Revenue Equivalence in Asymmetric Auctions

• Autores: Arieh Gavious, Gadi Fibich, Aner Sela
• Localización: Abstracts of the Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Applications / coord. por Jesús Mario Bilbao Arrese, Francisco Ramón Fernández García, 2002, ISBN 84-472-0733-1, pág. 31
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player�s valuation is independently drawn from a common support according to his/her distribution function as follows. Let e be the level of asymmetry among the distribution functions and let R(e) be the seller�s expected revenue in equilibrium.