In the process of democratization, many new democracies have experienced contentious politics. In particular, when a winner-takes-all presidential system is chosen in the cause of reform, political divisions tend to center around the role of the president, as demonstrated in Taiwanese and South Korean politics. How constitutional courts adjudicate on contentious presidential politics in new democracies remains a significant issue in comparative constitutionalism. This article looks into constitutional decisions by the constitutional courts of Taiwan and South Korea that involve divisive political disputes with respect to presidential powers and separation-of-powers conflicts. It finds that courts in both of these democracies chose not to directly confront the presidents but have resorted to methods of constitutional adjudication that promote dialogue and help diffuse the tensions associated with fractious presidential politics. The similarities between Taiwan and South Korea are striking, despite the divergent constitutional designs and social contexts that have presented some minor operational departures. The papers conclusion is that constitutional courts in Taiwan and South Korea are prodialogue courts that have been vigilant in dealing with contentious issues involving the role of the president by leaving space for political actors to resolve the issue.
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