

LEARNING FROM PATIENT 31 CASE: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE OF CORPORATE NETWORKS' DIFFUSION ABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA

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ABSTRACT

Objective: This paper has the purpose to discuss how corporate networks' big linkers constitute a development opportunity area in Latin America. **Method:** We employ a qualitative analysis that blends social networks literature and builds on interlocking directorates (IntDs) theory with a fascinating case study labeled the 'Patient 31' phenomenon that occurred during the coronavirus outbreak in South Korea. **Main results:** We generate managerial and conceptual insights on the diffusion processes of business practices, which have a series of profound implications for theory and practice on how corporate networks present differences in their diffusion ability. **Relevance/Originality:** Viral contagion processes are not a secret for health sciences, but they are still under researched in the context of managerial practices regarding diffusion processes. The COVID-19 virus has been (and is) a significant threat for global health since the beginning of 2020, as well as an operational challenge for almost every organization around the world. **Theoretical/Methodological contributions:** The results highlight the superspreaders' high diffusion power, warn about the risks of including 'Patient 31'- type of spreaders as members of the firms' boards, and also provide recommendations on how policy makers could harness this diffusion ability over the organizational networks.

INTRODUCTION

In 2019, two researchers at Cambridge University, Dr. Simon Beard and Dr. Lauren Holt, framed the human extinction scenarios in real global threats for humanity (see BBC, 2019). BBC (2019) argued that people-induced global threats are *more* likely to occur than natural disasters. Also, from their perspective, the most pressing (and scary) problem is not

the size of disasters, but their potential to disrupt the vital systems that underpin and support our interconnected, highly complicated global systems. Interestingly, among other threats in their analysis, they gave a mere 1.5% of likelihood that a severe pandemic occurs. Indeed, the 2019 Global Risk Report of the World Economic Forum graded the spread of infectious diseases as *only* the 10th most impactful risk (WEF, 2019).

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Nearly a year later, by the beginning of 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) was faced with a coronavirus that was fast spreading around the world.

Similarly to the coronavirus, infectious diseases are spread through social networks whose interconnected agents frequently share different activities and spend time together. However, as social networks literature suggests, there are some well-connected nodes or agents that serve as intermediaries or bridges for more than one connection through the network (Travers & Milgram, 1969; Gladwell, 1999). Such is the case of South Korean ‘Patient 31’, who could be responsible for the contagion of more than a thousand people in less than a month. In many respects this is mirrored in our managerial practices that similarly pivot on interaction and exchange (Newman, 2003).

Hence, according to Granovetter (1985), almost every business decision as well as economic activity is naturally embedded in social networks. In this regard, the many different business and social structures within the societies are operating inside an overall social networks’ framework — networks which can, under other circumstances, promote, or be part of, spreading processes. For instance, supply chain networks are systems that could facilitate the spread of the virus. Calatayud, Bedoya-Maya, Sánchez González and Giraldez (2022) provide a graphic illustration of this in their analysis of trucking networks (which move around 80% of goods in Latin America). This analysis highlights the pivotal role of trucking in spreading the pandemic to commercial hubs with subsequent high levels of infection. Some of the very first COVID-19 cases discovered in Colombia and Uruguay were truck drivers, who traveled also to Venezuela and Argentina respectively, before they realized that they were infected (Calatayud *et al.*, 2021).

Like the truck logistics operations, many other networks serve as diffusion environments for managerial practices and decision-making process imitation, having inter-connected participants into complex business and governance structures such as countries’ corporate networks of interlocking directorates (IntDs) (Shipilov, Greve & Rowley, 2010; Cordova, 2018), which are created when directors sit on multiple firms’ boards (Mizruchi, 1996). This IntDs’ diffusion ability was researched in Oceania (Bhuiyan & Roudaki, 2018), Asia (Fonseka, Al Farooque, Rajapakse &

Tian, 2018), North America (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Fracassi, 2016), Europe (Johansen & Pettersson, 2013; Ginesti, Sannino & Drago, 2017), and Latin America (Musacchio & Read, 2007; Pombo & Gutierrez, 2011; Bucheli, Salvaj, & Kim, 2018).

Furthermore, governance structures are shaped differently considering the geographical regions they operate in. According to Schneider (2013), Latin American capitalism has developed a hierarchical system that differs from the competitive capitalism in North America or the collaborative one in Europe or Asia. Thus, Latin America uses IntDs for business transactions rather than a management mechanism (Cárdenas, 2015), exerting a significant and pervasive influence on government decisions (Durand, 2019). While such influence varies from sector to sector and industry to industry, the effects can be profound. This is concordant with Peng, Sun, Pinkham and Chen (2009), who maintain that organizational strategies should include an institutional perspective in considering how context dynamics shape management outcomes.

