

**THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF TIME IN THE POETIC PHILOSOPHY
OF A.I. VVEDENSKY**

**A FENOMENOLOGIA DO TEMPO NA FILOSOFIA POÉTICA
DA I.A. VVEDENSKY**

**LA FENOMENOLOGÍA DEL TIEMPO EN LA FILOSOFÍA POÉTICA
DE A.I. VVEDENSKY**

Smirnov, Nikolay ALEKSEEVICH¹
Samson Aleksandrovich LIBERMAN²
Guryanov, Aleksey SERGEYEVICH³

ABSTRACT: For non-classical ontology, one of the major problems is time. It is through thinking about time and its relation to the essence of man, thought, or being that Kierkegaard, Bergson, and Heidegger attempted to construct a different ontology. The theme of time was also one of the main themes for the Russian poet and philosopher A. I. Vvedensky. The authors of the article suggest that on the basis of his poems and reflections conventionally united under the title "The Gray Notebook" the principles of a special phenomenology of time can be formulated; this work posits time as a quasi-ontological phenomenon that acts when we perceive and order reality through it, but it disappears when we try to observe and grasp it. Time cannot be a sequence or a counting measure. Thinking about time is a specific experience in which not only time itself disappears, but also the habitual reality measured and ordered by it, and something else opens up – a world outside of sequence and relation, outside of stable and limited relations and views. In this new world, the meditator himself dissolves and disappears crossing the border between time and eternity, the immanent and the transcendent, the human and the divine. Thus, Vvedensky's phenomenology of time is not a theoretical study but a practical turn, a change in the way of existence and, ultimately, an experience of salvation and freedom.

KEYWORDS: Time. Moment. Insubstantiality. Consciousness. Coherency-incoherency.

¹ PhD in philosophy, senior lecturer of the Department of social philosophy, Kazan Federal University, e-mail: nikolay.smirnov.1992@mail.ru, ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9757-8006>

² PhD in philosophy, senior lecturer of the Department of social philosophy, Kazan Federal University, Kazan, Russia, e-mail: samsonliberman@gmail.com, Id Scopus: 57192275893; ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9987-9905>

³ Doctor of philosophy, associate professor of the department of Philosophy and Media Communications, the department of History, Philosophy and Social studies, Kazan State Power-Engineering University, Kazan, Russia. Kazan State Medical University, Kazan, Russia, SCOPUS ID 57211909612, ORCID ID <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0394-343X>, e-mail: alexeigurianov1977@yandex.ru

RESUMO: Para a ontologia não clássica, um dos maiores problemas é o tempo. É pensando sobre o tempo e sua relação com a essência do homem, pensamento ou ser que Kierkegaard, Bergson e Heidegger tentaram construir uma ontologia diferente. O tema do tempo também foi um dos principais temas para o poeta e filósofo russo A. I. Vvedensky. Os autores do artigo sugerem que, com base em seus poemas e reflexões convencionalmente reunidos sob o título "The Grey Notebook", os princípios de uma fenomenologia especial do tempo podem ser formulados; este trabalho postula o tempo como um fenômeno quase ontológico que atua quando percebemos e ordenamos a realidade por meio dele, mas desaparece quando tentamos observá-lo e apreendê-lo. O tempo não pode ser uma sequência ou uma medida de contagem. Pensar no tempo é uma experiência específica em que não apenas o próprio tempo desaparece, mas também a realidade habitual medida e ordenada por ele, e outra coisa se abre - um mundo fora da sequência e da relação, fora das relações e visões estáveis e limitadas. Neste novo mundo, o próprio meditador se dissolve e desaparece cruzando a fronteira entre o tempo e a eternidade, o imanente e o transcendente, o humano e o divino. Assim, a fenomenologia do tempo de Vvedensky não é um estudo teórico, mas uma virada prática, uma mudança no modo de existência e, em última análise, uma experiência de salvação e liberdade.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Tempo. Momento. Insubstancialidade. Consciência. Coerência-incoerência.

