



ARTÍCULOS

UTOPIA Y PRAXIS LATINOAMERICANA. AÑO: 26, n.º extra interlocuciones 2, 2021, pp.89-108
REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE FILOSOFÍA Y TEORÍA SOCIAL
CESA-FCES-UNIVERSIDAD DEL ZULIA. MARACAIBO-VENEZUELA
ISSN 1316-5216 / ISSN-e: 2477-9555

Indonesian collaborative governance analysis facing Free Papua movement

Análisis colaborativo de gobernanza indonesia frente al movimiento de Papúa Libre

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This research is deposited in Zenodo:
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4678858>

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to analyze the conflict management that has been carried out by the government through the integrative framework of Collaborative Governance. The research method used was the deductive Post-Positivist paradigm by collecting data through interviews, focus group discussions, and surveys regarding the implementation of Special Autonomy Policy. The results of the study based on the integrative framework of collaborative governance model showed that the process of collaboration in implementing the Special Autonomy policy has not been successful and is less effective.

Keywords: Free Papua movement, separatism, special autonomy, Indonesian government

RESUMEN

El propósito de este estudio es analizar la gestión de conflictos que ha llevado a cabo el gobierno a través del marco integrador de la Gobernanza Colaborativa. El método de investigación utilizado fue el paradigma deductivo post-positivista mediante la recolección de datos a través de entrevistas, discusiones de grupos focales y encuestas sobre la implementación de la Política de Autonomía Especial. Los resultados mostraron que el proceso de colaboración en la implementación de la Política Especial de Autonomía no ha sido exitoso y es menos efectivo.

Palabras clave: Movimiento de Papúa libre, separatismo, autonomía especial, gobierno de Indonesia.

Recibido: 25-02-2021 Aceptado: 22-03-2021



INTRODUCTION

Separatism is one of the serious threats in terms of the integrity of a nation, including Indonesia. The separatist movement in Papua has become one of the concerns of the Indonesian government from time to time as outlined in various specific policies to overcome the movement, starting from President Abdurrahman Wahid, who allowed the rising of the West Papuan independence flag (Chauvel & Bhakti: 2004, pp. 44-55), President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who established the Papuan People's Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua) or PPA and encouraged the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law, to President Joko Widodo who released political prisoners and opened access for foreign journalists to enter Papua (Fujikawa: 2017, pp. 655-673).

There are many factors triggering the separatist movements that developed in Papua. In the Papua Road Map released by LIPI in 2009, four main problems in Papua are as follows: (1) marginalization and discriminatory effects against indigenous people of Papua, (2) development failures, particularly in the fields of education, health, and economic empowerment of the people, (3) historical contradictions about Papua and the construction of political identity between Papua and Jakarta, and (4) accountability for human rights violations (LIPI, 2009). In 2016, the Papua Road Map Update outlined three problems in Papua, namely: (1) internationalization of the issue of Papua, (2) resolution of human rights issues, and (3) development and implementation of Special Autonomy in Papua (LIPI, 2016).

One of the historical events acknowledged in most regions in Indonesia is the recognition of Indonesia as an independent country on 17 August 1945, while the region of West Irian, now renamed West Papua, was only recognized by the United Nations as part of Indonesia on August 15th 1962 through the signing of the New York Agreement initiated by the United States. However, in the process of formulating the agreement until the signing of the agreement, no representatives of indigenous Papuans were involved (Werang et al.: 2019, pp.133-155).

Meanwhile, a recognition from the United Nations did not necessarily indicate the agreement of the Papuan people of the integration of West Irian with Indonesia at the time. It took several months to put into place the transition, adaptation, and transfer of administration in terms of governance, in which the Dutch government finally handed over power to Papua to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) on 1 October 1962, which was then followed by the surrender power over Papua to the Indonesian government on 1 May 1963 (Habibah: 2017, pp. 30-55).

The Indonesian government held a gradual referendum in the form of the Act of Free Choice (Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat / Pepera) on 14 July – 2 August 1969, which involved the Papuan Election Consultative Council (Dewan Musyawarah Pemilihan Papua) or PECC (Djopari, 1993). The PECC has 1025 members representing eight districts in Papua to express attitudes related to the integration of West Papua with Indonesia, of which 95% chose to join by means of voting (Djopari, 1993). The Act of Free Choice 1969 was witnessed by the representatives from Australia, the Netherlands, and the United Nations, so that the Papua or West Irian region was recognized as an integral part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia *de jure* and *de facto* (Hemawan: 2015, pp. 195-220).

After the beginning of the reform era and the emergence of press freedom in Indonesia, the issue of Free Papua became intensively discussed where the validity of the results of the Act of Free Choice 1969 was often used as a propaganda issue and questioned again by figures from the Papuan separatist movement. In a research on the Act of Free Choice 1969, the Free Papua Movement considered the referendum as undemocratic and did not represent the choices of all members of the Papuan community at that time. In addition, the presence of non-Papuans who were involved in the referendum was also a hindrance in the representation of the wishes and integration of the Papuan people with Indonesia (Suryawan: 2012, PP. 12-26). The composition of the organization of the Act of Free Choice 1969 is detailed below:

Table (1). Comparison of the Implementation of the Act of Free Choice 1969 in Papua

Time	District	Act of Free Choice Election Consultative Council Members	Population Number
14 July 1969	Merauke	175	144.171
16 July 1969	Jayawijaya	175	165.000
19 July 1969	Paniai	175	156.000
23 July 1969	Fak-fak	175	43.187
26 July 1969	Sorong	110	75.474
29 July 1969	Manokwari	75	49.875
31 July 1969	Teluk Cenderawasih	130	91.870
2 August 1969	Jayapura	110	83.760

Source: Djopari, 1993.

