The probability of military rule in Africa, 1970-2007

• Autores: Raul Caruso, Jacopo Costa, Roberto Ricciuti
• Localización: Documents de treball IEB, Nº. 26, 2011, 22 págs.
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this paper we empirically analyze the socio-economic determinants of the existence of military dictatorships in Africa. A recent literature in political economy analyses the relationship between the civil undemocratic government and the military as an agency problem: the civilian government needs the army to avoid internal violence, but a larger army reduces the opportunity-cost for the military to run a coup d�état and seize power. These papers derive three main causes of military rule: income inequality, ethnic fractionalization, and external threat. We empirically analyze these issues by estimating the probability that a country experiences a military rule. We consider 48 African countries over the period 1970-2007.