

teorema

Vol. XL/3, 2021, pp. 141-160

ISSN 0210-1602

[BIBLID 0210-1602 (2021) 40:3; pp. 141-160]

REVISTA DE LIBROS/BOOK REVIEW

The Philosophy of Rhythm: Aesthetics, Music, Poetics, by PETER CHEYNE, ANDY HAMILTON and MAX PADDISON (EDS.), OXFORD, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2019, pp. xx + 415.

It won't be an exaggeration to say that this volume is a philosophical landmark in the realm of aesthetics, and, arguably, a quite helpful tool for other related philosophical usages. As the editors remark in the introduction, it comes to light with the aim to correct the recent neglect of the study of *rhythm*, an otherwise substantive element of common life, arts and philosophical traditions since ancient times, from Plato to Bergson or Whitehead [p. 1]. Accordingly, the task has been wisely accomplished with an interdisciplinary spirit, and the contributions stem, besides philosophical aesthetics, from a varied number of fields: neuroscience, psychology, literary studies, ethnomusicology, art history or dance. After a historical introduction and a brief overview of the issue in the last decades, the book is organized thematically in five parts: 'Movement and Stasis', 'Emotion and Expression', 'Entrainment and the Social Dimension', 'Time and Experience: Subjective and Objective Rhythm' and 'Reading Rhythm'. In this review, however, instead of following the ordered line of the twenty-four contributions that occupy these parts and embarking on the excessive endeavour of discussing the really broad range of significant topics this work contains, I will be content to highlight, in a transversal way, just two general issues that the reader may find under different guises in many of its contributions. First, I will address the so-called *dynamic conception* of rhythm. Then, and in a more succinct way, I'll discuss some aspects of the relationships between time and rhythm.

I. THE DYNAMIC VIEW

Though it is familiarly true, as Salomé Jacob observes talking about music, that 'rhythm can be conceptually distinguished from other musical features, even if it cannot always be separated from these features in

our experience' [p. 293], we could also assert, the other way round, that as soon as one acknowledges the relatively unproblematic awareness of the widespread phenomenon, conceptual puzzles begin. What is rhythm? Where and when do we find it? How could we individuate it? 'What does rhythm do?' [Clayton, p. 196]. It seems that rhythm is everywhere, underlying many, if not all, processes we humans are able to perceive: biological, bodily or natural, cultural, mechanical, everyday processes. But its nature or constitution remains elusive. Peter Simons claims in his contribution on the ontology of rhythm that we shouldn't see rhythm as a *thing*, but rather as 'an attribute, property, character, quality of something, [a] group of sounds, a sequence of steps or, arguably, the peaks of a mountain chain [—being the object qualified by a rhythm] 'a structural trope or property instance', in Simons' nominalist and actualist account [p. 74]. Quite differently, for Christopher Hasty, an author that has paid a sustained attention to these matters for more than twenty years, rhythm should be a dynamic interplay between an event and human perception, 'not an already-formed order (of isochronous division, or of fixed pattern), but the ongoing shaping of events and their succession, (...) a valuing that involves emotional investment and choice (agency)' [p. 233; cf. also Tenzer, p. 204]. This is a formulation fairly attuned with what one of this book's editors, Andy Hamilton, qualifying the classical definition of rhythm Plato gives in the *Laws* [p. 2], has called the *dynamic conception* of rhythm. According to Hamilton's *humanistic* view, rhythm involves movement and depends on human perception: 'rhythm [would be] [a primitive] order within human bodily movement or movement-in-sound' [p. 7].