The historical differences in the integration and process of seeding nationalism between West Papua and most regions in Indonesia need to be considered in an effort to understand the government's approach to conflict management and attempts to overcome separatism because these two factors can explain the possibility of two nationalisms and a national crisis that often arises as a trigger for separatism. In addition, the social gap and unequal distribution of economic development also constitute some of the factors supporting the separatist movement in Papua. These factors result in Papua being labeled as the longest violent conflict area in Indonesia.

The separatist movement in Papua itself began to develop from the beginning of Papua's integration into Indonesia. Papuan separatist groups who vigorously voiced Papuan independence are known as the Free Papua Movement (FPM), which was rooted in the militant group created by the Dutch at that time, the Papuan Volunteer Battalion or Papoe Vrijwelleger Corps (PVK) (Djopari, 1993). Prior to the New York Agreement, the Dutch Government initiated the formation of the Papua National Committee, which issued a manifesto regarding the Papuan flag, Papuan national anthem, determination of the name of the nation to protect West Papua, and raising of the Papuan flag (Brundige et al.: 2004, pp. 14-44). The Dutch also often supported Papuan separatist political movements, including a rebellion led by former PVK members in the Organization of Struggle for the Independence of the State of West Papua (OSP) Manokwari on July 26, 1965 (Djopari, 1993).

Fifty-eight years after the New York Agreement was signed, the separatist ideology and movements that seek to liberate West Papua from Indonesia continue to develop and cause conflicts in various regions. The Indonesian government continues to strive to improve welfare and enhance the infrastructure and economy in the Papua region in order to overcome separatism and strengthen the nationalism and sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia. The main government policy is currently under the umbrella of Special Autonomy Policy through the enactment of Law No. 21 the Year 2001 on Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua, which was considered as the best solution for the resolution of conflicts and problems in Papua at that time (Hikmawan: 2017, pp. 32-47).

In general, the Special Autonomy Law itself seeks to improve the welfare of the people of Papua. This is emphasized especially in Articles 34 to 36 of Law No. 21 the Year 2001, which govern the determination, acceptance, loans, profit sharing, and allocation of special autonomy funds and other additional funds, as well as supervision of the use of these funds in the context of development and improvement of several priority areas, particularly education, health, economy, and infrastructure. Previous research shows that the implementation of Special Autonomy in the Province of Papua shows the dominance of centralized patterns

in the application of policies at the local government level.

The Special Autonomy Policy for the Province of Papua gives special authority to the Papuan regional government to regulate and manage the interests of the Papuan people according to their own initiatives based on the aspirations and basic rights of the Papuan people, including giving affirmative action to the Papuans. This special authority is broad and comprehensive, so it requires large responsibilities that involve the collaboration of various parties and stakeholders in an integrative manner, starting from the central government, local governments of the Province of Papua, traditional leaders, religious leaders, non-governmental organizations, civil society to minority groups for the success of the 2001 Special Autonomy Law and its amendment.

The implementation of the Special Autonomy, which lasts for almost 20 years, apparently does not necessarily abolish the separatist movement in Papua, which is currently referred to by the Government of Indonesia under the names Armed Separatist Criminal Group (ASCG) and Political Separatist Criminal Group (PSCG). Borrowing the term by Kaisiepo, Papua is equated with a "Market for Violence." Examples of conflicts related to Papua are attacks by the Armed Separatist Criminal Group (ASCG), who rejected the construction of the Trans Papua road in Nduga Regency, and the provocation that arose after the discovery of the Indonesian National Red and White Flag in the gutter in front of a Papuan student dormitory in Surabaya which triggered demonstrations and anarchist mass action due to separatist propaganda.

The 1998 Reformation, which was marked by press freedom, public and political transparency, and the so-called rise of the era of democracy in Indonesia, has changed the way the government views in implementing policies in Papua that are more accommodating, including significant concessions to separatist groups (Walter, 2009). This can be seen as part of a conflict management strategy that involves collaboration from various stakeholders. Collaboration is necessary because the completion through cooperation alone is not enough; it takes a common goal in realizing a goal.

Some forms of collaboration began to be formed through institutional approaches such as the establishment of the Work Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (UP4B) in the era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Presidential Regulation No. 66, 2011) and the Welfare Development Acceleration Program in the era of President Joko Widodo (Presidential Instruction No. 9, 2017). When discussing conflicts in Papua, there are many categories and triggers, such as conflicts resulting from mining land disputes, land acquisition, and deforestation, interfaith conflicts (Alhamid: 2014, PP. 23-35), issues of discrimination and racism to the pro-independence separatist movement (AHRC, 2009). The conflicts discussed in this study are conflicts related to separatist groups originating from the Free Papua Separatist Movement.

Public policy implementation cannot be handled by one organization or agency alone. This also applies to the implementation of the Special Autonomy Policy for the Provinces of Papua and West Papua. The implementation of the 2001 Special Autonomy Law indeed prioritizes regional governments as the spearhead, but cooperation and involvement of multi-stakeholders are needed in the process of formulating regional policies and determining Development strategies, both in the short and long term. This includes the full involvement of all stakeholders to carry out open dialogue, create deliberative decisions and implement solutions to problems and goals that will be achieved together in an integrative manner.

Based on this background, the authors asked the following research questions: How is the conflict management carried out by the Indonesian government in the context of dealing with the Free Papua Movement through the analysis of the integrative framework of Collaborative Governance?

