Aristotle and Kant on practical reason: an Annotation to Korsgaard

• Autores: Ana Marta González González
• Localización: Acta Philosophica: rivista internazionale di filosofia, ISSN 1121-2179, Vol. 18, Nº. 1, 2009, págs. 99-112
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In recent years, scholarship has been calling our attention to the commonalities between Aristotelian and Kantian Ethics. In this general trend, Christine Korsgaard has a leading role. Yet, Korsgaard has also acknowledged an obvious difference between both authors: unlike Kant, Aristotle does not think of inclinations and emotions as mere feelings, but rather as valuable sources of information about morally salient aspects of our situation. In other words: they provide us with (germinal) reasons for action. Nevertheless, Korsgaard keeps this difference at the level of moral psychology, arguing that it does not make a great difference at the level of ethical theory. By contrast, in this paper, I try to argue that this sort of difference imports a more fundamental one about practical reason in its entirety.