Several classes of Inventory Games, which arise from basic inventory models, are introduced in Meca et al. (1999), Tijs et al. (2000), Meca et al. (2001), Meca and Toledo (2001). The first one, which is the starting point, studies several situations where a collective of firms minimizes its joint inventory cost by means of cooperation. Depending on the information revealed by the individual firms, related cooperative TU games are analyzed and focus on proportional division mechanishms to share the joint cost.
Tijs et al. (2000), following a slightly different line, study a situation where one agent has available an amount of storage facility and the other agents have some goods, part of which can be stored generating benefits. The problem of sharing the benefits produced by full cooperation between agents is tackled by introducing a related cooperative game, which turns out to be a Big Boss Game with interesting properties.
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