Resumen de Information Acquisition in Cournot Games: A (Enhanced) two stage approach
This paper presents an alternative or enhanced approach to information acquisition in Cournot markets with stochastic demand in which the cost of information acquisition is endogenously determined by firms� information p urchasing strategy. I propose a two-stage model in which in the first stage each firm decides whether it will join a coalition to purchase information and therefore share the cost of information acquisition, to individually purchase information, or to remain uninformed. In the second-stage firms engage in Cournot competition to choose output. The model I propose encompasses the main assumptions of the current view on information acquisition, mainly those related to the role of i nformation and how it affects firms� profits. However, I will argue that by adding natural assumptions on oligopolists� behavior, I can offer a model that provides a better description of firms� actions and trade-offs than the standard view. The paper also offers experimental evidences supporting the new approach to information acquisition.