RESUMEN: Para la ontología no clásica, uno de los principales problemas es el tiempo. Es a través del pensamiento sobre el tiempo y su relación con la esencia del hombre, el pensamiento o el ser que Kierkegaard, Bergson y Heidegger intentaron construir una ontología diferente. El tema del tiempo fue también uno de los temas principales del poeta y filósofo ruso A. I. Vvedensky. Los autores del artículo sugieren que sobre la base de sus poemas y reflexiones unidos convencionalmente bajo el título "El cuaderno gris" se pueden formular los principios de una fenomenología especial del tiempo; este trabajo plantea el tiempo como un fenómeno cuasi-ontológico que actúa cuando percibimos y ordenamos la realidad a través de él, pero desaparece cuando intentamos observarlo y captarlo. El tiempo no puede ser una secuencia o una medida de conteo. Pensar en el tiempo es una experiencia específica en la que no solo desaparece el tiempo mismo, sino también la realidad habitual medida y ordenada por él, y se abre algo más: un mundo fuera de secuencia y relación, fuera de relaciones y visiones estables y limitadas. En este nuevo mundo, el meditador mismo se disuelve y desaparece cruzando la frontera entre el tiempo y la eternidad, lo imanente y lo trascendente, lo humano y lo divino. Así, la fenomenología del tiempo de Vvedensky no es un estudio teórico sino un giro práctico, un cambio en la forma de existencia y, en última instancia, una experiencia de salvación y libertad.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Tiempo. Momento. Insustancialidad. Conciencia. Coherencia-incoherencia.

Introduction

The creative work of the poets and philosophers who were part of the informal esoteric community called *the Chinars*⁴ is difficult to define and classify. In this article, we will rely on the approach according to which their poetry, prose and philosophy are not art but experience of a special relationship with the world – existential experience rather than individual psychological: it is not the self-expression of a poet or philosopher but the expression of life itself at its extreme points. It is primarily evidenced by fragments of "Conversations" recorded by L. Lipavsky and various independent texts by D. I. Kharms and A. I. Vvedensky concerning philosophical problems and, secondly, by interpretation of their work given in the later works of Y. S. Druskin ("Diaries", "Vision of nonvision", "A Star of nonsense", etc.). But most vividly it is manifest in the existential nerve that permeates the life and work of each of the Chinars. Their approach to life and art is inseparable from the motive of getting out of everyday life, overcoming a certain habitual order, unraveling knots and attachments. Its entire inner intention is directed towards salvation and is occupied with salvation. The Chinar text has no independent artistic or theoretical-philosophical meaning, but it is an expression of the experience of freedom.

The peculiarity of this experience is that freedom, in this case, is something that cannot be achieved by an individual effort, that is, by a certain order of conscious acts performed or a certain order of vision and understanding. It implies no progressive movement from one stage-state to another, step by step, to freedom as a certain goal. There are no paths and stages in the philosophy of the Chinars. Freedom is not a goal that can be formulated, achieved, etc. It is the reality that is being realized, accomplished; it advances and captures the attention of the poet/philosopher speaking for itself in his thought. It cannot be subordinated to any logical or empirical order that is familiar to us. It

⁴ We think that the word "Chin" as a root morpheme for "chinar" denotes a praying order addressed to God with a request, a complaint or a cry.

cannot be a consequence, continuation, or a part of something; it cannot flow or develop from something; it cannot, all in all, even be the opposite, contraposition, or overcoming of something. It is beyond the dual oppositions (transcendent/immanent, empirical/theoretical, etc.) natural for our mind. It cannot be conditioned by our usual relations and causalities, nor can it follow from any of our actions (we cannot know in advance the point in space and time at which God will appear). And so, as an expression of some experience, the philosophy of the Chinars is an expression of the experience of impotence, inability, impossibility and ... salvation through this impossibility. The experience of touching the other embodied in the lack of understanding, inability to grasp, hold, master, etc. In other words, the event of freedom occurs in the inability to make an effort which, in turn (this very existential impotence), is realized in the inability to get free. This is the only reality that cannot be achieved by one's own effort, and to which, therefore, only our impotence can correspond - our impotence is the content of this possibility. Freedom comes through the inability to get free. Freedom lies in the very inability (since it is freedom from oneself, from one's power, from one's abilities). The Chinar philosophy is a thought that ponders this inability to free oneself from previous ties, and thus freeing by means of turning one's attention. To be able to escape from everyday life, you need to twist in the impossibility of doing this.

Circling in impossibilities and incapacabilities can one express the original ontological discord, the non-conformity of the world to itself, its incompleteness, its discrepancy with itself, and thus to express the need for the other, for the impossible, for something that transcends the world.

