Solutions for cooperative games based on marginal contributions and two-person coalition blocks

• Autores: Rafael Amer Ramon, José Miguel Giménez Pradales
• Localización: XXX Congreso Nacional de Estadística e Investigación Operativa y de las IV Jornadas de Estadística Pública: actas, 2007, ISBN 978-84-690-7249-3
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The semivalues are solution concepts for cooperative games that assign to each game player a weighted sum of his/her marginal contributions to the coalitions, where the weights only depend on the coalition size. In this work we consider the formation of a unique coalition block with two players as a tool to characterize some semivalues within the set of all semivalues on cooperative games. We also offer explicit expressions for the increases of allocation to the players when the quotient game or the modified semivalues for games with coalition structure are computed.