appear, like the epiphany of a mystery. "The visible part of the symbol, the 'signifier', will always be loaded with the maximum of concretes, and as Paul Ricœur said, every authentic symbol has three concrete dimensions: it is at the same time 'cosmic', 'dreamlike' and finally 'poetic', that is to say that it also resorts to the most intimate language, therefore the most concrete" (Durand, 1971: 15).

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In this field of symbolic universes that involve human beings, the imaginative faculty of the *anthropos* and their ability to institute society (Castoriadis, 1988, 2001, 2013) are related to film theory and imaginary man (Morin, 2001) and spectator as enunciate (Casetti, 1989). In the midst of a concatenation between symbolism, imagination, subject, society, device and spectator, we have tried to structure a theoretical basis and clarify this complex warp that escapes from all inherited reductive ontology, in order to break through and reflect on (the) being and its abilities of creation and symbolization, independent of the languages, supports and formats used.

Anthropos and imagining ability

The imagining capacity is immanent to *anthropos* and is a fundamental psychic faculty in the space and time channel through which the human

being transits. Before being rational, the Being is imaginative, for the Being lives on its imagination. This faculty allows us to form new ideas, imagine desirable situations and broadens our ability to know, since the human being is not imprisoned in plain objective knowledge. Well, as it became clear, *anthropos* is *logomitic*. In addition, it has two columns: reason and imagination, which are powers that make life possible. "The question of imagination is decisive because knowledge - and the possible communication, therefore rises and is outlined above all as 'image' (*mythos*); and only then, through a gradual symbolic and metaphorical 'transubstantiation', does it acquire precise contours and become 'concepts' (*logos*)" (Duch & Chillón, 2012: 237).

The study around the imaginary and, of course, the imagination itself, has suffered hard attacks from Cartesianism. They, with all the respect that researchers deserve and the explorations they carry out, pursue the hard data, the objective, the tangible, what can be measured, everything else is left over or serves as a referential additive, not as a central vertebra. But this vision emanates a range of errors, because studying Homo is thorny, since the human being is a Being of a vast complexity. Not to forget that the Being is ambivalent, wandering, multifaceted, hermeneutical, instinctive, semiotic, mythical, technical, to name some facets of who the human being is. Gaston Bachelard's disciple of thought and founder of the Centre de Recherche sur l'Imaginaire, Gilbert Durand, critically visualizes an 'Iconoclast West' and states that positivism was responsible for suppressing all that pertains to the symbolic. Durand warns that Cartesianism and empiricism have been the currents that have depreciated the symbol to a greater extent. From Aristotle, through scholasticism to reaching factual empiricism, the experience of facts and logical certainties have been conceived as the only accesses to the truth. This reasoning, anchored in factual experience and logical certainties, is called dialectic or binary reasoning. "Cartesianism ensures the triumph of iconoclasy, the triumph of the 'sign' over symbol. All Cartesians reject imagination, as well as sensation, as an inducer of errors" (Durand, 1971: 27).

Based on Gilbert Durand's perspective of thinking, it is important to make distinctions in certain concepts that are key and deal with each other. First, a) 'the imaginary': is the native and inherent capacity in the human being that allows him to

create and symbolize. Also, through symbolization we know the material and immaterial world. The imaginary is “that bound connector by which every human representation is constituted” (Durand, 2000: 60). Secondly, b) ‘the imaginary’: refers to what is culturally known as the fantastic, the fictional, the false. This concept, in itself, directs the dualistic reduction of the real and the unreal.

The imagination is so wide that it has the ability to transport us to unique and unexplored worlds, to spaces that are set to the taste of everyone whom is imagining them. The imagination that “flows constantly in the psychic torrent of the anthropos, rises with an irreducible creative power that allows to conjecture and travel beyond the geographical and cultural boundaries established in a society” (Riffo, 2019: 93). However, it must be clear that these worlds and environments are imagined according to the *acquis* and the particular socio-historical preconceptions that each Being carries or *the personal equation* (Baeza, 2015). This is because we are historical beings who chained traditions that merge into social reality. It should be clear that “tradition is not an inert repertoire of (old thoughts or beliefs), as common sense tends to believe, but a kind of symbolic environment that literally encourages communicative agents” (Chillón, 2000: 122).

