

**THE COLD WAR AND CHILEAN ANTARCTIC POLICY, 1946-1952**

LA GUERRA FRIA Y LA POLITICA ANTÁRTICA CHILENA, 1946-1952

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ABSTRACT: Chilean Antarctic claims were based on geopolitical grounds. This justified acts of sovereignty and constant presence after the demarcation of Chilean Antarctic Territory in 1940. In this way, national Antarctic policy emerged because Radical administrations and the military shared a vision of the country until 1952, thus shaping a legacy in Chilean Antarctic policy. Documentation used included diplomatic papers, memoirs and the archives of President González Videla.

KEY WORDS: Chilean Antarctic Policy – Cold War – Chilean Geopolitic

RESUMEN: Las reclamaciones antárticas chilenas tuvieron un fundamento geopolítico que justificaba ejercer actos de soberanía y presencia permanente tras la demarcación del Territorio Antártico Chileno en 1940. Así, la consolidación de la política antártica nacional se produjo porque las administraciones radicales y los militares compartían una visión de país que se extendió hasta 1952 y que, posteriormente, se proyectó como legado en la política antártica chilena. Se utilizó documentación diplomática, memorias y de los archivos del presidente Gabriel González Videla.

PALABRAS CLAVES: Política Antártica Chilena – Guerra Fría – Geopolítica Chilena

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1. INTRODUCTION

The 1940 Chilean Antarctic claim –albeit chronologically before the Cold War- played an important role if it is analyzed together with the possible outbreak of a 3rd World War. Chilean bibliography – with the exception of Villalón, León and Jara- consider Chilean claims were purely legal, unrelated to the prevailing international context¹. From this viewpoint then, the logic behind accession to TIAR and MAP would be other than the declaration of Antarctic sovereignty, as indicated in *Historia del Ejército de Chile* (1985)². On the contrary, this paper maintains the acts of sovereignty and the geopolitical conception of a southern, Antarctic and oceanic Chile³ substantiated the role Chile expected to play in the case of such a hypothetical confrontation between East and West blocs.

Government players work based on rational loss-gain assumptions derived from a subjective appreciation of national security. This “war of the future”, as a hypothetical exercise, summed-up the convictions and uncertainties of the time which, as a counter-factual narrative, explain Chilean foreign policy grounds and decisions. Various document depository sources were used, such as the Gabriel González Videla Archive of National History; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and General History of the Republic of Chile; as well as the Memoirs of former Minister of Defense, Guillermo Barrios Tirado, press cuttings, and specific documents of the time.

2. NEIGHBORING CONTEXT

One key aspect was the constant tension with Argentina, enhanced by the influence of *justicialismo*⁴ on trans-Andean foreign policy, and also the boundary differences and the none-too-fortunate proceedings in Chile of the then military attaché Juan Domingo Perón⁵. In addition, politically, Chilean Radicalism’s mistrust of nationalism and populism, the bases of trans-Andean *Peronism*. Therefore, during the Radical government of Gabriel González Videla, while maintaining a formal relationship of ideological coexistence, an anti-Argentine attitude was revived –which to a certain extent contributed to Chile’s promotion as a stable democracy in Latin America.

The Minister of Defense, General Guillermo Barrios Tirado, said that Chile maintained a “clear line as a member of the democratic community”, foreign to “conflicts of any nature with its neighbors”. However, clarifying that “the expansionist policy of the Argentines... and the fall of governments in Venezuela, Peru, Paraguay, and Bolivia, implied “being left surrounded by *de facto* governments, supported by the government of Argentina”⁶. To contain Argentina, the Chilean government decided to align with the United States against the Soviet Union; and in the writings of General Ramón Cañas Montalva as well as the position of the military command, Chile was shown to be a reliable democratic partner in hemispheric security.

Chile’s Antarctic claims came in addition to this ideological discrepancy; and, to complicate things even further, Argentina had also rejected the Antarctic claims by the United Kingdom, the third player in the dispute. This weakened the sovereignty of both Latin American states, allowing US and Soviet presence in the area, and unable to oust the British, soundly established in the Falkland Islands or *Dependencias de las Malvinas*. In this regard, Minister Barrios Tirado agreed in that the

topic of “Antarctic sovereignty became more acute with the always greater aspirations and demands by countries claiming rights over Chilean territory”⁷.

