A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel

• Autores: Shimomura Ken-Ichi, Roberto Serrano
• Localización: Documentos de trabajo. Economic series ( Universidad Carlos III. Departamento de Economía ), Nº. 58, 2005
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We propose positive and normative foundations for the average prekernel of NTU games, and compare them with the existing ones for the prekernel. In our non-cooperative analysis, the average prekernel is approximated by the set of equilibrium payoffs of a game where each player faces the possibility of bargaining at random against any other player. In the cooperative analysis, we characterize the average prekernel as the unique solution that satisfies a set of Nash-like axioms for two-person games, and versions of average consistency and its converse for multilateral settings.