The life and work of the Chinars is a kind of message about salvation, a gesture of inability / impossibility addressed to God, a response to which can only be his responsive gesture - salvation and freedom. That is also related to the specific themes that became cross-cutting for their work. For example, for Kharms this constant existential theme transformed into the theme of the miracle (the impossible possibility of the miracle). In this article, we will consider the theme of

time as an image of such an existential theme as it is developed in the ideas of A. I. Vvedensky.

Methods

It is important to remember that this is not a theoretical question, not a new opinion or idea of time among other ideas (of Aristotle, Kant, Bergson, Husserl, Heidegger... Vvedensky, - no, there is no Vvedensky in this series, and there could not be). The Chinar experience is the experience of contact with reality outside of all the habitual forms and prerequisites. You cannot prepare for it, you cannot approach or approximate it. You unnoticeably come into contact with reality, you just see that you are already involved in it. This is a vortex in which you spin each time anew (and the vortex, in this case, is not a metaphor for time but, rather, time is a metaphor for the ontological vortex). You cannot enter this vortex by performing certain actions (if it were possible, it would not be a vortex, but a tailwind). The very nature of the vortex indicates that we cannot know how to get into it, the only thing we know (realize) is that we have already found ourselves in it, regardless of the way it happened, of the principles of movement and directions. Thinking about time man powerlessly spins around when he starts considering it. In this case, the content of reflection is not the establishment of relations between phenomena, ideas and meanings, but the evidence of their disintegration that diverges and releases to direct contact with freely moving things. This is an inflated instant of perception of yet (or already - which, in this case, is the same thing) uncollected and analytically unordered world. Nothing follows and nothing can be inferred from that moment.

Vvedensky's poetic philosophy is a phenomenology of disintegration of the time sequence down to the moment of a vortex. It is a release of the habitual connections of thought and language, of all the established orders and arrangements, all habitual statics of consciousness which Husserl called "a natural setting". It is the axis of individual subjective self-consciousness on which the diversity of conscious experience is wound

and to which the "objective world" is contra positioned. Consciousness explores and learns the world, establishes connections between phenomena signified as objective. It defines, classifies, loses and gains, seeks to acquire things, states, abilities, etc. All this functionality of the "natural intention" is intertwined with knots and threads of time. While thinking about time all of that gets untied, lost and then disappears in front of a witness - a chinar-phenomenologist.

Results and Discussion

The major text devoted to the problem of time (a "program" one if you can say so about the work of a thinker who could not have any program) is probably "The Gray Notebook" - a kind of meditations on the theme of time written on the basis of Vvedensky's first imprisonment experience. This experience, which is quite different for different people, became the experience of meeting with the phenomenon of time for him (namely, with time itself as a particular reality and concrete experience, rather than an a priori form or some conditional framework of reality and any other experience).

"Once I was walking along the poisoned road
And time was advancing by my side" (VVEDENSKY, 1993).

Once is a moment of meeting with time. A strange circumstance - "walking along the poisoned road" - confirms the paradoxical nature of this event and its "transcendence" for it occurs as if after death. The "once" appears ambiguous, it matches something mismatching - "I was walking" is an action, the individuality of "I", movement, this world; "poisoned" indicates personal death, a complete stop, a border with the inconceivable. A meeting with time is a "once" matching a moment and time, a point and a line, movement and a stop. "Once I was walking along the poisoned road" is a kind of motionless movement; moments that occur one after another but do not connect in the flow of time, points that do not connect into a line. Each step is like a new movement that does not add up to the general procession. And these ungainly movements are accompanied by passing time. I understand time as long as it is a tool for

me to master reality: as long as I act and know reality in time, I use time to master this or that fragment of outer reality in one way or another (science, poetry, politics, etc.), but if I stop and think about what is happening, I will not be able to see my (belonging to me) practical and cognitive acts in it.

"I was thinking why only verbs
are subject to the hour, minute, and year.
And houses, forests, the sky, as if the Mongols,
from time suddenly got freedom " (VVEDENSKY, 1993).

The substantiality of verbs and what they designate is illusory. It refers to two main types of relation. First, the relations between different states of objects, the repeatability and consistency of changes that occur with them (including the relations covered by the most common verb - "to be"). Second, the relations between objects and the actions we perform as related to them - cognition, appropriation, possession, etc.

"I thought and understood. We know all of that,
that an action has become a sleepless China,
that actions have passed lying dead
and now we decorate them with wreaths" (VVEDENSKY, 1993).

Our consciousness does not deal with reality but with its dead, static form. We "decorate" events "with wreaths", namely, we appropriate them, designate them as our "actions" and secure them for ourselves. We create the illusion that what happens to us belongs to us.