Hence, Chile pushed forward with its Antarctic policy, establishing new bases and annual relieve expeditions, aside from doing scientific work⁸. In Santiago there was concern about unauthorized Argentine activities, such as the *Aviso N-13* docking in Puerto Borja or in Puerto del Hambre on 11 September 1946, when “six men under the command of a sergeant” photographed Puerto del Hambre and Fuerte Bulnes⁹.

3. THE IDEOLOGIST

Chilean Antarctic policy in the 1940’s was based on the views of Ramón Cañas Montalva, who had studied at the University of Uppsala, Sweden from 1920-24. There he was the direct disciple of Kjellen and knew Haushofer and MacKinder¹⁰. Years later he became a relevant political advisor to Radical administrations. Cañas Montalva contributed to the reconstruction of Fuerte Bulnes —inaugurated by President Pedro Aguirre Cerda- and in 1940 obtained from this President the official delimitation of Chilean Antarctic Territory¹¹. In 1946 Cañas Montalva was a member of the Chilean Antarctic Committee, in the purview of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; he created the influential *Terra Australis* Revista Geográfica de Chile, and was appointed that same year as Director of the Instituto Geográfico Militar and President of the Chile-Argentina Boundaries Commission.

As Commander in Chief of the Army he coordinated actual possession of Chilean Antarctic Territory, as well as the trip by President Gabriel González Videla to inaugurate the O’Higgins Base on 18 February 1948. All of this was carried out in the midst of complex political circumstances, which added greater difficulty to making the journey in secret to consolidate sovereignty. It also meant challenging the British Navy and demonstrating Chilean ability to willingly exercise permanent presence in the Antarctic.

A large part of the political and military spectrum shared the view of González Videla: Conservative Senator Joaquín Prieto, who accompanied the President, recognized the international dimensions of the topic by pointing out that “the sovereignty exercised by a country provides not only the right to enjoy a territory and exploit its wealth. There are also duties to be undertaken, imposed by civilization, culture, science, and the interdependence people live in, given today’s common array of difficulties and needs”¹².

In Punta Arenas, the speech by the Secretary General of the Government, Darío Poblete, reiterated the strategic need for the President’s visit, since “States from outside the continent resorted to threatening to attack our military bases and unleash the cannons of their invincible Navy to justify their imperialist purpose to colonize our land”; and added: due to its geographical location, Punta Arenas ought to be “a major center to supply the population... that continues settling in the silent Antarctic continent”; and that given the world relevance of the race for the Antarctic, this port should serve as connection for all the air and sea lines that will join America to Australia and New Zealand and other regions¹³.

Such concepts were none other than a transliteration of the ideas of Cañas Montalva himself, when he insisted on the “urgent need for an oceanic policy focused on the Pacific” to become a “South Pacific-Antarctic power”, using our “exceptional location” to “intensely project Chile’s political action... its Antarctic possessions and its oceanic domains”. During the inauguration of the O’Higgins Base, Cañas Montalva had reiterated the idea that Chile was a power in the South Pacific-Antarctic, and his original speech was kept in González Videla’s particular archive. As to future intercontinental air routes that would connect America to the people of Asia, he was convinced that “necessarily many of these should fly over the Antarctic, passing over our territory”, and hence the Chilean Air Force should have a base in Bahía Paraíso to safeguard “Chile’s aeronautical sovereignty in its polar regions”¹⁴.

Furthermore, he closely linked this topic to novel concepts of interdependence and evolution, by emphasizing “the need for men and people to think ‘on the basis of change’”. “In fact”, he said, “speed in addition to the term known as ‘third dimension’ or ‘air ocean’, has given ‘total, global, or world meaning’ to the political-economic difficulties of coexistence, a phenomenon known as ‘interdependence’”¹⁵. That is why southern, Antarctic, and oceanic Chile would be part of the new world geopolitics; and in such a context, control of oceanic passages would be essential.

This gave meaning and direction to Chilean concerns. In fact, already in 1939, alerted by the Norwegian Antarctic claims, Argentina quickly followed by Chile had created their respective Antarctic Commissions; and in our country this policy was formulated by Radical President Pedro Aguirre Cerda himself¹⁶. That same year Washington had urged Chile to claim an Antarctic area “on behalf of interested American countries” before a hypothetical German aggression —obviously, such a proposal had a clearly imperialist connotation, and it was Cañas Montalva himself who instead proposed Aguirre Cerda give priority to exclusive Chilean sovereignty in the region¹⁷.

