Economic Theory: Official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory

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  Año 2004, Vol. 23, Número 2

  • The probability of conflicts in a U.S. presidential type election

    Jean Louis Rouet, Marc R. Feix, Vincent Merlin, Dominique Lepelley

    pág. 227

    

  • A model of rational bias in self-assessments

    Ján Zábojník

    pág. 259

    

  • Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information

    José Vila, Amparo Urbano Salvador

    pág. 283

    

  • Background risk and the demand for state-contingent claims

    Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Richard C. Stapleton, Guenter Franke

    pág. 321

    

  • A tangent cone analysis of smooth preferences on a topological vector space

    Stephen A. Clark

    pág. 337

    

  • Edgeworth and Walras equilibria of an arbitrage-free exchange economy

    Nizar Allouch, Monique Florenzano

    pág. 353

    

  • Finiteness property in vertically differentiated markets: a note on locally increasing and decreasing returns

    Rim Lahmandi-Ayed

    pág. 371

    

  • Joint liability among bank borrowers

    Philip Bond

    pág. 383

    

  • Bilateral bargaining, unverifiable quality, and options to return

    Christoph Lülfesmann, Anke S. Kessler

    pág. 395

    

  • Does a sudden death liven up the game? Rules, incentives, and strategy in football

    Johan F. M. Swinnen, Anurag N. Banerjee

    pág. 411

    

  • Undecidability of the existence of pure Nash equilibria

    N. E. Sofronidis

    pág. 423

    

  • What is a commodity? Two axiomatic answers

    Yves Sprumont

    pág. 429

    

  • Distributive politics and economic growth: the Markovian Stackelberg solution

    Holger Strulik, Ines Lindner

    pág. 439

    

  • Finding a Nash equilibrium in spatial games is an NP-complete problem

    Hans Haller, Jacques Durieu, Richard Baron, Philippe Solal

    pág. 445

    

  • The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline

    Antoni Cunyat

    pág. 455