We can easily manage time as long as it is a tool in our hands. But if we think about time, if it ceases to be a tool ready at hand for us and becomes the subject of attention, if we try to perceive time not as a methodological but as an ontological phenomenon, then it will fall apart before our eyes. We master reality by means of time, but one cannot master time itself. It disappears as soon as we try to grasp it.

"I stopped. I thought here,
I could not grasp the mind of the invasion of all
new disasters" (VVEDENSKY, 1993).

One can think "here", but one cannot connect this "here" with other moments of time comprehending a coherent sequence of moments that occur one after another. When released, they (moments) become an "invasion of new calamities" for our mind (new ones – that is, they arise unpredictably and do not intertwine with our habitual relations; these are previously unknown "calamities" for which we are not ready and cannot be ready). Time is a net, it is threads that connect the ordinary, everyday order and structure of our conscious life – consciousness that functions in the "natural setting". In this structure of consciousness, the "I" (individual, empirical) acquires time and uses it to master everything that happens. Time release means the release of this form of consciousness. Words and thoughts losing time lose their grasping power. We find that time sequences (together with all they serve for – a way, causality, relations, etc.) are only mental constructs.

Consciousness, acquiring reality in its "natural setting", is based on discriminative experience, and distinctions, in their turn, are based on time. To determine, select, and distinguish B from A, you need to go through the gap between B and A marking this passage with certain time positions. All of the major distinguishing "natural settings" – the distinction between consciousness and "the objective world", the difference between the individual, "my" consciousness and other consciousness, this very state of consciousness and other states, etc. – arise as differences in time (both physically and mentally in time perception). The claim that I didn't know anything and then learned it or will learn it by following a certain order of actions is based on the idea of time and two different temporary states of consciousness – first I didn't know, and then I learned (the order of actions should also be filled with time). The same is applied to all verbs – to be/not to be, to have/not to have, to become/not to become, etc. We own actions and events and are subjects of everything happening to us because verbs (actions, events, processes) are tied to time. Consciousness in its everyday "natural" order is tied into a knot of language, time, and thought. All illusory forms of perception of reality are tied and intertwined, they are based on the fact that we do not notice time, do not think about it

but simply use it. As soon as we pay attention to time itself, the node breaks up, and consciousness loses its real control over itself and imaginary control over reality. Verbs are no longer associated with actions, events, and processes; they no longer belong to anyone but come into being, occur, disappear on their own.

"Now let's take a minute back, or try on a minute forward, then twist around or look around; we cannot see these minutes, one of them that is past we remember, another future point we imagine. The tree is on the ground, the tree is hanging, the tree is flying. I cannot ascertain that. We can neither cross it out nor touch it. I do not trust memory, I do not trust imagination" (VVEDENSKY, 1993).

"Verbs live out their lives before our eyes... " (VVEDENSKY, 1993).

In the new form of consciousness (consciousness of disintegrating time) verbs are not tied to the subject and are not connected with each other. Verbs lose time, and our actions no longer belong to us. Our actions cease to take hold of reality, transform and learn, establish causes and do actions (that is, observing time, we see that verbs and actions do not have time, and cannot take hold of reality). The main condition of our everyday perception and action is the absence of thought about time. As soon as we start thinking about time, all the usual forms of consciousness lose their meanings and relations. And the novelty of flickering previously hidden behind an imaginary sequence of movement in tamed time jumps out at us.

"Our calendar is designed the way we do not feel the novelty of every second. And in prison this novelty of every second, and at the same time the insignificance of this novelty, became clear to me" (VVEDENSKY, 1993).

"Let the mouse run onto the stone. Just count its every step. Forget the word "every", forget the word "step". Then every step it takes will seem like a new movement. Then, because you justly lose the perception of a series of movements as something whole that you mistakenly called a step (you confused movement and time with space. You incorrectly superimposed them on each other), your movement will start to split up, it

will come to almost zero. Flickering will start. The mouse will start flickering. Look around: the world is flickering (like a mouse)" (VVEDENSKY, 1993).

We did not think about time, so we could think that we own something that we consider our own (thoughts, minds, things, the world). When we start thinking about time, everything becomes incomprehensible. All attachments are untied - the world, things, words, and thoughts are released. Everything that exists is not bound by anything, is not defined by anything, and needs nothing. Even in yourself, everything arises at the present moment, every time again (just forget the word "every", forget the word "one"). In the experience of thinking about time the Chinars found what they sought salvation in - a poor, naked thought of the poet-philosopher meets a different reality. The transcendent turns out to be immanent, and the immanent turns out to be transcendent, they dissolve in one another.

