

# Characterization

## OF THE FORMATION AND STRUCTURING OF CRIMINAL GANGS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MAGDALENA

### ABSTRACT

From tracking reports state institutions and media analysis and interviews with demobilized paramilitaries, a characterization of the rise and expansion of Bacrim in the department of Magdalena is. Under the gaze and descriptive with the collection and processing of information that enable qualitative techniques is achieved specify how they are created, positioned and expand. The research is based on the business theory to a better understanding of the criminal phenomenon approximation.

**Keywords:** Criminal gangs, Weakness State, Criminal economy, Leader in action, Drug economy.

### RESUMEN

Desde un seguimiento de informes de instituciones del Estado y de análisis de prensa, así como de entrevistas a paramilitares desmovilizados, se hace una caracterización del auge y expansión de las Bacrim en el departamento del Magdalena. Bajo la mirada descriptiva y con la recolección y procesamiento de la información que posibilitan las técnicas cualitativas, se logra precisar la forma como se crean, posicionan y expanden. La investigación se apoya en la teoría empresarial para hacer una mejor aproximación comprensiva del fenómeno criminal.

**Palabras clave:** Bandas criminales, Debilidad del Estado, Economía criminal, Líder en acción, Economía del narcotráfico.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The multiplicity of armed groups and the struggle for dominance of geo-strategic corridors in the middle of a rural country has marked the socio-historical formation and structuring of the Colombian nation and its institutions. The alter-legal shapes arise conflictive, as a response to fluctuating weakness of the Colombian state, sometimes partial, sometimes in danger of collapse, to position and assume the real and symbolic control throughout the national territory (Moncada *et al.*, 2007).

Added to this, the emergence of “Lideres en Accion”, i.e. people who can promote social and institutionally by their own strength and their individual actions (which allows them to control strategic means through armed power), makes these gray areas very attractive, which are coopted by alternative legal forms that encourage the growth of micro-powers that feed and grow in the shadow of the leviathan, as noted by Peter Waldman (2007).

These armed actors assume various forms, and one of them is the paramilitaries. When referring to this type of actor that particularly added to the traditional historical conflict between guerrillas and State, high levels of violence and barbarism, it is necessary to clarify that the rise of the same is given in Colombia under the argumentative guise of a State partially weakened and the inability this to have a presence in all the land and defeat the guerrillas. This guise of anti-insurgency, was strategically used by paramilitary groups who

managed to colonize medially entrenched political speeches in the fight against the guerrillas. Thus, referring to these structures implies the use of the nickname paramilitary, which gave grounds of legitimacy in front of the national and regional public opinion (Franco, Nieto and Rincon, 2010).

The media discourse that cataloged the actions of these groups as expressions of self-defense, prevented them understand that, derived in death squads or private armies that revolved around the drug economy. To understand these structures is key to understand the multiple forms that arise from these death squads, which permeated by violence, assume expansions, contractions, difuminaciones, and survive, despite the various peace agreements and demobilization processes and the legal framework that has been built for them (Reyes Posada, 2009).

With the various processes of demobilization, and the falling of the attractive argument paramilitary political project, the essence of the action of these groups reveals, which acted as a large centralized hub poster and criminal economy, combining multiple forms of alter-legal domination, that is acted as a great organization to centralize the various aspects of the criminal: controlling drug trafficking and their exit routes, control of micro-traffic control, extortions nationally and locally control of the kidnapping, prostitution and control of killings. But the phenomenon of gravity is that it has demonstrated a cooptation of state institutions by the paramilitary structures in association with mobsters and

regional politicians, a phenomenon known as para-politics (Lopez, 2010).

From this recent past, and as an immediate consequence of the demobilization, there is a new expression: the Bacrim. As pockets of demobilized paramilitary groups or groups not demobilized, these bands without arguing politics remain entrenched in the local economies of large capital and intermediate cities in the geostrategic runner's rural enclaves important for marketing drug globally and continue coopting state institutions and political actors of the same. Thus the binomial corruption and drug trafficking, coupled with the dominance of micro-powers such as micro-extortion, drug dealing, smuggling and illegal mining, give life to this economic phenomenon in the last ten years has expanded widespread in the country.

