Deconstructing the Frenemy in International Relations

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ABSTRACT: *To say plainly that frenemyship or frenmity represent the theoretical and practical foundations of the present work may sound overly eccentric and ambitious. And yet, we feel the necessity for lenses other than the dichotomous ontology of friendship vs. enmity. Instead, we propose an ontology without ontology to capture the moment of radical undecidability which accounts for the haunting histories of counterfactual thinking and the immanent reversibility of dominant signifiers and the meanings annexed. Terrorism and mass surveillance further practically illustrate the striking similarity between apparent opposites, turning the us vs. them paradigm into the febrility of all the subjectivities involved.*

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ABSTRACT: *Affermare che la frenemyship o la frenmity rappresentino i fondamenti teorici e pratici di questo lavoro, potrà sembrare eccessivamente eccentrico e ambizioso. Eppure, sentiamo la necessità di utilizzare chiavi di lettura diverse dalla ontologia dicotomica di amicizia vs. inimicizia. Piuttosto, proponiamo un'ontologia senza ontologia per catturare il momento di indecidibilità radicale che spiega le storie ossessionanti del pensiero controfattuale e l'immanente reversibilità dei significanti dominanti e dei significati ad essa connessi. Il terrorismo e la sorveglianza di massa, inoltre, illustrano in pratica la sorprendente somiglianza tra opposti apparenti, trasformando il paradigma noi contro loro nella febbrilità di tutte le soggettività coinvolte.*

1. Introduction

Who or what is deconstructing the frenemy in international relations? Who or what is deconstructing the frenemy in international relations once both "frenemy" and "international (relations)" sound as deconstruction itself at work? Two portmanteaus, one in the form of a noun, the other disguised as an adjective, threatening with a third, the portmanteau of "portmanteau", a portmanteau of its very self. Once such a synthesis is reached, in "frenemy", "international", in or through a (")portmanteau("), difficult becomes to say whether it is their force or fragility which dominates the scene. At the end of the day, there may not even be a clear-cut response: the force of the synthesis lies in the word's fragility and its fragility in that same word's force. The most descriptive, yet also vague, it is precisely in a hybridly undecidable position.

At this point, the suitcase of linguistic baggage of portmanteaus could be sidelined, as long as baggage ever lets itself be as simply counted and recounted. For, however hard one tries, there remains the impression that we are altogether outplayed by a certain possibility of im-possibility,

driving and pushing forward the most improbable meanings and understandings. Every portmanteau, every apparently self-explanatory yet necessarily non-independent word, carries such a present or peril and this could no more come as a surprise for "frenemy", "frenmity", "frenemyship", "international". These are words which first and foremost or most obviously of all speak to themselves, testifying to our inability to *fully* grasp the so-called extralinguistic realities all while challenging the imprecision of much more frequently used signifiers, such as "friend", "enemy", "friendship", "enmity"...

What then makes for the possibility of this (originary) concordia discors or discordia concors of the non-self-coinciding sameness? What then does not let us talk about friendship *and then* enmity or the other way around without the bad news that this act is always-already anticipated by their juncture as a coat of primer before any other coat? For, any such alternation, as in *and then*, works only if immanent to it is the underground possibility of alteration, hence impure identity of the self. Accordingly, we can not deploy the difference between friendship and enmity without *ipso facto* affirming the work of difference subsuming both rather than featuring as sterilised interplay in between.

This is why the present work has no resolutive ambition in regard to friendship and enmity, but is intended to grapple and manage the fundamental insecurity of its own postulates. As it would be more superficial and perhaps even redundant to state as simply the bilateral, trilateral or any other condition of friendship *or* enmity, both synchronically and diachronically, here, friendship and enmity are no states, but unending and hence parricidal process(es). As such, friendship and enmity intermingle in a constant flux, while being separated only by a undulating pecked line, which is too flimsy to keep the two separate and too rigid to make them coincide. Hence, rather than looking for a condition of friendship or enmity, we look for the condition of im-possibility of neither/nor and both/and, the endless (un)making of frenemyship/frenmity, according to a Derridean ontology without ontology[1]. In the words of Arfi: «[w]e thus need [...] a sort of ontological without the 'essence' of ontology»[2]. Otherwise, we accept the necessity of an underpinning theoretical ground, but reject its oft-consequential identification with positive assumptions, which part from granted realities. Neither friendship, nor enmity and both friendship and enmity, such is the theoretical and practical purpose of this article, where the

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[1] See for instance DERRIDA, Jacques, *On the Name*, Stanford (CA), Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics, 1995, pp. 89-127. Not to be confused, we are not refering here to the concept of ontology as studied in international relations discipline, often limited to assigning meaning to artificial binomial distinctions such as agency and structure or material and ideational. For that strand of literature look at WENDT, Alexander, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999; WIGHT, Colin, *Agents, Structures and International Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006; REUS-SMIT, Christian, «Beyond Metatheory?», in *European Journal of International Relations*, 19, 3/2013, pp. 405-425.
[2] ARFI, Badredine, «*Khôra* as the condition of possibility of the ontological *without* ontology», in *Review of International Studies*, 38, 1/2012, pp. 191-207, p. 192.

neither/nor and both/and stand for precisely the incomplete, hence *in-process* entities, as well as the *irreducible* borderlines in between, the accent again being on irreducibility rather than any supposedly fixable entity of borderline.

