Political Competition as a War of Attrition

• Autores: Rene Levinsky
• Localización: Abstracts of the Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Applications / coord. por Jesús Mario Bilbao Arrese, Francisco Ramón Fernández García, 2002, ISBN 84-472-0733-1, pág. 112
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • The essence of the situation to be studied in this paper is the following: four players are involved in a competition that is resolved by playoff elimination.

    The heterogenous agents characterized by their �capacities� play sequential �concession� game to win the prize. Thus, the strategic variable of the players is the level of �effort� they are willing to spend in each round. It is assumed that the sum of effort spent in the two rounds cannot exceed the �capacity� of the player. The player investing higher effort in a partial conflict wins the particular conflict, the first round winners can participate in the final and the overall winner get the prize.