Philosophical Studies

• 

  Año 2015, Vol. 172, Número 4

  • Moral and scientific realism: : essays in honor of Richard N. Boyd and Nicholas L. Sturgeon

    Elizabeth S. Radcliffe

    • Resumen

    págs. 841-842

    

  • Moral relativism is moral realism

    Gilbert Harman

    • Resumen

    págs. 855-863

    

  • Shaftesbury’s place in the history of moral realism

    T.H. Irwin

    • Resumen

    págs. 865-882

    

  • Debunking evolutionary debunking of ethical realism

    William J. FitzPatrick

    • Resumen

    págs. 883-904

    

  • Two Cornell realisms: : moral and scientific

    Elliott Sober

    • Resumen

    págs. 905-924

    

  • Natural kinds as categorical bottlenecks

    L.R. Franklin-Hall

    • Resumen

    págs. 925-948

    

  • How (not) to bring psychology and biology together

    Mark Fedyk

    • Resumen

    págs. 949-967

    

  • Scientific kinds

    Marc Ereshefsky, Thomas A.C. Reydon

    • Resumen

    págs. 969-986

    

  • Epistemic modals and credal disagreement

    Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes

    • Resumen

    págs. 987-1011

    

  • This paper surely contains some errors

    Brian Kim

    • Resumen

    págs. 1013-1029

    

  • Justification, coercion, and the place of public reason

    Chad Van Schoelandt

    • Resumen

    págs. 1031-1050

    

  • Reading the Book of the World

    Thomas Donaldson

    • Resumen

    págs. 1051-1077

    

  • What kind of a mistake is it to use a slur?

    Adam Sennet, David Copp

    • Resumen

    págs. 1079-1104

    

  • Truthy psychologism about evidence

    Veli Mitova

    • Resumen

    págs. 1105-1126