Though, admittedly, rhythm doesn't have to be compulsorily linked to music, it should be no wonder to anybody that a good deal of the relevant thinking about it has taken place within the fields of musicology and philosophy of music. In this light, Martin Clayton notes that 'since Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff's seminal *Generative Theory of Tonal Music* (1983) music has seen a decisive shift to explanations of rhythm in terms of the cognitive capacities of the human individuals who perceive it' [p. 184]. In addition to which we could draw up a rough genealogy of this line of thought through the work of psychologist Marie Riess Jones ('Attentional Rhythmicity in Human Perception', 1986), Christopher Hasty (*Meter as Rhythm*, 1997), Justin London (*Hearing in Time*, 2004) or Andy Hamilton ('Rhythm and Stasis', 2011), to name just a few relevant scholars and works [p. 184]. As *Skeptikus* (David Macarthur) says to *Dynamicus* (Hamilton) in the delightful dialogued chapter that opens the book: 'Like

you, I want to reject both an abstract, Platonic conception, and also the sub-personal standpoint of neurophilosophy. I want to insist, with you, that rhythm is essentially a felt person-level phenomenon' [p. 17]. (It has to be said, however, that, despite these friendly words, MacArthur objects to certain central aspects of Hamilton's picture). Indeed, this view also reflects the latest aesthetic turn towards the performative. And surely some of the most challenging ideas of this book could be linked with the recent and felicitous criticisms of *textualism* –that ideology brought about by the hypertrophy of the score in the Western art music tradition and the conversion of musical studies in a sort of textual studies in the last two centuries– made by Hasty, Nicholas Cook and other musicologists and philosophers of music [cf., for instance, Peters, pp. 122-3; or Tenzer on Hasty, p. 204]. While, of course, 'the editors have not imposed theoretical or interpretational prescriptions' to the contributors [p. 1], the truth is that, except Peter Cheyne's and Peter Simon's, twenty-two of the twenty-four papers of this volume sympathize in one way or another with the spirit of the dynamic view.

I.1. *Rhythm and meter. Rhythm and movement*

In order to properly outline this conception, it would be useful first to consider that, as John Halliday summarizes, there have been two main problems in the recent debates on philosophy of rhythm, namely, (1) the relationships between rhythm and meter, and (2) 'whether movement is essential to rhythm' [p. 393]. Regarding the first question, some authors defend that there is a clear difference between both entities – 'meter is the frame, rhythm the life that grows on it' [Roger Scruton quoted on p. 393], arguing, for instance, that there can be rhythm without meter, as in Gregorian chants or Arabic Taqsim, musical forms that do not have a regular beat, but are rhythmical nonetheless [p. 294]. In a different way, Hamilton holds that, 'though there is a distinction in kind, rhythm cannot be understood independently of meter' [in Halliday, p. 393]. And, similarly, for Matthew Nudds, although the metrical structure would be an abstraction, a structure that seems to be 'abstracted from what is perceived rather than directly perceived' [p. 44], rhythm isn't just a sort of grouping (a concrete, real phenomenon) set against meter. Rather, rhythm should be understood as an entity made up of both meter and grouping [pp. 43-4] –as, for instance, the arrangement of the poetic verbal material, framed within the harness of an iambic pentameter [see Hasty, Ch. 15 and Montgomery, Ch. 23]. Still, according to a third position, Hasty's, there's 'no distinction in kind, but rather, a matter of de-

gree; meter [being] a particular, even if rigid, expression of rhythm' [Halliday, p. 394]. Close to this view, and drawing on Husserl's phenomenology, Salomé Jacob maintains that '[m]eter is also experienced and, as such, needs to be included in the study of rhythm as lived. [It is a mistake] (...) to consider that meter is an unfelt, objective division in the score (...). [B]eat induction does provide a feeling of the beat' [p. 294]. And, in the same direction, Jenny Judge claims that meter is not just the abstract frame in which rhythm occurs, but an object of human perception as well. It might be an abstraction –but with 'a phenomenal counterpart: the beat' [p. 79; see also London, Ch. 11].