Later, in 1941 Cañas Montalva took command of the Southern Regional Military Zone, a position from which he promoted the creation of the 5th Army Division; and the following year he proposed creating the “Southern Antarctic Zone”, which would include ‘not only the Antarctic Territory and Magellan... but also natural provisioning bases —the Chiloé archipelago— and its geographic continuation, Aysén’¹⁸. In 1943, after the Antarctic expedition by the North American Richard Byrd, he published “*Zona austral-antártida*”, a study that served for future discussion, showing an image of such territory extending south from Puerto Montt to the Antarctic.

In this way, the concept of “southern Antarctic zone” and keeping its control were the basis of his views, which pragmatically brought together the theories of Karl Haushofer about the emergence of the Pacific as an axis of world politics, and of Nicholas Spykman as to the “geostrategic importance of Chile in the case of a conflict, within the context of the Cold War”¹⁹. Cañas Montalva expressed this synoptically in a map of the Western Hemisphere published in the *Terra Australis* journal, showing the “Cañas Montalva geostrategic position of Chile in relation to the Pacific and the Western Defense Zone”, a zone that included the Chilean Antarctic aim of protecting the Drake passage that communicates the Pacific and Atlantic oceans²⁰.

Cañas Montalva gave importance to military variables, since the American continent was now the “epicenter of a possible and important theatre of operations for a 3rd World War”, and Chile was

the “power in the extreme south-Antarctic responsible for security in the continent”. In this conception of the Cold War he detected three key variables for continental security: “the Panama Canal; the Brazilian northeast prominence; and control of the sea passages in the extreme south, where Chile is immersed”. This was where “the future of democracy” was to be played out²¹.

This strategic redefinition of Chile occurred within a dual international context: one neighboring –marked by Argentina and *Peronism*– and another global and hemispheric. In his view, since Chile had cooperated in the allied victory, this had created an obligation toward Western democracies – and this gave Chile a place in the fight against the USSR. In fact, the González Videla presidential term was characterized “by intense activity at international level, resulting from the tense and sustained situation provoked by the so-called ‘Cold War’, which for many could at any moment turn ‘red-hot’”²².

All in all, in 1947 the Chilean government and the military were disagreeably surprised when the United States decided to provide military aid to Argentina, thereby contravening the implicit “democratic” requirement for such a concession, and challenging the assumption that Chile was a more appropriate democratically than the trans-Andean nation²³.

For Chile, the Argentina issue was of vital importance since this nation, with “its imperialist bouts attempted to infiltrate the national domestic process”. In addition, since the beginning of the 20th Century there had been differences with regard to the course of the Beagle channel and sovereignty of the Picton, Nueva and Lennox islands, and Argentine maps included various Chilean territories²⁴. The conflictive Antarctic issue also sharpened, given the “greater aspirations and demands by countries claiming rights over Chilean territory”. Due to all this, the Ministry of Defense officially asked General Ramón Cañas Montalva to prepare the map of Chilean national Antarctic Territory²⁵.

The relevance of these issues is clear during the meeting of 13 December 1948, convened by Chancellor Germán Riesco and attended by well-known diplomats and the military to “reach agreements regarding Argentine penetration in the southern zone”, including the “Aysen situation” as well as the problems afflicting Chilean population living in Argentina. One immediate outcome was the formation of a communications network within the territory, despite the existence of pressure groups opposed to “the interests of national defense and favoring foreign penetration”²⁶.

As mentioned earlier, Cañas Montalva was Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army from 1947 to 1949, and was paradoxically called to retirement for his strong anti-Argentine expressions, totally opposite to the new government policy that now pursued an economic agreement with that country²⁷.

4. ANTARCTICA, POSSIBLE SCENE OF COMBAT?

A second threat were foreign aspirations regarding Antarctic land and sea considered by Chileans as ours, and in regard to which USA, Great Britain, Japan, Argentina and others demonstrated an open interest. Intending to contain such an appetite, Chile decided to look for US support, ignoring

existing cooperation ties between the Anglo-Saxon nations. Nevertheless, with growing East-West confrontation, the Antarctic question would undergo many changes.

