

EDITORIAL

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DICTATORSHIPS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THEIR  
INFLUENCE OF RIGHT AND LEFT MOVEMENTS SINCE  
THE 20TH CENTURY\*

LAS DICTADURAS EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y SU INFLUENCIA EN LOS  
MOVIMIENTOS DE DERECHA E IZQUIERDA DESDE EL SIGLO XX

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## Abstract

Since the time of independence, the military has permeated politics by controlling the most important positions of the respective Latin American governments, such influences, have provoked a series of direct influences on the political, economic, cultural and social conception of the states. Directing the mythical-political referents accepted or formal, with a tendency to the right or conservatism-religious to the detriment of others, generating socio-political reactions against from a reactionary left or raised in arms. But these responses from the left have provoked political or military dictatorial responses. The methodology used for this analysis is based on the historical-critical construction, the critical discourse analysis and the normative and political hermeneutics, which will allow us to show the influence of the military within the countries, as well as, the political interference Exterior.

**Keywords:** Dictatorships in Latin America, right movements, left movements, religious conservatism, raised in arms, 20th century.

## Resumen

Desde la época de la Independencia, los militares han permeado la política controlando los puestos más importantes de los respectivos gobiernos latinoamericanos; dichas influencias han provocado una serie de dominios directos en la concepción política, económica, cultural y social de los Estados, dirigiendo los referentes mítico-políticos —aceptados o formales—, con tendencia a la derecha o conservadurismo-religioso en desmedro de otros, generando reacciones sociopolíticas en contra de una izquierda reaccionaria o alzada en armas. Las respuestas de la izquierda han provocado reacciones de tipo dictatorial político o militar. La metodología usada para el presente análisis se funda en la construcción histórico-crítica, el análisis crítico del discurso y la hermenéutica normativa y política, que nos permitirán evidenciar la influencia de los militares al interior de los países, así como las injerencias de la política exterior.

**Palabras clave:** dictaduras en América Latina, movimientos de derecha, movimientos de izquierda, conservadurismo religioso, alzados en armas, siglo XX.

## Resumo

Desde a Independência, os militares permeiam a política, controlando as posições mais importantes dos respectivos governos latino-americanos; Essas influências têm ocasionado uma série de domínios diretos na concepção política, econômica, cultural e social dos Estados, direcionando os referentes mítico-políticos, -aceitos ou formais-, com tendência à direita ou conservadorismo-religioso, em detrimento da outros, gerando efeitos sociopolíticos contra de uma esquerda reacionária ou armada. As respostas da esquerda produziram efeitos políticos ou militares ditatoriais. A metodologia utilizada para a presente análise baseia-se na construção histórico-crítica, na análise crítica do discurso e na hermenêutica normativa e política que nos permitirá mostrar a influência dos militares dentro dos países, bem como a interferência na política externa.

**Palavras-chave:** ditaduras na América Latina, movimentos de direita, movimentos de esquerda, conservadorismo religioso, rebeldes, século XX.

## WHAT IS THE DICTATORSHIP

The dictatorship is a category used with great frequency in Latin America, although it is not exclusive to the region, it is more a political historical construct of old data that implies a long historical journey, added to the understanding of the meaning and its possible typologies, since, like any conceptual construction, it has not been immobile or univocal in any way. On the contrary, it has changed to the same extent that capitalism has metamorphosed and the forms of government have been corporatized. Due to the flight of the State and its replacement by market rules, in addition to the return of the right, no longer as a nationalist fascist form, but as radical religious, neo-fascist, neo-conservative, xenophobic or racist movements.

As a concept, it can be determined as a system of government centered around a single person in charge of the dictator or a group (military boards, brotherhoods, religious groups, hegemonic political parties, members of political pacts that assure the control of the State for themselves) that it can alternate power by means of relief or designation of successor, either directly or indirectly, under conditions that may or may not be exceptional, having the authority to violate or replace current legislation. And depending on the social historical context, it can be populist or de facto, ruling arbitrarily for the benefit of the minority and preventing the opposition, imposing or maintaining a political system that benefits it, or benefits, acting under the pseudo-scheme of order, the country, or the national salvation to demand blind obedience from their dominated, being extraordinary constitutional or legal by means of the coup d'état (Dávila, 2002; Mikou, 2007; Rouquié, 1986; Valencia-Grajales, 2014 and Valencia-Grajales & Marín, 2016).

History will show its need within the rise of ancient Rome in order to concentrate power in the consul *praetor* (Tito Lazio can be considered the first and the last one would be Cayo Julio César), who was granted the *auctoritas, potestas e imperium*, to concentrate on a single man the military, administrative, legal and political capacity in times of war (Cicerón, 1981; 1991; Corey, 2011; García-Gelabert, 2011; Lana, 2009 and Livio, 1905; 1998). However, this capacity was transformed into tyranny or abuse of power as expressed by Polibio, and called *anaciclosis* (Asimov, 1981 and Polibio, 2008). This figure will only change its name at the end of the empire, calling it emperor and starting from the Middle Ages will be reconfigured as Prince, derived from the figure of Octavio Augusto in 27 a. C. and retaken by Marco Ulpio Trajano (Bennet, 2000 and Suetonio, 1985) would combine the mili-

tary and administrative powers locally, combining the powers of monarchical royalty, the Roman manor, and the division of family power. Born from the impossibility of having armies and administrative and judicial control in each of the existing regions.

The forms of concentration of powers will be accentuated during the period of rise and survival of the absolute monarchy, accentuated according to Beloff in the period from 1660 to 1789 for having of such temporary spaces a more extensive information of France, Spain, Portugal, Prussia, Austria, Russia, Poland, and the overseas colonies of America (Beloff, 1962) and which is complemented by Anderson's vision that includes England, Italy, Sweden, Japan and the Middle East dominated by Islam (Anderson, 1974) such moments will be contextualized from the black plague of 1348, the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the emergence of the bourgeoisie and the lineages of the Bourbon dynasty, Oliver Cromwell, the Tudors and the Hapsburg among others, where initially the problem is the land, then what it will be commerce and finally the domination of the bourgeoisie (Lachmann, 2002). This fact will also be presented in the French revolution initially maintaining the powers of the king (Assemblée Nationale Constituante, 1791, p. 93). Then granting powers to the Board ("Constitution du 5 Fructidor An III", 2011), and later making Napoleon emperor with absolute powers ("Constitution de l'An XII - Empire - 28 floréal An XII 18 MAI 1804", 2011). In the recent past, demonstrations in Europe will be noticeable in figures such as Adolf Hitler, Benito Amilcare Andrea Mussolini, Nicolae Ceausescu, Josip Broz Tito and Francisco Franco Bahamonde (Bullock, 1955; Nolte, 1975 and Rouquié, 1986). The latter being explained from the caudillismo, the populisms and the nationalism.