METHODOLOGY

This study used a deductive post-positivist paradigm by collecting data qualitatively through interviews, documentary studies, and focus group discussions. Semi-structured interviews were carried out through two stages, namely in Jayapura with the local government, traditional leaders, religious leaders, and community leaders. The second stage of the interview was conducted in Jakarta, namely with relevant stakeholders such as the Chairperson of the Papua Desk at the Office of the Ministry of Political Law and Human Rights (Ministry

of Law and Human Rights), the Director-General of Regional Autonomy and the Director-General of Politics and Public Administration of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Presidential Staff Office, the Ministry of Health, Bappenas, LIPI, and Ministry of finance. Then a Focus Group Discussion was held with the Ministry of Law and Security and the relevant institutions/ministries below.

Quantitative data collection was carried out through surveys in the Provinces of Papua and West Papua using proportional stratified random sampling methods, direct interviews with 200 respondents in Papua, and quality control and data confirmation by telephone with 30 respondents. The survey was conducted on 1-12 February 2020 and aimed to collect data on the opinions of the Papuan people in general on the Special Autonomy Policy in Papua.

Then, a comparative study was made between the implementation of the Government policies that were already implemented and the basic concept of the integrative framework of collaborative governance. This comparative study was carried out using a literature review and survey data analysis focusing on the implementation of Indonesia's Special Autonomy For Province of Papua policy since 2001 regarding the conflict management of the Government in overcoming the Free Papua Movement. Then, these elements were confirmed by analyzing the survey data. The survey data is then analyzed and compared with the main variables in the integrative framework of collaborative governance in order to determine the level of success of the implementation of Indonesian government policy in the context of conflict management in the Papua region (Lubis et al.: 2019, pp. 23-39).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Conflict Management

Separatism and conflict in Papua are often tinged with acts of violence and radicalization which have claimed victims from various parties, especially civil society. Radicalization itself can be triggered by four main factors, namely (1) implementation of policies, including those relating to conflict prevention and management, which are less effective, (2) impunity for security forces that fosters pro-independence narratives, (3) fragmentation at the level regional governments as a result of the division of territories that can be financially exploited by FPM leaders, and (4) decreasing influence of existing local customary institutions due to the formation of rival institutions, such as the Papua Customary Council (Dewan Adat Papua) and the government-formed institution namely the Indigenous Peoples Institution (IPAC, 2015).

Based on the historical approach used by Indonesianists, to overcome conflicts in Indonesia, we need to understand the genealogy of violence since colonial times because of the long and deep historical roots. This can be completed by supporting open discussions about conflict motives or ideologies. To stop conflict and violence structurally, culturally, and directly, there are three conditions that may put a conflict to an end, namely (1) disappearance of negative attitudes and feuds, (2) non-validity of the issue in dispute, and (3) cessation of coercive behavior and violence.

In the context of the conflict in Papua, Taum puts forward three foundations of conflict management, namely: (1) Historical Justice, (2) Memoria Passionis, and (3) Reconstruction of Papuan Identity. These three foundations are believed to be able to involve Papuan local wisdom in the conflict management process so that the integration of Papuan people can be better facilitated.

The first foundation, Historical Justice, consists of acknowledging wrongdoing which is the root of past conflicts, followed by several solutions, namely restitution, reparations, compensations, rehabilitations, the establishment of truth commissions, and official apologies. These elements can be the basis for fatal errors and differences in perceptions that hamper the relationship and harmony between the pro-independence Papuan people and the Indonesian government.

The second foundation, Memoria Passionis, relates to actions in which a country recognizes and retains memories of suffering as a result of a conflict that has occurred previously. One example is the commitment of the German government to commemorate the Auschwitz incident and Nazi genocide in its politics. The

people of Papua still have memories of unresolved distress, ranging from conflict-intensive integration processes, military operations which violate their human rights, to discrimination of Melanesian ethnic. If left untreated, the suffering of the Papuan people can become the basis of propaganda that fosters separatism.

The final foundation, the Reconstruction of Papuan Identity, deals with identities related to a certain sense of nationalism, ethnicity, religion, social class, generation, locality, and cultural groups. Hall revealed that identity consists of identity originating from one's own subject and identity obtained from the views of others (Hall in Barker, 2000). Conflict may occur if there is no understanding of the symbols and expressions of Papuan culture in Indonesia, especially because there are many educated and experienced migrants who work in Papua. Data shows that there was a surge in migrants from 40% in 2005 to 53.5% in 2011, threatening the indigenous people of Papua to become a minority on their own land.

Table (2). Scheme of Management Conflict Foundations

Historical Justice	Memoria Passionis	Reconstruction of Papuan Identity
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Restitutions • Reparations • Compensations • Rehabilitations • Truth commissions • Official apologies 	Acknowledgment and retention of the memory of distress because of a conflict that occurred in the past	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nationalism • Ethnicity • Religion • Social Class • Generation • Locality • Cultural Group

Source : (Taufik: 2015, pp. 23-43)

Collaborative Governance

Ansell and Gash stated that collaborative governance is a new strategy in governance that allows policymakers to gather in a forum that is aimed at reaching a shared consensus. This approach is an arrangement in which one or more public institutions can directly involve non-governmental actors in the process of making collective policies that are formal, consensus-oriented, and consultative with the purpose of making or implementing public policies, managing a program or assets public. Collaboration is at the highest level of cooperation between organizations, above coordination and cooperation (Ansell & Gash: 2008, pp. 543-571).

collaborative governance is a condition in which the government seeks to meet public objectives through collaboration between organizations and individuals as well as between government and the private sector. The collective decision-making process based on the concept of collaborative governance emphasizes six criteria, which are as follows:

1. Forum is initiated by public institutions
2. Forum participants include non-governmental actors
3. Participants are directly involved in the decision-making process and not just "consulting" with the government
4. Forum is held formally and brought together collectively
5. Forum is intended to make decisions based on consensus/deliberations (although in practice a consensus is not reached), and
6. Focus of collaboration is on public policy or public management

Furthermore, Ansell & Gash also emphasized that collaborative governance has four variables that influence each other, including (1) starting conditions, (2) institutional design, (3) leadership, and (4) collaborative processes. The starting conditions determine the level of trust, conflict, and social capital in the collaboration process. Institutional design determines the basic rules of collaboration. Leadership provides mediation and key facilities in the collaboration process. Meanwhile, the collaborative process is the core of the collaborative governance model that is non-linear and recurring (Ansell & Gash: 2008, pp. 543-571).