Concerning the second question, which is a modality of the old, vexed problem of movement in music, we could distinguish –again, with Halliday– three main positions: '(1) movement is an inessential, eliminable feature of experiencing rhythm' [Malcolm Budd]; (2) movement is essential, but metaphorical, being movement a phenomenological property, not physical [Scruton]; and (3) movement is essential, not metaphorical [Hamilton] [pp. 394 and 21-6]. One of the chief concerns of some of the endorsers of the dynamic view is to argue convincingly in favour of the existence of non–metaphorical movement in rhythm. Hamilton states firstly that this order of movement is not metaphorical but literal, 'an order imaginatively projected onto processes that do not literally possess it' [p. 18]. That is, an order within a literal but non–spatial movement [pp. 16, 21.], a notion that Hamilton qualifies in the course of the first chapter dialogue [p. 31]. And *Metaphysicus* (Matthew Tugby) –under the sceptical eye of Macarthur– has this movement to take place in a quality, non-geographical space [p. 24]. Undoubtedly, two attractive theses that deserve further development [see pp. 21-6]. Nudds also argues in favour of literal movement as a constitutive feature of rhythm: '[t]he movement we hear in music can be literal movement (...). That our experience has this kind of content doesn't rule out its being related to movement in other ways, for example by having metaphorical content concerning movement. Indeed, it might have metaphorical content partly in virtue of having content concerning literal movement' [p. 59]. And Jenny Judge shows compellingly how the origins of the beat –admittedly, not rhythm considered as a whole, but a common element of it– are not just auditory, but tactile and vestibular as well:

Beat experience is not exhausted by auditory experience; it also involves [...] vestibular and tactile experience, both of which give rise to the movement–involving perceptual content. This is true [...] whether or not

we are actively moving to the beat. Thus, our experience of movement in the ‘beat’ is justified by the perceptual experience itself; the seeming necessity of an appeal to metaphorical perception is thus undermined. [p. 89; cf. also pp. 79, 86, and Nudds, p. 44]

This appeal to tactile perception and the participation of the vestibular system points at perceptual cross-modality as another of the common assumptions of the defenders of the dynamic view [cf. London, pp. 173, 176]. An assumption closely related with the non-acousmatic conception of music, that is, the view that rejects music as a merely ‘unseen, auditory (...) art, focused on sounds without reference to the means of their creation’ [Hamilton, p. 31]. In fact, as Nudds put it, even our *sole* auditory perception is already non-acousmatic: ‘we should conceive of auditory perception as a perceptual system whose function is the perception of sound sources rather than sounds’ [p. 54].

Deniz Peters’ contribution takes an analogous orientation. Peters points out the problem of portraying rhythm as an abstraction or a ‘frozen gestalt (...) deprived of its (...) tactile, and temporal feel’ [p. 111] and, following Hamilton’s ‘Rhythm and Stasis’, claims that ‘rhythm resides in doings and happenings, in our bodies and between each other. (...) [It] is an experiential phenomenon that is manifested when we *attend* to sound, movement, and action felt or seen, or to other perceptions’ [pp. 110-1]. This humanistic, experiential stance explains why it could be problematic for the defender of the dynamic thesis to speak of ‘geological rhythms’ or of the rhythmical structure of things like *ASLSP*, the famous work by John Cage that spans through a huge lapse of time and is made up of musical items separated between them by years. If we admit that rhythm is inextricably associated to human perception, we will be forced to rule out these two cases from any real rhythmical experience, since we truly can conceive or even *cognize* their *rhythmical* structures, but not actually *perceive* them. Below and above certain beats per minute we humans would lose the necessary interconnection, the *perceived periodicity* between events in order to experience a group of successive items as an actual rhythm. As Justin London put it, ‘continuously sped-up rhythm becomes a pitch with a particular timbre, [while] if it is played too slowly, our sense of the (...) articulations forming a coherent temporal group is lost’ [pp. 173-4; p. 176]. According to London, since ‘our perception of rhythm is cross-modal (...), and ‘what is (...) a rhythm is mind-dependent (...), rhythm perception and action would be one of the best examples of embodied cognition’ [pp. 173-5].