## DICTATORSHIP FROM THE INDEPENDENCE OF COLONIAL AMERICA TO MILITARY LATIN AMERICA

However, the Latin American tradition will drink from two specific fronts, the French and American revolution in relation to the liberal-democratic principles and the Napoleonic and Spanish principles in its bifronte monarchy-emperor tradition, grounded in order and military control. This amalgam is especially seen in the constitutional construction of the first letters such as Pepa (Fernández, 2007) or that made by the Creoles in Nueva Granada as the Santiago de Cali Act of 1810, preconstitutional act of the free state of Socorro de 1810, act of the extraordinary town hall of Santa Fe and

additional of 1810, act of the confederation of the united provinces of the new granade of 1811, declaration of Pore of 1818, constitution of Venezuela of 1819, fundamental law of the Republic of Colombia of 1819, fundamental law of the union of the peoples of Colombia of 1821 (Restrepo, 2004), which invoke the absence of the king and the consequences of his absence, determining the division of powers in the best style of the French and American revolution, creating the presidential figure with a large number of governmental powers and extraordinary powers, in addition to attributing the control of the armies, but to the foregoing You can add the organic decree of the Bolívar dictatorship of August 27, 1828, which makes it a kind of semi-king (Restrepo, 2004).

## DICTATORSHIP IN COLOMBIA

In Colombia from the constitution of 1832 and continuing with that of 1843; 1853; 1858; 1863 until 1886, extraordinary powers were granted to the president through the state of siege, converting him for certain periods into Dictator. This extraordinary mechanism became customary, being used almost permanently by each political side or president on duty under the pretext of controlling public order, facilitating the limitation or denial of fundamental rights. But in practice, the direct consequence of it is the concentration of powers. The above, from the historical point of view could be explained by reason of the lack of a cultural, political, economic, industrial and historical tradition of a solid nation. Since this continent did not have an industrial or agricultural development sufficiently developed to generate surpluses or mechanisms for the dissemination of science, art, culture and identity. This degenerates in the imposition of ideologies and import of thoughts that did not describe Colombians, much less Latin Americans.

That is why the nation building was founded in the hope of resembling the colonizer, or the European forms of government. Having as references the absolute monarchy of Spain and the Napoleonic Empire. But resolving in practice through presidents with exceptional powers or military governments. This can be seen from the first governments that were headed by the military such as José Miguel Pey; Antonio Amador José de Nariño and Álvarez del Casal; Pedro Groot and Alea; Manuel Benito de Castro Arcaya; José Custodio Cayetano García Rovira; Antonio Villavicencio and Verástegui; Liborio Mejía Gutiérrez de Lara; Manuel Fernando Serrano Uribe or dictatorship of Bolívar and Francisco José de Paula Santander Omaña;

Simón José Antonio of the Holy Trinity Bolívar Palacios Ponte y Blanco; Domingo de Caycedo and Sanz de Santamaría; Joaquín Mariano de Mosquera-Figueroa and Arboleda-Salazar; Rafael José Urdaneta Farías; José María Ramón Obando del Campo; Pedro Alcántara Herrán Martínez de Zaldúa; Tomás José Ramón del Carmen de Herrera and Pérez Dávila; that they had the luxury of being re-elected, José María Dionisio Melo Ortiz, Tomás Cipriano Ignacio María de Mosquera-Figueroa and Arboleda-Salazar; Juan José Nieto Gil; Manuel Joaquín de Santa Isabel Riascos García; Manuel María de los Santos Acosta Castillo; José Santos Gutiérrez Prieto; José Bonifacio Aquileo Elías Parra Gómez; Julián Trujillo Largacha; Rafael Reyes Prieto; Jorge Marcelo Holguín Mallarino; José Rafael Ramón Eufasio de Jesús González Valencia; Pedro Nel Ignacio Tomás of Villanueva Ospina Vásquez; all of them from the beginning of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century, but with the common characteristic of being of a military nature, with exceptional powers or replacing the constitution with a new one or reforming it so much that they finally lost their original identity (Gaviria, 2002; Otero, 2015; Sanclemente, 1900 and Santos, 2011).

Then, starting in 1957, political instability will put Colombia back in the hands of a military man and in this case the Supreme Chief General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla and then by the Government Military Board, composed of Generals Gabriel Paris Gordillo and Deogracias Fonseca Espinosa, Vice Admiral Rubén Piedrahita Arango and Brigadiers General Rafael Navas Pardo and Luis Ordóñez (Valencia-Grajales, 2014). These will be these types of governments dominated by the states of siege, added to the military presidencies, military influence, with a conservative ideology and economic openness will be what will be imposed in the political history of Colombia. However, these governments are not remembered by everyone as disastrous moments, on the contrary, many of them remember them for powdered milk (product of the American intervention of Roosevelt), the vote of the woman (anticipating the possible uprising), the war against communism and guerrillas, the transportation allowance, credits and construction subsidies, as in the best of the fascist propaganda (Rojas, 1955).

The previous historical conditions allowed throughout the history of Colombia a series of conditions that penetrated the military class first and then in politics, which considered it necessary to maintain *de facto* powers, but camouflaged as democracy. That is, institutions were maintained within the constitution as the “State of Siege” (Valencia-Grajales, 2014; 2018) or in the law through the “security statute” (Republic of Colombia, 1978); “De-

mocratic security” (National Planning Department, 2003); “Live together” (Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, 1994); or “national defense” (Republic of Colombia, 1965). These in the background was a way of governing de facto, involving in the war with the insurgency to the citizenship and arming paramilitary groups. What basically shows that the presidencies in Colombia are not far from the dictatorships, with the difference, that here the image of the dictator is not sold, but the need of the State to end the internal enemy (guerrillas, communism, socialism, communities, human rights defenders, leftist parties or anyone who opposes the government’s vision), in response to the fear that war represents, which was envisioned by authors such as Guzmán Campos, Fals Borda, & Umaña Luna (1988).