Albeit international tensions over the Antarctic go as far back as before World War II, from 1943 to 1944 the British had occupied the Antarctic Peninsula to prevent it from falling into German hands and, at the same time, slash Chilean and Argentine intents²⁸. In this way, and as a result of *Operation Tabarin*, they established positions in Isla Decepción, Port Lockroy, and Hope Bay. This attitude turned out to be a determinant for subsequent behavior by Chile, Argentina, USA, and the USSR in the area.

Although the Japanese were considered new arrivals to the Antarctic, they had already made expeditions in 1911 and 1912. Their intentions were –according to the *New York Times*– supported by Byrd in 1935, and by late 1939 still intended making a formal Antarctic claim. During the war, ten Japanese factory ships continued in the area²⁹. Japanese presence continued to be seen with suspicious eyes even after the war. Hence, in mid-January 1947, faced by the possibility that Chilean war ships might sight Japanese whalers in Antarctic waters, the procedure to be followed was consulted, since Chile was officially still at war with Japan. The reply was that Chilean ships should refrain from hostilities against merchant vessels³⁰.

Subsequently, and starting from 1949, the Soviet Union joined the Antarctic conflict and, like the US, did not recognize the rights of third parties. In this regard, in August 1950 the Chilean Foreign Office issued a communication addressed to the Chilean embassy in Washington and other Antarctic countries, whereby they dismissed the whaling rights invoked on 8 June 1950 by the USSR, noting the “intentions of other powers” were inadmissible in Chilean Antarctic Territory, and emphasizing that the only nations with rights were Chile and Argentina³¹. To lower the tension and in turn demonstrate existing cooperation with the USA, mention was made of the by now traditional Chile, UK and Argentina decision not to send war ships for the 1949-1950 Antarctic season³².

Consequently, the Cold War supposedly assigned Chile certain implicit tasks derived from the defensive concept of hemispheric security. Additionally, however, and within this same context, Chile should also be concerned and defend its Antarctic sovereignty. Therefore the Chilean government intended to work in such a way for occupation of the Antarctic space to be considered, mainly as a contribution to hemispheric defense; that is, Cañas Montalva was consequent with his “responsibilities” in the extreme south of the American continent.

Nevertheless, the reality was unfortunately very different: “Anglo-Saxon collaboration” in the hemisphere extended to the South Pole, and included not only claims by the USA and the UK, but also claims by other new members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, such as New Zealand, Australia, and South African occupation of the Heard islands.³³

This would explain how in 1950 Chilean diplomatic correspondence assigned great importance to an article published in the small *Le Provençal* newspaper, where very positive statements were made with regard to the value of the visit by President González Videla to the Antarctic, and among other matters remarked: “Russians and Americans train men and experiment with firearms for this possible conflict. The Russians have the advantage of owning immense Siberian solitudes”... The

Antarctic continent, “totally isolated from the rest of the world, offers an ideal setting for Polar war training. The Americans use it and know it well”³⁴.

5. THE FUTURE GLOBAL WAR, HEMISPHERIC SECURITY, AND THE ANTARCTIC

US interest in the Antarctic consolidated during the post-war period, when using by then surplus ships Admiral Richard E. Byrd organized in 1946 a giant Antarctic taskforce known as High Jump. Among other missions, High Jump was to circumnavigate, flyover, and map the Continent to elucidate what was to be US Antarctic policy. This was, to great extent, designed by the State Department, and would gradually incorporate strategic factors proper to the Cold War. However, Washington was also interested in the Continent’s natural resources –uranium among these– and to take control of the Antarctic used two concepts which the British had employed for decades: scientific discovery and research³⁵.

Another new concept already mentioned –of US origin– was the “Western Hemisphere” or community of American nations –supposedly united on account of geographical and political reasons. This was complemented by “hemispheric security”, a task that would involve all nations in the continent³⁶. This was recognized by Minister Germán Vergara Donoso, when saying that “Chile, according to its tradition, democratic organization, and its geographical position, made its choice alongside the countries of America and the powers that represent Western civilization”³⁷. This was because just a few months earlier, in September 1947, Chile had subscribed to TIAR (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) which created a system for hemispheric security and mutual defense among American countries. In the international arena, Chile without hesitating decided in favor of the West, supposing –erroneously– this would protect its Antarctic territory from ambitions coming from outside the continent.