"And I saw a house diving like winter,
and I saw a swallow designating a garden
where the shadows of trees are like branches rustling.
where the branches of trees are like shadows of the mind"
(VVEDENSKY, 1993).

The world here turns out to be illusory, disembodied - "the branches of trees as the shadows of the mind", and not subject to the principles and connections that we considered the laws of this world ("a house that dives like winter", "a swallow designating a garden"). But the other world, on the contrary, is materialized, transformed into flesh, into something corporeal and tangible ("where the shadows of trees rustle like branches"). For Vvedensky there is neither transcendent, nor immanent in the usual sense. Reality is a transition, transformation of the transcendent into the immanent, and the immanent into the transcendent. We believe, after Y.S. Druskin, inter-transformation of the transcendent and the immanent is a central event in the poetic world of Vvedensky: "Transformation for Vvedensky is a certain hieroglyph that has an ontological and eschatological meaning" (LIPAVSKY ET AL., 2000).

The works of the 30s are filled with various plots and images of mutual transformation of words and things, the transcendent and the immanent, the mortal and the immortal, the main of which is undoubtedly transformation as an eschatological event described in the poem "God may be everywhere":

"We have become boring and funny.

And in our post-mortem rotation

Salvation is only in transformation" (Vvedensky, 1993).

Summary

Vvedensky describes an experience similar to that of Husserl's phenomenological reduction. But if the German phenomenologist reduces the "objective world" to consciousness, Vvedensky reduces it to time. Just as Husserl's phenomenology is a movement on the surface of consciousness, Vvedensky's philosophical poetry is a "superficial sense of time" (VVEDENSKY, 1993).

"The names of minutes, seconds, hours, weeks, and months distract us even from our superficial understanding of time. All these names are analogous, either to objects, or to space concepts and calculation. Therefore, the past week lies before us like a dead deer. This would be the case if time only helped to account for space, if it were double-entry bookkeeping, if time were a mirror image of objects. In fact, objects are a faint mirror image of time. There are no objects. Go and try to get them" (VVEDENSKY, 1993).

We perceive time as something static and dead ("like a dead deer"), as if it is given to us in order to count objects. But time cannot be grasped, and objects slip away with time. If Husserl's reduction has an epistemological and methodological meaning, Vvedensky's reduction of time is ontological and even soteriological. The impossibility of grasping objects and being in the world of ungraspable, free phenomena constitute the horizon of Vvedensky's phenomenology. We turn from the objects we acquire with the help of time to time itself. And then we see that it is not objects that create time by their determinations and differences, but time

that creates objects. And then we see that time itself is not something static and definite. We see that time is inessential, indefinite, and unsubstantial. And when we turn again to objects ("look around: the world is flickering") we see that they are just as irrelevant as time, and in reality we do not own and cannot own objects, just as we do not own and cannot own time.

"Time is the only thing that doesn't exist outside of us. It consumes everything that exists outside of us. The night of the mind is coming. Time rises above us like a star. Let's throw our thinking heads, that is, our minds. Look, it has become visible. It rises above us as zero. It turns everything to zero. (The last hope - Christ is risen)" (VVEDENSKY, 1993).

Vvedensky's phenomenology of time (and this is its main difference from Husserl) is the study of time that goes beyond time. Time dissolves and eternity appears through it. The whole familiar world dissolves in time together with it, and another world emerges from the bottom of this muddy river.

Conclusion

Generally speaking, one could depict Vvedensky's phenomenology of time in two ontological intuitions that are open to us at the same time:

1) Time does not exist outside of us: in reality, there is no tamed time with the help of which we record, count, and master everything that happens to us. There is no time as a sequence.

2) Time absorbs everything that exists outside of us: certainty, sequence and relation are not only non-relevant for time, but also they are not relevant for the events and phenomena to which we mistakenly attribute time. The world that consciousness organizes with the help of time is as illusory as time itself. Everything that exists outside of us is as insubstantial as time that exists only in us.

Time is a sign of insubstantiality of all things by which we recognize it (through experience). Reading/learning/recognizing this sign is the phenomenology of time as it is presented in Vvedensky. But this reflection is not theoretical, it's a phenomenological reduction of the world,

consciousness, and language to time; thus it becomes a real (existential) experience.