Accordingly, the present work can hereafter be conceived of as a chronological staging of not the states of friendship and enmity, but of an eternal process of becoming the one or the other, being meanwhile both the one and the other. Becoming, not yet being, and being precisely as two sides of the same coin. To this end, we proceed in two ways: first, the theoretical assumptions of the work are further broken down with a view to showing why it is of little if any analytical usefulness to use categorical classifications. This is then illustrated through the uncanny and privileged example of *state* friendship and enmity, roughly covering the origins and early discipline of international relations. The conclusion of the section eventually becomes that much geopsychoanalysis of frenmity in international politics is potentially overlooked through the squared lenses of circled categories. Second, further practical illustration follows, signalling the growing importance of friendship and enmity, here much more transparently blurred as frenemyship/frenmity. A dedicated section hence stages a miniature post-Cold War case study useful for the description of a global state of plague in which no one and everyone is neither a friend nor enemy and both a friend and enemy. The case study presented in this paper is of limited methodological value and we acknowledge that achieving validity would require much broader and refined explications. However, the ultimate aim of the case is to illustrate the theory, simultaneously testing it on the typical example. Bearing in mind an interpretivist approach to the ecclectic theorization, the case is a natural continuation of abstraction by other means.

2. The Unbearable Lightness of Enmity

«"Friends, there are no friends!" the dying wise man shouted.

"Enemies, there is no enemy!" shout I, the living fool»[3]

The opening quote of this section contains one striking similarity and one staggering difference. First, «friends» and «enemies» simply exchange places, instantly questioning the usefulness of the two categories as separate and self-referential. Second, the difference lies in the wisdom of the utterer, supposedly in reference to the age and longer exposition to the repetitiveness of the everyday. In sum, the paradox of identity is there, now and then, as the condition of the encounter with otherness eternally recurs, shaking the otherwise clear-cut relationships.

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[3] NIETZSCHE, Friedrich Wilhelm, *Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits*, Lincoln (NE), University of Nebraska Press, 1986, p. 194.

In the theory of international politics, an analogous condition arguably bears the name of "security dilemma", hypothesising a self-help situation in which actors, primarily and mainly states, look after their own security in the absence of a world government, yet in so doing unchain vicious circles of doubt and escalation[4]. Here no less, at issue are both the hybridity of identities (can I consider myself a friend without the other taking advantage or can I rather afford a continuously inimical stance?) and arguably the doom of iterability. Be that as it may, vast is today the literature pointing out the possibility of cooperation under such a condition of primordial uncertainty if only attention were paid to mutual payoffs, the clarity of defensive/offensive postures[5], the particularly greedy states[6], rather than actors and structures other than states, such as institutions[7] or identities[8]. In game theory as well, preferences and outcomes were found to change depending on the fact whether the situation is singular and experimental rather than regular and repetitive. One-shot setting favours mistrust; in the latter case, the tit-for-tat strategy starts by avoiding unnecessary conflict, responds in kind to any hostile behaviour, is forgiving thereafter and ultimately conveys great overall clarity of conduct.[9] In sum, a feedback loop between identities and longer patterns of exposure tend to defuse the incentive to deceive the counterpart and lead to predominantly cooperative relationship. The same goes for the opening quote: from the other to the brother may be a witty way of putting it, capturing as well the "fraternal" and non-sororal cementation of a lasting friendship[10].

While instructive, we claim that this famous dilemma, and later, game lying at the basis of the whole study of international politics contains a triple lacuna: first, analogous zoomed or isolated

[4] HERZ, John H, «Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma», in *World Politics*, 2, 2/1950, pp. 157-180. Herz is credited with coining the term. In roughly the same years, Butterfield referred to an "absolute predicament or irreducible dilemma" as underlying virtually the whole of historical plights. See BUTTERFIELD, Herbert, *History and Human Relations*, London, Collins, 1951, pp. 19-20; BUTTERFIELD, Herbert, *Christianity and History*, London, G. Bell and Sons, 1949.

[5] JERVIS, Robert, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton (NJ), Prineton University Press, 1976; JERVIS, Robert, «Cooperation under the Security Dilemma», in *World Politics*, 30, 2/1978, pp. 167-214.

[6] GLASER, Charles L, «Security Dilemma Revisited», in *World Politics*, 50, 1/1997, pp. 171-201.