## THE DICTATORSHIPS IN CHILE

The state configuration of Chile is similar to that of Colombia, preserving the particular political historical context of it, it is framed in an independence and construction of national identity strongly rooted in the military factor, proof of this is evidenced by its rulers, which are in most of them have been military, and that fit into the following leaders: Manuel Blanco Encalada, Ramón Freire Serrano, Francisco Antonio Pinto Díaz, Francisco Ramón Vicuña, José Tomás Ovalle Bezanilla, José Joaquín Prieto Vial, Manuel Bulnes Prieto, Manuel Montt Torres, Manuel Baquedano González, Jorge Montt Álvarez, Luis Altamirano Talavera, Pedro Pablo Dartnell, Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, Arturo Puga, Bartolomé Blanche, and the eternal Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, who, through the constitution or the law, managed to remain in power or dying it to extraordinary control interests or dictatorial powers that can be observed in the first constitution of 1822 of the State of Chile where in article 121 it is defined when they can be invoked: “In an imminent danger of the State, which requests very prompt measures, the Legislative Power may grant it extraordinary powers for the duration of the need, without any reason having the smallest extension”.

It will then be reissued in the 1823 constitution in article 18 by saying: “The exclusive powers of the Supreme Director are: [...] 9th. In an unforeseen external attack or internal commotion, he may issue hostile or urgently urgent measures, but immediately consulting the Senate” (Chile, 1823).

These extraordinary powers will also be in the 1833 constitution, in its article 82 numeral 20, then in the 1923 Constitution in its article 72 numeral 17 and have finally remained in the 1980 Constitution in articles 39 to 41.

## THE DICTATORSHIPS IN ARGENTINA

The dictatorships in Argentina and in Latin America can also be detected since their independence with a series of governments exercised by the military, many of them born of coups or due to a kind of hemispheric national security, born in principle of independence in presidents how: Just José de Urquiza, Juan Esteban Pedernera, Bartolomé Miter, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Julio Argentino Roca, Roque Sáenz Peña, Victorino de la Plaza, José Félix Uriburu, Agustín Pedro Justo, Pedro Pablo Ramírez, Edelmiro Julián Farrell, Juan Domingo Perón, Eduardo Lonardi, Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, Juan Carlos Onganía, Roberto Marcelo Levingston, Alejandro Lanusse, Jorge Rafael Videla, Roberto Viola, Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri and Reynaldo Bignone. That is to say, the military ascendant in the Argentine Nation has been constant and not only has governed its destinies, but has led to its constitution being of an exceptional, bone nature, that allows the exercise of extraordinary powers by the president of the republic.

As observed in the constitution of Argentina of 1853 in its article 23

In case of internal commotion or external attack that endangers the exercise of this Constitution and of the authorities created by it, the Province or territory where the disturbance of the order exists will be declared in a state of siege, constitutional guarantees being suspended there . But during this suspension, the President of the Republic may not condemn himself or apply penalties. Their power will be limited in such cases with respect to people, to arrest or transfer them from one point to another of the Confederation, if they do not prefer to leave outside the Argentine territory (Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, 2010, p. 35).

## THE DICTATORSHIPS IN PERU

Peru has the peculiarities of Latin America in the face of how it is constituted as an independent state and its conformation of national identity which is permeated by the norms and the presidents that were conforming it by the military such as:

José de San Martín and Matorras, José Bernardo de Tagle and Portocarrero, Marqués de Torre Tagle, José de La Mar Cortázar, Manuel Salazar y Baquijano, José de la Riva Agüero and Sánchez Boquete, Antonio José de Sucre and Alcalá, Simón Bolívar Palacios Ponte and Blanco, Andrés de

Santa Cruz y Calaumana, Antonio Gutiérrez de la Fuente, Agustín Gamarra Messia, Juan Bautista Eléspuru, Andrés Reyes and Buitrón, Luis José de Orbegoso y Moncada, Juan Francisco de Vidal La Hoz, Pedro Pablo Bermúdez, Felipe Santiago Salaverry del Solar, Juan Ángel Bujanda, Juan José Salas, Juan Bautista de Lavalle y Zugasti, Juan Pío de Tristán y Moscoso, José de la Riva Agüero, Ramón Herrera y Rodado, Juan Crisóstomo Torrico González, Eleuterio Aramburú, José Rufino Echenique Benavente, Manuel Ignacio de Vivanco Iturralde, Domingo Nieto and Márquez, Ramón Castilla y Marquesado, José Miguel Medina, José María Raygada, Miguel de San Román y Meza, Pedro Diez Canseco Corbacho, Juan Antonio Pezet Rodríguez, Mariano Ignacio Prado Ochoa, Luis La Puerta de Mendoza, Francisco Diez Canseco, José Balta y Montero, Tomás Gutiérrez, Mariano Herencia Zevallos, Mariano Ignacio Prado Ochoa, Francisco García Calderón Landa, Lizardo Montero Flores, Miguel Iglesias Pino de Arce, Andrés Avelino Cáceres Dorregaray, Andrés Avelino Cáceres Dorregaray, Remigio Morales Bermúdez, Justiniano Borgoño Castañeda, Óscar R. Benavides Larrea, Manuel María Ponce Brousset, Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro, Gustavo A. Jiménez, Zenón Noriega Agüero, Manuel A. Odría Amoretti, Ricardo Pérez Godoy, Nicolás Lindley López, Juan Velasco Alvarado, Francisco Morales Bermúdez Cerrutti, in addition to the constitutional presidential dictatorships of Augusto B. Leguía y Salcedo and Alberto Fujimori Fujimori.