The new criminal gangs, known as Bacrim can be considered as large criminal enterprises entering outrageous and violent competition for dominance in other markets (territories) and the rise of crime control and centralization. It is common to hear of the "Oficina de Envigado", "Los Rastrojos", "Los Urabeños", "Los Nevados". As large-scale criminal enterprises, entering local franchising process and tend to preserve a certain territory with the power and strength of leadership based on military action and a strong tendency to national and global expansion (Canales, 2012).

Expansive dynamics of these Emerging criminal gangs is typical of the hybridization of violent social phenomena and assumes a dy-

namic, heterogeneous, volatile mode. His hybridizations are liquid (Bauman, 2009). Despite this, it can be recognized that the origin of these organizations is linked to failed disarmament in the context of the demobilization of paramilitary groups and the laws made for this purpose, as stated by Sanchez (2011):

The Emerging criminal gangs are not only composed of demobilized paramilitaries. These are made up of dissidents (exmembers of groups outside the law that now comprise the bands), rearmed (exAUC members who demobilized, integrated rehabilitation programs and took up arms again in bands) and emerging (new generations of young people entering the weapons first and nourish these bands), its composition is heterogeneous, so it is not accepted peacefully, that it is a new generation of paramilitaries. And this heterogeneity as well as the composition and actions carried out by these bands difficult to catalog them as ordinary crime, because it is a complex web of alliances between organized crime, common crime and insurgencies (Sanchez, 2011, p. 42).

Despite the efforts of government agencies and NGOs (Corporacion Nuevo Arco Iris), to explore the issue of Bacrim is noticeable how little characterized the phenomenon in scientific research, conducted from the academic field is found. It has not been possible to know what differentiates a Bacrim from another, which features take in various national

contexts, just as there are absences of regional studies with scientific rigor that can visualize their performances. Therefore it is necessary to go beyond monitoring by institutions of the State and abandon the conceptual vision of reducing the phenomenon to a simple continuation of the paramilitary (which is referred to as neo-paramilitaries).

In our analysis, we turn to a reading of their reality from the interdisciplinary, hence the approximation we do, is supported in business theory and aims for understanding the Bacrim as criminals microenterprises based on an expanding capitalist logic, tend to grow depending on the recess market that allows (Canales, 2012), which are no more than situations of illegality, which are defined by Prieto (2013, p. 11) as:

Some scenarios... where these groups are reproduced to the extent that these conditions are met: 1) no state; 2) inheritance or experience with illegal markets and networks according to geostrategic factors: boundaries, for example; 3) “difficulties of communities and functional department for the national economic circuit reduced the possibilities of diversifying and expanding economic activity and therefore limited the deck of legal economic opportunities for the population”; and 4) cultural affability, understood as “the acceptance, ownership and shoot the perpetuation of constitutional values, (which) is relevant when it comes to understanding the existence of a

highly tolerant social group with certain illegal practices (smuggling) and its perpetuation.

This article is an attempt to abandon the clichés that are manifested by Prieto (2013), for it makes visible the way they have played the criminal gangs in the department of Magdalena (regional analysis), hence addressing critically the process expansion of Bacrim emphasizing in the various manifestations and timing of structuring the various criminal gangs in the department of Magdalena. It as a local example of what might be happening on the national stage.

The research is descriptive as it aims to specify the components of a particular phenomenon, in this case the phenomenon on the rise and consolidation of Bacrim. The information was compiled under the direction and process parameters and techniques that provide qualitative research. It recovered and process, based on track press since 2009 until the first half of 2013, and tracking official communications and reports from institutional sources such as the Attorney General's Office, reports the National Police and various state secretaries of district and provincial government. Confessions of paramilitaries were also analyzed, which were obtained under the Justice and Peace process.

The following characterize the various criminal gangs after the demobilization of paramilitary restructured in the governments of Alvaro Uribe, in the case of the department of Magdalena are characterized monitoring

processes of reorganization, rearrangement and fighting is done by territories, just as the various criminal phenomena franchise and attempted globalization of crime from the perspective of the local. Subsequently the factors from the context of illegality nourish the Bacrim and give them the “recess business” needed to expand itself.