The warmongering atmosphere was on the rise: Ricardo Latcham, while travelling through Europe, remarked “another major war is imminent... no-one wants another war, but everyone sees it as inevitable”³⁸. Along the same lines, columnist Luis Hernández Parker was of the opinion that in the face of possible conflict, González Videla would face it with “appropriate pomp and dress, and with clear political ideas that begin with demanding enforcement of the Chapultepec Treaty”³⁹.

In early July 1947, *Ercilla* published a lengthy report on how Chilean leaders saw the war of the future, and in which the Minister of Defense, Juvenal Hernández said “world events are precipitating in a way that leads us to fear a new war will be reached”. And, he added, in such a case “we should not be unprepared nor hesitate as we did in the last war, but situate ourselves in our respective orbit in the Hemisphere, alongside the United States”⁴⁰.

According to General Jorge Carmona, Chile would be “swept toward confrontation” against the Soviet bloc, as “no-one could remain neutral, since the battle field would spread to the entire globe, on land, air, and sea”. And in such a context he was concerned about the use given to atomic power, in which regard little was known in Chile⁴¹. In fact, in 1948 a report on the military preparedness of several countries sent from Washington coincided with Carmona’s words, by stating that “if Russia provoked hostilities, the United States would use the ‘absolute weapon’; that is, the atom bomb, and

with the Western European Union would deploy combined ground forces along an interim line of resistance that would be the Rhine, whereas the aviation would proceed to devastatingly destroy vital warfare production centers in Soviet territory”⁴².

Different opinions were held, for example, by Conservative MP Enrique Cañas, according to whom, due to Communist impiety “Chile will fight, to defend what is Christian”. Or the Communist representative Fonseca, who maintained there was no imminent danger and since it was only “a game of political interests, of monopolistic propaganda”⁴³. The following year, 1948, President González Videla said in a speech that world events were converging toward “the outbreak of a 3rd World War”, adding that Ambassador Manuel Bianchi had told him that at the United Nations no-one asks “if there will be war, but everyone asks ‘when?’”⁴⁴.

Alignment with the US did not achieve the aims expected by Chile. In fact, only mid November 1947 was it noticed that Washington was applying the “standardization” idea to address the issue of arms purchase at Inter-American level, and that the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act in fact opposed development of any national military expansion. Furthermore, President Truman recognized “reasonable limitations” for the provision of military equipment to Latin America, although some believed this was merely lip-service to calm US Congressmen. In this regard, several months earlier, the Chilean diplomat Enrique Berstein had reported it was impossible to “deny the clear tendency” of the US military to take control, and who had “abandoned the concept of autonomous military development of our countries, replacing it with a concept of the most profound Inter-American integration and regulation in order to achieve functional uniformity in military matters in the continent”⁴⁵.

A Chilean request to acquire armament for 20 million USD was denied, in regard to which the US military attaché said that opposing the Soviet Union required “an extraordinary effort” and “although sufficient funds were available for the purchase, no Western power was in condition to sell arms or warfare”⁴⁶. This did not change during the last years of the González Videla administration. Only on 19 April 1952 was Congress informed of MAP (Military Assistance Program) terms. But it was his successor, Carlos Ibáñez del Campo who subscribed it, thereby establishing hemispheric security military cooperation which was resisted by left-wing sectors⁴⁷.

The relevance of geopolitical factors during the Early Cold War should be recognized. That is, in the period spanning from the end of hostilities and January 1947. For some authors, 1946 is “difficult to study globally, since it is a complex period of transition toward the spirit of the Cold War, which will be unequivocally determined after March 1947 with the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine”. This coincided with the spread of the Cold War to the entire planet” and strengthened interdependence between the United States and the United Kingdom⁴⁸. In other words, Anglo-Saxon collaboration became global, and in military and political terms, control of southern sea passages continued to be exercised by Great Britain and not Chile.