[7] DEUTSCH, Karl W, et al, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton (NJ), Princeton University Press, 1957; DOYLE, Michael W., «Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs», in *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12, 3-4/1983, pp. 205-235; KEOHANE, Robert O, NYE, Joseph, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Boston (Ma), Little Brown, 1977; KEOHANE, Robert O, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton (NJ), Princeton University Press; LIPSON, Charles, *Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2003; WEINBERGER, Seth, «Institutional Signaling and the Origin of the Cold War», in *Security Studies*, 12, 4/2003, pp. 80-115.

[8] WENDT, Alexander, «Anarchy is What States Make of It», in *International Organization*, 46, 2/1992, pp. 391-425; ADLER, Emanuel, BARNETT, Michael, *Security Communities*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

[9] AXELROD, Robert, HAMILTON, William D, «The Evolution of Cooperation», in *Science*, 211, 4489, 1981, pp. 1390-1396; AXELROD, Robert, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, New York (NY), Basic Books, 1984. See also: KEOHANE, *After Hegemony*, cit, pp. 65-85.

[10] DERRIDA, Jacques, *The Politics of Friendship*, London - New York (NY), Verso, 2005.

encounters are rarely and barely ever possible in the so-called real-world and real-time scenarios. Second, the situation described cannot be reduced to a matter of *either* cooperative *or* defective behaviour, that is *either* friendship *or* enmity, hence focusing on the strategies of maximisation of one's own security while ignoring *in toto* the defining insecurity of the decision-making moment. The very same moment which defines the decision-maker as either a dying wise man attentively loyal to his acquaintances or a living fool constructively addressing his enemies. As the irony goes, pursuing security is only valid as relative and insofar as a dialectical reproduction of in/security. Third and final, the dilemma utterly ignores the role of identity, and not as much as a dependent or intervening variable, but rather (in)dependent, persistently informing and being informed in the process, all while also haunted by its irreducible bipolarity. Otherwise said, there is no way to label action as simply as (un)friendly, as the trigger is primarily the doubt, the febrility of identity, rather than a depoliticised ideal of objective manoeuvring.

It shall come as no surprise then that ensuing contributions reflect the same conceptual issues of a constitutive and emanating dilemma. For instance, Delori and Ware classify three types of scholarly contributions to the topic of enmity in particular, supposed to be the departure point of the dilemma:

- a first class for which othering and violence are directly proportional, as in the more othering, the more violence;

- an opposite one where sympathy rather than aversity entails violence;

- finally, a third group, devoiding the inimical relationship of any affectional charge, whereby mere co-existence is sufficient for violent episodes[11].

Taken collectively, all these contributions share a categorical ontology taking enmity (and friendship) as either given or socially constructed, as is the case with a lot of other scholarly literature which could easily be attributed to one of the classes. For instance, Kupchan sees enmity as a misplaced focus on the regime type rather than the quality of statecraft. The so-called democracies and non-democracies are no enemies by means of mere regime difference since mutual accommodation is possible if statecraft is solid[12]. Further, Jackson's study of post-WWII metamorphosis of Germany from a foe into a friend of the Western bloc is at least two steps into the same logic: there are friends and enemies and where there are enemies, their civilisation is possible, their affective status *vis-à-vis* the beholder being ultimately socially constructed[13]. On the same note, Wheeler takes inspiration from speech act theory, whereby speaking becomes doing,

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[11] DELORI, Mathias, WARE, Vron, «The faces of enmity in international relations. An introduction», in *Critical Military Studies*, 5, 4/2019, pp. 299-303.

[12] KUPCHAN, Charles A, *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace*, Princeton (NJ), Princeton University Press, 2010.

[13] JACKSON, Patrick Thaddeus, *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West*, Ann Arbor (MI), University of Michigan Press, 2006.

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and proceeds to describe enmity as a function of the interpersonal relationship between the heads of state or government[14]. Finally, other contributions still part from the purity of ontological categorisation and only divide between those taking enmity as given[15] and those believing it to be socially constructed[16].

Our approach is different, a third way, as it were, in the incessant production of alternatives. Namely, here it is not an issue of binary opposition, be binary opposites ontologically given rather than socially constructed, but a question of, at best, binary juxtaposition. As though binary opposites intimately *eo ipso* anticipated and justified the work of radical difference, we intend to defuse the notion of enmity as a privatised posture and postulate it as a public relation which cannot always be deliberately managed and whose condition of possibility is precisely this (leaking) conjuncture. Friendship/enmity does not belong to a condition of duality and so on, it is the dual condition of belonging and being summoned by and condemned to a relation to irreducible otherness. This is why we find it analytically more useful to speak of frenemyship/frenmity, in a double move intended, first, not to reveal any suffixal leanings towards the trace of either friendship or enmity; and, second, to reclaim the freedom to choose and dwell upon nothing less than undecidability. The right not to choose, as it were.