As noted previously, it is essential to highlight the relevance and power of the imaginary faculty that anthropos possess, an aspect that Cornelius Castoriadis went deeply in *Figures of the thinkable* (2001). Castoriadis refers to *ensidic* dynamics as the logic that establishes already determined meanings and is characterized by defining elements and grouping them into sets within rigid frames. In fact, every society, envelops and transforms itself by the *ensidic* dynamics. Societies constitute themselves and its own social experience from a necessary instituting order, based on elements already circulating since the past. In this sense, it can be emphasized that the history of humanity is the product of the individuals and their collectives who have created society through imagination (Cristiano, 2009). “Therefore, it is absolutely natural to call this faculty of radical innovation, of creation and of formation, imaginary and imagination (...) Having proven that, we must admit that in human collectivities, there is a power of creation, a *vis formandi*, which I call the instituting social imaginary” (Castoriadis, 2001: 94).

We understand the imagination as a unique psychic faculty capable of dreaming, of creating new forms (*eidos*) and institutions, and capable of mediating the relationship between the subject and its environment. According to Cegarra (2012), the imaginary shapes societies and allows it to be remodeled, transformed or adjusted. In this sense, the imaginary consents society to be grouped in a coherent way, through socially instituted meanings. The imaginary has a cardinal role in the legitimation processes of the social order (Carretero, 2003). “The role of the imaginary is to institute society, that is, to offer a set of meanings that make group life understandable and meaningful” (Claval, 2012: 31). The importance is that “the human being has created himself from his own imaginary, those that are socially established. It is socially constructed from the imagination” (Dittus, 2018: 87).

The imaginary springs from the psyche which is neither rational nor functional, but a flow of desires and representations that pursues pleasure. While for the psyche, pleasure is nothing other than its meaning. The psyche is what distinguishes the human being from other species, since this psyche is not just full of impulses from reality, but also radical imagination. For Castoriadis the imaginary “is not an image of. It is incessant and essentially indeterminate creation (historical-social and psychic) of figures / forms / images” (2013: 12). The historical-social is self-creation, it is constant poetry that has the particularity of being *ex nihilo*. The society imagines and institutes itself elaborating a great institution. It is the latter that keeps the society together with clear horizons of reference and is the one that “determines what is ‘real’ and what is not, what it has a meaning and what is meaningless” (Castoriadis, 1988: 69).

In the historical-social dimension is when the radical imagination is synthesized into an *imaginary institution*. In other words, it is the creativity of the social collective. In this way the imaginary social meanings arise. They “do not correspond to ‘rational’ or ‘real’ elements and are not consumed by reference to these elements. Instead, they are given by creation. I appoint/categorize them as social since they only exist if being instituted and being object of participation of an imperative and anonymous collective entity” (Castoriadis, 1988: 68).

The imaginary, when instituted and once has become social, is transcendental because it allows to generate a coherent and meaningful social dynamic, where desires, reveries and fears are grouped, both individual and collective. In agreement with Pintos (2015), the articulation of the imaginary mosaic fulfills the role of cartography with the socio-imaginary instituted signage. The importance of the imaginary in societies is such “because it institutes the systems of norms that guide human action and leads individuals and social groups to project themselves in the future and to model it as well. (Claval, 2012: 32).

Morin and the thesis of the imaginary man

First it is necessary to note that “the imaginary word awakens a certain invisible volume, a presence that surrounds us but that we cannot touch” (Franzone, 2005: 3). In other words, the imaginary refers to “an alternate mechanism of presences and absences, whose concealments must be as significant as their underlines” (Fernández, 2010: 269). Hence the importance of social imaginary in the field of symbolic fields (Gómez, 2001).

The theory of the imaginary is directly associated with the relationship of cinema with the figure of the spectator. The first antecedent of important theoretical repercussions is found in Edgar Morin’s book, *Le cinema ou l’homme imaginaire* (1956). Demonstrating a broad conceptual journey through Lacanian psychoanalysis, Sartrean existentialism and image theory, Morin demystifies in an anthropological essay some conceptions around the imaginary to transfer them into the cinematic territory’s field. The notion of imaginary - in Morin’s thesis - follows the background of Lacan’s theory for whom the imaginary refers, to the subject’s relationship with his formative identifications (...) and to the subject’s relationship with the real, whose characteristic is to be illusory. That is, the image and the imaginary are part of the same psychic nature, so the imaginary formations of the subject are images, not only in a sense of substitution or mediation but in the sense that they eventually become embodied in material images.

