The Rand Journal of Economics

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  Año 2013, Vol. 44, Número 3

  • Search costs, demand-side economies, and the incentives to merge under Bertrand competition

    José L. Moraga-González, Vaiva Petrikaite

    • Resumen

    págs. 391-424

    

  • Inefficient sales delays by a durable-good monopoly facing a finite number of buyers

    João Montez

    • Resumen

    págs. 425-437

    

  • Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms

    Emiko Fukuda, Yoshio Kamijo, Ai Takeuchi, Michiharu Masui, Yukihiko Funaki

    • Resumen

    págs. 438-461

    

  • Entry, exit, and the determinants of market structure

    Timothy Dunne, Shawn D. Klimek, Mark J. Roberts, Daniel Yi Xu

    • Resumen

    págs. 462-487

    

  • China's land market auctions: evidence of corruption?

    Hongbin Cai, J. Vernon Henderson, Qinghua Zhang

    • Resumen

    págs. 488-521

    

  • Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence

    Sourav Bhattacharya, Arijit Mukherjee

    • Resumen

    págs. 522-544

    

  • The impact of health information technology on hospital productivity

    Jinhyung Lee, Jeffrey S. McCullough, Robert J. Town

    • Resumen

    págs. 545-568

    

  • The effect of Internet distribution on brick-and-mortar sales (pages �)

    Andrea Pozzi

    • Resumen

    págs. 569-583