## II. BACRIM OVERVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MAGDALENA: ORIGINS AND EXPANSIONIST PROJECT

### • *Criminal band “Aguilas Negras” or the “Frente Cacique Arhuaco”*

This criminal gang, according to the information gathered, comes about in the month of October 2006, with presence in the highlands of the northern slope of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, especially in the town of Santa Marta, in rural areas the districts of Minca and Guachaca, as initially noted by the group Judicial Police of the Justice and Peace Unit of the Prosecutor of Santa Marta by No. 019 Report of November 24, 2006, where he communicated on the conformation this armed group.

In the report of the Judicial Police of the Justice and Peace, clearly describes how information about the appearance of the new criminal group that was publicly denounced by Hernan Giraldo Serna, who was the top commander of the “Bloque Resistencia Tayrona” from the AUC, demobilized from the other block and also for market traders citizens of the city of Santa Marta, who claim in their complaint, a summons to a meeting

that would take place in a village in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, the requirement of a certain amount of money, and death threats for failure of this quote, enclosing to their complaints a document or pamphlet that came to their homes, where a logo of an eagle with wings observed extended and the caption “Las Aguilas Negras”.

It also ensures that on November 3, 2006 was held in Santa Marta a meeting where the Commander of the Second Brigade participated, the Executive and two Commanders from BICOR, Ombudsman, a representative of the Presidency of the Republic, a representative of DAS and representative of CTI, four representatives of demobilized and a community leader in the area of Guachaca; at this meeting the representatives of demobilized and community leader complained that there is an armed group divided into two sections, one that already has possession Quebrada del Sol top and another having possession at the top of Bonda, on the side of La Zeta, for the top of Rio Piedra, are also making the presence of a base that had the Bloque “Resistencia Tayrona” in the field of Las Nubes; added that the group in Quebrada del Sol is called “Bloque Arhuaco”.

At this meeting the Magdalena Village Regional Ombudsman, at the time, Dr. Liceth Peñaranda Peña, provides a pamphlet dated October 27, 2006 signed by “Demobilized Peace Group” where complaints are similar to those set forth and arguing that the creation of this new group aims to criminal exploitation of drug trafficking in this area and states

that its members are demobilized “Bloque Resistencia Tayrona”.

This group which now calls itself “Frente Cacique Arhuaco” in its initial claims try to resume the armed control area Guachaca, Machete Pelao, Quebrada del Sol, Casa e’Tabla and generally throughout Northern Sierra Nevada, his logistic base and action was in Las Nubes in the upper zone of Quebrada del Sol; there is another group known as “Aguilas Negras” commanded by alias “57” that sought to regain control of the Sierra Nevada in sectors ranging from the Sierra de Cordoba to Palmor, the Negro Rojas as major runs urban areas of Bonda, Girocasaca, Masinga and the industry of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. This group intended to militarily dominate the northeastern sector of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and the municipalities located in the flat area of the Sierra.

According to the report No. 10-6740 SIJIN - GIBDES 29 of 19 October 2010 the Police Department Magdalena, this group achieved a presence in the village of Guachaca, trails of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, in the municipalities of Santa Marta, Cienaga, Fundación and Zona Bananera in the department of Magdalena, reaching to have a composition of about 120 members.

Finally, this criminal group divided following the frontal struggle of the polices and judicial authorities, which resulted in the capture and death of their main leaders; also the emergence of a new gang in 2007 called “Los

Nevados”, which caused a dispute between the pockets of “Aguilas Negras” and this new criminal group that disputed areas in which were present.

• ***Criminal gang “Los Nevados” or “Los Mellizos”***

In mid-2007 when they were prosecuted and captured the main leaders of the Bacrim “Aguilas Negras”, made an appearance in the department of Magdalena a new illegal armed group initially called itself as “Bloque Central Nevado” or “Los Nevados”, establishing their area interference especially in the town of Santa Marta and in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada in the districts of Guachaca, Bonda and Minca, according to the information stored by the Unit of Justice and Peace Regional Magdalena.