I.2. *Entrainment and the social origin of rhythm*

But if rhythm, as perhaps Schelling already envisaged as early as 1802 [p. 3], is something that we construct, at least partially, that is, if it's not a natural kind, or a wholly natural entity, it would be important to ponder to what extent we are entitled to talk about it as a social phenomenon. Certainly, rhythm isn't just a bodily business [see Judge, Ch. 4, Bresnahan, Ch. 5, or Peters, p. 112], but an interpersonal and social one as well [Peters, p. 116]. In this sense, *entrainment* is a capital concept to understand rhythm. Following the seminal research of the psychologists Edward Large and Mari Riess Jones, focused 'on the entrainment between brain processes and music, more specifically between neural oscillators (...) and the periodicity in the music' [pp. 294–5], Salomé Jacob affirms that '[e]ntrainment happens when two or more autonomous rhythms interact, e.g., the human circadian rhythm entraining to the twenty–four–hour cycle of light and dark (...) [or] when musicians play together in time.' [p. 294]. And Hamilton defines it as 'the tendency of a subject to align her movement to an external auditory pulse (...) [,] two rhythmic processes adjusting towards and eventually 'locking in' to a common phase or periodicity' [pp. 32-3; cf. also Clayton, p. 184 and Gracyk, p. 160]. But it's clear, then, that entrainment is not actually a property of *a* rhythm, but a relationship between at least two rhythms. If we endorse this humanistic account of rhythm, it seems that even the most elementary rhythm (or should we say, 'any rhythmical experience', or 'the experience of a rhythm?') has to be always a kind of *counterpoint*, a contrast of two simultaneous *lines*. There could never be a *sole* rhythm, as it were, since a rhythm becomes a rhythm only when perceived by another (subject's) rhythm [cf. also Jacob, p. 298]. If rhythm implies at least two series of ordered elements, we might talk, in a decisive sense—that Max Paddison discusses in Ch. 17 on rhythm and time—, of a sort of *original simultaneity* here, as long as *the beginning* is already a relationship.

Be that as it may, it is by virtue of entrainment, according to Justin London, that we *rhythmicize* subjectively, that is, we choose groupings and fill in missing beats, beats that we don't actually hear, being these listener's constructions legitimate parts of the music as well [p. 180; cf. also Paddison, 286 and Jacob, 295]. The 'perception of rhythm (...), [writes London,] reminds us that the perceptual process is not a linear chain of information from the external world to the mind, but an active interplay between mind and world' [p. 181]. Furthermore, our natural capacity of entrainment seems to be, says Ted Gracyk, significantly related to our capacity 'to recognize the emotional states of others by feeling them our-

selves –by *physically mimicking or imaginatively simulating* their *bodily actions* (...), [an] imaginative simulation (...) [that] prompts simulated emotional response’ [p. 164]. In a similar way, ‘[e]ntrainment [would be] a catalyst for emotional contagion’ [p. 165]. Interestingly, Gracyk gets here somewhat close to Aristotle’s account of ‘rhythm as a medium for mimesis’ [p. 2], though he doesn’t mention this resemblance.

Certainly, these considerations on entrainment open the door for an investigation of the possible social origins of rhythm. Though, as early as 1939, the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs already presumed that ‘[r]hythm is the product of social life’ [p. 183], Martin Clayton argues that the origins of rhythm are actually both social and natural or physiological [p. 184]. Beyond what he sees as the dominant view in musical cognition and musical theory (working solely at the level of individual’s internal rhythms and brainwaves), Clayton endorses a socially oriented view in which the interaction of two or more individuals is a pivotal issue [pp. 186-7]. Nevertheless, we shouldn’t rule out the human body as an origin as well –our respiration, heartbeat, locomotion, circadian and menstrual cycles, etc:

Musical rhythm is possible only thanks to inherently rhythmical, endogenous biological processes taking place in each individual human’s body. These processes are oscillatory and tend to produce quasi-periodic patterns in action and perception. Such rhythmical processes are, however, characteristic not of *Homo Sapiens* per se, but of life in general (...). What distinguishes *Homo Sapiens* is, rather, a flexible capacity to coordinate individual internal rhythms between members of a group. It is due to this capacity that rhythmical structures emerge in the course of entrainment between the endogenous rhythms of individuals [p. 184].

