Forward Induction and the Minimum Revision Principle

• Autores: Andrés Perea Monsuwé
• Localización: Abstracts of the Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Applications / coord. por Jesús Mario Bilbao Arrese, Francisco Ramón Fernández García, 2002, ISBN 84-472-0733-1, pág. 76
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this paper, we present a model of rationality in extensive form games in which players, during the course of the game, may revise their conjectures about the opponents� preferences, while imposing common belief of rationality at each information set. Since players are assumed to be expected utility maximizers, their preferences, at each of their information sets, are given by a utility function over the reachable terminal nodes and some subjective probability distribution over the opponents� strategy choices compatible with this information set. A player may therefore revise his conjecture about an opponent�s utility function, or his subjective probability distribution, or both, whenever this opponent has chosen a move which would be suboptimal given the previously conjectured preferences.