The creation of this new criminal gang was funded and supported by drug traffickers Miguel Angel and Victor Mejia Munera, known as “Los Mellizos”, who were demobilized as paramilitaries with “Bloque Vencedores de Arauca” of the AUC, these people made alliances with some demobilized “Bloque Resistencia Tayrona”, who provided their criminal activities and thus gain control of the processing areas of illicit drugs and illegal jetties located at the beaches and rivers of Parque Nacional Natural Tayrona and the Parque Natural Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.

This criminal group deploys its criminal actions with the collection of extortions to merchants of the city of Santa Marta and the movement of people from the civilian popu-

lation living in the rural areas of the municipality, likewise initiate a series homicide by reckoning with the former members of the Bacrim “Aguilas Negras”, many of these people end up integrating the new illegal armed group and pointing to his former colleagues, this accelerated the decline of the “Aguilas Negras” finishing part of its members to adhere to the band “Los Nevados”.

This criminal gang have also been shaped by people from the departments of Antioquia, Valle, with Cordoba and Santa Marta resident staff; and, according to the office DAS.SMAG. GINT.2010 - 933503-2 (Administrative Department of Security, 2010), this criminal gang also extended its presence to the municipalities of Cienaga, Aracataca and Fundacion.

As with the “Aguilas Negras”, an interagency group to fight the new armed group is formed, but due to the infiltration of criminals and leaking information on court operations to be implemented against the members of “Los Nevados”; and was on November 16, 2007 when was murder the CTI investigator, variable analyst paramilitarism and criminal gangs Farides Judith Alvarez Hernandez (First Prosecutor of Bogota Bacrim Unit); this fact was of great connotation and therefore all authorities launched a frontal attack on Bacrim “Los Nevados” against its top leaders and “Los Mellizos” Mejia Munera (*El Informador*, 2007).

In this way were giving heavy blows by the authorities against this criminal gang “Los Nevados”, by intensifying the searching of their

leaders brothers Mejia Munera, who finally were neutralized by the National Police in 2008 unsubscribing to one and captured the other, before being extradited on drug charges into the United States. This criminal group focused on the business of drug trafficking, and after their structures were attacked inside the country, wanted to appropriate the Atlantic Coast and Santanderes due to the importance of strategic mobility corridor representing the Sierra Nevada Santa Marta for the cultivation, processing and sale of cocaine. Its area of action was centered almost the northern part of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Santa Marta district and the town of Cienaga, Magdalena, with about 140 members.

The Mejia Munera had demobilized with the “Bloque Vencedores de Arauca”, on December 23, 2005, they refused to retreat into medium and high jail security in Itagüi with the other commanders, since then remained at large for justice and the authorities indicated have shaped the criminal gang known as “Los Nevados” criminal structure that virtually disappeared after the death and capture of its leaders, according to the reconstruction by Unit of Justice and Peace (2006).

#### • **Criminal gang “Los Paisas”**

The dismantling of criminal gangs of “Los Nevados” and “Aguilas Negras”, originated in August 2008, a new self-styled Bacrim “Los Paisas” in the “Oficina de Cobro de Envigado” absorb the disjointed Bacrim “Los Nevados”, keeping interference in same areas where this Bacrim transgress from the border with the department of La Guajira, coastal zone of

Guachaca sector, in the municipality of Santa Marta. At the same time unincorporated to said criminal organization created small groups of dissidents or former members who to independently title are known as members of these organizations, conducting criminal activities especially financial ones, extortion of merchants and farmers of the region, an approximate number of 60 subjects members of the band “Los Paisas” was established, whose area of interference it was in the rural part of Guachaca and Masinga in the municipality of Santa Marta, projected to strengthen its structure through recruitment and absorption of demobilized members of the AUC.

In general, the projection of this criminal structure was to control over the northeastern part of the department of Magdalena and northwestern part of the municipality of Dibulla (La Guajira), coastal area; likewise, seek merger with the structure of the criminal band La Guajira, alias “Pablo” commanding “Las Aguilas Negras”. However, the possible adverse effects of this leader of ceding control over these areas, led to a series of clashes in rural areas and increased murders citywide mainly on municipality of Santa Marta, Buritaca, Don Diego, Guachaca, in the department of Magdalena, and Riohacha, Maicao, Dibulla in La Guajira.