These initially constructed a panorama of a dispute over power, and then a division of power between Peru from the south and north and again in restoration. As can be seen from the previous list, the enormous military influence generated by a country convulsed with guerrillas and extreme movements in the absence of inclusion and political participation is evident. Now the dictatorship is maintained from the constitutions of Peru that adapt to the needs of each ruler, which is why they are constantly modified as seen in those of 1823, 1826, 1828, 1834, 1839, 1856, 1860, 1867, 1920 and 1933 and although the previous ones do not mention any exceptional power for the president, this occurred de facto. Then the constitution of 1979 and 1993 bring such exceptional powers as a necessary element. That is why the Constitution of 1979 prescribed the state of emergency for cases of catastrophe and internal order, but placing as limits the impossibility of dissolving the Congress according to its article 231:

The President of the Republic, with the agreement of the Council of Ministers, decrees, for a fixed term, in all or part of the territory and giving account of the Congress or the Permanent Commission, the states of exception that are this article are contemplated:

- a) State of emergency, in case of disturbance of peace or internal order, of catastrophe or of serious circumstances affecting the life of the Nation. In this case, it may suspend the constitutional guarantees related to personal freedom and security, the inviolability of the domicile, the freedom of assembly and transit in the territory, which are contemplated in subsections 7, 9 and 10 of article 2 and in the subsection 20-g of the same article 2. Under no circumstances may the penalty of exile be imposed. The term of the state of emergency does not exceed sixty days. The extension requires a new decree. In a state of emergency, the Armed Forces assume control of the internal order when it is arranged by the President of the Republic.
- b) State of siege, in case of invasion, foreign war, or civil war, or imminent danger of their occurrence, specifying the personal guarantees that remain in force. The corresponding term does not exceed forty-five days. When the state of siege is decreed, Congress meets in its own right. The extension requires congressional approval.

Article 229.- The President of the Republic cannot dissolve the Chamber of Deputies during the state of siege or emergency. Nor can he dissolve it in the last year of his term. During that term, the Chamber can only vote for the censorship of the Council of Ministers or of any of the Ministers with the vote of at least two thirds of the legal number of deputies.

The President of the Republic cannot exercise the power of dissolution only once during his term of office (García, 2006, pp. 628-629).

But the Peruvian constitution of 1993 admits the possibility of dissolving the Congress according to its article 134 and 137.

The President of the Republic is empowered to dissolve the Congress if he has censored or denied his trust to two Councils of Ministers. The decree of dissolution contains the call for elections for a new Congress. These elections are held within four months of the date of dissolution, without altering the pre-existing electoral system. The

Congress cannot be dissolved in the last year of its mandate. Once the Congress is dissolved, the Permanent Commission is in operation, which cannot be dissolved. There are no other forms of revocation of the parliamentary mandate. Under state of siege, Congress cannot be dissolved.

Article 137 The President of the Republic, with the agreement of the Council of Ministers, may decree, for a fixed term, throughout the national territory, or in part thereof, and giving account to the Congress or the Permanent Commission, the states of exception that in this article are contemplated:

1st. State of emergency, in case of disturbance of peace or internal order, catastrophe or serious circumstances affecting the life of the Nation. In this case, the exercise of constitutional rights relating to personal liberty and security, inviolability of domicile, and freedom of assembly and transit in the territory included in subsections 9, 11 and 12 of the article may be restricted or suspended. 2nd and in subsection 24, section f of the same article. Under no circumstances can anyone be banished. The term of the state of emergency does not exceed sixty days. His extension requires a new decree. In a state of emergency, the Armed Forces assume control of the internal order if the President of the Republic so provides.

2nd. State of siege, in case of invasion, foreign war, civil war, or imminent danger of their occurrence, with mention of the fundamental rights whose exercise is not restricted or suspended. The corresponding term does not exceed forty-five days. When the state of siege is decreed, the Congress meets in its own right. The extension requires approval of the Congress (García, 2006, pp. 623-624).

Finally it is found that there is an enormous influence of the military in the conformation of the government of Peru, added to some constitutions and norms that cause the excessive use of force and dictatorship as a mechanism of government, although it is camouflaged with the image of constitutionality or legality.

## THE DICTATORSHIPS IN BRAZIL

Brazil unlike the other Latin American states has a dissimilar conformation, and this is because it was born as an empire formed with Portugal during the Napoleon period, and at the head of Pedro I, who will then be handed over to his son Pedro II who will rule until the coup that puts him in power. It can be said that this coup is the turning point that makes Brazil similar in its constitution to the other Latin American countries. Because the military influence after that will be constant in history as evidenced in the large number of military presidents or that they did it in fact as the following: Deodoro da Fonseca, Floriano Vieira Peixoto, Hermes Rodrigues da Fonseca, Augusto Fragoso, Isaías de Noronha, Mena Barreto, Gaspar Dutra, Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, Artur da Costa e Silva, Augusto Rademaker, Aurélio de Lira Tavares, Márcio Melo, Emílio Garrastazu Médici, and Ernesto Geisel, João Figueiredo, who changed the configuration not only of the history of Brazil, but also modified the constitution in their favor.

From the coup d'état a constitution was created with the figure of the state of siege or the State of exceção in Brazil to stifle any initiative of the monarchical parties, or the support of the people to return to the monarchy. Remaining in the constitutions of 1891 and 1934, changing to a state of emergency and war in 1937, returning in 1946, then as a state of siege or serious disturbance of public order in 1967, until the constitution of 1988 and which can be seen in the constitution of 1891 which includes it in its section 1 chapter IV in its article 34 and 48:

Tabla 1.1 Constitution of Brazil 1891

Portuguese version	Spanish version	English version
Art. 34 Compete privativamente ao Congresso Nacional	Artículo 34. Le compete privativamente al Congreso Nacional	Article 34. The National Congress is privately responsible
21º) declarar em estado de sítio um ou mais pontos do território nacional, na emergência de agressão por forças estrangeiras ou de comoção interna, e aprovar ou suspender o sítio que houver sido declarado pelo Poder Executivo, ou seus agentes responsáveis, na ausência do Congresso	21) declarar el estado de sitio en uno o varios puntos del país, en emergencia por la agresión de fuerzas extranjeras o conmoción interna, y aprobar o suspender el sitio que ha sido declarado por el Poder Ejecutivo, o sus agentes responsables, en ausencia del Congreso	21) declare the state of siege in one or several points of the country, in emergency due to the aggression of foreign forces or internal commotion, and approve or suspend the site that has been declared by the Executive Power, or its responsible agents, in the absence of Congress
[...]	[...]	[...]
SEÇÃO II Do Poder Executivo	SECCIÓN II Del Poder Ejecutivo	SECTION II From the Executive Power
[...]	[...]	[...]
CAPÍTULO III Das Atribuições do Poder Executivo	CAPÍTULO III De las atribuciones del Poder Ejecutivo	CHAPTER III Of the powers of the Executive Power
Art 48 - Compete privativamente ao Presidente da República:	Art 48 - Compete privativamente al Presidente de la República:	Art 48 - The President of the Republic is privately responsible:
[...]	[...]	[...]
15º) declarar por si, ou seus agentes responsáveis, o estado de sítio em qualquer ponto do território nacional nos casos, de agressão estrangeira, ou grave comoção intestina (art. 6º, nº 3; art. 34, nº 21 e art. 80)	15º) declarar por si, o sus agentes responsables, el estado de sitio en cualquier lugar del territorio nacional en los casos, de agresión extranjera, o grave conmoción interior (art. 6º, nº 3; art. 34, nº 21 e art. 80)	15) declare in case, or its responsible agents, the state of siege in any place of the national territory in cases of foreign aggression, or serious internal commotion (art. 6, no. 3; art. 34, no. 21 and art. 80)

Fuente: elaboración propia.