Then proposed the concept of an integrative framework for collaborative governance that emphasizes various overlapping elements between several collaborative approaches, including cross-sector collaboration (Bryson et al.: 2006, pp. 44-55), collaborative planning, network management, collaborative public management (Agranon & McGuire: 2001, PP. 671-681), environmental governance and conflict resolution (Agrawal & Lemos: 2007, PP. 36-45), and collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash: 2008, pp. 543-571).

The theory of the integrative collaboration process in the form of a General System Context which houses the Collaborative Governance Regime (GCR), which includes Collaboration Dynamics and Actions. The context of the system is a fundamental container consisting of various factors that influence and are influenced by CGR, such as political, legal, social, economic, and environmental factors. The context of this system then impacts the dynamics of the collaboration process, which consists of three "driving wheels" including Principled Engagement, Shared Motivation, and Capacity for Joint Action triggered by the Drivers in order to take any action that produces an impact and change desired by the stakeholders involved.




Figure 1. Theory Model of Integrative Framework of Collaborative Governance Proc
 Source: (Emerson et al.: 2012, pp. 1-29).

Collaborative governance covers the context of a general system consisting of political, legal, socio-economic, environmental, and other influences (Borini-Feyerabend: 1996, pp. 480-510). Previous research revealed that there are several key elements that can influence the characteristics of CGR, such as policy and legal frameworks (Bingham: 2008, pp. 247-269), previous failures in dealing with related issues through conventional channels and authorities (Bryson et al.: 2006, pp. 44-55), political dynamics and power relations in society and at various levels of government (Ansell & Gash: 2008, pp. 543-571), historical level of conflict between known interests and level of trust and impact resulting from the employment relations (Ansell & Gash: 2008, pp. 543-571).

Drivers are related to the "conditions present at the outset of collaboration (which) can either facilitate or discourage cooperation among stakeholders and between agencies and stakeholders" (Ansell & Gash: 2008, pp. 543-571). Emerson et al. revealed four main variables for the driving axis of collaboration, namely

leadership, consequential incentives, interdependence, and uncertainty (Emerson et al.: 2009, pp. 27-64). Each of the three drivers of the dynamics of the collaboration process consists of four elements that can determine the achievement of the whole process, as listed in the table below:

Table (3). Scheme of Collaborative Governance Elements

Principled Engagement	Shared Motivation	Capacity for Joint Action
a. Discovery	a. Mutual Understanding	a. Procedural and Institutional Arrangements
b. Definition	b. Shared Commitment	b. Leadership
c. Deliberation	c. Trust	c. Knowledge
d. Determination	d. Internal Legitimacy	d. Resources

Source: (Emerson et al.: 2009, pp. 27-64).

The first driver, Principled Engagement, requires multi-stakeholder involvement in terms of uniting principles in order to reaffirm the initial objectives to be achieved together, which is shown from the factors of discovery, definition, deliberation, and determination of principles. Through shared principles, stakeholders who have different relations and identity goals work hand in hand in their respective institutions, sectors, and jurisdictions to resolve problems and conflicts and produce values (Cahn: 2013, pp. 23- 38).

Second, Shared Motivation includes mutual understanding, shared commitment, trust, and internal legitimacy. Shared Motivation underscores interpersonal and relational elements in the dynamics of collaboration and is sometimes also referred to as social capital.

Third, Capacity for Joint Action is closely related to procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge, and resources. This capacity is the basis of the empowerment of a group, which can also be called a democratic principle that underlies collaboration.

RESULTS

Special Autonomy Policy and Separatism in Papua

Separatism in Papua is not an ideology that has arisen only recently; the desire for independence for some groups has been going on since the unification of West Irian into Indonesia since it was abandoned by the Dutch. After the signing of the New York Agreement, Indonesia often seeks to support the integration and administrative transition of government in the Province of Papua after the transfer of power from UNTEA.

In October 1961, the Dutch Government formed the Papua National Committee, which issued the following manifesto: (1) Determination of the Papua flag; (2) Determination of the Papuan national anthem; (3) Changing the name of the nation to West Papua; (4) Proposal that the flag is raised on November 1st, 1961 (Brundige et al.: 2004, pp. 14-44). This manifesto inspired the demands of the Free Papua Movement (FPM), which actively carried out rebellion and propaganda at the national and international levels. However, there are different forms of separatist supporter movements at home and abroad.

The PVK separatist group supported by the Dutch often developed into other rebel groups, one of which was known as the FPM. The armed conflict triggered by separatist military-political movements calling themselves the Free Papua Organization (FPO) in Papua first broke out in Manokwari on July 26th, 1965 (Suryawan: 2012, PP. 12-26). The FPM also attacked mining activities in Freeport in 1977 (IPAC, 2015) until the latest was the attack on Trans Papua highway project workers in Nduga in 2018 (Suryawan: 2012, PP. 12-26). Domestic armed groups such as the FPM, TPN-OPM, and OSP often carry out attacks against civil society and security forces for their demands for independence.

