Econométrica: Journal of the Econometric Society

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  Año 1993, Vol. 61, Número 5

  • Global games and equilibrium selection

    Eric van Damme, Hans Carlsson

    págs. 989-1018

    

  • Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium

    Ehud Lehrer, Ehud Kalai

    págs. 1019-1045

    

  • Learning, local interaction, and coordination

    Glenn Ellison

    págs. 1047-1071

    

  • Indeterminacy of equilibria in a hyperinflationary world: Experimental evidence

    Ramón Marimon, Shyam Sunder

    págs. 1073-1107

    

  • The organization of decentralized information processing

    Roy Radner

    págs. 1109-1146

    

  • A unique informationally efficient and decentralized mechanism with fair outcomes

    Xavier Calsamiglia, Alan Kirman

    págs. 1147-1172

    

  • Sequential labor decisions under uncertainty: An estimable household model of West-African farmers

    Marcel Fafchamps

    págs. 1173-1197

    

  • Efficiency of weighted average derivative estimators and index models

    Whitney K. Newey, Thomas M. Stoker

    págs. 1199-1223

    

  • Common agency: Existence of an equilibrium in the case of two outcomes

    Jean Fraysse

    págs. 1225-1229

    

  • Subjective equilibrium in repeated games

    Ehud Kalai, Ehud Lehrer

    págs. 1231-1240

    

  • Untitled

    págs. 1241-1244

    

  • Untitled

    pág. 1245