That is to say, it could be assured that the extraordinary powers granted to the president have public order control purposes, but more than that, what they have intended is to eliminate dissent or political enemies that can destabilize the powers of those who hold it.

## THE DICTATORSHIPS IN BOLIVIA

Bolivia is one of the countries most influenced by the military wing and the dictatorship as a tool of political control, it can be seen the permanence in the power of some of them for long periods and the constant coup d'état to maintain control for the military, this can be seen in the large list of members of that dome who exercised power and can be seen in the following list: Pedro Domingo Murillo, Antonio José de Sucre Alcalá, Simón José Bolívar Palacios, José María Pérez de Urdininea, José Miguel de Velasco Lozano, Pedro Blanco Soto, Andrés Santa Cruz Calahumana, Sebastián Ágreda, José Ballivián Seguro, Eusebio Guilarte Mole, Manuel Isidoro Belzu Humérez, Jorge Córdova, José María Achá Valiente, Manuel Antonio Sánchez, Mariano Melgarejo Valencia, Agustín Morales Hernández, Adolfo Ballivián Coll, Hilarión Daza Grosellé, Narciso Campero Laws, José Manuel Pando Solares, Ismael Montes Gamboa, Carlos Blanco Galindo, Germán Busch Becerra, David Toro Ruilova, Carlos Quintanilla Quiroga, Enrique Peñaranda del Castillo, Gualberto Villarroel López, Hugo Ballivián Rojas, René Barrientos Ortuño, Alfredo Ovando Candia, Efraín Guachalla Ibáñez, Fernando Sattori Ribera, Alberto Albarracín Crespo, Juan José Torres González, Hugo Banzer Suárez, Víctor González Fuentes, Alfonso Villalpando Armaza, Gutemberg Barroso Hurtado, Juan Pereda Asbún, David Padilla Arancibia, Alberto Natusch Busch, Luis García Meza Tejada, Celso Torrelio Villa, Waldo Bernal Pereira, Óscar Pammo Rodríguez, Celso Torrelio Villa, Ángel Mariscal Gómez, Natalio Morales Mosquera and Guido Vildoso Calderón.

The previous names show how Bolivia, has had few constitutional periods of free elections, and how the way to maintain the *statu quo* is based on the military, with few exceptions, which end up being dictatorships from the democratic point of view, since many presidents of said country they maintained the power during several periods matter that is evidenced in the case of Evo Morales Ayma, that is finished de facto on the part of Jeanine Áñez Chávez, that although apparently it uses a constitutional justification the support to assume its functions constitutes from the armed forces, which

although they do not put a military, it ends up complying with the demands of the dictatorship that have been kept underground and publicly controlled by the military.

This is also reflected in the political letters that since the constitution of 1826 in its article 76 I consider necessary the figure of the life president (General Constituent Congress of the Bolivian Republic, 1826); while the political constitution of 1831, apart from admitting re-election, grants him exceptional powers in its articles 72 to 75 that exceed any state of siege, since the only restrictions on personal liberties fall by the mere fact of being faced with the internal commotion (Bolivian Constituent General Assembly, 1831); those same powers are reissued in the constitution of 1834 in articles 74 to 77 (Constitutional Congress of the Bolivian Republic, 1834); likewise the constitution of 1839 in its articles 79 to 81 (Constituent Congress of Bolivia, 1839); later, the constitution of 1843 keeps the same presidential powers intact in its articles from 44 to 45, although they do not make a direct reference to the state of siege or to the exceptional powers (National Convention of Bolivian, 1843); then we will find the constitution of 1851 said powers concentrated in article 76 (National Convention of Bolivia, 1851); in addition, these powers can be corroborated in articles 11 and 54 of the constitution of the year 1861 (National Constituent Assembly of Bolivia, 1861); this will be repeated in the constitution of 1868 in articles 20, 21, 47 and 69 although it does not make a precise definition of what is understood by state of siege or internal commotion (National Constituent Assembly of Bolivia, 1868).

According to the foregoing, the powers were maintained in the constitution of 1871 in articles 20 to 22 (Constituent Assembly of Bolivia, 1871); these were reissued in the constitution of 1878 in its articles 26 to 30 in which it is renamed state of siege in order to maintain public order (Bolivia, 1878); in the same way the airs of the previous constitution will be maintained in the reforms of the year 1880 in its article 26 (Constituent Assembly of Bolivia, 1880); then the constitution of 1938 in its articles 34 to 38 again mentions the state of siege and the exceptional powers that it contracts (National Assembly of Bolivia, 1938); said state of siege will be maintained in the same articles in the constitution of 1945 (National Assembly of Bolivia, 1945); additionally, the 1947 constitution will reissue the same powers in the same articles (National Congress of Bolivia, 1947); in those same terms the constitution of 1967 will have the state of siege in its articles 11 to 115 (Constituent Assembly of Bolivia, 1967); the previous dispositions were kept in the same articles and equal powers of the state of siege in the constitution of 1995

(National Congress of Bolivia, 1995); additionally the constitution of 2004 reissues the articles and powers (National Congress of Bolivia, 2004), finally from the constitution of 2009 (Constituent Assembly of Bolivia, 2009) the states of siege will disappear and the states of exception will appear that will really die the extraordinary powers granted to the president, which were more similar to dictatorial powers than powers of public order.