The Indonesian government itself does not recognize the existence of the FPM and refers to it as Free Papua Organization (OPM). OPM consists of two factions, namely the faction under the leadership of Aser

Demotekay, who was founded in 1963, and the faction under the leadership of Terianus Aronggear, who was founded in 1964. The faction led by Demotekay is relatively more cooperative with spiritual and traditional characteristics. Meanwhile, the faction led by Aronggear popularized OSP with a radical and armed approach. Supporters of separatism abroad emphasize more propaganda and diplomacy to seek the support of countries and international organizations in order to become an independent state. For example, the Third Papuan People's Congress formed a team to request the support of the UN Security Council and other countries in order to be able to help Papua get out of the Republic of Indonesia. The pro-independence group also lobbied internationally by raising the issue of Papua's political history, gross human rights violations, militarism, discrimination, to environmental damage that is happening in Papua today.

The final outcome of the 1969 Act of Free Choice was not considered legitimate by the supporters of the separatist movement due to the low level of trust, participation, and willingness to cooperate among stakeholders. The trigger for separatism in Papua was the lack of community welfare as measured by education, health, economy, and infrastructure, as well as differences of opinion regarding the history of integration and the sense of nationalism.

Indonesia, as a sovereign country, certainly does not allow the development of separatist groups. Based on the legal foundation of the Republic of Indonesia, the government administration in Indonesia uses the Decentralization Principle as a basic concept, in accordance with what is mandated in Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, namely "regional authority and obligation to regulate and manage their own domestic affairs in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations." Decentralization is generally categorized into three, namely political decentralization, administrative decentralization, and fiscal decentralization. Autonomy is an embodiment of decentralization at the regional level.

An autonomous region is a "legal community unit that has certain boundaries that are entitled, authorized and obliged to regulate and manage their own households in the bond of the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations." Basically, a package of autonomy in a country is influenced by the results of negotiations between the government and the rebel movement. The current Special Autonomy Policy for the province of Papua is the result of negotiations that do not involve the participation of rebel groups demanding independence. In theory, regional autonomy is a form of implementation of the principle of decentralization in Indonesia.

Decentralization of power and regional autonomy policy that is not properly implemented can lead to a loss of control of the central government over the region in question. The formulation of the vision of regional autonomy centered on three main areas of interaction, namely the political, economic and social, and cultural fields. Management in these fields needs to be considered in order to create good integration between the central and regional governments. Therefore, the practice of regional autonomy needs to open the way for democratic governance, optimization of the utilization of regional economic potential, as well as maintenance of social harmony and local values.

In the context of Papua, special autonomy is a form of implementation of the principle of decentralization that is adjusted to a number of basic values that exist among the people of Papua. The seven basic values of Papua's special autonomy are as follows:

1. Protection of the basic rights of the Indigenous People of Papua;
2. Democracy and maturity in the practice of democracy;
3. Respect for ethics and morals;
4. Respect for human rights;
5. The rule of law;
6. Respect for pluralism; and
7. Equality of position, rights, and obligations as a citizen.

Special autonomy is considered as a solution in dealing with the existing problems in Papua, although some studies view special autonomy more as a Political Solution rather than a Welfare Solution (LIPI 2012; Katharina, 2017; PPA, 2010). The condition of the relationship between the central government and the Papua region, which was marked by the issue of separatism and regional conflicts before the existence of a Special Autonomy Policy for the Province of Papua, made the government take a middle ground by imposing the Special Autonomy Policy.

Before enacting the Special Autonomy policy to respond to the issue of separatism, the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly's Decree No. The IV Year 1999 tried to formulate a policy to overcome the conflict situation that occurred in Papua at that time, which was then followed by the stipulation of Law No. 21 the Year 2001 on Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua. Law No. 21 the Year 2001 is a government instrument to significantly improve the welfare of the people of the Province of Papua in a short time and to strengthen national unity and integrity in Papua, thereby strengthening the integrity and integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, this policy mandates broad authority and great responsibility for the government of the Province of Papua.

Law No. 21 the Year 2001 and its amendment of Law No. 35 the Year 2008 emphasize the importance of improving people's welfare and regional development strategies to eradicate separatism. General Explanation of Law No. 21 defines that this policy seeks to empower indigenous Papuans through the involvement of stakeholders in the formulation of regional policies and the determination of development strategies. The specificity in this law consists of six aspects, namely (1) Socio-cultural and Protection of the Customary Rights of the Indigenous People of Papua, (2) Provincial Authority and Clean and Professional Implementation of Governance, (3) Finance, (4) Implementation of the Strategic Sectors of Development, (5) Political Representation, and (6) Resolution of Human Rights Violation and Reconciliation.