It seems that, somehow, on the one hand, rhythm has a social (and natural) origin, and, on the other hand, rhythm itself is a relevant tool in the creation of social structures as well. To this effect, and as an answer to the question previously posed: *What does rhythm do?* Clayton states that the ‘shared temporal flow’ among different individuals derived from rhythmical entrainment generates *entitativity*, that is to say, ‘feelings of belonging to a group (...), social bonding’ [p. 194; cf. also Stone, p. 154].

1.3. *Confronting the Dynamic View*

So far, a summary account of some of the central features of the dynamic view of rhythm. Not so much an account of Hamilton’s original formulation, strictly speaking, but rather an account of how those features are collected and applied by most of the contributors to this volume, a

group in which we are including –somewhat anachronistically– Hamilton’s predecessors, such as London or Hasty. Against this view, Peter Cheyne’s important contribution [Ch. 16] defends an objective –*encoded*– conception of rhythm over what he calls the *embodied* rhythm.

However, it is difficult to grasp the thrust of his main thesis, as long as we are clearly told by the author himself that an ‘encoded rhythm (e.g. scores)’ [p. 255] is not properly a rhythm but a description of a rhythm [pp. 256-7]. Cheyne celebrates ‘the ability of conventional description to preserve the essentials of rhythm—involving artworks, most notably, their flow, albeit in an encoded way’ [pp. 256-7]. Though, what would be an *encoded flow* but a description or representation of a real flow? However great the representative capacity of the encoded *real* phenomenon may be, a score cannot be anything more than the representation of the phenomenon, not the phenomenon. In Ch. 15, Hasty replies to Cheyne that the allegedly objective rhythm, which in fact is a description of rhythm, ‘occasionally overvalues itself to the point of denigrating (...) the temporal or performative [rhythm] (...), dismissed as mere performance, merely subjective.’ [p. 235]. For Hasty, this is not to deny the need of suitable devices to symbolize rhythm. ‘Positing [the rhythm performed] as primary does not (...) demote such discursive (...) activities but acknowledges the primacy of temporality and process. (...) [N]o (...) description can capture an intricacy that is always on the move’ [p. 235].

I agree with the spirit of Hasty’s words. Nevertheless, I think the proper response to Cheyne should be a different one. A rhythm and a description of a rhythm are incommensurable but complementary objects. Trying to couple both entities as if their differences were not of kind, but of degree, is a move hard to accept. That is, the question is not that *a description cannot capture an intricacy of something that is always on the move*, as Hasty argues. Even though a description could capture all that intricacy, it would keep on being a description. Perhaps, here we should return to Clayton’s question, *‘What does rhythm do?’*, just to confirm that our answer to it –whatever it may be– hardly could also be suitable for the question *‘What does encoded rhythm do?’*. To call attention on the primacy of the real phenomenon over its description doesn’t imply to undermine the value of the texts, but it does entail indeed to tackle their conversion into sacred scriptures, that is to say, the peculiar but common practice of considering the symbol more valuable than the symbolized object. Cheyne says that he’s ‘defending the sense of rhythm as a representable objective pattern’ [p. 265]. But the point is that no friend of what he calls *embodied rhythm* would deny that rhythm can be objectively representable.

Though a musical rhythm can be objectively representable, the result of the act of representation won't be a musical rhythm, but an objective representation of it. At best, it will be a second rhythm, a graphic one (but arguably *durational* as well?), in case we admit the existence of rhythm in the graphic arts – a really exciting issue, by the way, discussed in the book by Jason Gaiger [Ch. 19] and Víctor Durà-Vilà [Ch. 20] – and sadly beyond the scope of this review.