Therefore, we argue that contextual, as well as cultural differences, may affect how IntDs corporate networks spread practices and resources through their participants, changing the way organizations are doing business and building their governance structures — particularly in contexts like those present in Latin America and elsewhere. For example, typical Latin, Asian or African types of environments have an idiosyncratic combination of hierarchy and personal orientation. It is this unique combination that Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2003) term the ‘family’ corporate culture. Such management approaches highlight and emphasize the importance of networks, personal connections, with strong power orientation. This inter-dependence is the perfect breeding ground for ‘big linkers’ i.e. individuals, entities that move across networks, have high power, influence and impact.

This paper aims to build upon social networks theory and interlocking directorates theory, using the South Korean ‘Patient 31’ case as a framework to discuss how ‘big linkers’ in the IntDs corporate networks could provide opportunities for development in Latin America. Such dynamics provide new paths for research, as well as solutions to some of the main managerial issues in the region.

The relevance of this study is based on the urgency for Latin America to overcome the aforementioned issues. This is an already challenging context for management (Vassolo, De Castro & Gomez-Mejia, 2011) as well as a region that faces several structural and functional constraints for sustainability (Gonzalez-Perez & Velez-Ocampo, 2014; Aguilera, Ciravegna, Cuervo-Cazurra, and Gonzalez-Perez, 2017; Gonzalez-Perez, 2022). Hence, identifying and researching 'big linkers' and how they influence the diffusion ability of corporate networks would be helpful in addressing main business, environmental, as well as social issues through business elites in Latin America. Nevertheless, the strategies designed must consider contextual constraints and cultural differences that would provide divergent results for this region, since each group of countries' business agents develops its own corporate network based on unique needs and expectations, as it happened in Peru (Cordova, 2020), Argentina (Lluch, Salvaj & Barbero, 2014), Mexico (Musacchio & Read, 2007), Colombia (Pombo & Gutiérrez, 2011), and Chile (Salvaj, 2013).

To the best of our knowledge, existing research focusing on 'big linkers' in the corporate networks is scarce, having most of the IntDs research oriented to their structural network patterns as well as their managerial outcomes (Mizruchi, 1996; Cordova, 2018, 2019; Smith & Sarabi, 2021). Thus, this paper aims to shed light on this gap in the literature, re-directing the research attention on the 'big linkers' spread ability.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 'Patient 31' phenomenon that occurred in South Korea during the coronavirus global diffusion. Following on, we detail the methodology of the study and how context information of COVID-19 and the 'Patient 31' phenomenon are related to social networks and IntDs literature. Then, the paper explains the concept of super spreaders or 'big linkers' in social networks. The fifth section introduces IntDs concept and how these firms' relational mechanisms are reliable conduits for the diffusion of managerial practices. Additionally, the section includes a table with details on ten empirical studies that highlighted examples of transmission processes for managerial practices. Finally, we present the concluding remarks, with recommendations focused on policy makers and shareholders.

1. PATIENT 31

Initial results of the health crisis were deeply concerning, with thousands of people dead during the first wave, leading to the WHO declaring COVID-19 virus a pandemic in early 2020 (WHO, 2020b). The world, regional bodies and countries were all equally poorly prepared and positioned to cope with a 'highly contagious' disease (Choi, Rogers & Vakil, 2020) as fast decisions needed to be made about reducing disease spread, safeguarding health systems and minimizing the death toll (WHO, 2020a). In short, very quick responses from governmental agencies were needed and civil society's swift actions were important factors to contain and mitigate the pandemic and its aftermath. Indeed, the immediate impact was such that it was obvious that this pandemic would severely affect not only the health of populations, but also the main business activities that support the world's economy. By September 2022, there were more than six and a half million deaths worldwide (Worldometer, 2022).