Otherwise said, the problem of frenemyship/frenmity boils down to the problem of *declaration* since the latter always-already presupposes the affirmation of the other. An other whom I address is an other affirmed and recognised by the very gesture of address, however friendly or inimical the nature and tone of the address itself. It is this declaration without (formal) declaration, a *tacit declaration*, which underwrites the institution of declaration itself. For, «we are friends/enemies» works in any context whatsoever only through the underlying and undermining work of involuntary recognition, as though replicating the form of the opening quote, whereby friends or enemies are invoked in the same gesture which negates their existence. This is why friendship

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[14] WHEELER, Nicholas J, *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relations in International Conflict*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018.

[15] See for instance the "in/direct international relations" (i. e. the friend of my enemy, the enemy of my friend and so on) study of MAOZ, Zeev, TERRIS, Lesley G., KUPERMAN, Ranan D, TALMUD, Ilan, «What Is the Enemy of My Enemy? Causes and Consequences of Imbalanced International Relations, 1816-2001», in *Journal of Politics*, 69, 1/2007, pp. 100-115; PLÜMPER, Thomas, NEUMAYER, Eric, «The friend of my enemy is my enemy: international alliances and international terrorism», in *European journal of political research*, 49, 1/2010, pp. 75-96; CRAWFORD, Timothy W, «Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics», in *International Security*, 35, 4/2011, pp. 155-189; IGNATIEFF, Michael, «Enemies vs. Adversaries», in *The New York Times*, New York, 16 October 2013, URL: < https://nyti.ms/1aoR7lD > [consulted on 29 July 2020].

[16] See for instance: HERRMANN, Richard K., FISCHERKELLER, Michael P., «Beyond the enemy image and spiral model: cognitive-strategic research after the cold war», in *International Organization*, 49, 3/1995, pp. 415-450; HERRMANN, Richard K., VOSS, James F., SCHOOLER, Tonya Y. E., CIARROCHI, Joseph, «Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata», in *International Studies Quarterly*, 41, 3/1997, pp. 403-433; GREEN, David Michael, BOGARD, Cynthia J, «The Making of Friends and Enemies: Assessing the Determinants of International Identity Construction», in *Democracy and Security*, 8, 3/2012, pp. 277-314; MALICI, Akan, «Rogue states: Enemies of our own making», in *Psicologia Política*, 39, 2009, pp. 39-54.

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qua the relation of absolute acceptance is not possible without the work of difference testifying by the same token to the inimitable singularity of each and every engaging part. The same goes for enmity, unlike what is found in the hereby supplemented literature: when Ignatieff argues that between enemies, unlike adversaries, trust is impossible, he downplays the trust in the symbolic meaning of enmity, necessary to each and every articulation of however radical enmity itself[17]. For, even without flirting again with the paradoxical setting of the opening quote, communicating that «we are enemies» requires that the idiom of enmity is somehow shared in what easily becomes the first step towards equally futile mutual destruction, but perhaps also reconciliation. It is hence this idiom which speaks from us even before we may boast about mastering it, if ever.

Notwithstanding, enmity has still been historically predilect in the study of international politics, as in an overturn of the famous Clausewitzian idea of war into something as «politics as the continuation of war by other means». The relatively modern story for the purpose of this article goes that even before the formal birth of the discipline of international relations (IR), in Aberystwyth, Wales in 1919, ever since centrally concerned with bellicose conduct in international politics for obvious reasons[18], international law alone creaked in the attempt to limit the impact of hostilities for the parties concerned. For instance, Article 1 of the Hague Convention relative to the Opening of Hostilities (1907) reads:

> The contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a declaration of war, giving reasons, or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.

With the end of WWII, enmity was far from leaving the floor to friendship, which is perhaps by itself instructive of the unuttered seriousness of its issue over that of friendship[19]. As a matter of fact, even when the brand-new United Nations (UN) Charter banned the use of force by states through Article 2(4), enmity was simply displaced in an ever more radical negative ontological attempt at curbing its impact. For, even at this point, friendship was at the margins, except for its technical translation into alliances, yet again with external balancing functions and hence as guarantees of a *status quo* situation. One occasion it did penetrate somewhat serious fora of discussion culminated with the UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970), also known as «The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States» and perhaps even more for its discussion of self-determination as an intra- and

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[17] IGNATIEFF, Michael, *op. cit.*

[18] ANDREATTA, Filippo, CLEMENTI, Marco, COLOMBO, Alessandro, KOENIG-ARCHIBUGI, Mathias, PARSI, Vittorio Emanuele (a cura di), *Relazioni internazionali*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2012.

