The Rand Journal of Economics

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  Año 2015, Vol. 46, Número 4

  • Oblivious equilibrium for concentrated industries

    C. Lanier Benkard, Przemyslaw Jeziorski, Gabriel Y. Weintraub

    • Resumen

    págs. 671-708

    

  • Competitive intelligence and disclosure

    Mark Bagnoli, Susan G. Watts

    • Resumen

    págs. 709-729

    

  • Strategic bidding in multi-unit auctions with capacity constrained bidders: the New York capacity market

    Sebastian Schwenen

    • Resumen

    págs. 730-750

    

  • Competition and subsidies in the deregulated US local telephone industry

    Ying Fan, Mo Xiao

    • Resumen

    págs. 751-776

    

  • Hidden insurance in a moral-hazard economy

    Giuseppe Bertola, Winfried Koeniger

    • Resumen

    págs. 777-790

    

  • Dynamic information disclosure

    Pak Hung Au

    • Resumen

    págs. 791-823

    

  • Sequential procurement auctions and their effect on investment decisions

    Gonzalo Cisternas, Nicolás Figueroa

    • Resumen

    págs. 824-843

    

  • Market size and pharmaceutical innovation

    Pierre Dubois, Olivier de Mouzon, Fiona Scott-Morton, Paul Seabright

    • Resumen

    págs. 844-871

    

  • Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information

    Fahad Khalil, Jacques Lawarrée, Troy J. Scott

    • Resumen

    págs. 872-890

    

  • Race effects on eBay

    Ian Ayres, Mahzarin Banaji, Christine Jolls

    • Resumen

    págs. 891-917