During disasters, spreaders are helpful due to their diffusion of information capability. They facilitate other individuals' access to the right information, in a timely manner, therefore allowing them to better handle various difficult situations, using the new insights (Tsadikovich, Kamble & Elalouf, 2020). However, during disasters such as infectious diseases, it is not only information that is being transmitted by spreaders. Spreaders also play a key role in accelerating the transmission of the virus. Superspreaders unintentionally contributed to an accelerated transmission rate of the COVID-19 virus in 2020 (Gallagher, 2020), as well as Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2015, and Ebola in Africa in 2014. According to Illingworth *et al.* (2021), just 21% of the individuals caused almost 80% of the COVID-19 transmissions in the Cambridge University Hospitals network, based in the UK. Therefore, identifying superspreaders in networks is crucial to suppressing further spread, as well as mitigating negative consequences (Sheikhahmadi & Nematbakhsh, 2017; Zeng *et al.*, 2021).

At the end of February 2020, in the early stages of COVID-19, South Korea witnessed a surprise exponential increase in its infected population, from 30 initial cases to more than a thousand in just a few days. Evidence found that this event had been caused by a superspreader, a 61-year old Chinese woman, later

dubbed ‘Patient 31’ (Pueyo, 2020). According to Reuters (2020), once ‘Patient 31’ movements were traced and identified by the Korean Center of Disease Control (KCDC), it revealed that she had an astonishing list of almost 1,100 contacts. In fewer than 20 days, this woman was involved in a minor car accident, traveled to crowded spots in Daegu and Seoul, visited a hospital, attended Jesus Shincheonji church twice, was then back in hospital, after which she enjoyed a buffet lunch in a hotel. After such busy social days, she finally checked into a public clinic for coronavirus testing, which was only confirmed the day after. At this point she was then transferred to the Daegu Medical Center for her treatment (Pueyo, 2020).

Figure 1 shows the spread potential of ‘Patient 31’, showing the different groups or clusters in Daegu, in the timespan of fewer than 20 days; the size of the circles refers to approximately how many people had been potentially reached in each place or event (Reuters, 2020).

On March 18, the KCDC confirmed that 4,363 coronavirus cases were attributable to the Jesus Shincheonji church cluster in Daegu (Reuters, 2020). According to Shin, Berkowitz and Kim (2020), by late March 2020, Shincheonji church infected members represented more than half of the country’s confirmed COVID-19 cases to that date. The church, a religious movement with more than 120,000 followers (of which 1,000 in Daegu) was forced to close all its premises in the country, to avoid enabling an even more rapid spread of the virus (BBC, 2020).



Source: based on Pueyo (2020) and Reuters (2020).

Figure 1. Spread potential of ‘Patient 31’ in Daegu, South Korea, in less than 20 days.

2. METHOD: OUR APPROACH TO DIFFUSION ABILITY OF NETWORKS

The study conducted qualitative research, using the ‘Patient 31’ case study located in South Korea. A case study method allows evidence of the existence and structural patterns of a specific phenomenon (Yin, 1994), which is the presence of big linkers, who are well-connected agents within a network. According to Román, Cancino and Gallizo (2017), case studies provide additional theoretical explanations for research phenomena, elaborating on details and features that permit a comprehensive analysis.

Therefore, this conceptual paper discusses some implications of the literature on corporate networks under the perspective of COVID-19 news regarding how a big linker phenomenon, named ‘Patient 31’, provides an example of huge spreading potential through social networks, to elaborate propositions for further research. Specifically, it uses secondary data to highlight ten previous studies as examples of transmission of managerial practices through IntDs, which were selected for the convenience of researchers and came from board interlocking literature. Based on the characteristics of the ‘Patient 31’ phenomenon occurred in South Korea during the COVID-19 pandemic event, and social networks literature regarding diffusion processes, this study also proposes managerial insights for policy makers and firms’ owners, both close stakeholders of board of directors’ activities, in order for them to be aware or even use the spreading potential of IntDs for the transmission of desired practices.

3. SOCIAL NETWORKS’ SUPERSTARS: ‘BIG LINKERS’

Back in 1967, Dr. Stanley Milgram did an experiment in the U.S. sending several packages from defined points to several random ones, in order to measure how many steps (individuals within contact chains) would be involved until they reached their final destination. However, besides average chains’ length, his most relevant finding for the present study was the fact that some people received more than one package from different individuals in the same experiment. This means that more than one person relied on those well-connected people to be able to reach the target destination. Furthermore, some of

them received more than ten packages. These participants were recognized then as highly popular channels for transmission, acting as global connectors and able to keep many others linked to the whole network (Milgram, 1967). Another example for such experiences is the documented case of Lois Weisberg, a woman in Chicago who has become acquainted with many people who came from quite different social networks (Gladwell, 1999).