[19] Körösényi even argues that friendship is no political category at all. KÖRÖSÉNYI, András, «Politics of Friendship versus Politics of Enmity», in *ECPR Workshop on "The Politics of Friendship"*, Granada, April 2005.

sub-national issue of popular deliberation, fearing the potential for crumbling of the hitherto subject and object of friendship and enmity itself: the national state.

In accordance with earlier observations over binary oppositions, we believe that this lasting interest in enmity *and then* friendship could only work precisely as co-constitutive *vis-à-vis* the unitary subjectivities involved, precisely states. But even then, the trace of friendship contaminated the discourse as the aspirational and optimal condition of international politics, also buried in the idealistic foundations of the discipline studying it. Even more so, this was the case with friendship on the few rare occasions on which it featured as a political category of its own. Yet, to reduce enmity to, first, the regulation of war insurgence and, second, the complete ban of conflicts, and friendship to a reflection upon unbridled and natural self-determination, as it were, means to underestimate the workings of frenemyship/frenmity since declarations of war do not shoot as much as accomplished self-determination represents no guarantee of peace and friendly relations therefrom. The two have in common the tendency to excise undecidability in excess and isolate pure haecceities.

Contemporary reflections signal that this is no longer possible, if ever it has been. Hughes, for instance, dismantles the idea that sole enemies in the international realm are states, opening a Pandora's box of frenemyship and frenmity[20]. Although his contribution focuses only on proxy wars, also known as «internationalised non-international armed conflicts» in the field of adapting international humanitarian law (IHL), whereby a state meddles with the internal affairs of another state with the aim of supporting a state opponent in its political aims, contributions of the sort do justice in at least two important ways. First, by showing precisely that there is no friendship and/or enmity, but rather a scalar disposition of incessant difference permeating the subnational, national and international realms. Second, by translating the idea of frenemyship/frenmity as a fundamental undecidability between the «who» and «what» of a relation to otherness: for a relationship between A and B as normally conceived, there need to be A and B in the first place, which are here such only as homeostatic rather than static. Ergo, the question directly taunts states and any such structure (institutions, identities) envisaged as the privileged subject and object of friendship and enmity. In the words of Ashley, who baptises the security dilemma «the anarchy problematique»:

> Despite the fact, that the state is an intrinsically contested, always ambiguous, never completed construct – a construct that is itself always in the process of being imposed in the face of never-quieted resistances – theoretical discourse of the anarchy problematique must "find" the state to be a pure presence already in place, an unproblematic rational presence

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[20] HUGHES, Geraint, *My Enemy's Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics*, Eastbourne, Sussex Academic Press, 2012.

already there, a sovereign identity that is the self-sufficient source of international history's meaning[21].

In conclusion, non-friends and non-enemies that there are, in borrowing the Kantian category of infinite judgment, a category of no-category, a self-transcending category, such is the fate and curse of the international arena. Politics, with all its means is of little use in diluting the unbearable lightness of a relation so conceived since it is itself the haunting technique of choices not made and roads not taken, the very place and time of frenemy's reign. No pure identities, neither given nor socially constructed, can circumnavigate this necessity of their own (re)production. On multiple examples, we have already shown the staggering febrility of any such well-defined proposal. Now, how and why to track discommoding frenemyship/frenmity in practice is the topic of the following section.

3. State Frenemy No.1 – His Majesty the Citizen

The end of the Cold war without a doubt marked the disappearance of bipolar security architecture in which the two well-defined blocs stood opposed to each other with third parties bandwagoning to avoid geopolitical annihilation. The relative defeat of the Eastern bloc opened a way for new kind of structures, threats and strategies. Soviets were substituted with rogue countries, state actors with violent non-state actors, nuclear weapons with horizontal proliferation, conventional arms and war on drugs, imminent and concrete physical threat left open space for somewhat abstract and ubiquitous terrorist attacks[22]. In other words, states had apparently lost their primacy and the new era could start, that of technological advancements and liberal internationalism embodied in the notion of human security[23].

For this paper, particularly significant transformation is that of enemy which is present as a trace, in a spectral form, not anymore as an internationally legitimate state actor with even the minimum level of responsibility. However, the point is precisely that the change has not been as radical as one may claim. The majority of literature in security studies epitomised that source of the threat, strategic outlook, the polarity of the system or nature of power irreversibly changed

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[21] ASHLEY, Richard K., «Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique», in *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, 17, 2/1988, pp. 227-262, p. 231.

[22] VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, Nick, PEOPLES, Columba, *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction*, Abingdon, Routledge, 2010; MABEE, Bryan, *The Globalization of Security: State Power, Security Provision and Legitimacy*, London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2008; FRANKE, Volker C. (ed.), *Terrorism and Peacekeeping: New Security Challenges*, Westport (CT), Praeger, 2005.