Table (4). Substances of Specificity in the Special Autonomy Law for the Province of Papua

No.	Aspects	Description
1.	Socio-cultural and Protection of the Customary Rights of the Indigenous People of Papua	<p>The name Papua replaces West Irian.</p> <p>Papua has regional symbols in the form of regional flags and regional songs as cultural symbols, not as symbols of sovereignty.</p> <p>Recognition of customs in the form of recognition of customs, indigenous peoples, customary law, traditional communities, customary rights, customary courts.</p> <p>Establishment of PPA with all its authorities.</p>
2.	Provincial Authority and Clean and Professional Implementation of Governance	<p>The authority of the Province of Papua is carried out with certain specificities within the framework of the Papua Special Autonomy with Perdasi and Perdusus.</p> <p>Specificity to have desks at the Indonesian Embassy in various countries in the world in the context of the promotion and cooperation of social, cultural, economic, scientific, technological, Monday with various international parties.</p> <p>Appointment of Kapolda with the approval of the Governor of Papua.</p> <p>Appointment of the Head of the Provincial Attorney General's Office with the approval of the Governor of Papua.</p> <p>Arrangements that the creation of security and public order are carried out through synergistic cooperation and mutual respect and harmony between the Central Government and regional governments and the people of Papua by paying attention to aspects of respect for customs, the legal system, and human rights.</p> <p>Providing a large space for the Governor of Papua in the capacity as a representative of the Government and regional heads to carry out close coordination with the central government in the context of exercising central authority in the Province of Papua.</p> <p>Confirming the duties, authorities, rights, and obligations of the Governor, DPRD, and PPA.</p> <p>Arranging harmonious relations between the district/city government and the Province.</p> <p>Regencies / Municipalities are still recognized as autonomous regions.</p>

		Providing large space for the community to exercise control and be directly involved in the implementation of development.
3.	Finance	The nominal figures are given in order to accelerate important development in the fields of health, education, and infrastructure, as well as calculations of the real funding capability.
4.	Implementation of the Strategic Sectors of Development	Regulation on the Basic Pattern of Development of the Province of Papua. Strictly stipulates that 30% of revenue in the context of Special Autonomy is allocated for community education and training, and 15% is allocated for health sector development.
5.	Political Representation	Possibility to form political parties. The political infrastructure and superstructure in the Province of Papua pay special attention to the recruitment of indigenous Papuans so that they can be properly represented in the national and local political system.
6.	Resolution of Human Rights Violation and Reconciliation	Formation of representatives of the National Commission on Human Rights: for the complete and dignified settlement of human rights violations that occurred in the past. Establishment of a Human Rights Court: the certainty that human rights violations do not need to occur in the future. Establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: disclosure of the truth about the history of the integration of the Province of Papua into the Unitary Republic of Indonesia in the context of reconciliation and strengthening of national unity and unity in the Province of Papua.

Source: Risalah Pembahasan RUU, 2001.

In the financial aspect, the Special Autonomy Law stipulates the distribution of periodic funds for provinces, cities, and regencies in the regions, especially the Special Autonomy Fund and the Additional Infrastructure Funds. From 2001 to 2018, the total Special Autonomy Fund that has been allocated to provinces, municipalities, and regencies in Papua is Rp. 105,186,133,268,500.00 (Lantang, 2020, p. 41), which is mainly focused on financing education, health, and nutrition. Whereas the amount of the Additional Infrastructure Fund is determined based on proposals from the Province aimed at financing infrastructure development in the framework of supporting regional, national and global economic systems. Utilization of this autonomy fund can be seen from the increasing number of education buildings at elementary to high school / vocational high levels, an increasing number of health facilities (Ruru, 2018, pp. 151-172), and decreasing poverty percentage (Lantang, 2020, p. 41).

Table (5). Number of Population in Poverty in the Province of Papua
 The year 2011-2019

Year	Percentage of Population in Poverty (%)		
	City	Village	City + Village
March 2011	4.60	41.58	31.98
September 2011	4.75	40.53	31.24
March 2012	4.24	40.55	31.11
September 2012	5.81	39.39	30.66
March 2013	6.11	39.92	31.13
September 2013	5.22	40.71	31.52
March 2014	4.47	38.92	30.05
September 2014	4.46	35.87	27.80
March 2015	4.61	36.66	28.17
September 2015	3.61	37.34	28.40
March 2016	4.42	37.14	28.54
September 2016	4.21	37.07	28.40
March 2017	4.46	36.20	27.62
September 2017	4.55	36.56	27.76
March 2018	4.51	36.63	27.74
September 2018	4.01	36.65	27.43
March 2019	4.26	36.84	27.53

Source: (IPA, 2020, pp. 232-250).

Despite the apparent changes and improvements in the aspects of welfare and public infrastructure in several fields due to the use of special autonomy funds in the Province of Papua, a LIPI researcher stated that Special Autonomy funds are tainted with corruption, under poor financial management and implemented improperly. The inappropriate implementation of Special Autonomy Policy in Papua has an impact on various fields, such as the low quality of maternal and child health (Bisma: 2010, pp. 75-86), the high number of population with illiteracy to high cases of HIV / AIDS infection (Kemenkes, 2016). This can hamper the achievement of the development potential and welfare of the Papuan people, which are important in preventing and overcoming the emergence of conflict and separatism in Papua.

Collaborative Governance as a Means of Conflict Management in Papua

The starting conditions of the Indonesia-Papua relations marked by the Papuan integration process in 1962, the government's efforts to resolve the conflict, as well as the stakeholders' awareness of the importance of cooperation and collaboration in order to safeguard the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia are the Driving Axes of the collaboration process between the government and various stakeholders. One of the Papuan conflict management strategies used by the government is through the implementation of policies that prioritize the welfare of the community, including the completion of human rights cases in Papua, in the form of the Special Autonomy Year 2011 Law.

The Special Autonomy Law has the main objective to facilitate the assimilation and integration of Papua into Indonesia by accelerating development and improving the welfare of the people. This law is also intended to overcome separatist conflicts that often arise in the Papua region due to social and economic inequality and other historical factors. The approach used in the Special Autonomy Law supports local wisdom and political identity in the Papua region in accordance with the third foundation of conflict management expressed by Taum.

