Innovation, appropriability, and the underpricing of initial public offerings

• Autores: Michael B. Heeley, Sharon Matusik, Neelam Jain
• Localización: Academy of management journal, ISSN-e 0001-4273, Vol. 50, Nº 1, 2007, págs. 209-225
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Using the information asymmetries theory of underpricing, we investigate the role of innovation in the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). We develop and test a model in which patents reduce information asymmetries in industries where the link between patents and inventive returns is transparent, thereby reducing underpricing. Conversely, patents reflect increased information asymmetries and underpricing in industries where the link is not transparent. We examine these relationships in a sample of 1,413 IPOs and find strong support for our hypotheses. In so doing, we make an important theoretical contribution by showing that the IPO market contextualizes firm information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Academy of Management Journal is the property of Academy of Management and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)