II. TIME AND RHYTHM

If the dynamic view is well guided, with its humanistic, perceptual, bodily and social features, time awareness should be a capital issue concerning rhythm, as several authors in this volume try to show. Max Paddison writes that 'the concept of rhythm needs to be understood in the context of its relation to time and subjectivity' [p. 272]. In this sense, Michael Tenzer declares that the '*advancing now*' of McTaggart's A-series would be the proper time for the dynamic view of rhythm, and not the B-series, with its frozen spatial canvas [p. 204]. And Udo Will, in a neuro-psychological approach, remarks that detecting the regularities of the structured changes that conform our temporal experience 'enables [us] to adapt to a changing environment. As constructs, time and rhythm are shaped by physiological and psychological processes, and socio-cultural concepts' [p. 216]. According to Will, rhythm involves a specific cognitive process, 'a *direct experience* [...] that covers a range from sub-seconds to a few minutes, [and should be distinguished] from *remembrance of time*, (...) that concerns temporal phenomena beyond the minute range' [p. 216]. And, provided that 'our perception of duration is influenced by our movements' [p. 218], our perception [of rhythm] couldn't be 'a passive act: 'you live through an event by coupling with it'', adds Will quoting Alva Nöe [p. 217]. Similarly, Hasty defends that 'rhythm implies performance' –not only because rhythm requires the *assistance* of human perception to exist, but also because, strictly speaking, there can be no rhythm –as there cannot be sound– at a mere instant [p. 233-4]. Drawing from process metaphysics, Hasty stands, as we've seen, against the conception of rhythm as 'substance, stasis [or] timeless transcendence, [and in favour of] 'a process–thought perspective: process as activity, ongoingness, emergence (...)' [p. 234].

In a concordant spirit, Paddison argues cogently that rhythm should be a crucial element of a sound conception of duration, and, therefore, of our notion of time. Paddison draws on Bergson's notion of experience of duration as *temps durée* –a continuity, a flux of experience

grasped by intuition— against a *temps espace* —the measured, clock time of rationality—. This *temps durée* is characterized by a simultaneity and multiplicity of different durations [pp. 275-6], or, in other words, it's an experience where 'different—or (...) diversely rhythmicized— durations may coexist' [Bergson quoted in p. 276]. That way, since this '*simultaneity* would be precisely the possibility for two or more events to enter into a single instantaneous perception', we might well talk of duration as a constitutively rhythmic phenomenon. [p. 276]. To get support for this *contrapuntal* view of rhythm and this rhythmical view of time, Paddison quotes Gaston Bachelard: 'It is rhythm, not melody (...) that can provide the real metaphors of a dialectical metaphysics of duration' [p. 278]. However, for Bachelard time is a construct, while the Bergsonian notions of duration and continuity are ultimately fictions. We don't experience real duration, but the illusion of it [p. 286]. At this point, Paddison meets one of the main traits of the abovementioned concept of *entrainment* —and a requirement of the *dynamic view* as well— when he states that this illusory continuity, 'likely to break down at any moment, (...) [is] sustained only by our consciousness and our active attention through the process of making connections, through perceiving recurrences' [p. 286; cf. also London, pp. 180-1 and Jacob, p. 295]. To sum up, on the one hand, in temporal and rhythmical matters 'we have to make what we find', as Nelson Goodman said. And, on the other hand, it seems that time —our experience of time— is constitutively rhythmical. Or, conversely, it seems that rhythm —and its *original* durational simultaneity— is a central parameter of time.

(One short parenthesis. Paddison writes that the 'possibility of expanding our experience of increasing [rhythmical] complexity can also be seen to have gone hand-in-hand historically with the development of technologies of writing, notation, score, and in due course electronic and digital modes of production and reproduction' [p. 281]. Though probably Paddison is not misguided in general terms, I would like to introduce here a minor, probably dispensable qualification. This claim may be true regarding Western art music and what Paddison calls 'large-scale [artistic] forms', but certainly not of other non-Western musical practices, that have not needed a similar technological progress to exhibit from ancient times a high rhythmical complexity —even within large forms. And, in any case, this is not true either in the case of Western poetry. In twenty centuries of Western written poetry, probably there have not been such complex rhythmic arrangements as, for instance, the Alcaic metric pattern, born in the Greek 6th century BC, but successfully revived five

centuries later by Horace's *Carmina*, in the 1st century BC, and imitated in modern times by poets like Carducci, Hölderlin or Tennyson.)

