An Auction Mechanism for the Commons: some Extensions

• Autores: Juan Pablo Montero
• Localización: Cuadernos de economía: Latin American Journal of Economics, ISSN-e 0717-6821, Nº. 130, 2008, págs. 141-150
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Efficient regulation of the commons requires information about the regulated firms that is rarely available to regulators (e.g., cost of pollution abatement). Montero (2008) proposes a simple mechanism for inducing firms to truthfully reveal their private information: a uniform price sealed-bid auction of an endogenous number of (transferable) licenses with a fraction of the auction revenues given back to firms. This paper discuses further properties of the mechanism including its extension to the possibility of private externalities and non-transferability of licences.