This perspective was maintained until about March of 2009, when appears in the scene in the department of Magdalena, a new gang that calling itself “Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia” and as able to clear up, to made referred to this Bacrim , you should call “Bac-

rim de Uraba” which was led and funded by the drug trafficker Mario Rendon, alias “Don Mario”.

At the same way during the development of the events that were presented in 2009 with Bacrim “Uraba”, which allow the Bacrim “Los Paisas”, got, not to say it in another way, acquire franchise Bacrim “Aguilas Negras” in La Guajira, led by the drug dealer Arnulfo Gonzalez Sanchez, alias “Pablo” disappearing this structure in his name and in some members of the same and follow their criminal actions under the label of Bacrim “Los Paisas”.

For the month of December in 2009 on development of offensive operations executed by army troops against suspected groups of extortionists in the Zona Bananera, it was able to capture Nicolas Alberto Lemus Hernandez, alias “Choque”, where it was possible to reveal the existence of the rural group Bacrim “Los Paisas”, whose aim was to consolidate and not leave their territory between the town of Cienaga and the town of Fundacion, Magdalena (*El Informador*, 2010). The criminal gang “Los Paisas” is a criminal structure whit a presence in both urban and rural territory, have networks of information through communication equipment and a complex finance network that makes profits of the drug trafficking.

• **Criminal gang “AUC Gaitanistas de Colombia” or “Los Urabeños”**

This gang has its origin with Daniel Rendon Herrera, alias “Don Mario” –who was part of “Bloque Centauros” but demobilized with



“Bloque Elmer Cardenas” commanded by his brother Fredy Rendon Herrera alias “El Aleman”– linked the benefits of Law 975 of 2005. Alias “Don Mario”, began strengthening their illegal structures and emerging groups, through middle management of the demobilized Bloque “Cordoba” and “Elmer Cardenas”.

On wednesday April 15, 2009, units of the Dijin of the National Police captured demobilized Daniel Rendon Herrera, alias “Don Mario”, in an operation in rural area of “Cerro Azul” of Necocli municipality in Uraba, Antioquia. In this way the band called “Autodefensas Gaitanistas” o “Los Urabeños”, that is led by Dairo Antonio Usuga David, alias “Oto” or “Mauricio”, an demobilized of the EPL “Bloque Centauros”; and his brother Juan De Dios Usuga David, alias “Giovanni”, another demobilized of the EPL and subsequently of the “Bloque Calima” of the AUC, are known as the Usuga brothers. Joining them were located Henry De Jesus Lopez Londoño, alias “Mi Sangre”, “Salvador” or “Carlos Mario”, a demobilized of the “Bloque Centauros”, who serves as a financial strategist through management of drug trafficking.

In the department of Magdalena are currently committing crimes a network identified as “Uraba”. This is a drug dealer criminal group that initially are being led by a person who comes from the region of Uraba and is known by the alias “Belisario”. Also, in the department of Magdalena local leaders of this criminal network is conformed by demobilized persons who were part of the Bloques “Resistencia Tayrona” and “Norte de las AUC”.

The structure of the Bacrim “Los Paisas” was under the command of the family clan “Los GiralDOS”, who sold his own armed franchise to the Oficina de Sicarios de Envigado, organization that generated friction within the clan members, who felt losing power quotas, members of this band made contact with the head of the “Bacrim Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia”, who ran the trafficker “Don Mario” which, once was captured by National Police, began to know this structure as Bacrim “Uraba”.

The Bacrim “Uraba” began to enter the region Marquetalia through Guachaca limits with the town of Palomino (La Guajira), from June of 2009, when information on the presence of 12 sidewalk members of a new structure in Marquetalia path, and to the statistical growth of activity killed by hired killers on Guachaca region. A mid-August 2009, a reduction of activity including hired killers was observed, it is assumed that this reduction was because of the Bacrim “Uraba”, which dominated the conflict, as well as dismantled the Bacrim “Los Paisas”.