It is in an intermediate ontological plane level where the mental image is found, whose reality - as it happens - is never questioned. As for Sartre, the mental image is an essential structure of consciousness or, written in another way, it fulfills an important psychological function by associating

man with his material environment; For Morin, the cinematographic object is absent within its very presence in the viewer’s psyche. It is the presence-absence duality that defines the nature of the film image. The subjective overvaluation made by the subject of his immediate or distant environment depends on the objectivity of the mental image in its apparent material exteriority, that is, in shapes, colors, size or density. For Morin, all of this is part of the psyche, we imagine it. As the objective necessity increases, the image tends to project and objectify itself. By increasing its degree of realism acquires autonomy and immortality, generating other realities. These new realities are characterized by concentrating fears, needs and dreams of humankind and that are enhanced in collective images, magnifying, fetishizing or mythologizing elements that are part of the objective culture of a group of people.

These are cultural features that contribute from the unreal, the illusory, the reverie and the supernatural, the basis for the success of the big screen in the West. It is through cinema -claims Morin- where our dreams are visualized and where the imagination of the human being becomes a reality. Cinema represents materiality where the impossible becomes possible. The unreality of cinema is an illusion that becomes reality. However, it is paradoxical. “It is not this machine the most absurd thing to imagine since it only serves to project images for the pleasure of seeing them?” Asks Morin (2001: 19). Furthermore, he writes: “The cinematographer is a true image in an elementary and anthropologically state of shadow-reflection. In the twentieth century it resurrects the double imaginary. More specifically, in this adaptation to project in spectacle an image perceived as an exact reflection of real life” (Morin, 2001: 48).

In Morin’s thesis, cinema, like photography, confirms the presence of something that is absent. However, it adds a double impression of reality, “restoring the movement of things and beings, projecting them, freeing them from the film on a surface on which they seem autonomous” (Morin, 2001: 21). In this way, the richness of the cinema lies not in what it represents, but on what the viewer focus on or is able to project. Thus, the imagination is activated.

How is it possible to activate those images so characteristic of the subject’s exclusive

subjectivity, nourishing them with a visual device such as cinema? The mental image, explains Morin, is projected twice, and spontaneously. But it also does it on images and material forms, such as drawings, engravings or sculptures, in a clear tendency towards deformation or the fantastic. Because of that, the mental image and the material image rise its value or deteriorate the reality provided, addressing importance to a representation seemingly worthless. It is an unreal world which has effects on reality itself. These are two poles of the same reality: the double and the image, an idea that Morin explains: “In the unreal world of the doubles (...) a psychic projective power creates a double of everything to open it in the imaginary. An imaginary power unfolds everything in the psychic projection (...) and the image has the magical quality of the double, but internalized, nascent and subjective. The double possesses the psychic, affective quality of the image, but alienated and magical” (Morin, 2001: 35).

Morin’s quotation bases supports the idea that cinema inextricably connects objective reality and subjective vision. In that practical assimilation of knowledge that the cinematographer makes possible, the dreams of the humankind are visualized, projected, objectified, industrialized and shared by contemporaneity. The first reality support are the forms. Faithful to the appearances of a referent, they give an impression of reality. What the cinematographer does with the movement, is to contribute to development, duration, time and spatial depth. The movement restores autonomy and corporality to forms. Thus, “film projection releases the image of the plate and the photographic paper” (Morin, 2001: 108). To achieve this imaginary effect, in this initial empirical process of vision and perception, the camera puts the psychological vision into action. These are fragmentary visions that concur in a global perception, which means that an object is seen psychologically from every single angle (objective perception), both by the camera and by the viewer. The making and editing process of the film mechanizes the perceptual processes, unifying them in a psychological vision.

All this is possible because psychic processes lead on the one hand, to a practical, objective and rational vision and, on the other, to an affective, subjective and fantastical vision. Both are joined in the cinema. Objective and subjective images are juxtaposed, prefabricated through an initial

deciphering made by the camera from the first image captures. The viewer activates the mixture that Morin talks about, because although the film has a reality outside the viewer, a materiality, the spectator recognizes the film as unreal and imaginary. Proof of this is that aesthetic vision is used, which only applies to double images. It decodes the cinema, giving it subjectivity and imaginary value. For Morin, as for Jean Epstein, cinema is psychic. Two psyches are united in it, the one of the film and the one of the spectator.

Therefore, the cinema seems to drag the subjectivity of the spectator in a single flow, and the latter - an active subject in the dark room - does not realize that it is an essential part of that projection, identification and participation machine called ‘cinematograph’. The film is our total psyche, as if it was imagining for each one of us. Thus, the figure of the spectator as part of this psychic relationship with the cinema guarantees the existence of a device that exceeds the notion of a mere technical apparatus system. It’s everything that surrounds the film. And inside it, the viewer has a main role.