Diffusion processes were studied from different knowledge fields in order to explain how diseases, rumors, new ideas, behaviors, managerial practices amongst others spread through networks (Schnettler, 2009). Moreover, research on social networks tended to appoint specific individuals, sometimes called superspreaders or 'big linkers', as responsible for boosting diffusion processes among networks participants, behaving as wide freeways through which several resources are quickly distributed on a large scale (Travers & Milgram, 1969; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005; Gu, Luo & Liu, 2019; Ikizler, 2019; Wang, Cheng & Mei, 2019).

Even though the identification of superspreaders would be of utmost importance (Gallagher, 2020) as they are highly capable of accelerating transmission processes much more than lower centrality actors (Wang *et al.*, 2019), finding their location as well as knowing their precise diffusion potential is almost impossible (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). Such superspreaders are involved in extremely complex social networks systems. Furthermore, in the case of firms' directors that are recognized as 'big linkers', understanding their behavior within organizations may depend on the characteristics of their professional backgrounds, as well as past experiences as individuals (de Jong, Fliers & Westerhuis, 2021).

4. OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS OF MANAGERIAL PRACTICES DIFFUSION THROUGH INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES CORPORATE NETWORK

IntDs are constituted when a director serves on different firms' boards, connecting them informally, and playing the role of a bridge through several resources which may be transferred from one organization to another (Dooley, 1969; Mizruchi, 1996). Directors are invited or may decide to sit on boards

across various economic sectors. Moreover, IntDs are established between different types of organizations such as governmental institutions, corporations, or even non-profit firms (Moore, Sobieraj, Allen Whitt, Mayorova & Beaulieu, 2002). For instance, boards' composition in Argentina by early 1970s included professionals and technicians as relevant linkers within the corporate network (Lluch *et al.*, 2014), while Chilean business groups relied more on IntDs among businesspeople to establish their corporate boundaries by 1997 (Khanna & Rivkin, 2006). Also, in 2015 the Peruvian corporate network included one director who held at least ten mandates on different firms in the financial, foods and beverages, logistics services, insurance, textile, and construction sectors (Cordova, 2020). Furthermore, along with the connectivity diversity in terms of industries, well-connected directors tend to establish IntDs with boards that include other 'big linkers' as well (Canyon & Muldoon, 2006).

We illustrate the establishment of IntDs between different organizations in Figure 2. As per the literature previously mentioned, Director A is a well-connected executive who held board positions in a non-profit organization, a state-owned firm, as well as private firms in various sectors, such as agriculture, construction, mining, foods and beverages, and finance, all possible strategic economic sectors for a country. In this figure, circle size represents the potential to reach other directors, based on each boards' feasible composition (who the other directors are) and size (number of seats on each board).




Figure 2. Possible IntDs diversity between organizations: Director A.

IntDs behave as conduits or bridges for resource exchanges among organizations (Shipilov *et al.*, 2010). In this regard, some companies create these mechanisms and use them intensively, providing cohesiveness and resilience to the corporate network (Salvaj & Couyoumdjian, 2016). Resources such as information, knowledge, trust, legitimation, learning capability, financial benefits, managerial practices, and many others, flow through IntDs from one firm to another (Palmer, 1983; Mizruchi & Brewster Stearns, 1988; Bizjak, Lemmon, & Whitby, 2009; Chiu, Teoh and Tian., 2013). These provide external resources to organizations, many of which would not be able to be obtained by their own means. Moreover, directors' characteristics to facilitate the transmission process, as well as boards' characteristics to receive those resources, are important two-way portals to ensure such diffusion (Shropshire, 2010).

Hence, Figure 2 reflects the scope of 'big linkers' within the IntDs corporate network. They could be connected to civil society groups that are autonomously governed (Ma & DeDeo, 2018), to political

factions to obtain political capital (Szalacha, 2011), and/or to different economic sector such as financial, agriculture, construction, mining, and so on, in order for them to obtain information and other resources that enhance their decision-making processes (Pfeffer, 1972; Mizruchi & Brewster Stearns, 1988; Mizruchi & Brewster Stearns, 1994; Davis & Mizruchi, 1999; Fattobene, Caiffa & Di Carlo, 2018; Cordova, 2020). This broad scope of 'big linkers' exhibited in Figure 2 allows them to provide strategic resources to facilitate and influence the main decisions of firms through the corporate network. Furthermore, it serves as a proper conduit for organizational diffusion practices.

The same spreading potential of the 'Patient 31' case applies to the diffusion ability of IntDs for managerial practices and has been tested in several studies. Table 1 summarizes ten empirical studies that included examples of managerial practices diffusion through IntDs in North America.