## THE DICTATORSHIPS IN ECUADOR

Ecuador will have features that show the influence of the military in the formation of government, but it will have some additional features that include the revolutions that were found by political or military figures or by ideological movements or democratic changes, compared to obtaining of power by the military are the following: Juan José Flores and Aramburu, José María Urbina y Viteri, Francisco Robles y García, Ignacio de Veintemilla and Villacís, José María Sarastí y Guevara, Luis Cordero Crespo, Agustín Guerrero Lizaraburu, Pedro Ignacio Lizaraburu y Borja, Antonio Flores Jijón, Eloy Alfaro Delgado, Leónidas Plaza y Gutiérrez, Francisco Arízaga Luque, Francisco Boloña Rolando, Pedro Pablo Garaycoa Cabanilla, Luis Napoleón Dillon Cevallos, José Rafael Bustamante Cevallos, Francisco Gómez de la Torre Zaldumbide, Modesto Larrea Jijón, Moisés Oliva Jiménez, Julio Enrique Moreno Peñaherrera, Homero Viteri Lafronte, Isidro Ayora Cueva, Adolfo Hidalgo Nevárez, José A. Gómez Gault, Pedro Pablo Egüez Baquerizo, Luis Larrea Alba, Alberto Enríquez Gallo, Carlos Mancheno Cajas, Ramón Castro Jijón, Guillermo Rodríguez Lara and Alfredo Poveda Burbano.

The previous ones show the great influence of the military in the political life of Ecuador, but to this it is added that the country has periods of such influence as that of General Juan José Flores, then there is a revolutionary tour towards Marxism but with military influence, then there will be a republican crisis coupled with the seizure of Gabriel García Moreno and its influence in its continuation and then there will be a post Garciana era, then the restoration will be presented and then there will be a progressive era initiated by de facto power military. Later, there will be the liberal revolution that will begin with a military coup that will be reissued in the Julian Revolution with a small variant, since it will be members of civil society who will take de facto power giving way to a post-Julian period, which will end with a new civil takeover through the Ecuadorian Democratic Alliance.

From there the Velasquista era (José María Velasco Ibarra) will be presented, which will end with the military dictatorship from 1963 to 1969, which will continue with a constitutionalist period, to fall into a new dictatorship from 1972 to 1979, the apparent military control will end.

In that same sense, the constitutional norm will play a fundamental role in history since this will allow the president to impose the state of siege, this can be observed in the constitutions of: Riobamba, September 23, 1830 in which his Article 35-5 confers the possibility of taking on its own, not having the Congress met, the necessary measures, to defend and save the country, in the face of internal commotion with the consent of the Council of State (Congress of Ecuador, 1830); the previous measures are reissued and increased in the constitution of Ambato of August 13, 1835, because in its articles 63 to 68 it is empowered in case of internal commotion or war to increase the army, put taxes or make loans, restrict rights, change the capital or grant pardons, with the authorization of Congress or the Governing Council (Convention of Ecuador, 1835); the previous powers were reissued in the constitution of Quito, from April 1, 1843 in its articles 62 to 65 (National Convention of Ecuador, 1843); likewise, these powers are again observed in the constitution of Cuenca, of December 8, 1845 in its articles 73 to 75 (National Convention of Ecuador, 1845); these provisions will be seen again in the Quito Charter, dated February 27, 1851, in its articles 59 to 64 (National Convention of Ecuador, 1851); later, these provisions will be repeated in Carta Magna de Guayaquil, of September 6, 1852 in its articles 72 to 74 (National Assembly of Ecuador, 1852); later they will be found in the constitution of Quito, from April 10, 1861 in articles 71 to 72 (National Convention of Ecuador, 1861).

According to the previous exceptional powers that were envisaged in the previous constitutions, from the Letter of Quito, of August 11, 1869, they began to be referred to as powers of state of siege, and these had the same powers granted by the Letters previous only that will be made in articles 61 to 62 of the 1869 (National Convention of Ecuador, 1869), these provisions will be validated in the constitution of Ambato, of April 6, 1878 in its articles 80 to 81 complying with the characteristics of state of siege even though it is no longer called state of siege (National Assembly of Ecuador, 1878); again the constitution of Quito, of February 13, 1884, will replicate the exceptional powers in its articles 94 to 96 (National Assembly of Ecuador, 1884); then the Magna Carta of Quito will be approved, dated January 14, 1897, which

will keep intact the extraordinary powers in articles 98 to 100 (National Assembly of Ecuador, 1897); then the Constitutional Charter of Quito, dated December 22, 1906, will be promulgated, which will preserve the powers of the president in its articles 83 to 85 (National Assembly of Ecuador, 1906); later, a new constitution will be installed in Quito, on March 26, 1929, where the previous powers will be maintained in its articles 86 to 88 (National Assembly of Ecuador, 1929).

Along the same lines, the constitution of December 2, 1938 was finally not promulgated, because 2 months after its completion it was repealed, which is why it is only enunciated (Gómez, 2012); then the constitution of March 6, 1945 will be given, which will keep intact the exceptional powers in its articles 68 to 72 (National Constituent Assembly of Ecuador, 1945); this will be repeated in the constitution of Quito, of December 31, 1946 in articles 94 to 97 (National Assembly of Ecuador, 1946); in that same sense the powers of state of siege will be renewed in the Ecuadorian Magna Carta of May 25, 1967 in its articles 185 to 188 (National Constituent Assembly of Ecuador, 1967); she will be reissued in the powers in the constitution of Quito, from January 15, 1978 in articles 78 numerals n to o (Constituent Assembly of Ecuador, 1978); these powers will be reissued in the constitution of Riobamba, from June 5, 1998 in articles 180 to 182 although the name is changed to the state of emergency while retaining the same powers of the state of siege (National Constituent Assembly of Ecuador, 1998); and finally the constitution of Montecristi, of September 28, 2008 will maintain the same powers of state of siege under the name of states of exception in its articles 164 to 166 (Constituent Assembly of Ecuador, 2008).