[23] DOMBROWSKI, Peter, GHOLZ, Eugene, B*uying Military Transformation: Technological Innovation and the Defense Industry*, New York (NY), Columbia University Press; TOFFLER, Alvin, TOFFLER, Heidi, *Revolutionary Wealth*, New York (NY), Alfred A. Knopf, 2006; BOOTH, Ken, «Security and Emancipation», in *Review of International Studies*, 17, 4/1991, pp. 313-326.

with the disappearance of Soviet threat and the consequential unipolar moment[24]. Contrary to that, we claim that the underlying logic of security through actor-based security model and threat-based strategy remained intact while manifest forms evolved. Put plainly, the mainstream literature owes a convincing explanation as to why and how the positivist framework of friends vs. enemies crumbled with the Berlin Wall, simply calling for alternative explanations. Our hitherto take, hereafter tested upon post-Cold war, is that non-identity contaminates and has always been intrinsic to interstate relations. Therefore, post-Cold war security architecture served as a *sui generis* justification for actions that would come afterwards owing to the blurred borders between allies and adversaries. Hence, while in itself it would be an understandable course within narrow confines of a self-help international system, contemporary history witnesses the transcendence of the very ethical and cosmopolitan paradigms.

Every society turning the spearhead of its existential paranoia towards the inner space must behave irrationally and erode the basic socio-political contract with its citizens. Here, the problem of sovereignty will be analysed. A turmoil in entitlement of sovereignty finishes as a misuse of a prerogative to introduce the state of exception. Every citizen is consequently deprived of his citizenship, while the sovereign disperses the substance of statehood.

Giorgio Agamben has become famous for his attempts to modernise the sovereignty theory of Carl Schmitt through the employment of state of exception as a legal form of something that cannot be legal[25]. Namely, in a paradoxical manner, a norm fringe to the law keeps the juridical system alive. In the post-Cold war environment, the state of exception gets some additional connotations because by continuous applications it stops being so exceptional. Anticipating the essence of these paragraphs, Damai claims: «Agamben's prophetic portrayal of contemporary politics in which the state of exception—normally a provisional attempt to deal with political exigencies— has become a permanent practice or paradigm of government»[26]. When an exception becomes the new normalcy, nothing less than creation of a series of dubious governance techniques can be expected.

Among them, spaces of exception where human life is scaled down to its bare physiological nature are the cruelest if not globally dangerous. Those spaces such as black sites, prisons, secret interrogation centers, even the whole micro-regions are «legally ambiguous spaces or territories where the law is suspended and where state-orchestrated violence, including torture, plays out

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[24] BUZAN, Barry, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Colchester, ECPR, 2008; HARRISON, Evan, *The Post-Cold War International System: Strategies, Institutions and Reflexivity*, London, Routledge, 2004; PATMAN, Robert G, *Security in a Post-Cold War World*, London, MacMillan, 1999; KRAUTHAMMER, Charles, «The Unipolar Moment», in *Foreign Affairs*, 70, 1/1990, pp. 23-33.
[25] AGAMBEN, Giorgio, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1998.
[26] DAMAI, Puspa, «The Killing Machine of Exception: Sovereignty, Law, and Play in Agamben's State of Exception», in *CF: The New Centennial Review*, 5, 3/2005, pp. 255-276.

with impunity»[27]. Agamben described it as a camp, permanent spatial arrangement that remains continually outside the normal state of law[28].

Finally, nowadays we can talk about globalised substance of the exception which is not only a merit of citizen-state, but also citizen-world and state-world relations. The vertigo of sovereignty is adjacent both to the structures and systems. And they are always immersed in violence preceding its fundaments. When Derrida wrote that there is something rogue in every state, he added: «[T]he recourse to terror and fear, which *has always been* [...] the ultimate recourse for the sovereign power of the state, in an implicit or explicit, blatant or subtle, form, and even when it is contractual and protective»[29]. Accordingly, sovereignty and citizenship start and end at the very same point. It is the one where the friend and the enemy meet.

As was already said, post-Cold war period was marked by the forces of deterritorialisation that counter-intuitively go hand in hand with territorialisation, just with the prefix re- to signal repetitive and cyclical nature of the process[30]. The most important deterritorialised threat has certainly been the terrorist one. Therefore, on its example we will investigate the mechanisms of how, so to speak, an unknown enemy is actually substituted with a known friend. Three are the phases that will be part of the analysis, deliberately put in the form of imperative: deterritorialise; reterritorialise; technologise.