The projection of this criminal structure is to exercise control over the northeastern part of the department of Magdalena and northwestern part of the municipality of Dibulla (La Guajira), coastal area. At present this criminal gang criminal run activities such as extortion, killings and drug trafficking in the department of Magdalena and holding a dispute over control of the territory with the criminal gang “Los Rastrojos” (*El Informador*, 2010).

• **Criminal gang “Los Rastrojos”**

Former armed wing of the North of Valle cartel, headed by drug traffickers Varela Wilber, alias “Jabón”, and the clan of Urdinola, who created a murder for hired killers group to address an internal war declared on this poster by another of its members, drug trafficker Diego Leon Montoya and his security chief Juan Carlos Rodriguez, who created the hired killers armed group “Los Machos”, for control of drug trafficking routes and land or land located in the Serranía de los Paraguas, fertile land for crops illegal construction of laboratories and geographical advantages it has.

After the capture of Diego Leon Montoya, left members integrating “Los Machos” joined the ranks of “Los Rastrojos”. After the extradition of the main leaders of the blocks of self-defense, including alias “Macaco”, members of the blocks that he controls from prison, went headless and was used by “Los Rastrojos” to absorb and expand its military and territorial capacity from offending in North of Valle y el Eje Cafetero, to commit crimes in 10 departments and have 1.384 troops.

The presence of the Bacrim “Los Rastrojos” in the Caribbean region dates back to the second half of 2009, which began with clashes the Bacrim “Los Urabeños” against the band “Los Rastrojos” (Massé & Camargo, 2012). The appearance of these criminals bands for drug traffic in the department of Magdalena was given from January 2010, in order to start the consolidation of a route drug in the department of La Guajira, and to achieve this task needed to start attacking clan “Los GiralDOS”, who worked for the Bacrim “The

Urabeños”, which comes a presence in those regions, which favors a bloody war and thus a wave of violence between these two criminal organizations.

By early 2010, is known for the presence of an urban group in the city of Santa Marta which begins to seize strategic positions, making contact with offenders located in the “Barrio Pescaito” making this organization to recruit about 20 about criminals, which begin to make extortion activities sector traders El Rodadero activities and killings against members of “Los Urabeños”.

The intent of the Bacrim “Los Rastrojos” in Santa Marta is create two fronts of war to Bacrim “Los Urabeños”; the first in the field of Fonseca, Palomino, and the rural area of Dibulla, Mingueo in La Guajira, and the second in the city of Santa Marta (*El HeraldO*, 2012).

Above is the picture of the actions of criminals in the Magdalena, between disputes, accommodations and reorganizations, have been a presence in this jurisdiction since 2006 bands. As evidenced, the actions of Bacrim has close similarity with the procedures that had been developed criminal self-defense groups, but are closer to the activities of organized crime that is experienced in the global world.

### III. ALCOVES MARKETS: FINANCING SOURCES BACRIM IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MAGDALENA

One of the funding mechanisms that occur in the context of the weakness of the State and

the existence of gray areas, is the alter legal activity extractive revenues under various forms of extortion and micro-traffic. The Bacrim financed traders or groups of traders, deploying the domain through the proliferation of particular areas or micro-powers given under fear and a context of illegality.

In this sense, there has been an increase in acts of violence, especially homicide cases in major capital cities, mainly reflecting a process of reconfiguration of territorial control and redistribution of local economies in several overlapping types of illegal armed groups, such as drug cartels, well-organized criminal networks, groups dedicated to smuggling and theft cartels and smuggling of fuel, among others. Let's consider carefully each of these aspects.

The criminal actions of Bacrim in the department of Magdalena has been directed to dominate territorially corridors for traffic and drug delivery, particularly the areas surrounding the Parque Tayrona and the northern Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (areas that correspond to the villages of Guachaca, Bonda and Minca in the town of Santa Marta). The case of this territory is that historically has been influential in the development of the drug trade. Similarly, these groups seek to preserve control of the port of Santa Marta for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine by different shipping routes that depart from there; this statement correlates with drug seizures that have lately occurred and destruction of plantations and laboratories for the production of alkaloids the authorities have made.

