Media bias and electoral competition

• Autores: Ascensión Andina-Díaz
• Localización: Investigaciones económicas, ISSN 0210-1521, Vol. 33, Nº 2, 2009, págs. 211-231
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We present a model of electoral competition with uninformed voters. There is a market for news with ideological media outlets. We consider two market structures: monopoly and duopoly. We show that if each party has the support of an outlet, either party has the same probability of winning the election. However, if just one of the parties has the support of the media, the results might well change as this party will get into o..ce with a higher probability than the other party. We also analyze voters� welfare and show that the important aspect is whether a media industry exists, and not the number of media outlets.