"Woe to us who think about time. But then, with the growth of this misunderstanding, it will become clear to you and me that there is no grief, neither to us, nor to those who think, nor to time" (VVEDENSKY, 1993).

"Thinking about time" is the one who plainly is not, the one freed from the burden of self-consciousness. Consciousness designed as a direction of attention, as grasping objects, grasps at what cannot be grasped, and loses its grip. The one "thinking about time" falls into the horizon of the ungraspable. It breaks out of everyday life through the impossibility of escaping, it comprehends the incomprehensible through the impossibility of comprehension, touches eternity through non-essentiality of time.

"And in the walls of the vessel of time, God appeared to him... " (VVEDENSKY, 1993).

He is saved through impotence.

Acknowledgement

The work is performed according to the Russian Government Program of Competitive Growth of Kazan Federal University.

References

"...a company of friends abandoned to fate". L. Lipavsky, A. Vvedensky, Y. Druskin, D. Kharms, N. Oleynikov: "The Chinars" in texts, documents and research: in 2 vol. V.2 - Moscow: "Ladomir" publ., 2000. - 749 p.

DRUSKIN, Y.S. (1999). Diaries. - St.Petersburg: "Academicheskyy proyekt", - 605 p.

Edmund Husserl. (1990). On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917) / trans. by Brough, J.B.: Dordrecht: Kluwer.

GIBIAN, G. (1971). Introduction: Daniil Kharms and Alexander Vvedensky. Russia's Lost Literature of the Absurd: A Literary Discovery: Selected Works of Daniil Kharms and Alexander Vvedensky. — Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.

KERSTEN, F. (1982). Edmund Husserl. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy - First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology. The Hague: Nijhoff.

LIPAVSKY, L., VVEDENSKY, A., DRUSKIN, Y., KHARMS, D., & OLEYNIKOV, N. (2000). A company of friends abandoned to fate. The Chinars" in texts, documents and research: in 2 vol. V.1 - Moscow: "Ladimir" publ., - 846 p.

MILLNER-GULLAND, R. (1991). Beyond the Turning-Point: An Afterword. Daniil Kharms and the Poetics of the Absurd. — London.

STONE NAKHIMOVSKY, A. (1982). Laughter in the Void: An Introduction to the Writings of Daniil Kharms and Alexander Vvedenskij. Wiener Slawistischer Almanach. Sonderband 5. — Wien.

VVEDENSKY, A.I. (1993). Complete works in 2 vol.: V.1. Works of 1926-1937 - Moscow: "Gilea" publ., - 285 p.

VVEDENSKY, A.I. (1993). Complete works in 2 vol.: V.2. Works of 1938-1941 - Moscow: "Gilea" publ., - 271 p.

Short biography. Nikolai Smirnov from 2010 to 2015 studied at the Faculty of Philosophy (from 2014 - Institute of Social and Philosophical Sciences and Mass Communications) of Kazan Federal University, graduated from the faculty with honors with a degree in Philosophy. In February 2019, he defended his thesis for the degree of candidate of philosophical sciences, specialty 09.00.01 Ontology and the theory of knowledge on the theme "Embodiment: a sketch of a soteriological ontology (based on the novel by Pasternak 'Doctor Zhivago')". He is the author of numerous articles and co-author of monographs. Since 2020, he has been working at the Department of social philosophy of Kazan Federal University.

Short biography. Samson A. Liberman graduated from the Kazan Federal University with honors in 2015. The theme of the final work is "Development of historicism: from history to contemporaneity ". In 2019, he defended his PhD thesis on "Social philosophy in a post-post situation: methodological crisis and possible ways to resolve it". He is the author of numerous articles and co-author of monographs. Since 2018, he has been working at the Department of social philosophy of Kazan Federal University. Teaches courses: "Philosophy", "Logic", "Culture studies", "Social philosophy", "Philosophical problems of socio-humanitarian Sciences", "Methods of teaching social science".

Short biography. Aleksei Guryanov graduated from Kazan State Pedagogical Institute in 1998, specialty - English language. He received

his PhD degree from Chuvash State university. He received his Doctor's degree from Kazan Federal University in 2019. He works as an associate professor at Kazan Power-Engineering University and Kazan State Medical University. His areas of specialization include: logic, philosophical anthropology. His areas of scientific interest include: modal logic in general, existentialism, dialectic. A. Guryanov has over 40 publications, including 5 publications in Scopus and Web of Science sources.