The Rating Agency Oligopoly and its consequences for European Competition Law

• Autores: Henrik Gildehaus
• Localización: European law review, ISSN 0307-5400, Nº 3, 2012, págs. 269-293
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The rating market is dominated by only three agencies. This raises concerns with policymakers attempting to introduce more competition. Whether such concerns are justified and whether more competition is really desirable will be examined in the light of the 2008 financial crisis. It becomes clear that market forces are partially turned on their heads and that Moody's and S&P infringed art.101(1) TFEU by colluding with investment banks prior to the 2008 crisis. Paradoxically, under the current circumstances more competition is likely to exacerbate the situation. In order to make the instruments of competition law work again, structural changes are necessary in the industry. Special emphasis should be placed on re-establishing competition for quality by means of an efficient reputation mechanism.