It is pertinent to note the incidence of criminal organizations in urban contexts, scenarios where the business of selling illegal drugs plays a fundamental role. The phenomenon of micro traffic is a key factor to understand the resurgence of violence in the last 10 years in the city of Santa Marta, for control of illegal drug sales struggles are evident. But also he notes the weakness of the cartels at the national level, which makes his strategy routed to the domain of local urban markets in intermediate cities of the country.

Another means of funding these criminal groups has been the extortions that impose especially traders and businessmen.

There are strategic objectives that are sources of funding for Bacrim, we note that the Public Market of the city of Santa Marta is one of them, followed in order of importance the Sanandresitos, the public transport companies and the various merchants in particular the small and medium enterprises.

Besides micro extortion the Bacrim like any business group have a constant innovation of its products and services. That is why it is common to find innovative ways of crime, including highlights, renting weapons, which are leased for a "specific job", i.e. for a previously authorized criminal actions. Similarly retail arms are rented for common criminals. It is a permanent practice dropwise loan, which is centralized by these bands, extortion are also given in kind, people may pay with proprietary products, which are topped by these bands where to buy contraband. So

the massive smuggling of DVD movies and music CDs are also centralized. Likewise, debt collection, which are resold to Bacrim to raise these with the disproportionate interest (Magdalena Police Department, 2010).

In this context, the irregular sale of gasoline in the way of Carretera Troncal del Caribe, which links Santa Marta with the department of La Guajira, more specifically in the corridor Guachaca, is a business which allows many families to live settled in that area. There are informal sellers of gasoline, or “pimpineros” as they are known to persons engaged in peddling this fuel. The most questionable of this is that Bacrim use children for gasoline sales, as we can find a video posted by Noticias Caracol del Mediodia on the 5th of March 2012.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS

Professor of the School of Business at the University of Yale, Rodrigo Canales (2012), argues that it is necessary to understand Mexican cartels as a business model that generates a large-scale criminal activity under the franchise system; in this respect, business theory serves as an interdisciplinary field to handle a better approach to the phenomenon, since it allows to understand these new forms of reunification of Mexican crime, as the struggle to seize new territories (new markets), the search for new alcoves to develop criminal activities (economic settlements) and the centralization of criminals (parent company) structures. Canales explained as follows:

Like any transnational, have specialized and focused only on the part of the business with higher profits, high-margin drugs such as cocaine, heroin and methamphetamines. Like any traditional Latin American transnational control their operations through family ties. When entering a new market, they send a family member to supervise, or if they associated with a new organization they create a family bond, either through marriage or other ties. Like any transnational, protect your brand with the most questionable outsourcing parts of their business model, such as when they have to use violence against other criminal organizations recruit bands and other small groups to do the dirty work (Canales, 2012, p. 4).

Reality and the Mexican context differs a lot of the local context, but the approach of Canales open an option to deviate from the commonplace to tackling the phenomenon of Bacrim. This article has highlighted how Bacrim does business, explained how these criminal organizations without the guise of anti-insurgent political discourse combined drug trafficking, extortion, smuggling of petrol, as major sources of finance their illegal activities, building a great crime industry which gives them economic strength. Interestingly, these Bacrim cycle is the same cycle that meets a microenterprise. That is needed for an entrepreneur (leading share), an enabling environment for business idea (context of illegality)

and a market to position their products (U.S. market in most occasions).

Is evident that drug trafficking is concentrated after the demobilization of paramilitary groups. The places abandoned by paramilitary groups produce a power vacuum in the regions, which is quickly repositioned by so-called criminal gangs. This becomes evident when reviewing the various violent interactions between criminal gangs, which could explain the high levels of violence recorded in suitable for commercialization of drug trafficking and illegal extraction of rents geographic territories.

It is necessary to review public policies designed to curb the phenomenon of Bacrim, we believe that a key bet implies initiate a process to end illegal contexts that are suitable for the alcoves market strategy in support of the criminal Bacrim. Also it is necessary to study carefully what differentiate a Bacrim of other and what is the preponderant role of the leader in action in the construction of the expansionist projects of these bands. What would study the criminal leadership and the different incentives that allow crime viable industry.

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