Strategic coalition voting: Evidence from Austria

• Autores: Michael F. Meffert, Thomas Gschwend
• Localización: Electoral Studies: An international Journal, ISSN 0261-3794, Vol. 29, Nº. 3, 2010, págs. 339-349
• Idioma: inglés
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• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen

  • Strategic coalition voting assumes that voters cast their vote in a way that maximizes the probability that a preferred coalition will be formed after the election. We identify three decision contexts that provide incentives for strategic coalition voting: (1) a rental vote of a major party supporter in favor of a preferred junior coalition partner perceived as uncertain to pass a minimum vote threshold, (2) avoiding a wasted vote for the preferred small party that is not expected to pass the minimum vote threshold, and (3) explicit strategic coalition voting to influence the composition and/or portfolio of the next coalition government. The results based on a nationally representative survey conducted before the 2006 Austrian general election generally support these hypotheses.