Unfortunately, in Chile such objective realities were not viewed in this way. Domestic political factors, such as the activities of certain pressure groups, weighed more than a realistic assessment of the international scene. In relation to the Antarctic, an understanding gradually gained ground among the British and North Americans –some who had the experience, others the resources and


the technology— to shape an Antarctic policy consistent with their interests. Before such an adverse as well as unequal reality, albeit Chilean efforts to defend their Antarctic position were constant and made with great sacrifice, later on it was necessary to accept the guidelines which were in fact set by the major powers in Washington in 1959.

6. CONCLUSIONS

During the Cold War, the activities of subordinate players were not totally subordinated to hegemonic powers. Chile joined the Antarctic issue thanks to the dynamic activities of a cross-cutting stakeholder, whose key players were Gabriel González Videla and Ramón Cañas Montalva. The latter contributed the geographical and geopolitical grounds to the historical and legal grounds on which Chilean aspirations are based, and which must be upheld in an asymmetric and adverse international scene derived from the incorporation of the Antarctic reality of powers such as the United States, Japan, USSR, and Great Britain, as well as others such as Norway and Argentina.

Chile permanently consolidated its presence in the Antarctic as part of its reaffirmation of preeminence and sovereignty over the South Pacific-Antarctic triangle. But no great power could support this Chilean position, because the US-British alliance had strong interests in these parts of the world and our country was unable to understand what was obvious: Washington will always trust more in Great Britain than a South American country. Furthermore, given a Cold War world scenario, when faced by a conflict of interest between one regional partner and another global partner, there is no choice.

Ultimately, by aligning with the United States, Chile did not receive economic aid to stabilize its economy or increase or modernize its military power. Neither did Chile receive support to strengthen its position against Argentine territorial intentions, far less to safeguard its Antarctic possessions against powers from outside the continent.



Speech by General Ramón Cañas Montalva at the inauguration of O'Higgins Base on 18 February 1948, FGGV, Vol. 116, 1948.