To understand the success rate of the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law in an effort to overcome FPM based on a collaborative governance perspective, a comparison was made between survey data on the Special Autonomy Policy with three variables that were the driving force for the success of the collaboration process according to Emerson's concept of the integrative framework of collaborative governance, namely the Principled Engagement, Shared Motivation, and Capacity for Joint Action. This step is carried out to determine whether the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law meets the criteria of each variable so that it will realize Collaborative Action or it will actually become a Collaborative Inertia (Emerson et al.: 2012, pp. 1-29).

From the survey data of the Special Autonomy policy in the Province of Papua conducted by researchers in the period 1 - 12 February 2020, it appears that there are differences of opinion regarding the successful implementation of this policy, particularly in terms of conflict management efforts and increasing the level of community welfare. This survey consisted of questions in the form of questionnaires given to 200 respondents who were randomly selected in several districts and cities in the Province of Papua. Quality control of the survey is carried out by arranging minimal education and intensive training for interviewers. Then, quality control and data confirmation by telephone to 30 respondents.

The results of the research survey indicate differences of opinion and assessment of the Papuan people regarding the implementation and success rates of special autonomy policies in the Province of Papua for the last twenty years or so, which include the contribution of special autonomy policies to development, welfare, security and conflict management as well as community involvement or collaboration in the formulation and implementation of special autonomy policies. Survey data show that in general, 50% of respondents rated that the implementation of Special Autonomy in Papua during the last 20 years as fair, while 18% said it was good, 15% very poor, 9% very good, and 8% poor (diagram 2).



Figure 2. Assessment on the Implementation of Special Autonomy in Papua
 Source: Researcher's Survey Result, 2020.

Respondents' assessments about the improvement of the security and comfort of the Papuan people are closely related to the success of the government in terms of conflict management and handling separatist movements or other armed movements that can be unsettling for the community. Survey data show that 29% of respondents have fairly disagreed that Special Autonomy has contributed to improving the security and comfort of people in Papua for the past 20 years, while 23% strongly disagree, 22% disagree, 18% agree, and 8% strongly agree (diagram 3).

Furthermore, the Indonesian government seeks to involve various stakeholders in the form of collaboration for the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of Special Autonomy in the Province of Papua in order to improve the welfare of the community and deal with problems in Papua. However, 49% of respondents stated that community involvement in policymaking and problem-solving in the Special Autonomy era was still fair, while 17% said it was very poor, 17% good, 9% poor, and 8% very good (diagram 4).




Figure 3. Contribution of Special Autonomy on the Improvement of Security and comfort of Papuan Community

Source: Researcher's Survey Result, 2020.




Figure 4. Community Involvement in the Policy Formulation and Problem Solving Process

Source: Researcher's Survey Result, 2020.

Overall, the implementation of the Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua policy still requires a lot of enhancement and improvement to support the government's efforts to suppress the pro-independence or separatist movement, which is dangerous not only for the civil society in the Papua region but also for the sovereignty and unity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. This is indicated by the opinions of respondents who revealed that 30% of them agreed and 27% of them strongly agreed that Special Autonomy was deemed to have failed in fulfilling its mandate, while 16% said fairly disagree, 15% strongly disagree, and 13% disagree (diagram 5).

From the perspective of conflict management, the foundation of historical justice and memories of suffering have not yet been fully fulfilled. This is evidenced by the differences in perspectives between separatist groups and Indonesian people in other regions in general, including the Indonesian government, regarding the process of integration and sense of nationalism. Historical issues are often become an interesting subject of discussion among activists and used by independence groups to attract sympathy. The high level of violence resulting from repressive efforts in overcoming conflicts often actually endangers the success of the conflict handling process itself because it will add to the long list of memories that will trigger resentment, distrust, and motivation to separate from Indonesia, but on the other hand, the Indonesian Government also could not remain silent when they saw separatist groups shooting civilians and state officials. Various alternatives continue to be pursued by the Indonesian government, such as the political demands of the separatist movement, which will be more effective if carried out using a humanist approach such as deliberation, support, and development (Suaedy: 2018, P.67).

Learning from the approach taken by the German government in relation to the Holocaust massacre by the Nazi regime, the Indonesian government also needs to seek measures to open discussion rooms without repression with separatists and prevent the emergence of various factors which may trigger separatism, such as discrimination and racism that are widely spread in the community. In connection with the Reconstruction of Papuan Identity, one of the factors which are proved to trigger the separatist conflict is the educational, economic, and social inequality between indigenous people of Papua and migrants. Demographic changes due to the dominance of migrants led to the marginalization of indigenous Papuans in their own land, which will slowly foster a collective feeling that their existence will be threatened (Taum: 2015, pp. 23-43). Although the 2011 Special Autonomy Law contains provisions regarding socio-cultural aspects, protection of customary rights to political representation, the survey results of researchers indicate that the application in the field is still considered unsuccessful by the respondents.




Figure 5. Opinion on the Assumption of Failure of Special Autonomy

Source: Researcher's Survey Result, 2020.

In terms of the integrative framework of collaborative governance, Emerson et al. stated that to move the process of collaboration, it is necessary to fulfill the criteria of three main variables, which are Principled Engagement, Shared Motivation, and Capacity for Joint Action. In matters related to Principled Engagement, the results of the survey and review of previous studies published in the discussion explained that not all interested parties were involved in the process of formulating the Special Autonomy Law, including separate groups that were the subject of this law. In this study, the results of the FGD interviews also showed the role of Non-State Actors such as community leaders, NGOs, and traditional and religious leaders in relation to Special Autonomy programs in the regions (Emerson & Gerlak: 2014, pp. 768-781).

