Policy competition and agglomeration: a local government view

• Autores: Michiel Gerritse
• Localización: Documents de treball IEB, Nº. 31, 2010
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper presents a model of local government policy competition in an New Economic Geography-setting. To maximize welfare, local governments can subsidize a mobile factor or provide public goods. In the local perspective, firms� vertical linkages promote colocation and policy (subsidy) setting is simultaneous, giving rise to mixed profiles. Agglomeration benefits lead larger regions to set higher subsidies, preventing a race to the top. We show the results numerically as well as in an analytical case. In contrast to related literature, policy harmonization can be welfare-improving, mainly due simultaneous policy-setting with a (local) utilitarian objective.