SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

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  Año 2011, Vol. 2, Número 4. Texto Completo Ejemplar. Dedicado a: Special Issue in Honor of Salvador Barberà

  • An individual manipulability of positional voting rules

    Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, M. Remzi Sanver, Vyacheslav Yakuba

    • Resumen
    • Texto completo

    págs. 431-446

    

  • A characterization of the uniform rule without Pareto-optimality

    Lars Ehlers

    • Resumen
    • Texto completo

    págs. 447-452

    

  • Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked

    Carmen Herrero Blanco, Ricardo Martínez Rico

    • Resumen
    • Texto completo

    págs. 453-467

    

  • Euclidean preferences, option sets and strategyproofness

    Georges Bordes, Gilbert Laffond, Michel Le Breton

    • Resumen
    • Texto completo

    págs. 469-483

    

  • Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences

    Hans Peters, Souvik Roy, Ton Storcken

    • Resumen
    • Texto completo

    págs. 485-496

    

  • Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation: the average vote example

    Régis Renault, Alain Trannoy

    • Resumen
    • Texto completo

    págs. 497-513

    

  • The Gibbard random dictatorship theorem: a generalization and a new proof

    Arunava Sen

    • Resumen
    • Texto completo

    págs. 515-527

    

  • A unified approach to strategy-proofness for single-peaked preferences

    J. A. Weymark

    • Resumen
    • Texto completo

    págs. 529-550