Although some of the criteria for this variable have been met, namely participation with people with the intention, relationship, and identification of different goals in solving problems or shared conflicts (Cahn: 2013, pp. 23- 38), there are still a number of parties which is not involved. The data in diagram 4 also shows a similar situation, where 49% of respondents think that community involvement in policymaking and problem solving is still considered fair.

Shared Motivation consists of a cycle of four important elements, namely trust between parties, understanding, internal legitimacy, and commitment. To meet the criteria of this variable, all parties involved in the collaborative process of implementing the Special Autonomy Law must be able to work together, share with one another and prove that they can be trusted (Fisher & Brown: 1989, pp. 12-24). Trust is a fundamental factor that cannot be replaced. This is also a fundamental problem because it involves suspicion and conflicts of interest between Jakarta and Papua (Interview results, 2019). Therefore, it is necessary to have the trust of all parties involved in the collaboration process to achieve the goals of the collaborative work.

In the context of Papua, the influence of separatist movements at home and abroad after decades of adoption of the Special Autonomy Law demonstrates the pessimism and distrust of some parties over the ability of the central government to accelerate development and improve the welfare of the Papuan people, resulting in preference to leave Indonesia. In addition, the survey data in diagram 3 shows that 29% of respondents feel fairly disagree that Special Autonomy has contributed to improving the security and comfort of people in Papua. The data implies that there is a pessimism in the community regarding the effectiveness of Special Autonomy in Papua. Not only that, the outbreaks of conflict based on separatist ideology, such as the Wamena conflict and the Nduga conflict (Eryanto et al.: 2019, pp. 12-27), also show the ineffectiveness of government conflict management in suppressing separatist movements.

The Capacity of Joint Action ensures that all parties involved in the collaboration process are able to work together to achieve goals that cannot be met if done alone. In other words, collaboration can increase the capacity of each party involved so that they can achieve common goals through cooperative activities. Good procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge, and resources are needed to be able to

increase the capacity of the parties' actions to carry out a successful collaborative process. The problem that often arises in the implementation of Special Autonomy is the lack of quality human resources capable of managing special autonomy funds, causing budget misuse to corruption. One of the most affected factors is the high level of poverty in Papua, evidenced by Indonesian Statistics of the Province of Papua data which shows that poverty in the cities and villages in Papua is still relatively high, namely 4.26% of the population in the city and 36.84% in villages as of March 2019. This shows the lack of capacity, competence, and leadership to manage the resources that have been allocated by the central government to the local government of the Province of Papua, thus threatening the successful implementation of Special Autonomy in the field. Along with this, survey data show that 30% of respondents agreed with the assumption that Special Autonomy failed to be implemented, and 50% of respondents considered that the implementation of Special Autonomy was fair.

CONCLUSION

Implementation of the Special Autonomy policy requires collaboration and active participation from various parties at the central and regional levels as an effort to manage conflict with the Papuan people in general and separatist groups in particular. With the appropriate drivers, the collaboration process can be initiated if it involves all stakeholders. The results showed that there were still weaknesses in the implementation, so that there was public dissatisfaction regarding the implementation of Special Autonomy Law. These weaknesses are seen in the three foundations of conflict management and the three drivers of the collaboration process in governance.

The success of conflict management in Papua needs to take into account the fulfillment of three main foundations, namely Historical Justice, Memoria Passionis, and Reconstruction of Papuan Identity. The weakness of the government's conflict management strategy related to the first foundation, Historical Justice, consist of a lack of common perception of independence between separatist groups and the Indonesian government, so that there is still a pro-independence movement that considers that Pepera 1969 is invalid and Papua has the right to become an independent state. Weaknesses related to the second foundation, namely Memoria Passionis, consist of the problem regarding the memory of people's suffering due to violence, poverty, and other inequality that has not yet been resolved. Weaknesses related to the last foundation, Reconstruction of Papuan Identity, consist of the threat to local Papuan identity as a result of radical demographic changes in the region as well as the low level of representation of indigenous people of Papua in various forums and institutions involving their interests.

The success of the collaboration process in policy implementation needs to take into account the fulfillment of the criteria of three main variables, namely Principled Engagement, Shared Motivation, and Capacity for Joint Action. The weakness of the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law related to the first variable, Principled Engagement, consists of the non-fulfillment of criteria which require all parties who have an interest in a collaborative process to be actively involved, starting from the level of formulation to the level of implementation. The weaknesses related to the second variable, Shared Motivation, consist of the lack of cooperation and trust between the parties that have interests. Weaknesses related to the last variable, Capacity for Joint Action, consist of the low quality of human resources which are given responsibility for managing the facilities provided by the Special Autonomy Law, especially the Special Autonomy Fund and the Infrastructure Fund.

Overall, the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law requires more improvement. This is evidenced by the results of the survey, which demonstrate that 50% of respondents considered that the implementation of Special Autonomy in Papua for the last 20 years as fair, while 18% said that it was good, 15% very poor, 9% good and 8% poor. Furthermore, 29% of respondents fairly disagreed, and 23% strongly disagreed that Special Autonomy has contributed to the improvement of the feeling of security and comfort among the people in Papua. As many as 49% of respondents stated that the community involvement in policymaking and

problem resolution in the Special Autonomy era was fair, while 30% of them agreed and 27% strongly agreed that Special Autonomy was considered to have failed in fulfilling its mandate.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author would like to thank her family, Faculty of Administrative Science of the University of Indonesia and all informants in the Provincial Government of Papua and the Central Government in Jakarta. The author would also like to thank the Cendrawasih Reading Centre team in Jayapura, who assisted the author in collecting research questionnaires in Papua.

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