## THE DICTATORSHIPS IN URUGUAY OR THE ORIENTAL REPUBLIC OF URUGUAY

The history of Uruguay is very particular since its independence begins late with respect to the continent. But under the central military influence initially of the United Provinces of the South or United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata (today Argentina) where it was called Eastern Province, later under the influence of the Brazilian Empire after the Luso-Brazilian or second invasion Portuguese invasion, called Cisplatina Province, to then regain its name of Eastern Province as a result of the battle of Ituzaingó to finally become an independent republic in 1828, henceforth its rulers have

been heavily influenced by the military and civil wars that they have ended up in de facto governments and the military civic union, having the following military within these examples: Nicolás Rodríguez Peña, Miguel Estanislao Soler, José Gervasio Artigas, Fernando Otorgués, Miguel Barreiro, Carlos Federico Lecor, Francisco de Paula Magessi Tavares de Carvalho, Juan Antonio Lavalleja, Joaquín Luis Miguel Suárez de Rondelo and Fernández, Luis Eduardo Pérez, José Rondeau, Juan Antonio Lavalleja, Fructuoso Rivera, Carlos Anaya, Manuel Oribe, Gabriel Antonio Pereira, Venancio Flores, Atanasio Cruz Aguirre, Lorenzo Batlle, Lorenzo Latorre, Máximo Benito Santos Barbosa, Máximo Tajés, Juan Bautista Idiarte Borda y Soumastre, Juan Campisteguy, Alfredo Baldomir, Oscar Diego Gestido Pose; In 1973 there was a coup d'état with the beginning of a military civic government with Juan María Bordaberry Arocena, Pedro Alberto Demicheli Lizaso, Aparicio Méndez Manfredini, Gregorio Conrado Álvarez and Armelino, and Rafael José Addiego Bruno, ruled during the period that goes from 1973 to 1985.

It can be concluded that the influence of the military in that country is not only entrenched, but that it directed the destinies of that nation to a large extent, which gave it a special composition and with a tendency to dictatorships through the coup d'état, the civil and military unions to maintain the government and the constant of repeating in power. The above added to the legal and constitutional conditions that allowed the president or who exercised power to have exceptional and expedited tools to maintain power by force, through the state of siege, although its characteristics do not appear with that name in its text they maintain said scheme (Esteva, 2002 and Flores, 2008), this can be seen in the magnificent letters such as: the constitution of 1830 in article 81 empowers the president to take security measures in cases of internal commotion allowing arrest to people, and obliges him to give notice to the General Assembly, but does not limit the scope of his decisions (General Assembly of Uruguay, 1830); the constitution of 1918 in its article 79-19 (General Assembly of Uruguay, 1919); this is repeated in the constitution of 1938 in its article 158-18 (Constituent Assembly of Uruguay, 1934); this is done again by the constitution of 1942 in its article 157-18 (General Assembly of Uruguay, 1942); the previous measures only change place and number within the constitution of 1993 and 1967 with its reforms going on to its article 158-18 (General Assembly of Uruguay, 1967).

## THE DICTATORSHIPS IN PARAGUAY

The Republic of Paraguay will have a complex historical start because it is born amid the pressures of the empire of Brazil and the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata. In addition to the initial perception of continuing to be part of the Spanish crown. This makes it possible to try to remain independent without achieving it, seeing itself committed to constant wars that will only allow self-government until after 1876 (Godoi, 1893) one of the peculiarities of its construction as a nation will also occur as the Latin American in the sense of a strong military pressure both inside and outside, to be evidenced in its military presidents as evidenced below: Bernardo Luis de Velasco and Huidobro, Juan Valeriano de Zevallos, Fulgencio Yegros and Franco de Torres, Manuel Antonio Ortiz, Triumvirate appointed by the Paraguayan military: Juan José Medina; José Gabriel Benítez and José Domingo Campos, Mariano Roque Alonso, Francisco Solano López Carrillo, then there is the new Triumvirate imposed by the Argentine and Brazilian military after the triple alliance war anointing Cirilo Antonio Rivarola, Carlos Loizaga Machaín in power, José Ponciano Díaz de Bedoya in 1869; Juan Bautista Richter and García del Barrio, Bernardino Caballero Melgarejo, Patricio Escobar Cáceres, Juan Gualberto González Berges, Juan Bautista Luis Egusquiza Isasi, Juan Antonio Escurra, Benigno Asunción Ferreira, Albino Jara Benegas (Halle & Breen Printers, 1886), by 1912 establishes a new trunvirate after a coup d'état with: Marcos Caballero Codas, Mario Uscher and Alfredo Aponte; Rafael de la Cruz Franco Ojeda, José Félix Estigarribia Insaurralde, Higinio Nicolás Morínigo Martínez, Raimundo Rolón Villasanti, Federico Chaves Careaga, Alfredo Stroessner Matiauda and Andrés Rodríguez Pedotti.

These influences will occur from the possibility of creating a monarchy with an initial essay of the French consulate model and then called perpetual dictator exercised for more than 24 years by José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia, then there will be a high political instability coupled with international pressures of Brazil and the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata (today Argentina) and the constant wars, including those of independence, the triple alliance, the Chaco War and the Paraguayan civil war, added to the military influence and finally the dictatorship in head of Alfredo Stroessner Matiauda for about 35 years, until he was overthrown again by the military.

But not only the historical political and social conditions will be the only ways to understand the dictatorship in Paraguay, they will also be appreciated in their constitutions in their constitutional provisions of 1870 in their articles 9, 72-22, 102-17, where the state of site, and the possibility of decreeing it by the congress or the president within its functions (National Constitutional Convention of Paraguay, 1870) the 1940 Constitution within its article 52 allows the state of siege in order to protect the constitution and institutions. It also gives the president authority to decree it and the possibility of arresting those who are considered suspects (Estigarribia, 1940); the constitution of 1967 on the other hand will do it in its articles 79, 181, 182 and 183 where the state of siege is defined as a means to defend the constitution and the authorities created in it, the executive (president) is authorized to decree it, define the freedoms that are cut, the dissolution of Congress, the power to create laws and call elections (National Constitutional Convention of Paraguay, 1967). Which will die but remain in the so-called State of Exception in the 1992 constitution in article 228 authorizes the executive to decree it for cases of war or internal commotion limiting it to 60 days and with the possibility of being revoked by the congress and with the requirement to be justified and informed of his actions to the Congress and the Supreme Court (National Constitutional Convention of Paraguay, 1992). In other words, the norms currently continue to allow the possibility of coup d'états or legal dictatorships.