The cinematographic spectator as a speaker

The study of the Italian Francesco Casetti, *The film and its viewer* (1986), analyzes this figure, from a clear semiotic perspective, and does so by entering the cinematographic enunciation. For Casetti, it is possible to observe the “implicit reader” or the “image of the public” that the film text outlines. In this thesis, the imaginary link becomes possible with the search for a presence, that of the interlocutor, which materializes in a kind of circular relationship where both -spectator and film- are needed. That means, the film builds its viewer, draws it, gives it a place, makes it follow a path (Casetti, 1989: 35). The place of the spectator is part of the imaginary construction process, it is the position of the subject-receiver as it is constructed by the film itself when addressing the audience. In this way, the viewer stops being considered as an empirical subject located materially in the dark room, but is an integral part of the film, involved in the form of the text.

When considering the film as text, the premise is assumed that it is seen or institutes its own purpose, this feature also extends to the viewer. In the words of Casetti (1989: 29), “far from being in the unarmed camp, and long before offering a

personal reaction, whoever sits in the room helps to build what appears on the screen.” Or what is the same, whoever sits in the showing room lives with the film, better yet, lives inside it. In this way, the inside and outside of the text converge on the viewer. It is the field of enunciation that Casetti offers to take charge of this imaginary spectatorial. It is from that enunciative analysis where the figure of the viewer makes sense and is revealed. There, the film draws it, gives it a site, places it in the structure of its story, as an active entity. According to Casetti, the cinematographic enunciation refers to the act of “appropriating or seizing the expressive possibilities offered by the cinema to give body and consistency to a film” (Casetti, 1989: 42). That saying and its modalities is nourished from a point of view that organizes the different aspects of the film, such as the taking, the framing, the sequence, the depth of field or the music. From the enunciation, the position in which the person watching the projected scene on the screen is placed, is observed. Thus, the presence and importance of its destination, of its assigned place is manifested.

The difficulty lies in the fact that both the enunciation and enunciating subject are never presented as such. It is the enunciation that becomes invisible to the eyes of the beholder. The enunciator in a film -Casetti explains- always exists, either in an obvious or implicit way. That accompanies the text throughout its development, and even may not be in the plot. It has a capacity to act in the text that proclaims it as one of the basic and active elements of the cinematographic text. The interpellation is one of the resources used by the cinematographic language so that the spectator intervenes in the text, “when the film speaks to him, he looks him in the eye from the screen, as if he wanted to invite him to participate in the story,” says Casetti (1989: 39). And give two examples of it. On the one hand, *The great train robbery* (Edwin Porter, USA, 1903), in which at the end of the film, the head of the assailants band, in the foreground, points and shoots looking at the camera, watching the spectators. The other case is *Vent d'est* (Jean Luc Godard, Italy/France/Germany, 1969), where a young man in the foreground and then in general, facing, looking straight ahead, invites viewers to reach him; then, a voiceover realizes the impossibility of such a request. In both there is a “you” that the film seems to suggest, starting-also-from the narrative context in which the interpellations occur.

Thus, the viewer is a brand within the film, a presence that designates being seen and understood, but that evidence is always relative, and depends on how clear the interpretation is and what psychological factors of the subject help or hinder the setting in the presence of this presence in the text. A kind of dedication that Casetti graphs as “It is you who I am addressing”: “It is the enunciation that sets the coordinates of a film (and the “you” who emerges owes its own consistency to that starting gesture) (...) emergent or submerged, obvious or hidden, is the place of affirmation and installation of an enunciator; it is the field in which a paper will be welded with a body to define behaviors and profiles of what is called the viewer” (Casetti, 1989: 50-51).

In this sense, it is clear that Casetti’s thesis draws on literary theory to address this kind of “model spectator”, referring to the figure that Umberto Eco recognizes for the literary text. The mysterious relationship between the author and an imaginary reader drawn on the reading path defined by the text, and which Eco describes the *Reader in fabula* (1979), inspires Casetti, and from there he builds his thesis. That someone to whom the author directs his work is in the film. And with him - separated from any abstraction - the figures of the *narrator* and *narratee*. Not to be confused, Casetti seems to exclaim. While the enunciator and enunciatario respond to abstract instances and are not personalized or corporatized in someone or something, the *narrator* and the *narratee* assume the figurativizations of those on the surface of the text, it is the *I* and *you* that are said and shown, presented, mostly, as simple characters.