Thus, previous studies emphasized the potential of IntDs as contagion mechanisms in the corporate network. In addition to this, these examples point

Table 1. Ten empirical studies as examples of managerial practices diffusion in North America.

Reference	Paper title	Managerial practice transferred	Practice type
Bizjak <i>et al.</i> (2009)	Option Backdating and Board Interlocks	Option backdating practice	Financial
Cai, Dhaliwal, Kim and Pan (2014)	Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy	Disclosure policies: quarterly earnings guidance cessation	Financial
Chiu <i>et al.</i> (2013)	Board Interlocks and Earnings Management Contagion	Financial reporting: Earnings management practice	Financial
Davis & Greve (1997)	Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 1980s	Poison pill decisions toward hostile takeovers	Strategy
Fich & Shivdasani (2007)	Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth	Financial frauds	Financial
Fracassi and Tate (2012)	External Networking and Internal Firm Governance	More acquisitions	Financial
Godigbe, Chui and Liu (2018)	Directors network centrality and earnings quality	Financial reporting: Earnings management practice	Financial
Mizruchi and Brewster Stearns (1994)	Managerial practice transferred	Acquire debts and financing from external sources	Financial
Ortiz-de-Mandojana, Aragon-Correa, Delgado-Ceballos and Ferron-Vilchez (2012)	The Effect of Director Interlocks on Firms' Adoption of Proactive Environmental Strategies	Pro-environmental strategies	Strategy
Stuart and Yim (2010)	Board interlocks and the propensity to be targeted in private equity transactions	Private equity-trade transactions	Financial

to the diffusion of major financial decisions such as financial reporting, mergers and acquisitions or investment transactions, as well as pro-environmental strategies and decisions against shareholders' interests (poison pills). Moreover, Table 1 shows a diversity of diffused managerial practices, even when some of them are illegal and unethical. According to Szalacha (2011) and Zajac (2017), IntDs could be created also under conflict-of-interest situations that lead firms to spread and acquire negative practices.

Even though there are few studies about diffusion of managerial practices through IntDs in Latin America (Khanna & Thomas, 2009; Pombo & Gutiérrez, 2011), we believe that other regions' examples could guide the path on how to use these informal mechanisms of corporate governance in order to leverage Latin American firms' management. However, contextual factors as well as the institutional environment must be highly considered, according to how these are influencing not only the formation of IntDs, but their later behavior and diffusion ability too. Finally, 'big linkers' are key players in this diffusion process too, and their presence has to be identified and encouraged, taking care of the type of IntDs firms want to promote or even if undesired or unexpected negative practices appear.

5. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The application of lessons from the 'Patient 31' phenomenon to social networks literature and building on IntDs theory suggests several implications for both theory and practice. In addition, these insights allow us to draw multiple paths for further research within these organizational fields of study.

Even though important questions in the IntDs literature, such as what do interlocks do? (Mizruchi, 1996) and when do interlocks matter? (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998), are still pending to be globally solved; they bring special attention to how Latin American organizations are using them. Hence, the present analysis provides additional insights on how to proceed with further studies about diffusion processes within corporate networks in Latin America. Thus, in doing so, this paper highlights other relevant questions regarding how cross-cultural and contextual factors enhance a proper environment for diffusion. How are firms able to control what

to diffuse or not over the network? What are 'big linkers' able to do in the diffusion process? Which mechanisms do the organizations have to recruit and select well-connected directors in order to spread some specific managerial practices?

Furthermore, our approach provides an insight into how industrial isomorphism (Beckert, 2010) can form and spread within sectors, industries, and cultural contexts. As such, where superspreaders disseminate ideas and practices that are constructive, efficient and effective, the network will grow and prosper. However, the reverse could also happen. This study demonstrates that superspreaders facilitate rapid and effective dissemination: in certain instances (i.e. a management fad, or extreme governmental policy), such dissemination can be as negative as the spread of a virus. Hence, how could firms be able to prevent the spread of a negative managerial practice? Could it be possible that some specific institutional and contextual factors (such as the ones in Latin America) would turn a positive practice diffused into a negative one in the recipient firm? How long-lasting is the degree of imitation provided by 'big linkers' through corporate networks?

