University of Pennsylvania law review

• 

  Año 2003, Vol. 151, Número 3

  • INTRODUCTION

    Peter H. Huang, Mathew D. Adler, Claire Finkelstein

    págs. 707-715

    

  • THE DOMAIN OF PREFERENCE

    Lewis A. Kornhauser

    págs. 717-747

    

  • PARADOXES OF THE SAFE SOCIETY: A RATIONAL ACTOR APPROACH TO THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF RISK AND THE REFORMATION OF RISK REGULATION

    Jason Scott Johnston

    págs. 747-786

    

  • Takeover defense when financial markets are (only) relatively efficient

    Michael L. Wachter

    págs. 787-824

    

  • WILL AS INTERTEMPORAL BARGAINING: IMPLICATIONS FOR RATIONALITY

    John Monterosso, George Ainslie

    págs. 825-862

    

  • BEFORE AND AFTER. TEMPORAL ANOMALIES IN LEGAL DOCTRINE

    Leo Katz

    págs. 863-885

    

  • CAN UTILITARIANISM JUSTIFY LEGAL RIGHTS WITH MORAL FORCE?

    Joe Mintoff

    págs. 887-915

    

  • PRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

    Edward F. McClennen

    págs. 917-961

    

  • IS RISK A HARM?

    Claire Finkelstein

    págs. 963-1001

    

  • BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

    Cass R. Sunstein

    págs. 1003-1058

    

  • TRUST, GUILT, AND SECURITIES REGULATION

    Peter H. Huang

    págs. 1059-1095

    

  • THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GREED

    Eric A. Posner

    págs. 1097-1135

    

  • VALUE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR-- SELF-INTERESTED : MORALISTIC :: ALTRUISTIC : MORAL

    Jonathan Baron

    págs. 1135-1167

    

  • RATIONAL CHOICE AND CATEGORICAL REASON

    Bruce Chapman

    págs. 1169-1210

    

  • REGULATION FOR CONSERVATIVES: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE CASE FOR ASYMMETRIC PATERNALISM.'

    Matthew Rabin, Ted O'Donoghue, Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein

    págs. 1211-1254

    

  • THE PUZZLE OF 'EX ANTE EFFICIENCY': DOES RATIONAL APPROVABILITY HAVE MORAL WEIGHT?

    Matthew D. Adler

    págs. 1255-1290