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Amended Final-offer Arbitration Outperforms Final-offer Arbitration

  • Autores: Cary Deck, Amy Farmer, Dao-Zhi Zeng
  • Localización: American law and economics review, ISSN 1465-7252, Vol. 9, Nº. 2, 2007, págs. 384-407
  • Idioma: inglés
  • Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
  • Resumen
    • Amended final-offer arbitration (AFOA) has been developed as an attractive alternative mechanism to final-offer arbitration (FOA). Under AFOA, more reasonable offers win, but the outcome is determined by the loser's offer and the arbitrator's value. In AFOA, disputants making extreme offers are penalized, thereby encouraging compromise. This article compares the theoretical and behavioral properties of AFOA and FOA. Controlled laboratory experiments indicate that AFOA significantly outperforms FOA, generating substantially greater prearbitration settlement. Consistent with theoretical predictions, offers converge under AFOA; however, FOA offers neither converge nor are consistent with theoretical predictions. This work suggests practitioners should consider adopting AFOA over FOA.


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