In her substantial contribution [Ch. 18], close both to Paddison's path and to the dynamic view, Salomé Jacob addresses Husserl's phenomenology of time to show how it 'strongly enables to connect the experiences of musical rhythm and the listener's bodily movements (...)' [p. 292]. According to the German philosopher, *the living present*—any current moment of experience—has three simultaneous phases: *retention* (of the just past), *the primal-impression* (the now-point) and *protention* (short-term anticipation) [pp. 296-7]. Rhythm cannot dispense with any of the three. That is, there might not be rhythm where the agent cannot predict or anticipate the next item or event by drawing on what she has just perceived [p. 294]. And precisely by means of what Husserl calls *protentional continuity* or *directness-ahead*, the just past is projected into what is about to come [pp. 297-8]. That way, says Jacob, 'Husserl's theory sheds light on the interaction between short-term memory and short-term anticipation' [p. 299]. Of the three phases of memory that Husserl distinguishes (*echoic memory*, that usually fades away in less than a second, *short-term memory*, that has a range of 3-5 seconds, and *long-term memory*, which operates beyond these 3-5 seconds), it would be the short-term memory, connected both to the present moment and the immediate past alike, and commonly accessible to our conscious awareness, that permits us to perceive rhythm [pp. 300-1; cf. also London, pp. 173-6].

On the other hand, in Husserl's conception of time-consciousness it is always at stake the experience as a—most often implicit—awareness of something. An experience that has a double intentionality. When listening to music, for instance, one is aware of the music itself, and also of one's current experience of that music. That is, any experience is actually made up of two *simultaneous* experiences, of the object and of oneself [p. 298]. And this second intentionality corresponds with 'a sense of self (...) not explicitly posited as an I' [p. 302], a self-awareness usually marked by kinesthesia, a sort of body agency 'freely executed (foot tapping, jumping (...))' [p. 302]. The point here is that, provided that our bodily movements are not a dispensable component of this picture, 'the temporal structure of (...) [those movements] interacts with the temporal structure of the music (in this case the beat)' in order to assemble a full-fledged rhythmic experience [p. 302]. As a consequence, and in accordance with the dynamic view, rhythm 'cannot be reduced to the temporal matters in the music [or any other perceived process, object or event, we might add]; one needs to include—concludes Jacob—the tem-

porality on the side of the subject in order to provide an adequate phenomenology of rhythm' [p. 304].

Admittedly, the dynamic view will have to set forth more elaborate responses to certain issues. Can we properly talk of a geological rhythm, although it's out of reach of human perception? How should we understand that non–metaphorical (literal or non–literal) space that hosts rhythm's movement? And how should we understand this problematic *order of movement*? [see *supra*, pp. 5–6]. In addition, perhaps the volume would have benefitted from a larger number of contributions endorsing views akin to Simons' and Cheyne's solitary defences (along with Macarthur's part in the first chapter dialogue) of abstract, static or *encoded* conceptions of rhythm –if only for the sake of contrast. But these minor remarks shouldn't cloud by any means the undeniable value of the book and its usefulness concerning current debates in aesthetics, ethnomusicology, philosophy of mind or philosophy of perception. In this review, I've tried to outline what I see as the most discussed, rich and controversial idea of *The Philosophy of Rhythm*, namely, the dynamic conception of rhythm. Then I've dealt as well, albeit more briefly, with the substantial relationships between time and rhythm as addressed by several contributors to this work. Both the philosopher and the general reader interested in a phenomenon of such a broad scope or jurisdiction as rhythm will find in this book a highly commendable collection of articles on the subject from a varied array of disciplines. I've chosen two of the most relevant topics debated through its pages, though, this goes without saying, many other appealing considerations and insights are contained in this fertile, stimulating volume.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to Xavier de Donato for his valuable guidance.

PABLO SEOANE RODRÍGUEZ
Department of Philosophy and Anthropology,
Universidade de Santiago de Compostela,
Praza de Mazarelos s/n,
15782 Santiago de Compostela
E-mail: pablo.seane.rodriguez@rai.usc.es