Moreover, policy makers aiming to disseminate ideas, principles or other innovations could identify and persuade Patient 31-type top executives who are especially highly connected. This would facilitate the diffusion of a national policy (for example), and strongly influence decisions and, ultimately, the behavior of firms or the business community as a whole. Thus, identifying, targeting, and influencing these 'Patient 31s' could accelerate policy/idea/concept spread. This chimes with Wang *et al.* (2019), who pertinently note that where the diffusion process begins is meaningless, but the crucial issue is who, how and where the spread is achieved.

On the other hand, shareholders need to analyze the associated risks of the spreading potential of 'Patient 31s' over their executive boards. These well-connected directors are able to diffuse financial practices which could be against their host-firm's best interests, prioritizing individual benefits as well as those of other businesses' (Fich & Shivdasani, 2007; Zajac, 2017). Also, looking at the personal background of these executives (de Jong *et al.*, 2021) could prevent having negative practices to diffuse over the corporate network. Hence, identifying

them in advance will favor better decisions regarding directors' invitations to join the board, and how they can prompt business culture and the firm's strategy from the top of the organization.

CONCLUSION

The presence of 'big linkers' within IntDs corporate networks would reflect their high ability to intensively mobilize several resources through them, increasing the diffusion capacity of the entire system and inadvertently distributing positive as well as negative practices from one firm to another. However, IntDs literature has not comprehensively addressed 'big linkers', so further research is needed to explore how to identify them, track their activity in networks, as well as find what exactly moderates or mediates their effectiveness.

While infectious diseases like the COVID-19 spread contamination among the related agents, resources such as knowledge or managerial practices spread also through interconnected organizations, sometimes upgrading their decision-making processes, other times 'contaminating' them with the imitation of unethical behavior.

Future research should shed light on 'big linkers' to serve as recognized, formal mechanisms for diffusion over networks, allowing businesses, policy-makers, and practitioners to consider them in their organizational strategies as agents that contribute to reinforcing economic activities, national policies, and society's structures. This would be of special interest in developing regions such as Latin America, as overcoming and leveling economic, social, and environmental issues is most urgent.

To conclude, firms need to understand not only the complex dynamics regarding diffusion processes through social networks, but also to identify who the main actors for this process are and how cultural patterns, institutional barriers, and contextual constraints could moderate in some sort the diffusion ability of corporate networks. Moreover, regions such as Latin America, where the managerial challenges are latent and huge, would have to regulate and create control systems in order to prevent IntDs from taking advantage of those contextual limitations or being corrupted by those cultural patterns.

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APRENDENDO COM O CASO DO PACIENTE 31: UMA PERSPECTIVA TRANSCULTURAL SOBRE A CAPACIDADE DE DIFUSÃO DE REDES CORPORATIVAS NA AMÉRICA LATINA

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DETALHES DO ARTIGO	RESUMO
<p>Histórico do artigo: Recebido em 28 de fevereiro de 2022 Aceito em 10 de outubro de 2022 Disponível online 06 de dezembro de 2022</p> <p>Sistema de revisão “Double blind review”</p> <p>Editora Chefe Fernanda Cahen</p> <hr/> <p>Palavras-chave: COVID-19 Paciente 31 Redes sociais Poder e influência Redes corporativas Diretorias interligadas América latina Gerenciamento entre culturas</p>	<p>Objetivo: Este artigo teve como objetivo de discutir como os grandes linkers das redes corporativas constituem uma área de oportunidades de desenvolvimento na América Latina. Método: Empregamos uma análise qualitativa que mescla literatura de redes sociais e se baseia na teoria das diretorias interligada com um estudo de caso fascinante rotulado de fenômeno Paciente 31, que ocorreu durante o surto de coronavírus em Coreia do Sul. Principais Resultados: Geramos <i>insights</i> de gestão e conceituais sobre os processos de difusão de práticas de negócios, que têm uma série de profundas implicações para a teoria e a prática sobre como as redes corporativas apresentam diferenças na sua capacidade de difusão. Relevância / Originalidade: Processos de contágio viral não são segredo para as ciências da saúde, mas ainda são pouco pesquisados no contexto das práticas gerenciais em relação aos processos de difusão. O vírus da COVID-19 tem sido (e é) uma ameaça significativa para a saúde global desde o início de 2020, bem como um desafio operacional para quase todas as organizações em todo o mundo. Contribuições Teóricas / Metodológicas: Os resultados destacam o alto poder de difusão dos <i>super spreaders</i>, alertam sobre os riscos de incluir espalhadores do tipo Paciente 31 como membros dos conselhos das empresas e também fornecem recomendações sobre como os formuladores de políticas poderiam aproveitar essa capacidade de difusão pelas redes organizacionais.</p>

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