After the first terrorist attacks on the US soil in 2001, the question was against whom to retaliate. Was it a particular state, cluster or even the whole continent? President Bush made the choice easier by claiming that they will treat as terrorists even those who are harbouring them[31]. Declaration of War on terror and coalition of the willing ostracised everyone who did not want to join. Contrary to the expected, deterritorialised threat could not be neutralised in such a way because terrorism was simultaneously sub- and supra-state threat. Some theorists even described it as a dream threat[32]. Inability of a state to confront the terrorist threat caused appearance of

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[27] LUNSTRUM, Elizabeth, «Terror, Territory, and Deterritorialization: Landscapes of Terror and the Unmaking of State Power in the Mozambican "Civil" War», in *Annals of the American Association of Geographers*, 55, 5/2009, pp. 884-892. See also: BUTTLER, Judith, *Precarious life: The powers of mourning and violence*, London, Verso, 2004; GREGORY, Derek, «The black flag: Guantanamo Bay and the space of exception», in *Geografiska Annaler* 88, 4/2006, pp. 405-427; COMAROFF, John, «Terror and territory: Guantanamo and the space of contradiction», in *Public Culture* 19, 2/2007, pp. 381-405.

[28] AGAMBEN, Giorgio, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-60.

[29] DERRIDA, Jacques, «The World of the Enlightenment to Come (Exception, Calculation, Sovereignty)», in *Research in Phenomenology* 33, 2007, pp. 47-48. The emphasis is ours.

[30] O TUATHAIL, Gearoid, LUKE, Timothy W., «Present at the (Dis)Integration: Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization in the New Wor(l)d Order», in *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 84, 3/1994, pp. 381-398.

[31] BUSH, George W, *Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation*, 2001, URL:
< http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html > [consulted on 29 July 2020].

[32] FELDMAN, Allen, «Books Deterritorialized Wars of Public Safety», in *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice*, 48, 1/2004, pp. 73-80, p. 74.

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new discourses about networks of terror, axis of state sponsors of terrorism...[33]. At the same time it was the public demonstration of a novel security challenge, but also a subtle justification for the inefficiency of countermeasures. Famous is the statement of a US general questioning the mere possibility of destroying the enemy hidden in the caves of Kabul, while Whine warns that «Al Qaeda consists of nomadic and amorphous networks characterized by the diffusion of its groups, it challenges the abilities of governments to infiltrate the networks and to track these terrorists»[34]. On the other side, deterritorialisation of the terrorism was used as an opportunity to partially dislocate the credible struggle. O' Malley was writing about the emulation of precautionary principle in the light of existential uncertainty[35], while Feldman put deterritorialised wars of public safety as a corollary of the transfer of counter-terrorist focus[36].

What followed was the second phase of reterritorialisation or logical step to give physical boundaries to an allegedly invisible threat. However, instead of placing terrorists outside, majority of countries decided to take their own territory as an ultimate terrorist frontier. To put it simpler, containing the threat within the reach of a sovereign was meant to delegitimise it. Bonditti claims that the aim of every government suddenly became to conduct «multileveled dispositive of control over people in a given territorial space»[37]. As can be inferred, this meant spillover of oppressive state measures from terrorists to the immigrants, workers, foreign students, the Other in general. Moodliar even writes that states employ indiscriminatory measures oriented at anyone and everyone[38]. In that precise moment the world turned into a panopticon and similarly to the so-called erosion of sovereignty, control and discipline became the contemporary globalised substance. In that conjuncture, the vital interest of every state is to precisely know who is entering the state and who is already there[39]. That could be done solely through the absolute control of personhood without respect for anything except for the grand strategy and goal of national survival.

After we described how states universalised, territorialised and even adopted such a fringe element as a terrorist threat, the third stage investigates the means to efficiently deliver protective measures. Obviously, it is done through the help of cutting-edge technological systems. Here, we would like to pinpoint two of them, notorious for the ubiquitous presence and

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[33] BONDITTI, Philippe, «From Territorial Space to Networks: A Foucaldian Approach to the Implementation of Biometry», in *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 29, 4/2004, pp. 465-482.
[34] WHINE, Matthew, *The New Terrorism*, Tel Aviv, Stephen Roth Institute, 2005, p. 8.
[35] O'MALLEY, Pat, *Risk, Uncertainty and Government*, London, The Glasshouse Press, 2004, p. 23.
[36] FELDMAN, Allen, *op. cit.*
[37] BONDITTI, Phillipe, *op. cit.*, p. 472.
[38] MOODLIAR, Suren, «Militarism, Mass Surveillance and Mass Incarceration», in *Socialism and Democracy*, 28, 3/2014, pp. 77-83, p. 81. Look also at: MARAS, Marie-Helen, «The social consequences of a mass surveillance measure: What happens when we become the 'others'?», in *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice*, 40, 2012, pp. 65-81, p. 68.
[39] BONDITTI, Phillipe, *op. cit.*, p.473.

implications on the bare life: Total Information Awareness (TIA) and mass surveillance. Although similar in the final results, the former is more of a principle, while the latter is a set of concrete measures taken.

