An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games

• Autores: Francisco Javier Arin Aguirre, Jeroen Kuipers, Dries Vermeulen
• Localización: Documentos de Trabajo BILTOKI, ISSN-e 1134-8984, Nº. 8, 1998
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper follows an axiomatic approach to the problem of combining stability and egalitarianism in the context of transferable utility games. We consider two notions of egalitarianism, a weak and a strong one. One of the results of the paper is that every value on the class of balanced games that satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, Symmetry, and Continuity selects a weakly egalitarian point in the core. By adding a fourth axiom we obtain a full characterization of one of these values: the point in the core that minimizes the Euclidean distance to the origin. We also provide axiomatizations of egalitarian values on two subclasses of balanced games: the class of convex games, and the class of games with a large core.