## THE DICTATORSHIPS IN VENEZUELA

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has had a history strongly influenced by the military and constitutional, legal and de facto changes, not only to take power, but to produce dictatorships that have been both civil and military. This can be seen in the long list of military officers who achieved de facto presidency or through democratic means, such as: Juan Manuel de Escalona Arguinzones, Francisco José Rodríguez del Toro and Ibarra, Sebastián Francisco de Miranda and Rodríguez Espinoza, Simón José Antonio of the Holy Trinity Bolívar Palacios Ponte y Blanco, José Antonio Páez Herrera, Carlos Valentín José de la Soledad Antonio del Sacramento de Soublette and Jerez de Aristeguieta, José Tadeo Monagas Burgos, Antonio Leocadio Guzmán Águeda, José Gregorio Monagas Burgos, José Joaquín Herrera, José Tadeo Monagas Burgos, Julián Castro Contreras, José Antonio Páez Herrera, Juan Crisóstomo Falcón and Zavarce, Manuel Ezequiel Bruzual Veloz, José Ruperto Monagas Oriach, Antonio

José Ramón de La Trinidad and María Guzmán Blanco, Francisco de Paula Linares Alcántara, José Gregorio Valera, Joaquín Sinforiano de Jesús Crespo Torres, Hermogenes López, Ignacio Andrade Troconis, José Cipriano Castro Ruiz, Juan Vicente Gómez Chacón, José Eleazar López Contreras, Isaías Medina Angarita, Carlos Román Delgado Chalbau d Gómez, Marcos Evangelista Pérez Jiménez, Wolfgang Enrique Larrazábal Ugueto, and Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías.

This demonstrates the long-standing roots of the military in power, as well as their influence in maintaining the *statu quo* of military control, this can be found in the three periods of military regimes, coups, revolutions such as March, Blue, of April, Claims, Legalist, Restorative Liberal, of October and Bolivarian, in addition to the liberal, conservative, and autocratic hegemonies. The previous ones show the bids for power and the dictatorship as a mechanism to perpetuate themselves, added to the 25 constitutions that said country has had, being among others that of 1811, 1819, 1821, 1830, 1857, 1858, 1864, 1874, 1881, 1891, 1893, 1901, 1904, 1909, 1914, 1922, 1925, 1928, and 1931 were battle constitutions, which depended on the president or power group on duty that generally did so through the state of siege (Brewer-Carías, 2013); the constitution of 1936 considered necessary to enable the president for the restriction and suspension of rights in case of civil war or calamity (Congress of the United States of Venezuela, 1936); the constitution of 1947 placed the state of emergency at the head of the president internal and legislative the international in its article 162 and 198-18, but additionally empowered the president through article 76 so that the president could suspend or restrict civil guarantees (National Constituent Assembly of Venezuela, 1947); the Constitution of the Republic of Venezuela of 1953 contained it in its article 36 as a state of national emergency headed by the president (National Constituent Assembly of Venezuela, 1953); the constitution of 1961 contains in its article 190-6, the figure of the state of emergency that can be exercised by the president of the republic in case of emergency and restriction of rights, defining its scope in its article 240 to 244 (Congress of the Republic of Venezuela, 1961); finally the constitution of 1999 admits the state of exception and that is sheltered in article 236-7 where the president is empowered and 337 where the circumstances that may be of social, economic, political, natural or ecological order, and that according to Article 339 will have control of the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court (Brewer-Carías, 2013 and National Constituent Assembly of Venezuela, 2009).

## CONCLUSIONS

The dictatorships in Latin America have several explanations: from the political, cultural, economic, social and historical. From the historical-political and cultural it could be said that the answers are given in the longing that the Creoles had to exercise power, with the same prerogatives that they knew of their colonizers, because of feeling pure Spaniards but diminished by the metropolis, in addition of the rights granted to Creole classes from which they did not want to detach themselves, such as: inheritance rights over land, slaves, church, indigenous people or titles granted. That is why the main image of government is the monarchist, not only because of the concentration of power, but because of the prestige of the accrual. Added to the fact that the other model existing at the time was the Napoleonic, which was of military and dictatorial roots. Both forms of government concentrated power and annihilated difference or dissent. It is possible that there is the explanation of why initially prefer during the independence, the military with dictatorial powers and even the presidential powers are seen as a monarchy. This could explain dictatorships such as those of Simón José Antonio de la Santísima Trinidad Bolívar Palacios Ponte y Blanco, José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia, Bernardo O'Higgins Riquelme, Antonio José de Sucre Alcalá, José Joaquín Prieto Vial, Juan José Flores y Aramburu, or Carlos Federico Lecor, however, does not explain the other dictatorships.

Another possible explanation to the dictatorships from the political point of view, is in understanding the war as a political mechanism to take power, since the dictatorships that were born from the states of siege or the declaration of coup d'état, not only did it in reason to the existence of military forces capable of deposing the executive, but civilians were carried out under the connivance of the military forces or allowing their participation and, ultimately, as a mechanism to annul a political counterpart. But this does not end by explaining the coup d'états that did not have a partisan explanation or confrontation of opposing forces, left versus right type, without this meaning that the macartization or stigmatization of the political enemy has not been used, to defeat or annul it, an issue that has more explanation from the cultural.

However, it is also necessary to observe that from the economic point of view there are a series of plausible explanations, determined by Latin American historical conjunctures such as the era from 1970 to 1990, propitious moments for the military to take power in order to rescue you from

the increase in external debt. The fall in oil prices or the fall in the import substitution model. It is in any case corroborable that the dictatorships, have more accurate explanations in the fact that the military had a great influence on the construction of the nation, in the conformation of civil power, in the economic, political, cultural and social configuration, in the exercise of power itself, in the perpetuation of public order or security doctrines, perpetuated in the initially external and then internal fear. Finally added to the creation, imposition or perpetuation of norms, laws or constitutions that allowed them to concentrate power. Finally, the constitution of power was established over the constant and non-existent symbolic threat of the arrival of the left, communism or Marxism, as an imaginary enemy from which the fear was enough to prefer security and peace over those political ideologies.

It is inevitable to clarify that the dictatorship is not a palpable phenomenon, by the mere fact of configuring a long period of time in power, or by simply being military, or because it is carried out under the coup d'état. Those are those that in principle can best be identified, but dictatorships also occur when unique, hegemonic political groups are presented, or others are stigmatized, equally, when indefinite reelections and even reelection itself occur because democracies they do not require, nor need, heroes, leaders, martyrs or caudillos, because that would be to distrust the system itself. But it is necessary to rethink new questions such as: If today the large multinationals, banks, or medium-sized companies are able to control governments because they finance their campaigns, will it not be that these are the new dictators of modernity?

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