Skillfully evading constitutional provisions, Bush administration introduced a project called TIA intended to put an end to the terrorist threat. It involved the «construction of a vast database of personal information (from movie rentals and credit card purchases to phone and e-mail conversations) and a network of integrated technologies for trolling through it»[40]. The government did not need a warrant by a judge to conduct the oversight and keep records of the acquired data through the large databases. The only formal requirement for the government was to provide a so called National Security Letter which actually was nothing more than a provisional confirmation that someone can potentially be a security threat[41]. Feldman rightfully noted that TIA represents an attempt to create «a new form of citizenship and concomitant personhood»[42]. Under the guise of the fight against terrorism, a huge space for power abuse was opened and prospects for absolute control of the population enhanced. TIA used «sociality patterns along with racial and ethnic affiliation [which] are meant to dissect the social persona»[43]. All of the aforementioned created an overarching paranoia that state is present everywhere and that everyone is a potential victim. In other words, citizens became terrorists, while governments inverted the paradigm to demonstrate that they oppress citizens for their own good. Accordingly, state-sponsored terrorism and state-sponsored fight against terrorism retain striking similarities.

A passage from Maras reads: «In response to these [terrorist] attacks, an intense system of mass registration and surveillance of movement was set in place to combat the terrorist threat»[44]. Surveillance as a method has been employed since the dawn of humanity, but if its aim is to increase the capacity for doubt, then it becomes a tool at the disposal of a state to even turn daily routines of people into a public event[45]. Moreover, attempts to stop terrorist plots can easily slide into a tendency to preserve *status quo*[46]. All of this suggests that eventual non-compliance of citizens with state policies as a permanent possibility for limitations of governance is much more dangerous than the mere terrorist threat which almost regularly boosts confidence in the state itself. However, surveillance of phones, mail, homes, routines threatens to fulfill the plea of Tony

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[40] COHEN, Elliot D., *Mass Surveillance and State Control*, London, Palgrave McMillan, 2010, p. 17.

[41] *Ibidem*, p. 8.

[42] FELDMAN, Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

[43] *Ibidem*.

[44] MARAS, Marie-Helen, «How to Catch a Terrorist: Is Mass Surveillance the Answer?», in *Journal of Applied Security Research*, 5, 1/2010, pp. 20-41, p. 20.

[45] LYON, David, *The Electronic Eye The Rise of Surveillance Society*, Minneapolis (MN), Minnesota University Press, 1994, p. 37.

[46] MARAS, Marie-Helen, *The Social Consequences*, cit., p. 71.

Blair that bases with private data should include anyone who steps in in the country[47]. Through surveillance, the state becomes big (br)other, an agent of absolute control and discipline, while citizens become the «permanent shadow of an ever present witness»[48].

To conclude, this is an illustration of a manifest blurring between friends and enemies. Terrorist threat is countered through the oppression of non-terrorists, while freedoms are sacrificed for the sake of achieving freedom. Feldman writes: «The current warfare ideologies of public safety share with their "terrorist adversary" an epistemological and visual investment in actuarial retribution and the dramaturgy of sacrificial repetition»[49]. Nevertheless, if we employ Hobbesian pessimism, maybe that is just the normal order of things. Order in which disorder is a structural necessity.

4. Conclusion

The aim of this paper was not to show that there are no differences between friend and enemy. Quite on the contrary, it demonstrated the horizons of possibility for being same and/or different. Maybe even to be indifferently different because the importance of semantic consequences withers away when confronted with the ipseity of the friend/enemy. Derrida ingeniously described this circular vernacular illusion:

> This is a logic that will have to be questioned: if there is no friend elsewhere than where the enemy can be, the 'necessity of enemy' or the 'one must love one's enemies' (*seine Feinde lieben*) straight away transforms enmity into friendship, etc. The enemies I love are my friends. So are the enemies of my friends. As soon as one needs or desires one's enemies, only friends can be counted - this includes the enemies, and vice versa - and here madness looms[50].

Theoretical assumptions about frenmity and frenemyship deprive us of the power of language to put in relation, operationalise and oppress. As an independent concept friend is losing meaning without relation to the Other(er). Therefore, it is not the value of difference or sameness between enemy and friend that matters, but the very moral blind spot in which we lack the means to be friends to our friends and to be friends at all. IR is the enemy of the featuring scientific concepts, thus it is its constitutive friend. Global state of plague described in the second part of the paper

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[47] *Ibidem*, p. 70.
[48] WILLIAMS, Robin, JOHNSON, Paul, «Circuits of surveillance», in *Surveillance and Society*, 2, 1/2004, pp. 1-14, p. 12.
[49] FELDMAN, Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
[50] DERRIDA, Jacques, *The Politics of Friendship*, pp. 32-33.

reconfirms the thesis: it is frenemy who advocates for frenemyship. It is our duty to be friendly towards the geopsychoanalytical vertigo of a discipline and the Discipline.

Let us embrace the path of an adversarial friendship!

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