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- ² TIAR is the American Mutual Defense Treaty or Rio Treaty signed in 1947, MAP is Military Assistance Program signed in 1952. Estado Mayor General del Ejército de Chile (Chilean Army General Staff, hereon EMGE). *La historia del Ejército Chileno* (Santiago: IGM, 1985, IX), p. 82.
- ³ This is a geographical and political conception of the Chilean situation and role in the world, based on the repercussions of its ample maritime and Antarctic façade and its location connecting the southernmost Pacific and Atlantic oceans.
- ⁴ *Justicialismo*: pertaining to Juan Domingo Peron's "social justice" and political thought.
- ⁵ Uki Gofñi. *Perón y los alemanes: La verdad sobre el espionaje nazi y los fugitivos del Reich* (Buenos Aires: Ed. Sudamericana, 1998), pp. 17-25. More recently Adrián Pignatelli, *Perón, el espía* (Buenos Aires: Ed. Vergara, 2014).
- ⁶ Guillermo Barrios Tirado. *Memorias del Grl. Guillermo Barrios Tirado* [here on Barrios Tirado], s/f, VIII, p. 23.
- ⁷ Barrios Tirado, VIII, p. 77.
- ⁸ Barrios Tirado, VIII, pp. 77-78.
- ⁹ Enrique Berstein, for the Minister to the Ministry of National Defense, Confidential N° 21, 6 February 1947, AMRE, Santiago, Vol. 2637, Marine Undersecretariat, Diplomatic Department, America Section, in: Confidential Proceedings between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1947: 100-0839.
- ¹⁰ Howard Pittman dedicated two chapters in his study "The works of Ramón Cañas Montalva", 1981, pp. 1189-1199, and "Cañas Montalva and the Argentinian threat", pp. 1119-1207. Referring to the *Revista Geográfica de Chile*, he says: "The geopolitics of *Terra Australis* must be regarded as the attempt to create a Chilean national geopolitics" In: Howard Taylor Pittman. *Geopolitics in the ABC countries: A comparison* (Tesis doctoral en Relaciones Internacionales. Washington D.C.: The American University, 1981), p. 1206.
- ¹¹ Cañas Montalva was 7 months ahead of Decree No.1747, publishing an article in the *La Verdad* newspaper of Punta Arenas on 30 March 1940. In: Cristian Garay Vera. "Introducción" In *Geopolítica Oceánica y Austral: General Ramón Cañas Montalva* (Santiago: Academia de Guerra, 2008), p. 24. In 1948 he published *Base O'Higgins*, a book containing "Reflexiones geopolíticas sobre el presente y el futuro de América y de Chile", the article simultaneously published in *Revista Geográfica de Chile Terra Australis* n° 1, by Cañas Montalva.
- ¹² *Texto del discurso pronunciado por el senador Joaquín Prieto G*, 18 March 1948 Press. Fondo Gabriel González Videla [hereon FGG], National Archive, Santiago de Chile. Vol. 116.
- ¹³ Toward 1935, Cañas Montalva had explored the area of Chabunco and planned building an airport for projected routes to Asia, Australia, and New Zealand. Secretary General of the Government, Darío Poblete, *Discurso ante el pueblo de Magallanes*, FGG, Santiago, Vol. 116, 1948.
- ¹⁴ Ramón Cañas Montalva. "El Pacífico, epicentro geopolítico de un nuevo mundo en estructuración" *Revista Geografía de Chile Terra Australis* [hereon *Terra Australis*] n° 12 (1955), pp. 12, 15 and 16.
- ¹⁵ Ramón Cañas Montalva. "Chile, el más antártico de los países del orbe y su responsabilidad continental en el Sur-Pacífico" *Terra Australis* n° 4 (1950), p. 24.
- ¹⁶ In Chile comprised Comm. Enrique Cordovez, the lawyer Julio Escudero Guzmán, and the Head of the Diplomatic Department at the Foreign Office, Enrique Gajardo Villaroel; Villalón et al, *Jalonando* (2010), p. 135; Marcelo Ruiz. "El decreto de límites en la Antártica" In: *Anales Medio Siglo de Política Antártica, 1940-1990* (Santiago: Academia Diplomática de Chile, 1991), p. 8.
- ¹⁷ Villalón et al, *Jalonando* (2010), p. 138.
- ¹⁸ Garay (2008), p. 21.
- ¹⁹ Pittman (1981), p. 1188.
- ²⁰ Reproduced in Garay (2008), p. 20.
- ²¹ Ramón Cañas Montalva. "Reflexiones geopolíticas sobre el presente y el futuro de América y de Chile" *Terra Australis* n° 13 (1948), p. 11
- ²² Barrios Tirado, VIII, p. 75.
- ²³ Enrique Berstein, Confidential n° 13, 14 January 1947, Diplomatic Dept., America Sect. AMRE, Stgo. Vol. 2637 in Confidential Proceedings between Min. of Defense and Min. of Foreign Affairs, 1947.
- ²⁴ Cf. *Mapa de la zona austral* published by Argentine Instituto Geográfico Militar in Enrique Berstein, 27 January 1947, Confidential n° 13 and n° 17, AMRE, Stgo. Vol. 2637, Diplomatic Dept., America Sect. in Confidential Proceedings between Min. of Defense and Min. of Foreign Affairs, 1947.

