Information acquisition in auctions: sealed bids vs. Open bids

• Autores: Angel Hernando-Veciana
• Localización: Working papers = Documentos de trabajo: Serie AD, Nº. 10, 2006
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper studies the incentives of a bidder to acquire information in anauction when her information acquisition decision is observed by the otherbidders before they bid. Our results show that the sealed bid (second price)auction induces more information acquisition about a common component ofthe value than the open (English) auction, but less about the private componentof the value. Moreover, under our assumptions more information about theprivate value and less information about the common value improves efficiencyand revenue in some sense. Consequently, our results suggest new argumentsin favor of the open auction