Price interactions between theme park and tour operator

• Haiyan Song ^[1] ; Shu Yang ^[2] ; George Q. Huang ^[3]
  1. [1] Hong Kong Polytechnic University

     Hong Kong Polytechnic University

     RAE de Hong Kong (China)

     
  2. [2] University of Science and Technology of China

     University of Science and Technology of China

     China

     
  3. [3] University of Hong Kong

     University of Hong Kong

     RAE de Hong Kong (China)

     

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• Localización: Tourism economics: the business and finance of tourism and recreation, ISSN 1354-8166, Vol. 15, Nº. 4, 2009, págs. 813-824
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • This paper conducts a theoretical investigation into pricing competition and coordination between Hong Kong Disneyland (HKD) and a tour operator. HKD supplies two types of admission ticket to the tour operator: an admission-only ticket and a package ticket that combines admission to the park and one night's accommodation in its hotels. The tour operator then sells these two types of admission ticket in the target market. A Stackelberg game model is proposed to formulate the leader'follower relationship, with HKD leading and the tour operator following. The equilibrium prices are derived by backward induction. The theoretical results show that HKD can coordinate with the tour operator through a quantity discount schedule. A Nash bargaining game suggests that HKD receives a larger share of the profit growth due to its dominant market power.