- ²⁵ Barrios Tirado, VIII, p. 77. Enrique Berstein to Ramón Cañas Montalva, "Antecedentes para la confección de un mapa del Territorio Antártico Chileno" 29 January 1947, Confidential n° 26, AMRE, Stgo. Vol. 2637, IGM, Diplomatic Dept., America Sect., in Confidential Proceedings between Min. of Defense and Min. of Foreign Affairs, 1947.
- ²⁶ Attended by Guillermo Barrios Tirado; diplomats Enrique Berstein, Humberto Beltrán and Abelardo Silva; the three Commanders in Chief (Grl. Ramón Cañas, Alm. Carlos Torres and Grl. (A) Aurelio Celedón); the Comm. of the 5th. Division (Magallanes) Grl. Antonio Tovarías; and the War Undersecretary Guillermo López. Barrios Tirado, VIII, p. 78.
- ²⁷ He was later President of the National Committee of Geography, Geodesy and Geophysics for 20 years, tirelessly publishing to promote a Chilean school of geopolitics.
- ²⁸ Villalón, et. al. (2010), p. 120.
- ²⁹ Villalón, et. al. (2010), p. 117.
- ³⁰ Oficio N° 10, Secret, strictly confidential 98/4, AMRE, Stgo, Vol. 2637, Diplomatic Dept., America Sect. in Confidential Proceedings between the Min. of Defense and the Min. of Foreign Affairs, 1947.
- ³¹ Aerogram n° 93, August 1950, AMRE, Stgo. Vol. 2981. Diplomatic Dept. to Chile Emb. (USA). The text was also sent to Argentina, New Zealand, Australia, UK, France and USA.
- ³² This refers to the so-called Tripartite Agreement. Aerogram n° 239, October 1950, AMRE, Stgo. Vol. 2981. Diplomatic Dept. to Chile Emb. (USA). Walker, telegram n° 251, 17 November 1950.
- ³³ Villalón, et. al. (2010).
- ³⁴ "El Polo Sur y la hazaña del viaje antártico del presidente Gabriel González Videla" n° 295/73, Marsella, 30 June 1950, Consul General to Chanceller, p. 4. Consular Dept. n° 118/15, 29 March 1950. AMRE, Stgo. Vol. 2989, Chilean Consulate (Paris-Marbella), 1950.
- ³⁵ US Antarctic policy appeared unclear and contradictory to Chileans: sometimes advocating a hemispheric policy or other times declaring no knowledge of all claims, safeguarding the right to put forward their own. Later on the US was inclined to put an end to "sectors" in the Antarctic. Consuelo León Wöppke. "La Antártica y el Departamento de Estado norteamericano hacia 1946" *Notas Históricas y Geográficas* n° 2 (2000), pp. 123 and ss.
- ³⁶ Consuelo León Wöppke. "The Western Hemisphere o Hemisferio Occidental: Un concepto mítico relevante de las relaciones interamericanas, 1939-1940" *Revista Diplomacia* n° 72 (March-June, 1997), pp. 74-87.
- ³⁷ Min. Germán Vergara Donoso (Stgo.) to Amb. Osvaldo Vial (Río), "Instrucciones Generales", Confidential n° 68, 11 diciembre 1947, p. 5. AMRE, Santiago, Vol. 2536. Chilean Emb. in Brazil. Confidential Proceedings, 1947. Diplomatic Dept.
- ³⁸ "Ricardo Latcham habla de Europa" *Revista Ercilla* n° 633 (17 June 1947), p. 17.
- ³⁹ Luis Hernández Parker. "Ante una eventual guerra mundial N° 3, Chile desea vigencia del Pacto de Chapultepec" *Revista Ercilla* n° 635 (1 July 1947), p. 13.
- ⁴⁰ Interviewed an atomic physicist, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, the Communist Party leader, a financier, Defense Chief of Staff, and a Conservative Member of Parliament; "Chile ante la guerra N° 3: Opinán" *Revista Ercilla* n° 636 (6 July 1947), p. 15.
- ⁴¹ "Chile ante..." *Revista Ercilla* n° 636 (6 July 1947), pp. 16 and 17; G. C. Reinhardt and W. R. Kitner. *Armas Atómicas en el combate terrestre* (Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, 1956), Vol. 453.
- ⁴² Chilean Emb. (Washington) "Si la guerra viene". AMRE, Santiago, Vol. 2689, 1948. Diplomatic Dept.
- ⁴³ "Chile ante..." *Revista Ercilla* n° 636 (6 July 1947), pp. 16-17.
- ⁴⁴ Gabriel González Videla, *Discurso*, fs. 167 (23). FGGV, Santiago de Chile.
- ⁴⁵ Enrique Berstein, for the Min. of Foreign Affairs to the Min. of National Defense; Coordination, Confidential n° 26, Santiago, 6 February 1947, AMRE, Santiago, Vol. 2637, Diplomatic Dept. / Military Cooperation and Standardization of Armament in Confidential Proceedings between the Min. of Defense and the Min. of Foreign Affairs, 1947. Photos 100-0841 and 100-0842.
- ⁴⁶ Barrios Tirado, VIII, P. 117. "Por muy grande y respetable fueran nuestras necesidades ellas eran secundarias para los Estados Unidos enfrentado en los serios problemas de Europa (Defensa del Atlántico) y los creados por la guerra de Corea" s/f, p. 120.
- ⁴⁷ MAP was based on the US Mutual Security Act of 10 October 1951. It was sent to Chilean Congress on 17 April 1952.
- ⁴⁸ See Villalón, et. al. (2010), pp. 145-164.

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