How does a statement that does not become a protagonist manifest itself in the text? How is this constructed in the complex cinematographic enunciation? The key is the point of view, that is, the summary position that is assumed both from what is shown, what is not shown and how it is displayed on the big screen. The point of view guarantees that the enunciator - the spectator - does not become a protagonist, but is only a witness. That allows him not to intervene on stage, but becoming a nobody with open possibility for all. It is a role that the enunciator is in charge of defining and that, in passing, puts his complicity into play, because if there is someone who looks - the enunciatario - it is due to someone who questions and let’s look, the enunciator.

The statement, in short, defines the contours that articulate the statement, and with it the fields of action of the enunciario and enunciator. For example, with the subjective camera, the film offers images through someone's eyes. It is the enunciario that is concretized from a component of the enunciator, elevating it to a narrator. In this case, the viewer is the one who penetrates the film in the eyes of a character and adopts his behaviors. The enunciario pushes the viewer to participate without intention, imprisoned in the confines of the scene. The situation is different in the case of the objective camera, where in front of an effective witness, but mute or hidden, a neutral space or without marked boundaries is displayed. Here both the enunciario and the enunciator unfold entirely implicitly. In the interpellation, however, the viewer is required but stays away from the action or on the margins of the scene. With the subjective camera, as discussed, it is the speaker who looks with the eyes of a character, and becomes a field viewer.

As can be seen, the film -based on a diversity of aesthetic and narrative resources- draws a viewer who participates according to different degrees of diegetic intervention, giving him high doses of realism. In Casetti's words, "these images, often used as mere metaphors, actually synthesize very well the fact that the text is not only a gamble, but also a real maneuvering ground" (Casetti, 1989: 174), achieving a true interface, that is, that connection between the world represented on the screen and the world of which the screen is one of many other objects. Two machines in which images (visual and psychical) are juxtaposed, forming the cinematographic device. It is the filmic text that is confronted from within - through the enunciation mechanisms described by Casetti - and from its exterior, those imaginary spaces with which it comes into contact, the outside, the real world. An inside and an outside that always end up coming together in the viewer.

CONCLUSIONS

After this reflexive effort, in order to try to clarify and lay down epistemological bases around the notions of the imaginary and the theory of the cinematographic spectator, it is established by way of conclusions, always provisional, that the imaginary faculty of the human being can not be reduced to reductionist logics, categorical and purely rational logics. The power to create

and dream new possible worlds is unique in the anthropos, and it is this purely imaginary question that sets us apart from the rest of the animals.

In addition, the cinematographer is considered to be the space where the rational-objective-practical vision and the affective-subjective vision converge. Both emanate from the human being himself, since he is able to figure and create new forms thanks to his imaginary faculty. If our dreams and fears are visualized in the cinema, it is because cinema has the capacity to realize what is impossible for us. Our greatest creations and delusions are within a film. It is the image of the public that is articulated, technically, within the film.

It is not possible to conceive a world without images and a human being without imagination. The images, with all that symbolic load they possess, are dynamic and provide the imaginary, that is to say the creative capacity. The creation, in this case that of a filmmaker, gathers the objectified world to, as spectators, put ourselves inside, for this matter the film becomes coherent, plausible and intelligible. This question is ascribed to the idea that the film manifests itself as a social psyche where our imaginary world is contained.

As a result, it follows that from the fascination of the images that appear / disappear on the big screen, the scope of the subjectivation propitiated by the device that makes cinema possible, can be explained. The game of perceptions that he raises in his creative and testimonial account only emphasizes the ethical dimension of being, constituting an incentive for the conscience of the masses, but always through the director's temperament. It is also the occasion to confirm the old saying that "what is inside is also outside".

In summary, thanks to the reflection on the imaginary and the cinematographic spectator it is concluded that through an artificial-imaginary state the spectator feels close to the reality of the images that the cinema offers him. You feel part of them. Thus, the device-cinema that can not evade the idea of reverie and referential illusion, because the viewer comes into direct contact with his fantasies and dreams, capturing in the reception the ideal means through which the cinematographic mechanism enters into action. That is, the double dimension of the film is observed as an artifact and as a subjective experience. It is an indissoluble link that unites objective reality with subjective

vision, recognizing in the spectatorial subject the bridge through which cinema is concretized in a symbiosis. In short, two seemingly opposite worlds come into contact: the outside world and the viewer's psyche. In the film, the subject does not make his marks visible as an enunciario, since the device suppresses any reference to the enunciator. It is a piece of reality that speaks and reveals itself. The reason is that the anthropos has always needed to place everything in images, and the current technological tools facilitate the operation. The images themselves are one of the main ways of understanding and expressing ourselves in the daily life that occurs.

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